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DOE OSTI2024

A review of criticality dosimetry at the Y-12 National Security Complex and practical importance of dose accuracy in emergency response

A nuclear criticality results in the emission of both neutron and gamma radiation and can produce doses to personnel near the event that exceed 0.1 Gy (10 rad). The primary purpose of nuclear accident dosimetry is to rapidly identify affected personnel in need of prompt medical treatment and to reassure personnel who have been only minimally exposed. While accurate dosimetry is desired, it must be recognized that dose determinations made from whole-body dosimeters or simple triage methods are very rough estimates and contain significant uncertainties. Even when accounting for factors like varying neutron energy spectra, mean photon energies, body orientation within the radiation field, and transient effects on dosimeter response, etc., the end value is a dosimetric quantity defined for very specific radiological conditions and determined within a simple phantom usually at a single depth. Of more importance is the biological response to the radiation, which will vary by person and can be affected by the individual’s radiation sensitivity, age, gender, mass, and underlying health conditions. The overall biological, person-specific response to a given dose cannot be precisely determined except by patient symptom observation and individual biological dosimetry (e.g. chromosome analysis, lymphocyte ratios, etc.). This work describes and discusses the criticality accident dosimetry program at the Y-12 National Security Complex, a United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration facility. In conclusion, the primary goals of the Y-12 accident dosimetry program are, among others, the rapid identification of significantly exposed persons, prompt routing of exposed workers for medical evaluation and treatment, and the ultimate processing of dosimeters to assign doses to personnel.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Training calibration-based counterfactual explainers for deep learning models in medical image analysis

The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence methods in healthcare is coupled with the critical need for techniques to rigorously introspect models and thereby ensure that they behave reliably. This has led to the design of explainable AI techniques that uncover the relationships between discernible data signatures and model predictions. In this context, counterfactual explanations that synthesize small, interpretable changes to a given query while producing desired changes in model predictions have become popular. This under-constrained, inverse problem is vulnerable to introducing irrelevant feature manipulations, particularly when the model’s predictions are not well-calibrated. Hence, in this paper, we propose the TraCE (training calibration-based explainers) technique, which utilizes a novel uncertainty-based interval calibration strategy for reliably synthesizing counterfactuals. Given the wide-spread adoption of machine-learned solutions in radiology, our study focuses on deep models used for identifying anomalies in chest X-ray images. Using rigorous empirical studies, we demonstrate the superiority of TraCE explanations over several state-of-the-art baseline approaches, in terms of several widely adopted evaluation metrics. Our findings show that TraCE can be used to obtain a holistic understanding of deep models by enabling progressive exploration of decision boundaries, to detect shortcuts, and to infer relationships between patient attributes and disease severity.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cutaneous and local radiation injuries

The threat of a large-scale radiological or nuclear (R/N) incident looms in the present-day climate, as noted most recently in an editorial in Scientific American (March 2021). These large-scale incidents are infrequent but affect large numbers of people. Smaller-scale R/N incidents occur more often, affecting smaller numbers of people. There is more awareness of acute radiation syndrome (ARS) in the medical community; however, ionising radiation-induced injuries to the skin are much less understood. Here, this article will provide an overview of radiation-induced injuries to the skin, deeper tissues, and organs. The history and nomenclature; types and causes of injuries; pathophysiology; evaluation and diagnosis; current medical management; and current research of the evaluation and management are presented. Cutaneous radiation injuries (CRI) or local radiation injuries (LRI) may lead to cutaneous radiation syndrome, a sub-syndrome of ARS. These injuries may occur from exposure to radioactive particles suspended in the environment (air, soil, water) after a nuclear detonation or an improvised nuclear detonation (IND), a nuclear power plant incident, or an encounter with a radioactive dispersal or exposure device. These incidents may also result in a radiation-combined injury; a chemical, thermal, or traumatic injury, with radiation exposure. Skin injuries from medical diagnostic and therapeutic imaging, medical misadministration of nuclear medicine or radiotherapy, occupational exposures (including research) to radioactive sources are more common but are not the focus of this manuscript. Diagnosis and evaluation of injuries are based on the scenario, clinical picture, and dosimetry, and may be assisted through advanced imaging techniques. Research-based multidisciplinary therapies, both in the laboratory and clinical trial environments, hold promise for future medical management. Great progress is being made in recognising the extent of injuries, understanding their pathophysiology, as well as diagnosis and management; however, research gaps still exist.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Mathematical solutions in internal dose assessment: A comparison of Python-based differential equation solvers in biokinetic modeling

Abstract In biokinetic modeling systems employed for radiation protection, biological retention and excretion have been modeled as a series of discretized compartments representing the organs and tissues of the human body. Fractional retention and excretion in these organ and tissue systems have been mathematically governed by a series of coupled first-order ordinary differential equations (ODEs). The coupled ODE systems comprising the biokinetic models are usually stiff due to the severe difference between rapid and slow transfers between compartments. In this study, the capabilities of solving a complex coupled system of ODEs for biokinetic modeling were evaluated by comparing different Python programming language solvers and solving methods with the motivation of establishing a framework that enables multi-level analysis. The stability of the solvers was analyzed to select the best performers for solving the biokinetic problems. A Python-based linear algebraic method was also explored to examine how the numerical methods deviated from an analytical or semi-analytical method. Results demonstrated that customized implicit methods resulted in an enhanced stable solution for the inhaled 60 Co (Type M) and 131 I (Type F) exposure scenarios for the inhalation pathway of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 130 Human Respiratory Tract Model (HRTM). The customized implementation of the Python-based implicit solvers resulted in approximately consistent solutions with the Python-based matrix exponential method ( expm ). The differences generally observed between the implicit solvers and expm are attributable to numerical precision and the order of numerical approximation of the numerical solvers. This study provides the first analysis of a list of Python ODE solvers and methods by comparing their usage for solving biokinetic models using the ICRP Publication 130 HRTM and provides a framework for the selection of the most appropriate ODE solvers and methods in Python language to implement for modeling the distribution of internal radioactivity.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Temporal Characterization of Tritium Smear Activities

Tritium collection efficiency varies as a function of smear media. The use of porous smear materials leads to an increase in the measured tritium activity as a function of time when the measurement is performed with liquid scintillation counters. Operational inclusion of the efficiency differences and the time dependence of the tritium smear activity is necessary to preclude inadvertently releasing materials or areas. Thomas Jefferson National Laboratory Radiological Control Department identified a contaminated stainless steel containment vessel that previously housed a target containing more than 37 TBq of tritium. The item was systematically sectioned and surveyed to compare three smear types: water-wetted cotton swabs, water-wetted paper smears, and ethanol-wetted Styrofoam wipes (NUC-Wipes™). The total activity of each section was determined using repeated decontamination. The time dependence of the measured activity was also studied. The measured activity of both paper smears and cotton swabs showed significant time dependence. The cotton swabs also showed significantly reduced collection efficiency. Given the widespread use of both of these media in routine contamination surveys, site operational limits were derived using fitted curves for time dependence and average efficiency results. In conclusion, the use of these more restrictive limits allows for rapid measurement of tritium smears while ensuring regulatory compliance.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Triage Methods for Criticality Accidents

Studies indicate that early identification of persons involved in and receiving high doses of radiation in accidents is key to providing life-saving medical treatment. Although the risk of criticality accidents is low the potential impact to workers is significant. For facilities that employ large numbers of workers a key element in the response to a radiological emergency is identifying personnel that received significant, and potentially harmful, doses. Also important is having the ability to screen large numbers of workers to identify persons that did not receive significant exposure so as to reduce the impact on emergency response efforts. At the Y-12 National Security Complex the focus on criticality accident response is the rapid triage of personnel in order to identify persons exposed to large radiation doses and to prioritize those persons receiving the highest exposures. Once identified personnel are transported to local medical facilities including the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) for medical evaluation and treatment. The Y-12 external dosimetry program utilizes a number of techniques to identify and prioritize workers and these methods were evaluated at a criticality dosimetry intercomparison exercise. Finally, the methods used were shown to perform as intended and other sites may consider incorporating these methods into their accident dosimetry response procedures.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2025

On the Necessity of Adopting Irradiation Protocols Recommended by the Compatibility in Irradiation Research Protocols Expert Roundtable (CIRPER) in Published Research and Why It Matters to Health Physicists

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) seeks to assist and support all partners in the fields of radiobiology, health physics, radiation physics, and related areas to transition from cesium-137 chloride-based technologies that can potentially be used in an act of terrorism to X-ray technologies. The absence of information on experimental procedures, equipment, and irradiation parameters directly and negatively impacts the reproducibility and translatability of a sizable portion of radiation biology studies. It also discourages researchers from adopting new tools that eliminate the risks of a radiological dispersal device.

Stern, Warren [Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL↗
DOE OSTI2026

Statistical Uncertainty of Inhalation Dose Coefficients: Impact of Particle Deposition in ICRP 66 Human Respiratory Tract Model

Inhaled radioactive materials can pose a long-term health concern, as the material can be incorporated into the body’s metabolic pathways and remain in organs and tissues for extended durations. During the retention period, the radioactive material may localize in a source organ and irradiate adjacent target organs and tissues. Distribution of these materials changes over time, requiring biokinetic modeling to evaluate their movement through various tissues and organs. The evolving distribution depends on multiple inputs characterizing the inhaled material, such as particle size and size distribution, particle density, aspect ratio, specific radionuclide, the chemical form, and solubility. In addition, biological parameters such as breathing rate, breathing type (nasal or nasal/oral), respiratory system morphometry, tidal volume, functional residual capacity, and anatomical dead space all influence material transport. These aerosol properties and physiological characteristics of the respiratory tract jointly define a range of initial conditions that influence the time-dependent distribution of radioactive material. To evaluate both uncertainty in the initial conditions of inhalation exposure and the final output (committed effective dose) from biokinetic models, a Python-based software tool, Radiological Exposure Dose Calculator (REDCAL), was developed to propagate uncertainty within the human respiratory tract model. Focusing on deposition fraction uncertainty, the primary objective was to characterize the initial activity distribution across respiratory regions as a function of anticipated particle sizes and distributions. The impact of the deposition fraction uncertainty was propagated to committed effective dose coefficients for selected radionuclides in a companion publication. For each particle size, a lognormal distribution, characterized by its geometric mean as defined within ICRP Publication 66, serves as the basis for introducing uncertainty into the physical processes governing deposition in various lung regions. Finally, this study addresses the deposition process and examines how uncertainty in deposition mechanisms affects activity distribution in the airways, ultimately presenting the expected range and standard deviation of deposited activity as a function of particle size.

International Commission on Radiological Protectio↗
DOE OSTI2024

Preliminary Study of Iodine Gas Removal in Sodium Pools

Potential iodine gas release from failed fuel pins is a critical factor in the source term analysis of oxide fuel-loaded sodium fast reactors (SFRs). The accumulated iodine-containing gas mixtures inside pin plenums are expected to be ejected during pin failures and rise through sodium pool, with potential release of gaseous iodine to the cover gas region. Due to its potential radiological impacts, a proper assessment of iodine behavior is necessary for an accurate source term assessment. Throughout the bubble rise trajectory in the sodium pool, iodine gas is continuously removed or transformed at the bubble interface by diffusion, as the combining reaction between the iodine and sodium to form sodium iodide (NaI) is a chemically preferred process. As the final amount of iodine released from the facility is strongly influenced by the removal phenomenon inside the sodium pool, experiments were previously performed by PNC (Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation) to provide insight into this phenomenon. To assess the accuracy of present methods for predicting iodine gas removal within sodium pools, several candidate approaches, available in source term analysis codes, have been summarized and evaluated in this study. Spherical cap bubbles and spherical bubbles are considered in accordance with the methods adopted in each approach, and different forms of correlations for major parameters have been implemented in accordance with the original adoptions. Based on the summarized results, important aspects to be considered have been derived.

Decontamination↗
DOE OSTI2020

Replacement of Cobalt in Medical Device Sterilization: Current Trends, Opportunities and Barriers to Adoption of X-ray and E-Beam Within the Medical Device Sterilization Market

Radioactive sources, specifically Co-60, are crucially important to the medical device sterilization industry; however, their benefits must be balanced against the need to ensure that the materials are secure. Accelerator-based sterilization methods, including X-ray and E-Beam, can in many cases sufficiently replace Co-60 and ethylene oxide, the dominant modalities currently in use; however, a lack of hands-on experience with accelerators, regulations, and a lack of capacity have hampered faster adoption of these technologies. The market is likely to change, however, given public pressures against ethylene oxide and concerns over the cost and long-term supply chain robustness of Co-60. This may provide an opportunity for growth for accelerator capabilities. Current research at Sandia National Laboratories and Argonne National Laboratory, on behalf of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Radiological Security, is focused on developing an understanding of the medical device sterilization marketplace, the different modalities that are used to sterilize goods, and the drivers that affect the actors within it. Research at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, in conjunction with the medical device sterilization industry, has focused on expanding the industry’s understanding of the capabilities of X-ray sterilization and developing data that can inform the industry’s consideration of a transition towards accelerator-based devices.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: (Jan 1 - Dec 31 2018)

During the late 1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted a series of safety experiments to determine if a nuclear device subjected to a large conventional explosives detonation would result in a nuclear yield. The AEC obtained temporary use of a large portion of western Emigrant Valley from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for one of these experiments: Project 57. Following the Project 57 safety experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Emigrant Valley is part of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). For safety and security reasons, access to the NTTR is controlled using both physical (i.e., fences) and administrative (e.g., signs and postings) controls. Therefore, the public cannot access the Project 57 site and there are no known human receptors that routinely access the site. Project 57 was detonated on April 24, 1957, in Emigrant Valley approximately 13 mi (21 km) northeast of the north end of Yucca Flat. This test was undertaken to develop: (1) a means of estimating immediate distribution and long-term redistribution of plutonium dispersed during a nonnuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in likely plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of decontaminating ground areas, pavements, and building materials; and (4) alpha survey instruments and field monitoring procedures to promptly estimate contaminant deposition. Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the ground surface. Various radiological surveys have been performed in the area since Project 57 was conducted. The AEC delineated the area containing radioactive material based on radioactivity surveys performed shortly after the test was conducted. A designated Contamination Area (CA), marked by a fence, was established later. The distribution of americium-241 (Am-241) in the area was determined again in a 1997 flyover, which showed Am-241 ranging from as much as 70,000 counts per second (cps) at ground zero to background (<70 cps). This survey also documented Am-241 radioactivity on the ground surface beyond the east side CA fence at levels of up to 150 cps. In 2007, the DOE expanded the CA by posting “Contamination Area” signs 200 ft to 400 ft (60 m to 120 m) beyond the original fence, which formed a new CA boundary.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through September 30, 2020, with a Review of the Period of Record Radionuclide Analyses

The DOE Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) identified the Project 57 contaminated area as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 415, Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion Site, which consisted of one Corrective Action Site (CAS): NAFR-23- 02, Pu Contaminated Soil (U.S. DOE, 2014). The CAS included several Project 57 operational facilities in addition to the plutonium-contaminated soil. With approval of the State of Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, the DOE closed the Project 57 surface soil contamination site in October 2020. Closure was accomplished by installing a clean soil cap constructed over ground zero and the surrounding areas of the CA that may be entrained with wind-transported soil particles. After completion of the ground zero cap in October 2020, DRI discontinued monitoring of meteorological and associated environmental conditions at the Project 57 site as directed by DOE EM NV. Navarro dismantled air monitoring stations P57-3 and P57-4 and removed the equipment on October 20, 2020. This report presents the meteorological and dust observations and radiological analyses accomplished during the approximately 10 months when the air monitoring data collection equipment was operational during CY2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

User's Manual for RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4: Vol. 2 - User's Guide for RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4

The RESRAD-BUILD computer code is designed to assess radiological doses to individuals who live or work in a building contaminated with radioactive material. The code is equipped with a user-friendly interface that has many features to facilitate using the computer code and understanding the results. The design of the interface provides various options, from entering data and performing calculations to displaying calculation results. General and context-specific help are available, providing information on editing and viewing the radionuclide database, the definitions of input parameters and their use in the calculations, and the selection of the calculation results for placement into other applications. Two types of sensitivity analysis are supported by the code, i.e., deterministic and probabilistic, that can be used to study the influence of input parameters on the calculation results. This user’s guide provides instructions to help users on how to install the RESRAD-BUILD code, navigate the interface, and use the various features to set up a dose/risk analysis and to view/print the results in text and graphical outputs.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2022

User’s Manual for RESRAD-BUILD Code V.4: Vol. 1 – Methodology and Models Used in RESRAD-BUILD Code

The RESRAD-BUILD computer code models radionuclide release and transport in indoor environments and performs pathway analyses to evaluate the potential radiological dose and risk incurred by an individual who works or lives in a building contaminated with radioactive material or housing radioactively contaminated furniture or equipment. The code provides four geometries to characterize a radiation source: point, line, area, and volume, in which radionuclides are homogeneously distributed. Radionuclides contained in a source are considered to be released to the indoor air due to various processes including erosion (mechanically or weathering), diffusion (for tritium and radon in a volume source), or emanation (radon in a point, line, or area source). The release can proceed through different time phases with different rates. In RESRAD-BUILD Version 4.0, a dynamic ventilation model is implemented to simulate the fate and transport of source material particles and radionuclides after their releases. This dynamic ventilation model considers (1) air exchange between rooms in the building and between the rooms and the outdoor environment, (2) deposition from air to floor, (3) resuspension from the floor to the air, and (4) periodical vacuuming that reduces the floor deposition. The fate and transport modeling provides estimates of radionuclide concentrations in the source, in the air, and on the floor at different times, which are then integrated over the exposure duration for the calculation of radiation doses and cancer risks. A single run of the RESRAD-BUILD code can model a building with up to 9 rooms, 10 sources, and 10 receptors. The potential radiation dose and cancer risk incurred by each receptor are calculated for seven exposure pathways: (1) external radiation directly from the sources (accounting for shielding), (2) external radiation from radioactive particles deposited on the floors, (3) external radiation from airborne radionuclides, (4) inhalation of airborne radionuclides, (5) inhalation of radon and radon progenies, (6) inadvertent ingestion of radioactive particles directly from the source, and (7) ingestion of radioactive particles deposited on the floors. Various exposure scenarios can be modeled with RESRAD-BUILD, including but are not limited to, office worker, renovation worker, decontamination worker, building visitor, and resident. Both deterministic and probabilistic analyses can be performed to obtain results in both text reports and graphic displays.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening-level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program mixing-cell model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer-code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). It is highly unlikely the test scenarios evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health based on comparisons of calculated dose and concentration against regulatory standards and risk-based screening levels. Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of possible radionuclide releases are far below federal radiation protection standards. Conservative estimates of potential contaminant concentrations in groundwater are less than federal drinking water standards or screening levels. Predicted radionuclide concentrations in surface soils are below risk-based screening levels, except for Ge-68 (material Ga-68) for the worker. The Ge-68 soil concentration can be made less than the worker PRG, if the number of annual tests using Ga-68 is reduced from 12 to 6. However, the sum of ratios still exceeds one because of the high K-40 ratio. If the EF of the worker (number of days the worker is in the contaminated testing area) is reduced from 225 days/yr (default value for full time worker) to 112 days/yr, the Ge-68 ratio is less than one and the sum of ratios is less than one. Actual radiation doses and groundwater and surface-soil concentrations are likely to be much less than those calculated because of the conservative assumptions and parameters employed in the modeling. For example, atmospheric-transport calculations assume the entire inventory of each material type is readily released to the atmosphere and no plume deposition, depletion, or radioactive decay occurs during transport. The calculations also assume the same meteorological conditions (e.g., wind velocity, wind direction, stability class) that produce the maximum 95th percentile concentration (i.e., concentration representing the 95th percentile of a distribution of concentrations derived from 3 years of hourly meteorological data) at each receptor location are the same for all 12 tests during the year, and each receptor is assumed to be present during all 12 tests. The surface-soil assessment assumes the entire inventory of each test is deposited in the top 5 cm of soil. No atmospheric dispersal is assumed, and the radionuclides are subject only to leaching and radioactive decay. The groundwater-pathway modeling is conservative in that it is one-dimensional in the unsaturated zone (no lateral spreading/dilution) and assumes the entire inventory of contaminants infiltrates into the ground at the same location for every test. This is especially conservative for particulate radionuclides because they would have to dissolve or corrode first and some would be dispersed into the atmosphere. The groundwater receptor is also assumed to consume water directly from a hypothetical well positioned in the location of maximum concentration. In addition, conservative degradation rates were used, and volatilization was not considered for the nonradradioactive chemicals modeled. And finally, the calculations assume all 12 tests will be performed at the same place at both locations, and all 11 radioactive material types will be used for each test. This is conservative because it is anticipated that no more than two material types will be used per test.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Domestic Extremism (Executive Summary)

Domestic extremism (DE) has been a growing concern in the U.S. in recent months, as illustrated in multiple bulletins from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) warning law enforcement partners of the heightened threat. As concerns about these actors grows, it is important that facilities in the U.S. and internationally that protect critical assets, such as sensitive information, hazardous materials, or critical infrastructure, have effective methods in place to secure those assets. DE has challenged security systems through the danger of insider attack and violence, creating a new threat to be countered. In this effort, therefore, we used a literature review and focus group discussions with experts in critical asset security and extremism to understand the nature of the domestic extremist threat, to identify best practices in securing assets, recognize potential gaps in security measures to be corrected, and recommend actions for the Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to address DE with its partners.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Baseline Hypothetical Facility for the Production of 131 I, 99 Mo, and 133 Xe from HALEU Fission Targets

The report describes the development of a hypothetical facility to produce the pharmaceutical radioisotope 131 I at an amount of 60 curies per week via the fission of a High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) target, along with the chemical and physical processes and equipment needed to separate the 131 I and co-produced 99 Mo and 133 Xe. The hypothetical design was carried out using a 10 MWt research reactor. The irradiation calculation determined that three HALEU targets with aluminum cladding can be used to produce 60 Ci/week of 131 I, 750 Ci/week of 99 Mo and 560 Ci/week of 133 Xe. The process selected for the baseline design uses caustic dissolution of the target material with ion exchange processes to separate and purify the iodine and molybdenum. The xenon is processed using a cryogenic carbon bed separation process. Target processing occurs in seven shielded hot cells with a total footprint of 16m 2 and waste management occurs in an eight hot cell with a 2.5 m 2 footprint. Waste generated from the processing of the three targets per week would generate less than 4 shielded drums of waste annually. These hot cells would need varying levels of shielding due to the amount of fission products being handled in the unit. Hot cell facilities also require support services including QA/QC, health physics, administrative staff, operator changing room, radiological buffer areas, and waste storage. The overall facility would require a footprint of 1050 m 2 with 20.25 m 2 of shielded hot cells.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗