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At least 433 records · Page 24

Opportunities for Simultaneous Efficiency Improvement and Refrigerant Transition in Air Conditioning

In October of 2016, nearly 200 Parties agreed to amend the Montreal Protocol in Kigali, Rwanda, to phase-down consumption and production of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) by 2050. Growth in the use of HFCs, including those currently used as refrigerants in air-conditioning systems, is being driven by demand from emerging economies, hot climates, and rising incomes that are also undergoing rapid urbanization and electrification. Air conditioners (ACs), as an energy-intensive end-use technology, are also covered by a growing number of energy efficiency standards, labeling, procurement, incentive, and other supporting efficiency programs. Therefore, improving room AC energy efficiency and transitioning to low-global warming potential (GWP) refrigerants simultaneously presents significant opportunities to deploy energy efficient technology and reduce the energy and emissions impacts of room ACs, while keeping costs low for consumers. This report aims to provide an initial sense of the opportunities to improve efficiency and transition to low-GWP refrigerants by reviewing the HCFC and HFC regulatory framework and energy efficiency standards and labeling programs in 19 economies that account for roughly 65 percent of global room AC demand. Based on this analysis, we identified key opportunities for coordinated action on efficiency improvement and refrigerant transition for the domestic room AC sector (i.e., ductless mini-split ACs), such as: - implementing or revising standards and labeling programs to improve efficiency levels with the possibility of adding a low-GWP criterion. - combining fixed speed and inverter AC product categories to account for seasonal variations in climate and part-load operating conditions, and using seasonal energy efficiency ratio (SEER) instead of energy efficiency ratio (EER) to better reflect performance of inverter ACs. - implementing market transformation programs, such as bulk procurement programs, to drive down the costs of efficient technology through economies of scale. - aligning timelines for implementing efficiency standards with timelines for refrigerant management plans to coordinate policy actions. - maximizing the energy efficiency improvements of Montreal Protocol investments by coordinating efforts to help keep costs low for consumers and manufacturers during equipment redesign and manufacturing line retooling for refrigerant transition. In order to realize the significant peak load, energy saving and climate benefits of these opportunities associated with improving energy efficiency in tandem with the refrigerant transition, some risks may need to be mitigated, principally safety concerns over risks of accidental ignition with refrigerants rated flammable. This can be mitigated by continuing and accelerating the development of safety standards currently being updated, for example, by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and improving training for production, installation and maintenance during the use of flammable refrigerants. While some low-GWP refrigerants may cost more than the current baseline refrigerants, the cost of refrigerants is only ~1% of lifecycle costs for an AC. Costs can also be reduced through manufacturing advances and efficiency improvements, particularly if they are supported by policies that encourage technological development through deployment of superefficient ACs at scale. Finally, during the transition, there is a risk of obsolete technology being deployed in markets that either have not updated their standards or have later compliance dates. This risk can be mitigated by updating standards and reviewing them periodically to ensure their effectiveness.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

A Review of the Literature on the Radiolytic Stability of the Next-Generation Solvent

The Original Caustic-Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) solvent (based on the BOBCalixC6 extractant) currently in use at the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) is set to be replaced by the Next-Generation Solvent (NGS, based on the MaxCalix extractant). Current SWPF flammability safety controls use G-values for volatile gases obtained from radiolysis studies with the Original CSSX solvent. A review of past irradiation tests of both solvent systems was performed to assess the radiolytic stability of NGS with respect to flammable gas generation from radiolysis.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MIS Shelf-Life Final Report for Plutonium Oxide Item 1000089 (SSR136 and SSR136A) from Rocky Flats Peroxide Precipitation and Calcination Process

A plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied to determine the gas generation and corrosion behavior in a storage environment. Sample 1000089 represents product-quality plutonium oxides produced in the Rocky Flats peroxide precipitation process currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure and composition of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions had been measured periodically over almost 13 years. The maximum observed gas pressure was 204 kPa and was related to a temperature excursion. The maximum observed gas pressure from gas generation was 126 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 86.7 kPa was due to the generation of hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Carbon dioxide, methane and carbon monoxide were minor components of the headspace gas. The material exhibited unusual behavior in that the atmosphere reached flammable levels of hydrogen and oxygen within the first 30 days and remained flammable for the duration of the experiment. It has been determined that the sample inside the reactor was a mixture of the AR material, material calcined at 800 °C, and material calcined at 950 °C. The experiment was terminated in 2012 and unloaded in 2016. A new reactor, SSR136A, was loaded with the original sample freshly calcined at 950 °C. The total pressure inside SSR136A remained close to the initial value of 93 kPa. The total pressure is composed of He (steady levels after the reloading) and hydrogen which is 10% of the reactor’s total pressure. Nitrogen and oxygen compose trace amounts of the reactor headspace. The internal components of SSR136 were inspected in 2021, five years after it was removed from the array. The inside surfaces of the inner bucket exposed to the original sample for 4,576 days had an etched appearance, and pit-like features were observed in the microscopic analysis. No corrosion was observed on the SSR136A inner bucket that held the freshly calcined sample that was exposed for 1,303 days.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Modeling DOE Standard Canister Configurations with Updated Surface Chemistry

Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the advanced test reactor (ATR) fuel currently specifies storage within helium backfilled DOE sealed standard canisters. The aluminum cladding of the ATR fuel contains an oxyhydroxide layer of boehmite/bayerite that generates hydrogen when subjected to irradiation. Understanding the effect of this hydrogen buildup over time to important for long term storage considerations. Previous modeling efforts have built a coupled CFD-chemical model to simulate the temperature gas phase concentrations within the DOE sealed standard canisters. These models have coupled the temperature conditions to both the gas phase radiolysis chemistry and the surface chemistry associated with the oxyhydroxide layer. Continued experimental work has identified trends for aluminum surrogate samples with oxyhydroxide layers for tests done at higher dose rates. At low initial doses a fast generation rate of hydrogen occurs which starts to roll over to a lower generation rate as the total dose applied in increased. A previous study created a small-scale chemical model was built to replicate a mini-canister surrogate system at SRNL as well as for the smaller capsule tests performed at INL. The previous iteration of the model utilized step function for its G-values for the hydrogen generation over a 200-year period. This model makes an update to the surface chemistry to account for theorized surface chemistry reactions allowing for oxygen to remain bounded to the oxyhydroxide layer. As additional experiments continue, the kinetic fits may be adjusted to adapt to new data. Three canister configurations are modeled – the base 18-inch, 15-foot DOR standard canister with 30 ATR fuel elements, an 18-inch, 10-foot DOE standard canister with 32 ATR fuel elements and a 24-inch, 10-foot DOE standard canister with 40 ATR fuel elements. In previous reports, the primary sensitivity of the canister conditions was identified as the decay heat of the fuel and the dried condition of the fuel. Only these parameters are studied in the report. For the nominal case with dried fuel, the hydrogen generation is only about 2%, so it is even less than the flammability limit if it were exposed to oxygen. For the densely packed 18-inch case the total hydrogen concentration is only around 4% with the nominal decay heat. For the densely packed 24-inch case the total hydrogen concentration is only 2.5%, roughly 20% higher than the original packing design, and still under flammability conditions if exposed to oxygen.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Thermal Modeling of Advanced Test Reactor Fuel in a Generalized Dry Storage System Under Hypothetical Accident Conditions

Work was performed to investigate the thermal behavior of a sealed aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) dry storage configuration under hypothetical accident conditions during long-term storage. The considered system consists of a concrete dry storage overpack; a welded over canister, backfilled with argon; and nine Department of Energy (DOE) standardized canisters (DOESCs) loaded with ASNF, backfilled with helium gas. One technical concern associated with the long-term storage of ASNF includes radiolytic hydrogen generation. The yield of large quantities of hydrogen could lead to DOESC over pressurization or a flammable internal atmosphere. While flammability concerns can be resolved by preventing the ingress of oxygen, the canister pressure is partially controlled by the atmosphere temperature. This memorandum summarizes the results of modeling and simulation (M&S) work completed with Star CCM+ (a computational fluid dynamics [CFD] software) considering the thermal effects of a fully engulfing flame and another scenario with the vent ports of the concrete dry storage overpack completely blocked. The goal was to determine the bounding maximum temperature of the DOESC internal atmosphere to evaluate a worst-case pressure scenario, as well as the critical vent port blockage durations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Safe Electrolytes for Batteries

The demand for reliable and safe lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) for electric vehicles (EVs) and energy storage systems (ESS) necessitates the exploration of nonflammable phosphorus-based electrolytes as alternatives to the traditional flammable carbonate-based ones. However, integrating phosphorus-based electrolyte poses challenges, including capacity fading and compatibility issues with graphite material. Here, a high-throughput (HTP) electrochemical characterization method, similar to PH test paper, is introduced to fast screen compatible phosphorus-based electrolyte for use with graphite. Among 1,740 combinations of phosphorus-based electrolytes and graphite materials, 101 promising combinations are identified for further evaluation. These identified phosphorus-based electrolytes and graphite materials are evaluated and optimized in Li/Graphite half-cells and Graphite/LiFePO 4 (LFP) full-cells using commercial-level electrodes. The desolvation energy of a complex with one Li+ and four solvent molecules of phosphate or carbonate is calculated by density functional theory (DFT). Key parameters such as viscosity, ionic conductivity, and flammability of the electrolytes are thoroughly tested and optimized. The modified phosphate-dominant electrolyte (2 M LiFSI TEP/DME/EC (6/2/2, volume ratio) + 5 wt.% VEC + 5 wt.% FEC) demonstrates excellent thermal stability with lithiated graphite and showcases superior cycling performance in the Graphite/LFP full cell, surpassing prior research findings in phosphate-dominant electrolytes. By the rapid HTP screening and identification of compatible electrolyte-graphite combinations, this approach contributes to expediting the development of safer LIBs for EVs and ESS.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Summary of Gas Generation Behavior Observed in 3013 Surveillance and Monitoring Program Shelf-Life Experiments

Gas generation experiments have been conducted in small- and full-scale test containers at Los Alamos National Laboratory on samples of plutonium oxide material collected from plutonium processes across the DOE complex and tested at the bounding conditions for the Department of Energy 3013 Standard. The gas composition and pressures in the sealed experimental containers were measured over periods of months to years. These experiments have provided results for the formation and consumption of hydrogen and other gases. The conditions supporting the formation of flammable gas mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen in flammable gas mixtures were also determined. Different behaviors were observed between the materials tested based on their compositions, the stabilization performed on the material, and the post stabilization handling of the material. Many of the experiments are still ongoing. This report summarizes the results obtained for the gas generation behavior for high-purity plutonium oxides and salt-bearing impure plutonium oxides in sealed containers.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Management of the Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Accident Corium and Severely Damaged Fuel Debris

The Three Mile Island, Unit Two (TMI-2) pressurized water reactor core melted down in 1979 due to an untimely combination of maintenance problems that led to a loss of feedwater, followed by a series of operational misunderstandings and errors. The melted core recovery process required development of a wide array of tools. After approximately three years of water management and other cleanup actions, the first views of the core revealed a much higher degree of damage than previously expected. Approximately 62 metric tons of the core had melted, leaving only 42 of the 177 fuel assemblies standing with a majority of rods intact. The core to be recovered was composed of loose debris and a solidified mass of formerly molten fuel. Robotic tools that had been designed for the task were of limited effectiveness due to the range of material types and phases. Over a period of several years, the central melt was broken up, primarily by use of a core-boring drill originally designed to acquire samples through the depth of the debris field. The broken pieces were loaded into specially designed debris canisters by use of long-handled pick-and-place tools and suctioned into baffled knockout canisters using an airlift vacuum system. A remotely operable underwater plasma arc torch was developed for removal of the lower core support structure to be able to retrieve the fuel pieces and secondary melt that had accumulated on the bottom reactor vessel head. Canister design played a central role in defining the initial retrieval process and later affected transportation, interim wet and its current interim dry storage. Due to concerns about the potential for radiolysis of residual water in the debris and other canister material, the canisters were fitted with hydrogen recombiner catalyst units to prevent a buildup of flammable gas and potential pressurization. To confirm the effectiveness of the recombiners during shipping, eight dewatered canisters were kept sealed for up to 205 days with periodic sampling of the headspace gas. The highest hydrogen value (9 vol%) was observed in a canister held for 147 days while the longest stored canister resulted in a 5% hydrogen concentration. The oxygen concentration never exceeded 0.5 %, and the primary backfill was >80% argon, meaning there was no flammability risk. Radiolytic hydrogen was also observed in wet pool storage, where the vented canisters discharged a portion of the water backfill as a result of gas production. The 344 canisters (268 fuel debris, 62 filter, and 12 knockout type) were dewatered, loaded in groups of seven into a double barrier shipping cask, and transported to the U.S. Department of Energy site in Idaho for 10 years of pool storage.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Novel Nonflammable Electrolytes for Secondary Magnesium Batteries and High Voltage Electrolytes for Electrochemcial Supercapacitors

Magnesium has been used successfully in primary batteries, but its use in rechargeable cells has been stymied by the lack of suitable non-aqueous electrolyte that can conduct Mg+2 species, combined with poor stripping and plating properties. The development of a suitable cathode material for rechargeable magnesium batteries has also been a roadblock, but a nonflammable electrolyte is key. Likewise, the development of safe high voltage electrochemical supercapaitors has been stymied by the use of flammable solvents in the liquid electrolyte; to wit, acetonitrile. The purpose of the research conducted in this effort was to identify useful compositions of magnesium salts and polyphosphate solvents that would enable magnesium ions to be cycled within a secondary battery design. The polyphosphate solvents would provide the solvent for the magnesium salts while preventing the electrolyte from being flammable. This would enable these novel electrolytes to be considered as an alternative to THF-based electrolytes. In addition, we explored several of these solvents together with lithium slats for use as high voltage electrolytes for carbon-based electrochemical supercapacitors. The research was successful in that: 1) Magnesium imide dissolved in a phosphate ester solvent that contains a halogented phosphate ester appears to be the preferred electrolyte for a rechargeable Mg cell. 2) A combination of B-doped CNTs and vanadium phosphate appear to be the cathode of choice for a rechargeable Mg cell by virtue of higher voltage and better reversibility. 3) Magnesium alloys appear to perform better than pure magnesium when used in combination with the novel polyphosphate electrolytes. Also, this effort has established that Phoenix Innovation's family of phosphonate/phosphate electrolytes together with specific lithium slats can be used in supercapacitor systems at voltages of greater than 10V.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Oxygen Handling and Cooling Options in High Temperature Electrolysis Plants

Idaho National Laboratory is working on a project to generate hydrogen by high temperature electrolysis (HTE). In such an HTE system, safety precautions need to be taken to handle high temperature oxygen at ~830°C. This report is aimed at addressing oxygen handling in a HTE plant.. Though oxygen itself is not flammable, most engineering material, including many gases and liquids, will burn in the presence of oxygen under some favorable physicochemical conditions. At present, an absolute set of rules does not exist that can cover all aspects of oxygen system design, material selection, and operating practices to avoid subtle hazards related to oxygen. Because most materials, including metals, will burn in an oxygen-enriched environment, hazards are always present when using oxygen. Most materials will ignite in an oxygen-enriched environment at a temperature lower than that in air, and once ignited, combustion rates are greater in the oxygen-enriched environment. Even many metals, if ignited, burn violently in an oxygen-enriched environment. However, these hazards do not preclude the operations and systems involving oxygen. Oxygen can be safely handled and used if all the materials in a system are not flammable in the end-use environment or if ignition sources are identified and controlled. In fact, the incidence of oxygen system fires is reported to be low with a probability of about one in a million. This report is a practical guideline and tutorial for the safe operation and handling of gaseous oxygen in high temperature electrolysis system. The intent is to provide safe, practical guidance that permits the accomplishment of experimental operations at INL, while being restrictive enough to prevent personnel endangerment and to provide reasonable facility protection. Adequate guidelines are provided to govern various aspects of oxygen handling associated with high temperature electrolysis system to generate hydrogen. The intent here is to present acceptable oxygen standards and practices for minimum safety requirements. A summary of operational hazards, along with oxygen safety and emergency procedures, are provided.

08 HYDROGEN↗

LLNL Site 200 Risk Management PlanAgust 2008

It is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) policy to perform work in a manner that protects the health and safety of employees and the public, preserves the quality of the environment, and prevents property damage using the Integrated Safety Management System. The environment, safety, and health are to take priority in the planning and execution of work activities at the Laboratory. Furthermore, it is the policy of LLNL to comply with applicable ES&H laws, regulations, and requirements (LLNL Environment, Safety and Health Manual, Document 1.2, ES&H Policies of LLNL). The program and policies that improve LLNL's ability to prevent or mitigate accidental releases are described in the LLNL Environment, Health, and Safety Manual that is available to the public. The laboratory uses an emergency management system known as the Incident Command System, in accordance with the California Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) to respond to Operational Emergencies and to mitigate consequences resulting from them. Operational Emergencies are defined as unplanned, significant events or conditions that require time-urgent response from outside the immediate area of the incident that could seriously impact the safety or security of the public, LLNL's employees, its facilities, or the environment. The Emergency Plan contains LLNL's Operational Emergency response policies, commitments, and institutional responsibilities for managing and recovering from emergencies. It is not possible to list in the Emergency Plan all events that could occur during any given emergency situation. However, a combination of hazard assessments, an effective Emergency Plan, and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) can provide the framework for responses to postulated emergency situations. Revision 7, 2004 of the above mentioned LLNL Emergency Plan is available to the public. The most recent revision of the LLNL Emergency Plan LLNL-AM-402556, Revision 11, March 2008, has been included as an appendix to the RMP Supplemental Information document. LLNL Site 200 is a research and development laboratory with infrastructure necessary to support its operations and personnel. Research and development activities at LLNL are focused on stockpile stewardship; achieving robust and vital scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capability; inertial confinement fusion; laser technology; materials and process science; computational and information sciences; basic sciences; engineering sciences; and biological sciences. Based upon CalARP Program regulations, guidance found in California Accidental Release Prevention Program (CalARP) Administering Guidance, Chapter 1, a review of facility specific documents, accident analyses summarized in this document & detailed in the LLNL Site 200 RMP Supporting Information document, LLNL has determined that each process meeting the CalARP threshold criteria meets the requirements for CalARP Program Level 1. In accordance with CalARP regulations, LLNL considers the natural segmentation of processes at Site 200 to be on a building basis and therefore consideration of inventory should be on a building basis rather than a 'site-wide' basis. Only those materials identified as equal to as or greater than the threshold quantities for the CalARP program on a building (process) level are reflected in this document. As such, materials and quantities reported in this document on a building (process) level will vary from materials and quantities reported in the LLNL Hazardous Materials Business Plan, Acutely Hazardous Material Registration Form on a site-wide level. For each process involving regulated quantities of lithium hydride, worst case accident analysis shows that the toxic endpoint lies within the site boundaries. These analyses document that the nearest public receptor is beyond the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint. Refer to the LLNL Site 200 RMP Supporting Information document for a more detailed explanation of the worst case accident analyses for these processes. For the process involving regulated quantities of nitric acid, worst case accident analysis predicts a hazard zone well within areas under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy. This analysis documents that the nearest public receptor is beyond the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint. Refer to the LLNL Site 200 RMP Supporting Information document for a more detailed explanation of the worst case accident analysis for this process. LLNL maintains an active program to protect workers, the public, and the environment from harm resulting from its activities. Its policies and technical directions for controlling all hazards that are present as a result of its operations are described in the LLNL Environment, Health, and Safety Manual (referenced above).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

RADIOLYTIC HYDROGEN GENERATION INSAVANNAH RIVER SITE (SRS) HIGH LEVEL WASTETANKS COMPARISON OF SRS AND HANFORDMODELING PREDICTIONS

In the high level waste tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS), hydrogen is produced continuously by interaction of the radiation in the tank with water in the waste. Consequently, the vapor spaces of the tanks are purged to prevent the accumulation of H{sub 2} and possible formation of a flammable mixture in a tank. Personnel at SRS have developed an empirical model to predict the rate of H{sub 2} formation in a tank. The basis of this model is the prediction of the G value for H{sub 2} production. This G value is the number of H{sub 2} molecules produced per 100 eV of radiolytic energy absorbed by the waste. Based on experimental studies it was found that the G value for H{sub 2} production from beta radiation and from gamma radiation were essentially equal. The G value for H{sub 2} production from alpha radiation was somewhat higher. Thus, the model has two equations, one for beta/gamma radiation and one for alpha radiation. Experimental studies have also indicated that both G values are decreased by the presence of nitrate and nitrite ions in the waste. These are the main scavengers for the precursors of H{sub 2} in the waste; thus the equations that were developed predict G values for hydrogen production as a function of the concentrations of these two ions in waste. Knowing the beta/gamma and alpha heat loads in the waste allows one to predict the total generation rate for hydrogen in a tank. With this prediction a ventilation rate can be established for each tank to ensure that a flammable mixture is not formed in the vapor space in a tank. Recently personnel at Hanford have developed a slightly different model for predicting hydrogen G values. Their model includes the same precursor for H{sub 2} as the SRS model but also includes an additional precursor not in the SRS model. Including the second precursor for H{sub 2} leads to different empirical equations for predicting the G values for H{sub 2} as a function of the nitrate and nitrite concentrations in the waste. The difference in the two models has led to the questions of how different are the results predicted by the two models and which model predicts the more conservative (larger) G values. More conservative G values would predict higher H{sub 2} generation rates that would require higher ventilation rates in the SRS tanks. This report compares predictions based on the two models at various nitrate and nitrite concentrations in the SRS HLW tanks for both beta/gamma and for alpha radiation. It also compares predicted G values with those determined by actually measuring the H{sub 2} production from four SRS HLW tanks (Tanks 32H, 35H, 39H, and 42H). Lastly, the H{sub 2} generation rates predicted by the two models are compared for the 47 active SRS high level waste tanks using the most recent tank nitrate and nitrite concentrations and the beta/gamma and alpha heat loads for each tank. The predictions of the models for total H{sub 2} generation rates from the 47 active SRS waste were, for the most part, similar. For example, the predictions for both models applied to 25 tanks agreed within {+-}10% of each other. For the remaining 22 tanks, the SRS prediction was more conservative for 9 tanks (maximum 29% higher) and the Hanford prediction was more conservative for 13 tanks (maximum 19% higher). When comparing G values predicted by the equations presuming only alpha radiation or only beta/gamma was present the results were somewhat different. The results of predictions for alpha radiation, at the 47 current nitrate and nitrite concentrations in the SRS tanks indicated that all the SRS predictions were higher (up to 30%) than the Hanford predictions and thus more conservative. For beta/gamma radiation the predictions for both models agreed to {+-}10% for 18 of the combinations, the Hanford model predicted higher values (11 up to 17%) for 25 of the concentrations considered, and the SRS model predicted higher G values for the remaining two combinations (12 and 17%). For the four SRS tanks, where we compared measured G values to those predicted by the two different models, the results for two tanks (Tanks 35 and 39) were in good agreement with predictions from both models. For the other two tanks (Tanks 32 and 42) the predictions of both models were conservative. The predictions were 3 to 4X higher than the measured G values for H{sub 2} production.

08 HYDROGEN↗

RESULTS FOR THE FIRST QUARTER 2009 TANK 50 WAC SLURRY SAMPLE: CHEMICAL AND RADIONUCLIDE CONTAMINANT RESULTS

This report details the chemical and radionuclide contaminant results for the characterization of the 2009 First Quarter sampling of Tank 50 for the Saltstone Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). Information from this characterization will be used by Liquid Waste Operations (LWO) to support the transfer of low-level aqueous waste from Tank 50 to the Salt Feed Tank in the Saltstone Facility in Z-Area, where the waste will be immobilized. This information is also used to update the Tank 50 Waste Characterization System. The following conclusions are drawn from the analytical results provided in this report: (1) The concentrations of the chemical and radioactive contaminants were all less than their respective WAC Targets or Limits except for Am-242m. (2) The radionuclide Am-242m was not detected; however, its detection limit is above the WAC Target given in Attachment 8.4. The higher detection limit was expected based on current analytical capabilities as stated in the Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP). (3) The reported detection limit of isopropanol was lower than its WAC Limit for accident analysis but higher than its WAC concentration given in Table 4 for vault flammability. The higher detection limit was expected based on current analytical capabilities and is documented in the Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP). (4) The reported detection limit for Isopar L is lower than its WAC limit for accident analysis in Appendix 8.1 but higher than its WAC concentration given in Table 3 in reference to vault flammability. The higher detection limit was expected based on current analytical capabilities as stated in the Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP). (5) Isopar L and Norpar 13 have limited solubility in aqueous solutions making it difficult to obtain consistent and reliable sub-samples. The values reported in this memo are the concentrations in the sub-sample as detected by the GC/MS; however, the results may not accurately represent the concentrations of these analytes in Tank 50.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL FOR HYDROGEN GENERATION DURING GROUTING OPERATIONS IN THE R- AND P-REACTOR VESSELS

The R- and P-reactor buildings were retired from service and are now being prepared for deactivation and decommissioning (D&D). D&D activities will consist primarily of immobilizing contaminated components and structures in a grout-like formulation. Aluminum corrodes very rapidly when it comes in contact with the alkaline grout materials and as a result produces hydrogen gas. To address this potential deflagration/explosion hazard, the Materials Science and Technology Directorate (MS&T) of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been requested to review and evaluate existing experimental and analytical studies of this issue to determine if any process constraints on the chemistry of the fill material and the fill operation are necessary. Various options exist for the type of grout material that may be used for D&D of the reactor vessels. The grout formulation options include ceramicrete (pH 6-8), low pH portland cement + silica fume grout (pH 10.4), or Portland cement grout (pH 12.5). The assessment concluded that either ceramicrete or the silica fume grout may be used to safely grout the P-reactor vessel. The risk of accumulation of a flammable mixture of hydrogen between the grout-air interface and the top of the reactor is very low. Portland cement grout, on the other hand, for the same range of process parameters does not provide a significant margin of safety against the accumulation of flammable gas in the reactor vessel during grouting operations in the P-reactor vessel. It is recommended that this grout not be utilized for this task. The R-reactor vessel contains significantly less aluminum and thus a Portland cement grout may be considered as well. For example, if the grout fill rate is less than 1 inch/min and the grout temperature is maintained at 70 C or less, the risk of hydrogen accumulation in the R-reactor vessel is very low for the Portland cement. Alternatively, if the grout fill rate is less than 0.5 inch/min and the grout is maintained at a temperature of 80 C, the risk will again be very low. Although these calculations are conservative, there are some measures that may be taken to further minimize the potential for hydrogen evolution. (1) Minimize the temperature of the grout as much as practical. Lower temperatures will mean lower hydrogen generation rates. For P-reactor, grout temperatures less than 100 C should provide an adequate safety margin for the pH 8 and pH 10.4 grout formulations. For R-reactor, grout temperatures less than 70 C or 80 C will provide an adequate safety margin for the Portland cement. The other grout formulations are also viable options for R-reactor. (2) Minimize the grout fill rate as much as practical. Lowering the fill rate takes advantage of passivation of the aluminum components and hence lower hydrogen generation rates. For P-reactor, fill rates that are less than 2 inches/min for the ceramicrete and the silica fume grouts will reduce the chance of significant hydrogen accumulation. For R-reactor, fill rates less than 1 inch/min will again minimize the risk of hydrogen accumulation. (3) Ventilate the building as much as practical (e.g., leave doors open) to further disperse hydrogen. The volumetric hydrogen generation rates in the P-reactor vessel, however, are low for the pH 8 and pH 10.4 grout, (i.e., less than 0.32 ft{sup 3}/min). If further walk-down inspections of the reactor vessels suggest an increase in the actual areal density of aluminum, the calculations should be re-visited.

08 HYDROGEN↗

RESULTS FOR THE THIRD QUARTER 2009 TANK 50 WAC SLURRY SAMPLE: CHEMICAL AND RADIONUCLIDE CONTAMINANT RESULTS

This report details the chemical and radionuclide contaminant results for the characterization of the 2009 Third Quarter sampling of Tank 50 for the Saltstone Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). Information from this characterization will be used by Liquid Waste Operations (LWO) to support the transfer of low-level aqueous waste from Tank 50 to the Salt Feed Tank in the Saltstone Facility in Z-Area, where the waste will be immobilized. This information is also used to update the Tank 50 Waste Characterization System. Recently, a review of the radionuclide inventory in Saltstone Vaults 1 and 4 identified several additional radionuclides, not currently in the WAC, which require quantification ({sup 40}K, {sup 108m}Ag, {sup 133}Ba, {sup 207}Bi, {sup 227}Ac, {sup 228}Ra, {sup 228}Th, {sup 231}Pa, {sup 247}Cm, {sup 249}Cf, {sup 251}Cf). In addition, several of the radionuclides previously reported with minimum detection limits below the requirements listed in the WAC required analysis with reduced detection limits to support future inventory reporting requirements ({sup 22}Na, {sup 26}Al, {sup 59}Ni, {sup 94}Nb, {sup 106}Ru, {sup 144}Ce, {sup 152}Eu, {sup 155}Eu, {sup 226}Ra). This added scope was formally requested in a revision to the standing Technical Task Request for CY2009 Saltstone support and is further discussed in several supporting documents. The following conclusions are drawn from the analytical results provided in this report: (1) The concentrations of the reported chemical and radioactive contaminants are less than their respective WAC targets or limits unless noted in this section. (2) The reported detection limits for {sup 59}Ni, {sup 94}Nb, {sup 247}Cm, and {sup 249}Cf are above the limits requested by LWO; however, they are below the achievable limits established by Analytical Development (AD). (3) The reported detection limit of isopropanol is lower than its WAC Limit for accident analysis in Appendix 8.1, but higher than its WAC concentration given in Table 4 for vault flammability. The higher detection limit is expected based on current analytical capabilities and is documented in the Task Technical and Quality Assurance Plan (TTQAP). (4) The reported detection limit for Isopar L is lower than its WAC limit for accident analysis in Appendix 8.1 but higher than its WAC concentration given in Table 3 in reference to vault flammability. (5) Isopar L and Norpar 13 have limited solubility in aqueous solutions making it difficult to obtain consistent and reliable sub-samples. The values reported in this memo are the concentrations in the sub-sample as detected by the GC/MS; however, the results may not accurately represent the concentrations of these analytes in the Tank 50 sample received by SRNL.

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ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL FOR HYDROGEN GENERATION DURING GROUTING OPERATIONS IN THE R AND P REACTOR VESSELS

The R- and P-reactor buildings were retired from service and are now being prepared for deactivation and decommissioning (D and D). D and D activities consist primarily of immobilizing contaminated components and structures in a grout-like formulation. Aluminum corrodes very rapidly when it comes in contact with the alkaline grout materials and as a result produces hydrogen gas. To address this potential deflagration/explosion hazard, the Materials Science and Technology Directorate (MS and T) of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has been requested to review and evaluate existing experimental and analytical studies of this issue to determine if any process constraints on the chemistry of the fill material and the fill operation are necessary. Various options exist for the type of grout material that may be used for D and D of the reactor vessels. The grout formulation options include ceramicrete (pH 6-8), low pH portland cement + silica fume grout (pH 10.4), or Portland cement groupt (pH 12.5). The assessment concluded that either ceramicrete or the silica fume grout may be used to safely grout the P-reactor vessel. The risk of accumulation of a flammable mixture of hydrogen between the grout-air interface and the top of the reactor is very low. Portland cement grout, on the other hand, for the same range of process parameters does not provide a margin of safety against the accumulation of flammable gas in the reactor vessel during grouting operations in the P-reactor vessel. It is recommended that this grout not be utilized for this task. The R-reactor vessel cotnains significantly less aluminum based on current facility process knowledge, surface observations, and drawings. Therefore, a Portland cement grout may be considered for grouting operations as well as the other grout formulations. For example, if the grout fill rate is less than 1 inch/min and the grout temperature is maintained at 70 C or less, the risk of hydrogen accumulation during fill operations in the R-reactor vessel is low for the Portland cement. Alternatively, if the grout fill rate is less than 0.5 inch/min and the grout is maintained at a temperature of 80 C, the risk is again low. Although these calculations are conservative, there are some measures that may be taken to further minimize the potential for hydrogen evolution. (1) Minimize the temperature of the grout as much as practical. Lower temperatures will mean lower hydrogen generation rates. For P-reactor, grout temperatures less than 100 C should provide an adequate safety margin for the pH 8 and pH 10.4 grout formulations. For R-reactor, grout temperatures less than 70 C or 80 C will provide an adequate safety margin for the Portland cement. The other grout formulations are also viable options for R-reactor. (2) Minimize the grout fill rate as much as practical. Lowering the fill rate takes advantage of passivation of the aluminum components and hence lower hydrogen generation rates. For P-reactor, fill rates that are less than 2 inches/min for the ceramicrete and the silica fume grouts will reduce the chance of significant hydrogen accumulation. For R-reactor, fill rates less than 1 inch/min will again minimize the risk of hydrogen accumulation. (3) Ventilate the building as much as practical (e.g., leave doors open) to further disperse hydrogen. The volumetric hydrogen generation rates in the P-reactor vessel, however, are low for the pH 8 and pH 10.4 grout, (i.e., less than 0.97 ft{sup 3}/min). If further walk-down inspections of the reactor vessels suggest an increase in the actual areal density of aluminum, the calculations should be re-visited.

08 HYDROGEN↗

RH-TRU [ Remote-Handled Transuranic ] Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) (Rev. 10)

The Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of RH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC). The RH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the RH-TRU 72-B. This document is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents by site. A content code is defined by the following components: (1) a two-letter site abbreviation that designates the physical location of the generated/stored waste (e.g., ID for Idaho National Laboratory [INL]); and (2) a three-digit code that designates the physical and chemical form of the waste (e.g., content code 317 denotes TRU Metal Waste). For RH-TRU waste to be transported in the RH-TRU 72-B, the first number of this three-digit code is "3." The second and third numbers of the three-digit code describe the physical and chemical form of the waste. Content codes are further defined as subcodes by an alpha trailer after the three-digit code to allow segregation of wastes that differ in one or more parameter(s). For example, the alpha trailers of the subcodes ID 322A and ID 322B may be used to differentiate between waste packaging configurations. As detailed in the RH-TRAMPAC, compliance with flammable gas limits may be demonstrated through the evaluation of compliance with either a decay heat limit or flammable gas generation rate (FGGR) limit per container specified in approved content codes. As applicable, if a container meets the watt*year criteria specified by the RH-TRAMPAC, the decay heat limits based on the dose-dependent G value may be used as specified in an approved content code.

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RH-TRU Waste Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) (Rev. 11)

The Remote-Handled Transuranic (RH-TRU) Content Codes (RH-TRUCON) document describes the inventory of RH-TRU waste within the transportation parameters specified by the Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Authorized Methods for Payload Control (RH-TRAMPAC). The RH-TRAMPAC defines the allowable payload for the RH-TRU 72-B. This document is a catalog of RH-TRU 72-B authorized contents by site. A content code is defined by the following components: (1) a two-letter site abbreviation that designates the physical location of the generated/stored waste (e.g., ID for Idaho National Laboratory [INL]); and (2) a three-digit code that designates the physical and chemical form of the waste (e.g., content code 317 denotes TRU Metal Waste). For RH-TRU waste to be transported in the RH-TRU 72-B, the first number of this three-digit code is "3." The second and third numbers of the three-digit code describe the physical and chemical form of the waste. Content codes are further defined as subcodes by an alpha trailer after the three-digit code to allow segregation of wastes that differ in one or more parameter(s). For example, the alpha trailers of the subcodes ID 322A and ID 322B may be used to differentiate between waste packaging configurations. As detailed in the RH-TRAMPAC, compliance with flammable gas limits may be demonstrated through the evaluation of compliance with either a decay heat limit or flammable gas generation rate (FGGR) limit per container specified in approved content codes. As applicable, if a container meets the watt*year criteria specified by the RH-TRAMPAC, the decay heat limits based on the dose-dependent G value may be used as specified in an approved content code.

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