Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “CAS”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 433 records · Page 24

Corrective Action Decision Document for Corrective Action Unit 568. Area 3 Plutonium Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada Revision 0

The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document is to identify and provide the rationale for the recommendation of corrective action alternatives (CAAs) for the 14 CASs within CAU 568. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from April 2014 through May 2015, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 568: Area 3 Plutonium Dispersion Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada; and in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the DQO process. The CAU 568 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated that the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Based on the evaluation of analytical data from the CAI, review of future and current operations at the 14 CASs, and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, the following corrective actions are recommended for CAU 568: • No further action is the preferred corrective action for CASs 03-23-17, 03-23-22, 03-23-26. • Closure in place is the preferred corrective action for CAS 03-23-19; 03-45-01; the SE DCBs at CASs 03-23-20, 03-23-23, 03-23-31, 03-23-32, 03-23-33, and 03-23-34; and the Pascal-BHCA at CAS 03-23-31. • Clean closure is the preferred corrective action for CASs 03-08-04, 03-23-30, and 03-26-04; and the four well head covers at CASs 03-23-20, 03-23-23, 03-23-31, and 03-23-33.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 573: Alpha Contaminated Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

CAU 573 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 05-23-02, GMX Alpha Contaminated Area • 05-45-01, Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton These two CASs include the release at the Hamilton weapons-related tower test and a series of 29 atmospheric experiments conducted at GMX. The two CASs are located in two distinctly separate areas within Area 5. To facilitate site investigation and data quality objective (DQO) decisions, all identified releases (i.e., CAS components) were organized into study groups. The reporting of investigation results and the evaluation of DQO decisions are at the release level. The corrective action alternatives (CAAs) were evaluated at the FFACO CAS level. The purpose of this CADD/CAP is to evaluate potential CAAs, provide the rationale for the selection of recommended CAAs, and provide the plan for implementation of the recommended CAA for CAU 573. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 2015 through November 2015, as set forth in the CAU 573 Corrective Action Investigation Plan (CAIP). Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against appropriate final action levels (FALs) to identify the contaminants of concern. Assessment of the data generated from investigation activities conducted at CAU 573 revealed the following: • Radiological contamination within CAU 573 does not exceed the FALs (based on the Occasional Use Area exposure scenario). • Chemical contamination within CAU 573 does not exceed the FALs. • Potential source material—including lead plates, lead bricks, and lead-shielded cables—was removed during the investigation and requires no additional corrective action.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Issues Management Process Course # 38401

The purpose of this training it to advise Issues Management Coordinators (IMCs) on the revised Contractor Assurance System (CAS) Issues Management (IM) process. Terminal Objectives: Understand the Laboratory’s IM process; Understand your role in the Laboratory’s IM process. Learning Objectives: Describe the IM process within the context of the CAS; Describe the importance of implementing an institutional IM process at LANL; Describe the process flow for the Laboratory’s IM process; Apply the definition of an issue; Use available resources to determine initial screening risk levels for issues; Describe the required major process steps for each risk level; Describe the personnel responsibilities for IM process implementation; Access available resources to support IM process implementation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Post-Closure Inspection Report for the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2017, Revision 0

This report provides the results of the annual post-closure inspections conducted at the closed corrective action units (CAUs) located on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). This report covers calendar year 2017 and includes visual inspection and repair activities completed at the following CAUs: CAU 400: Bomblet Pit and Five Points Landfill (TTR) CAU 407: Roller Coaster RadSafe Area (TTR) CAU 424: Area 3 Landfill Complexes (TTR) CAU 453: Area 9 UXO Landfill (TTR) CAU 487: Thunderwell Site (TTR) Visual inspections were conducted according to the post-closure plans in the approved closure reports and subsequent correspondence with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. The annual post-closure inspections were conducted on May 23, 2017. No maintenance or repair issues were noted at CAU 400 and CAU 487. Maintenance items and subsequent repairs include the following: CAU 407: A large animal burrow was observed in the southeast corner of the cover during the inspection. Two additional animal burrows were discovered during repair actions. All cover defects were repaired on January 9, 2018. CAU 424: CAS 03-08-002-A304 (Landfill Cell A3-4): A new monument was installed and the subsidence area was repaired on January 9, 2018. CAU 424: CAS 03-08-002-A308 (Landfill Cell A3-8): Lava rock, used to mark the two eastern monument locations, was noted as missing during the inspection. The lava rock was replaced on January 9, 2018. CAU 453: Five large animal burrows, located near the east–central portion of cover, was noted during the inspection. Eight additional animal burrows were discovered during repair actions. All cover defects were repaired on January 9, 2018.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Preliminary Investigation for Corrective Action Unit 572: Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures, Corrective Action Site 25-33-05: Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance Building, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I), personnel—assisted by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), radiological control personnel—conducted a preliminary field investigation to obtain information about Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 572, Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures; Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-33-05, Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance (ETSM) building. The ETSM building is located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The information learned from the investigation will reduce uncertainty about the nature and scope of potential releases and, therefore, reduce management risk associated with the planning and scheduling of future corrective action investigation activities. Site reconnaissance efforts for CAS 25-33-05 were conducted on June 18 and September 10–11, 2012. Detailed site conditions, building contents, potential waste streams, photographic documentation as well as radiological and chemical survey results are contained within this preliminary investigation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy Standard Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation (DOE-STD-5002-2017) requires preparation of an Annual Summary Report comparing low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities operations with the Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) and its supporting technical documents including the performance assessment (PA) and the composite analysis (CA). The fiscal year (FY) 2018 Annual Summary Report for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) was prepared by reviewing planned and discovered changes, waste receipts, monitoring results, research and development (R&D) results, and the status of DAS conditions and issues to assess the validity of the DASs, PAs, and CAs. The Area 3 RWMS was placed in stand-by in 2006 and remained inactive in FY 2018. Resumption of waste disposal operations is planned for FY 2019. No proposed actions, new information, or discoveries affecting the Area 3 RWMS were identified in FY 2018. No significant changes have occurred since preparation of the most recent special analysis, which indicates a continuing reasonable expectation of meeting the PA performance objectives and measures, and the CA dose constraint in DOE O 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management.” No changes were made to documents supporting the Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB) including the PA, CA, DAS, waste acceptance criteria (WAC), closure plan, monitoring plan, or maintenance plan. Monitoring results for the most recent year with available data, calendar year (CY) 2017, indicate no changes to long-term trends and no results inconsistent with expected performance. R&D results for the Area 3 RWMS Drainage Lysimeter Facility continue to be consistent with the conceptual site model (CSM). All Area 3 RWMS DAS conditions and secondary issues were closed in 2002. The Area 5 RWMS continued disposal operations within the Northern Expansion Area in FY 2018. Eighty-six changes involving proposed actions, new information, or discoveries affecting the Area 5 RWMS PA and CA were screened during FY 2018 in the Unreviewed disposal question (UDQ) process. Twenty-two changes required UDQ evaluations and two changes resulted in unreviewed composite analysis question evaluations. None of the proposed actions, new information, or discoveries had significant impacts on the PAs or CAs. All of the planned changes were implemented. No special analyses were performed, and no changes were made to documents supporting the RWMB including the PA, CA, DAS, WAC, closure plan, monitoring plan, or maintenance plan. Planning continued and construction commenced on development of the Western Expansion Area within the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. All Area 5 RWMS DAS conditions and secondary issues were closed in 2002. The cumulative effects of changes occurring since preparation of the Area 5 RWMS PA and CA were assessed with the current baseline PA/CA model. Model results indicate that there is a reasonable expectation that the PA performance objectives and measures, and the CA dose constraint in DOE O 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” can be met. No PA or CA mean result exceeds 50% of its performance objective. Monitoring results and R&D results continue to be consistent with the CSM. Monitoring results for CY 2017 indicate no changes to long-term trends and no results inconsistent with expected performance. R&D results for the Area 5 RWMS Weighing Lysimeter Facility continue to be consistent with the CSM. The FY 2018 review of Area 3 RWMS and Area 5 RWMS disposal operations supports the following conclusions: The Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS PA and associated CA assumptions and conclusions remain valid based on consideration of all changes identified or planned; The reasonable expectation that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs will meet the performance objectives identified in DOE O 435.1, “Radioactive Waste Management”, remains valid; and The DAS, based on interpretation of the data collected, monitoring results, and other information, continues to be adequate.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site (Rev.3)

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, requires that performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities be maintained by the responsible field office. This plan describes the activities performed to maintain the PA and the CA for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The plan is based on DOE Order 435.1 Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 2007), DOE Manual 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual (DOE 2011), and DOE Standard DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation (DOE 2017). The facility’s Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) specifies conditions for the continuing operation of a LLW facility. The DAS is issued based on a review of the facility's PA, CA, the maintenance plan, preliminary closure plan, and preliminary monitoring plan. The DAS specifies the limits and conditions on construction, design, operations, and closure of the low-level waste facility based on these reviews. The Maintenance Plan uses an Unreviewed Disposal Question (UDQ)/Unreviewed Composite Analysis Question (UCAQ) change control process to identify, evaluate, and control planned or discovered changes affecting the PA, CA, DAS, or other documents composing the Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB). The UDQ/UCAQ process uses the PA and CA GoldSim models to calculate updated results, assess the significance of changes, and to assess the need to revise the PA, CA, or DAS. In addition to the change control process, the Maintenance Plan requires an annual review of all changes and an annual assessment of the need to revise RWMB documents, plans, and programs. The cumulative effect of all changes is assessed annually by preparing a revised PA and CA baseline model that is used to update PA and CA results. The updated results are used to assess compliance with the PA performance objectives and the CA dose constraint, and to assess the need to revise the PAs, CAs, and other documents, plans, and programs supporting the RWMB. An Annual Summary Report documenting the results and conclusions of the annual review is prepared and submitted to DOE.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Groundwater Potability Determination Report for Sylvan Grove, Kansas

The Commodity Credit Corporation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (CCC/USDA) operated a grain storage facility from 1954 to 1966 at the northeastern edge of Sylvan Grove, Kansas (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). During this time, commercial grain fumigants containing carbon tetrachloride were in common use to preserve grain in storage. The CCC/USDA is in the process of preparing a Corrective Action Study (CAS) to address carbon tetrachloride contamination in groundwater on the portion of the site that it formerly leased and operated. As stated in the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) Bureau of Environmental Remediation (BER) policy BER-RS-045 (KDHE 2016), Considerations for Groundwater Potability and Use Determinations (hereafter referred to as “Potability Determination Guidance”), the KDHE considers all groundwater to be a potential source of potable water. This report, however, substantiates that groundwater resources in the Cretaceous Dakota Formation—more specifically, that localized portions of water bearing strata affected by operations at the former CCC/USDA site—are non-potable. The purpose of this report, therefore, is to provide additional information to support the KDHE’s decision-making process with regard to the disposition and closure of the Sylvan Grove site. Per the Potability Determination Guidance the results of this potability evaluation will play a role in selecting the site remedial action objectives and the overall proposed path for long-term management. This report presents the data and analyses of the potability study and the results of the potability determination, which will be taken into consideration during the development of cleanup goals for the CAS or for any other future remedial or long-term management action agreed to by the CCC/USDA and KDHE. The Potability Determination Guidance provides a framework to evaluate groundwater potability by outlining: The set of threshold criteria under which KDHE will consider an aquifer to be non-potable; The data and information necessary to evaluate potability; and, Considerations for long-term management of aquifers that are deemed non potable. According to the guidance, the KDHE may determine that groundwater is non-potable due to natural conditions such as water quality or quantity characteristics. As suggested in the guidance, this report will discuss the initial potability threshold screening for entering the evaluation process (Section 2); justify the work plan that was covered by the site investigation planning (also in Section 2); and present the relevant data and evaluation results (Sections 3-6).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through September 30, 2020, with a Review of the Period of Record Radionuclide Analyses

The DOE Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) identified the Project 57 contaminated area as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 415, Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion Site, which consisted of one Corrective Action Site (CAS): NAFR-23- 02, Pu Contaminated Soil (U.S. DOE, 2014). The CAS included several Project 57 operational facilities in addition to the plutonium-contaminated soil. With approval of the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, the DOE closed the Project 57 surface soil contamination site in October 2020. Closure was accomplished by installing a clean soil cap constructed over ground zero and the surrounding areas of the CA that may be entrained with wind-transported soil particles. After completion of the ground zero cap in October 2020, DRI discontinued monitoring of meteorological and associated environmental conditions at the Project 57 site as directed by DOE EM NV. Navarro dismantled air monitoring stations P57-3 and P57-4 and removed the equipment on October 20, 2020. This report presents the meteorological and dust observations and radiological analyses accomplished during the approximately 10 months when the air monitoring data collection equipment was operational during CY2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Calendar Year 2020 Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This report presents the results of monitoring conducted for water quality, water levels, and institutional controls in calendar year (CY) 2020 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 99, Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM), at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada. This report also presents analytical laboratory results (including results of quality assurance/quality control samples, such as field duplicates [FDs]), and verification of use restrictions (URs), institutional controls, and water usage. Groundwater samples were collected; water levels were measured; and well site surveillance was conducted in support of the Underground Test Area Closure Report (CR) for Corrective Action Unit 99: Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2020). Rainier Mesa (RM) was the site of 61 underground nuclear tests, and Shoshone Mountain (SM) was the site of 6 underground nuclear tests. As a result of these activities, which took place from 1957 to 1992, radionuclides (RNs) were released in the subsurface in the vicinity of the detonations. These 67 underground nuclear tests are associated with 66 specific corrective action site (CAS) numbers, as listed in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). Two tests, HURON LANDING and DIAMOND ACE (conducted simultaneously), are included within one CAS. The CR (DOE/EMNV, 2020) establishes the regulatory boundaries and regulatory boundary objectives, monitoring program, UR boundaries and URs, and other institutional controls agreed to by EM Nevada Program and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for closure of CAU 99. Regulatory boundaries for the RM/SM CAU were established to protect receptors of groundwater from RN contamination within the three downgradient groundwater basins that receive recharge from RM. The SM regulatory boundary was established to verify that RN contamination does not reach the lower carbonate aquifer below SM. The UR boundaries were established based on contaminant simulation forecasts from the flow and transport simulations with consideration of site-specific topographical controls. The URs associated with the UR boundaries were identified to protect onsite workers and the public from inadvertent exposure to contaminated groundwater as forecasted to occur assuming current conditions. The UR is intended to restrict activities that might expose workers to contaminated groundwater within the UR area. In addition to the URs, other institutional controls are established to monitor and limit access to groundwater. These include federal ownership and management in perpetuity, controlled access of the NNSS and surrounding areas, and reporting water use on the NNSS and surrounding hydrographic basins.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 578: Miscellaneous Inactive Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, (Rev. 0)

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 578, Miscellaneous Inactive Sites, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). CAU 578 comprises the following 11 corrective action sites (CASs) located in Areas 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, and 23 of the Nevada National Security Site: • 02-26-01, Lead (Concrete Box w/Lining) • 02-26-07, Gun Turret w/Lead in Barrel • 03-16-01, U-3auS Disposal Site • 04-26-02, Lead on Instrument Bunker • 06-99-07, Sump • 07-99-01, Miscellaneous Debris • 12-02-11, UST-P-2 • 12-06-01, Muckpile • 12-06-04, Muckpile • 23-12-01, Boiler (2) • 23-99-04, Salvage Yard This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing each CAS. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 578 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. This will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DECOVALEX-2023: Task D Final Report

Task D of DECOVALEX-2023 is focused on the simulation of the coupled thermal hydraulic-mechanical (THM) behaviour in the full-scale engineered barrier system (EBS). The Horonobe EBS experiment is the demonstration of the full-scale EBS in the underground research laboratory (URL) (performed by JAEA in the Horonobe URL in Japan). Task D consisted of the three steps, a preliminary step (Step 0), simulation of the laboratory tests (Step 1) and simulation of the in-situ full-scale EBS experiment (Step 2). Since the Horonobe EBS experiment demonstrates the vertical emplacement option of the EBS, the experiment gallery is also backfilled with the backfill material. Therefore, interaction between the EBS and the backfill material can also be demonstrated, such as deformation (change of density) of the buffer material. The underground water in the Horonobe URL is saline. This fact adds chemical processes to THM behaviour. For example, mechanical properties (such as swelling pressure of the buffer material and backfill material) and hydraulic properties (such as permeability of the buffer material and backfill material) change depending on the water chemistry. Task D was therefore a challenging Task focused on not only the relatively simple THM behaviour but also complex THM behaviour including chemical processes. Six research teams (BGR, CAS, JAEA, KAERI, SNL and Taipower) participated the Task D. BGR, CAS, JAEA, KAERI and Taipower research teams selected a THM approach, while the SNL research team selected a TH approach. Step 1 involved the simulation of laboratory test results and was important to check the numerical codes developed by the research teams. Step 1 was divided into four sub steps. The simulation results through the Step 1 identified the parameters for simulation of the Step 2. Basic parameters of the materials (buffer material, backfill material, rock mass, concrete, sand) were provided by JAEA. Special parameters which research team needed were identified by back analysis of Step 1. Most notably the mechanical behaviour of swelling and displacement depended on the applied model (elastic model or elastoplastic model). Parameters such as Young’s modulus were found to need smaller values than characterised in the fundamental laboratory test results (Step 1-1, 1-2) for the elastic model. Although laboratory experiments are usually simple, test results contained some error. For example, if the saturation level is 100 % or higher, it should be considered an error. This situation was presented in the Step 1-3. A possible reason is that the buffer material is a mixture of bentonite and silica sand. When a specimen is cut to measure volume or weight, sand grains will affect the measurement data. In Step 2, boundary conditions such as temperature on the surface of the simulated overpack, heater power of the electrical heaters installed in the simulated overpack, injection pressure and inflow rate of the test water, were applied. The outer boundary conditions can be selected using measured data (injection pressure and inflow rate of the test water that is controlled by the injection systems installed in the sand layer around the buffer material and in the boundary between backfill material and concrete support). Since such measured data has some noise, research teams developed their own simplified boundary conditions. Inner boundary conditions can be selected using measured data as heater power and temperature on the surface of the simulated overpack. These data also contain some noise, so research teams developed their own simplified developed boundary conditions. Task D validated various approaches thorough the simulation of the in-situ full scale EBS system including backfill of the gallery: variations in the coupling processes (THM or THC), analysis codes, and boundary conditions. Temperature distribution in the buffer material was simulated well by all research teams. This means thermal behaviour is not sensitive to the simulation approaches. Although the water content distribution on the outside of the buffer material was well simulated by all research teams, the simulation results differ from the measured values inside the buffer material (at the centre and inside, near the simulated overpack). The buffer material is made from tap water, but in the in-situ experiment, saline groundwater infiltrates the buffer material. Therefore, the selection of the hydraulic parameters of the buffer material greatly affects the simulation results of the re saturation behaviour of the buffer material. In the Horonobe EBS experiment, measured values suitable for validating the simulation results were not obtained near the simulated overpack. When simulating the pressure and deformation of the buffer material, the measurement data is easily affected by the installation conditions of the measurement sensors, so verifying the measurement data itself remains an issue. Mechanical simulation results differ depending on whether they are considered as elastic or elastoplastic phenomena. The accuracy of measured in-situ data can be assessed by detailed analysis comparing sampling specimen analysis and measured data. The Horonobe EBS experiment is scheduled to be dismantled in the future (FY2026 and 2027). This detailed dismantling investigation will finally confirm the measured data.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DISCOVERY OF RAPIDLY MOVING PARTIAL X-RAY ABSORBERS WITHIN GAMMA CASSIOPEIAE

Gamma Cassiopeiae is an enigmatic Be star with unusually strong hard X-ray emission. The Suzaku observatory detected six rapid X-ray spectral hardening events called “softness dips” in a ∼100 ks observation in 2011. All the softness dip events show symmetric softness-ratio variations, and some of them have flat bottoms apparently due to saturation. The softness dip spectra are best described by either ∼40% or ∼70% partial covering absorption to kT ∼ 12 keV plasma emission by matter with a neutral hydrogen column density of ∼(2−8) × 10{sup 21} cm{sup −2}, while the spectrum outside these dips is almost free of absorption. This result suggests the presence of two distinct X-ray-emitting spots in the γ Cas system, perhaps on a white dwarf (WD) companion with dipole mass accretion. The partial covering absorbers may be blobs in the Be stellar wind, the Be disk, or rotating around the WD companion. Weak correlations of the softness ratios to the hard X-ray flux suggest the presence of stable plasmas at kT ∼ 0.9 and 5 keV, which may originate from the Be or WD winds. The formation of a Be star and WD binary system requires mass transfer between two stars; γ Cas may have experienced such activity in the past.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

The Einstein@Home gamma-ray pulsar survey. I. Search methods, sensitivity, and discovery of new young gamma-ray pulsars

We report on the results of a recent blind search survey for gamma-ray pulsars in Fermi Large Area Telescope (LAT) data being carried out on the distributed volunteer computing system, Einstein@Home. The survey has searched for pulsations in 118 unidentified pulsar-like sources, requiring about 10,000 years of CPU core time. In total, this survey has resulted in the discovery of 17 new gamma-ray pulsars, of which 13 are newly reported in this work, and an accompanying paper. These pulsars are all young, isolated pulsars with characteristic ages between 12 kyr and 2 Myr, and spin-down powers between 10{sup 34} and 4 × 10{sup 36} erg s{sup −1}. Two of these are the slowest spinning gamma-ray pulsars yet known. One pulsar experienced a very large glitch Δf/f≈3.5×10{sup −6} during the Fermi mission. In this, the first of two associated papers, we describe the search scheme used in this survey, and estimate the sensitivity of our search to pulsations in unidentified Fermi-LAT sources. One such estimate results in an upper limit of 57% for the fraction of pulsed emission from the gamma-ray source associated with the Cas A supernova remnant, constraining the pulsed gamma-ray photon flux that can be produced by the neutron star at its center. We also present the results of precise timing analyses for each of the newly detected pulsars.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

A Massive Shell of Supernova-formed Dust in SNR G54.1+0.3

While theoretical models of dust condensation predict that most refractory elements produced in core-collapse supernovae (SNe) efficiently condense into dust, a large quantity of dust has so far only been observed in SN 1987A. We present an analysis of observations from the Spitzer Space Telescope , Herschel Space Observatory , Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy, and AKARI of the infrared shell surrounding the pulsar wind nebula in the supernova remnant G54.1+0.3. We attribute a distinctive spectral feature at 21 μ m to a magnesium silicate grain species that has been invoked in modeling the ejecta-condensed dust in Cas A, which exhibits the same spectral signature. If this species is responsible for producing the observed spectral feature and accounts for a significant fraction of the observed infrared continuum, we find that it would be the dominant constituent of the dust in G54.1+0.3, with possible secondary contributions from other compositions, such as carbon, silicate, or alumina grains. The total mass of SN-formed dust required by this model is at least 0.3 M {sub ⊙}. We discuss how these results may be affected by varying dust grain properties and self-consistent grain heating models. The spatial distribution of the dust mass and temperature in G54.1+0.3 confirms the scenario in which the SN-formed dust has not yet been processed by the SN reverse shock and is being heated by stars belonging to a cluster in which the SN progenitor exploded. The dust mass and composition suggest a progenitor mass of 16–27 M {sub ⊙} and imply a high dust condensation efficiency, similar to that found for Cas A and SN 1987A. The study provides another example of significant dust formation in a Type IIP SN explosion and sheds light on the properties of pristine SN-condensed dust.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

A JWST Survey of the Supernova Remnant Cassiopeia A

We present initial results from a James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) survey of the youngest Galactic core-collapse supernova remnant, Cassiopeia A (Cas A), made up of NIRCam and MIRI imaging mosaics that map emission from the main shell, interior, and surrounding circumstellar/interstellar material (CSM/ISM). We also present four exploratory positions of MIRI Medium Resolution Spectrograph integral field unit spectroscopy that sample ejecta, CSM, and associated dust from representative shocked and unshocked regions. Surprising discoveries include (1) a weblike network of unshocked ejecta filaments resolved to ~0.01 pc scales exhibiting an overall morphology consistent with turbulent mixing of cool, low-entropy matter from the progenitor's oxygen layer with hot, high-entropy matter heated by neutrino interactions and radioactivity; (2) a thick sheet of dust-dominated emission from shocked CSM seen in projection toward the remnant's interior pockmarked with small (~1'') round holes formed by ≲0$^"_•$1 knots of high-velocity ejecta that have pierced through the CSM and driven expanding tangential shocks; and (3) dozens of light echoes with angular sizes between ~0$^"_•$1 and 1' reflecting previously unseen fine-scale structure in the ISM. NIRCam observations place new upper limits on infrared emission (≲20 nJy at 3 μm) from the neutron star in Cas A's center and tightly constrain scenarios involving a possible fallback disk. These JWST survey data and initial findings help address unresolved questions about massive star explosions that have broad implications for the formation and evolution of stellar populations, the metal and dust enrichment of galaxies, and the origin of compact remnant objects.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Molecular mechanism of active Cas7-11 in processing CRISPR RNA and interfering target RNA

Cas7-11 is a Type III-E CRISPR Cas effector that confers programmable RNA cleavage and has potential applications in RNA interference. Cas7-11 encodes a single polypeptide containing four Cas7- and one Cas11-like segments that obscures the distinction between the multi-subunit Class 1 and the single-subunit Class-2 CRISPR Cas systems. We report a cryo-EM (cryo-electron microscopy) structure of the active Cas7-11 from Desulfonema ishimotonii (DiCas7-11) that reveals the molecular basis for RNA processing and interference activities. DiCas7-11 arranges its Cas7- and Cas11-like domains in an extended form that resembles the backbone made up by four Cas7 and one Cas11 subunits in the multi-subunit enzymes. Unlike the multi-subunit enzymes, however, the backbone of DiCas7-11 contains evolutionarily different Cas7 and Cas11 domains, giving rise to their unique functionality. The first Cas7-like domain nearly engulfs the last 15 direct repeat nucleotides in processing and recognition of the CRISPR RNA, and its free-standing fragment retains most of the activity. Both the second and the third Cas7-like domains mediate target RNA cleavage in a metal-dependent manner. The structure and mutational data indicate that the long variable insertion to the fourth Cas7 domain has little impact on RNA processing or targeting, suggesting the possibility for engineering a compact and programmable RNA interference tool.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Upper limits of hard gamma-ray emission from six X-ray sources

The Cornell 100-inch gamma-ray telescope has been used to set upper limits for the gamma-ray flux above 400 MeV from the X-ray sources Cyg X-1, Cyg X-2, Cyg X-3, Cas A, Cas B, and Per X-1. An upper limit for the diffuse flux of the galactic disk was set which is consistent with OSO-3 and SAS-2 data. A new measurement of the atmospheric gamma-ray generation rate is presented.

Campbell, M.↗