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NASA NTRS1988

Alignment verification procedures

In alignment verification procedures each laboratory is required to align its test machines and gripping fixtures to produce a nearly uniform tensile stress field on an un-notched sheet specimen. The blank specimens (50 mm w X 305 mm l X 2.3 mm th) supplied by the coordinators were strain gauged. Strain gauge readings were taken at all gauges (n = 1 through 10). The alignment verification procedures are as follows: (1) zero all strain gauges while specimen is in a free-supported condition; (2) put strain-gauged specimen in the test machine so that specimen front face (face 1) is in contact with reference jaw (standard position of specimen), tighten grips, and at zero load measure strains on all gauges. (epsilon sub nS0 is strain at gauge n, standard position, zero load); (3) with specimen in machine and at a tensile load of 10 kN measure strains (specimen in standard position). (Strain = epsilon sub nS10); (4) remove specimen from machine. Put specimen in machine so that specimen back face (face 2) is in contact with reference jaw (reverse position of specimen), tighten grips, and at zero load measure strains on all gauges. (Strain - epsilon sub nR0); and (5) with specimen in machine and at tensile load of 10 kN measure strains (specimen in reverse position). (epsilon sub nR10 is strain at gauge n, reverse position, 10 kN load).

Edwards, P. R.↗

DOE OSTI2026

Evaluation of AI-Enabled Digital Documented Safety Analysis: A Case Study

Safety basis documentation development and review under U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) authorization have emerged as critical constraint throttling deployment of advanced nuclear reactors, with traditional processes demanding extraordinary resource investment that delays the delivery of these technologies. Traditional Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) processes rely on static documents with limited traceability [U.S. DOE]. The regulatory review and engagement processes are similarly constrained, often requiring significant effort and extensive manual verification. The scale of this challenge is exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review of the NuScale application, which required over 250,000 staff hours and the evaluation of approximately two million pages of documentation [Bergman 2021]. The volume and complexity of information within nuclear licensing applications or authorization reviews demands innovative approaches to document generation and data management.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS1998

TOPEX/Poseidon orbit maintenance for the first five years

The TOPEX/Poseidon orbit maintenance strategy was changed following launch to include the effects of observed unmodeled, and hence anomalous, along-track accelerations. The anomalous force causes the semi-major axis, a, to either increase (called "boost") or decrease ("deboost" or "decay") depending on the satellite attitude and solar array pitch angle offset. Although this force is the most uncertain parameter in ground track prediction, it has been used as a passive technique for orbit maintenance, thereby reducing the number of propulsive maneuvers, enhancing maneuver spacing, and to place maneuvers at convenient times. This passive technique was first demonstrated in May 1993. The TOPEX/Poseidon orbit has been uniquely maintained using both passive (non-propulsive) and active (propulsive) maneuvers. Furthermore, the orbit has been maintained using only the passive technique since the ninth orbit maintenance maneuver on January 15, 1996. Only nine orbit maintenance maneuvers have been required to maintain the ground track, including verification site over flights, since achieving the operational orbit on September 21, 1992 (mission requirement: 95% within +/- l km). During this period, a has varied within 7,714,429 +/- 7 m, while the inclination i periodically fluctuated in the range 66.0408 deg. +/- 0.0040 deg. The frozen orbit (required e < 0.001 and omega approximately equals to 90 deg.) has been maintained without any dedicated eccentricity maneuvers. The frozen eccentricity vector has completed two periodic cycles and it is currently tracing its third cycle (period approximately equals 26.7 months).

Bhat, R. S.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Guidance and Control Software Project Data - Volume 3: Verification Documents

The Guidance and Control Software (GCS) project was the last in a series of software reliability studies conducted at Langley Research Center between 1977 and 1994. The technical results of the GCS project were recorded after the experiment was completed. Some of the support documentation produced as part of the experiment, however, is serving an unexpected role far beyond its original project context. Some of the software used as part of the GCS project was developed to conform to the RTCA/DO-178B software standard, "Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification," used in the civil aviation industry. That standard requires extensive documentation throughout the software development life cycle, including plans, software requirements, design and source code, verification cases and results, and configuration management and quality control data. The project documentation that includes this information is open for public scrutiny without the legal or safety implications associated with comparable data from an avionics manufacturer. This public availability has afforded an opportunity to use the GCS project documents for DO-178B training. This report provides a brief overview of the GCS project, describes the 4-volume set of documents and the role they are playing in training, and includes the verification documents from the GCS project. Volume 3 contains four appendices: A. Software Verification Cases and Procedures for the Guidance and Control Software Project; B. Software Verification Results for the Pluto Implementation of the Guidance and Control Software; C. Review Records for the Pluto Implementation of the Guidance and Control Software; and D. Test Results Logs for the Pluto Implementation of the Guidance and Control Software.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Validation and Verification (V&V) of Safety-Critical Systems Operating Under Off-Nominal Conditions

Loss of control (LOC) remains one of the largest contributors to aircraft fatal accidents worldwide. Aircraft LOC accidents are highly complex in that they can result from numerous causal and contributing factors acting alone or more often in combination. Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these accidents. Research is underway at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the development of advanced onboard system technologies for preventing or recovering from loss of vehicle control and for assuring safe operation under off-nominal conditions associated with aircraft LOC accidents. The transition of these technologies into the commercial fleet will require their extensive validation and verification (V&V) and ultimate certification. The V&V of complex integrated systems poses highly significant technical challenges and is the subject of a parallel research effort at NASA. This chapter summarizes the V&V problem and presents a proposed process that could be applied to complex integrated safety-critical systems developed for preventing aircraft LOC accidents. A summary of recent research accomplishments in this effort is referenced.

Belcastro, Christine M.↗

NASA NTRS2012

A Design Rationale Capture Tool to Support Design Verification and Re-use

A design rationale tool (DR tool) was developed to capture design knowledge to support design verification and design knowledge re-use. The design rationale tool captures design drivers and requirements, and documents the design solution including: intent (why it is included in the overall design); features (why it is designed the way it is); information about how the design components support design drivers and requirements; and, design alternatives considered but rejected. For design verification purposes, the tool identifies how specific design requirements were met and instantiated within the final design, and which requirements have not been met. To support design re-use, the tool identifies which design decisions are affected when design drivers and requirements are modified. To validate the design tool, the design knowledge from the Taxiway Navigation and Situation Awareness (T-NASA; Foyle et al., 1996) system was captured and the DR tool was exercised to demonstrate its utility for validation and re-use.

design verification↗

NASA NTRS2011

Range 7 Scanner Integration with PaR Robot Scanning System

An interface bracket and coordinate transformation matrices were designed to allow the Range 7 scanner to be mounted on the PaR Robot detector arm for scanning the heat shield or other object placed in the test cell. A process was designed for using Rapid Form XOR to stitch data from multiple scans together to provide an accurate 3D model of the object scanned. An accurate model was required for the design and verification of an existing heat shield. The large physical size and complex shape of the heat shield does not allow for direct measurement of certain features in relation to other features. Any imaging devices capable of imaging the entire heat shield in its entirety suffers a reduced resolution and cannot image sections that are blocked from view. Prior methods involved tools such as commercial measurement arms, taking images with cameras, then performing manual measurements. These prior methods were tedious and could not provide a 3D model of the object being scanned, and were typically limited to a few tens of measurement points at prominent locations. Integration of the scanner with the robot allows for large complex objects to be scanned at high resolution, and for 3D Computer Aided Design (CAD) models to be generated for verification of items to the original design, and to generate models of previously undocumented items. The main components are the mounting bracket for the scanner to the robot and the coordinate transformation matrices used for stitching the scanner data into a 3D model. The steps involve mounting the interface bracket to the robot's detector arm, mounting the scanner to the bracket, and then scanning sections of the object and recording the location of the tool tip (in this case the center of the scanner's focal point). A novel feature is the ability to stitch images together by coordinates instead of requiring each scan data set to have overlapping identifiable features. This setup allows models of complex objects to be developed even if the object is large and featureless, or has sections that don't have visibility to other parts of the object for use as a reference. In addition, millions of points can be used for creation of an accurate model [i.e. within 0.03 in. (=0.8 mm) over a span of 250 in. (=635 mm)].

Schuler, Jason↗

DOE OSTI2025

Single Grid Error Estimation for Neutron Transport Solvers

The method of nearby problems (MNP) is a solution verification technique that does not require the use of multiple spatial grids. To estimate spatial discretization error without requiring a high-fidelity spatial grid, an analytical curve fit is interpolated from the numerical solution. The residual between the curve fit solution and numerical solution is calculated and added as an additional source term to the governing equation. The nearby solution is estimated using the updated source term and boundary conditions to remain consistent with the curve fit interpolation. The nearby solution can be compared to the curve fit solution as a discretization error estimation while using a single spatial grid. Without the use of higher fidelity spatial grids, the MNP is able to approximate the spatial discretization error, a facet of solution verification. The application of the method of nearby problems is presented for one- and two-dimensional neutron transport problems for both fixed source and criticality problems on the spatial variable. The fixed source results demonstrate the effectiveness of nearby problems for spatial error identification using the discrete ordinates method. Criticality results are shown to identify area of high spatial error for the C5G7 problem as well as for the discrete ordinates solver. A novel approach of combining the capabilities of Monte Carlo with the discrete ordinates nearby problems is presented for one- and two-dimensional fixed source problems. In conclusion, the MNP demonstrates its effectiveness at identifying spatial error on a single structured grid with a wide variety of neutron transport problems.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

NASA NTRS1976

A system for automatic evaluation of simulation software

Within the field of computer software, simulation and verification are complementary processes. Simulation methods can be used to verify software by performing variable range analysis. More general verification procedures, such as those described in this paper, can be implicitly, viewed as attempts at modeling the end-product software. From software requirement methodology, each component of the verification system has some element of simulation to it. Conversely, general verification procedures can be used to analyze simulation software. A dynamic analyzer is described which can be used to obtain properly scaled variables for an analog simulation, which is first digitally simulated. In a similar way, it is thought that the other system components and indeed the whole system itself have the potential of being effectively used in a simulation environment.

Ryan, J. P.↗

DOE OSTI2025

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NASA NTRS2021

Verifying Mars 2020 Sampling and Caching Robotic Functions with Position Budgeting Process and Tool

The Mars 2020 Perseverance Rover was launched on July 30th, 2020 with one of the most complex robotic systems ever implemented on an interplanetary mission. Much of this robotic complexity resides in the Rover Sampling and Caching Subsystem (SCS) to enable collection of Martian samples for eventual return to earth and preparation of surfaces for close-up surface science observations. Two robotic arms are used by SCS: the large Robotic Arm (RA) positions the coring drill and science instruments mounted to the Turret for surface interactions, and the smaller Sample Handling Assembly (SHA) manipulates Sample Tube Assemblies (STA) within the Adaptive Caching Assembly (ACA) to prepare them for sample collection, processing, and hermetic sealing. The robotic arms interact with the Martian surface and other SCS components in many ways and in a variety of configurations, with positioning accuracy requirements ranging from tens of millimeters for some surface interactions down to sub-millimeter accuracy for some ACA interactions.This paper describes the process and tool used to calculate the SCS robotic interaction positioning budgets and verify the as-built hardware when delivered. To ensure that these robotic systems are able to perform their tasks, each robotic interaction with another element was broken down into its composite functions. To calculate a positioning budget margin for each function, an allowable was defined and then compared to the list of error sources that contribute to misalignment. Across the subsystem, over 250 functions were identified to be assessed, with almost 500 error sources feeding into their budget calculations. In addition to using as-built values in the budgets for SCS Verification and Validation (V&V) after the hardware was complete, these budgets were populated with design data during the design phase to identify areas of concern and guide hardware design to ensure positive position budget margins.Because of the size of the SCS team that had inputs to the positioning budgets and the sheer number of items in the budgets that needed to be created, updated, and verified, having a tool that would allow for simultaneous access and robust data integrity and processing was imperative. To accomplish this, a web-based MySQL database was created that allowed users to create function position budgets, link individual errors and allowables to them, and view function position budget margin reports. Each error and allowable records data for lateral, normal, angular, and clocking errors, with the ability to add as-built data for up to four different hardware builds. Margin reports can be generated for either design values alone or replacing design data with as-built data when available. These as-built reports are used for final verification of the SCS positioning requirements. Ultimately, the SCS positioning budget process and database tool led to successful interactions during test and an SCS robotic system that is ready to perform sample acquisition and caching on the surface of Mars.

Williams, Jeffrey↗

NASA NTRS1985

Shuttle avionics software trials, tribulations and success

The early problems and the solutions developed to provide the required quality software needed to support the space shuttle engine development program are described. The decision to use a programmable digital control system on the space shuttle engine was primarily based upon the need for a flexible control system capable of supporting the total engine mission on a large complex pump fed engine. The mission definition included all control phases from ground checkout through post shutdown propellant dumping. The flexibility of the controller through reprogrammable software allowed the system to respond to the technical challenges and innovation required to develop both the engine and controller hardware. This same flexibility, however, placed a severe strain on the capability of the software development and verification organization. The overall development program required that the software facility accommodate significant growth in both the software requirements and the number of software packages delivered. This challenge was met by reorganization and evolution in the process of developing and verifying software.

Henderson, O. L.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Anthropometric Measurement Procedures at the Anthropometry and Biomechanics Facility

The Anthropometry and Biomechanics Facility (ABF) at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) is the centralized source of anthropometry data at NASA for use in requirement development, engineering design, and verification of human-system integrations such as spacesuits and vehicles. To ensure the collection of consistent, accurate, and valid anthropometry data, ABF has defined anthropometric measurements and anatomical landmarks which are generally based on the Anthropometric Survey for US Army Personnel (ANSUR), but with additional measurements which have been uniquely designed for spacesuit and hardware accommodation purposes. Unlike ANSUR, NASA anthropometry measurements primarily rely on 3D body scanning, a method which allows for explicitly defining the process of collecting measurements and the quality control methods used to ensure measurement reliability. In addition to ABF’s anthropometry measurement definitions and procedures, this presentation will also compare specifics of different measurement techniques ABF uses, for example, laser scanning versus manual measurement methods (e.g., tape measure or anthropometer-based), and the benefits and considerations of each method. The evolution of ABF’s measurement process will also be addressed, as new spaceflight programs have been introduced which have required unique measurements and the need to capture body shape changes over time was identified to be critical for spacesuit fit in some instances.

Garima Gupta↗

NASA NTRS2024

Anthropometric Measurement Procedures at the Anthropometry and Biomechanics Facility

Garima Gupta↗

NASA NTRS2018

Collaborative Systems Engineering in the Ascent Abort-2 Crew Module/Separation Ring Project

Generally speaking, systems engineering (SE) tool-sets face a dilemma balancing power and accessibility. High-powered SE tools (MagicDraw, Cradle, Core, etc.) tend to be specialized and are available only to highly trained Systems Engineers, and/or through the use of a 'back room' developer team making the output products available to the broader team. On the other hand, highly accessible tools (MS Word, Excel, etc.) do not have the power to implement SE in a rigorous manner. NASA has to test all aspects of the new human-rated Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle spacecraft prior to its first crewed mission. The test program includes uncrewed launch abort flight tests to demonstrate the capability to save the crew in the event that a launch failure occurs. Orion's second abort flight test will be a low-altitude flight test known as "Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2)." This test is currently scheduled to be carried out at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 46 (SLC-46) in Florida in 2019. NASA's in-house AA-2 Crew Module and Separation Ring (CSR) Team is producing the crew module and separation ring. Operating jointly as both an Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Project and an Orion Project, the CSR project charter includes development of innovative, streamlined and generally more efficient practices for creation of flight hardware and software. One result of this tasking has been development of a collaborative and data-centric systems engineering environment within the team's shared web environment (Microsoft SharePoint). Through the use of built-in, 'out of the box capabilities' present in MS SharePoint, the CSR Systems Engineering team has created (with some limited developer support) a data-centric architecture for the project's SE implementation, including functional and interface analysis, requirements development and management, risk management, verification planning and management, test results, and end item management. Data elements are linked between data structures so as to define and control relationships between item types, link requirements to parents and children, and link tests to the requirements that they verify. The overall project team integration is increased by also linking SE content to project management content over the project life cycle, including team communication, action items, configuration management, decisional and meeting materials, and life cycle reviews. This presentation will provide an overview of the collaborative SE environment, showing how it provides the power for a number of SE tasks while still providing the accessibility and transparency to allow the full project team to collaborate and succeed. Given the project phase, we'll be able to present a nearly full lifecycle discussion, from concept through verification and approaching delivery.

Systems Engineering environments↗

NASA NTRS1993

EOS-AM precision pointing verification

The Earth Observing System (EOS) AM mission requires tight pointing knowledge to meet scientific objectives, in a spacecraft with low frequency flexible appendage modes. As the spacecraft controller reacts to various disturbance sources and as the inherent appendage modes are excited by this control action, verification of precision pointing knowledge becomes particularly challenging for the EOS-AM mission. As presently conceived, this verification includes a complementary set of multi-disciplinary analyses, hardware tests and real-time computer in the loop simulations, followed by collection and analysis of hardware test and flight data and supported by a comprehensive data base repository for validated program values.

Throckmorton, A.↗

NASA NTRS1992

Engineering verification of the biomass production chamber

The requirements for life support systems, both biological and physical-chemical, for long-term human attended space missions are under serious study throughout NASA. The KSC 'breadboard' project has focused on biomass production using higher plants for atmospheric regeneration and food production in a special biomass production chamber. This chamber is designed to provide information on food crop growth rate, contaminants in the chamber that alter plant growth requirements for atmospheric regeneration, carbon dioxide consumption, oxygen production, and water utilization. The shape and size, mass, and energy requirements in relation to the overall integrity of the biomass production chamber are under constant study.

Prince, R. P.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Thermal Protection for Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle: A Grand Challenge for Design Methodology and Reliability Verification

Mars Sample Return is our Grand Challenge for the coming decade. TPS (Thermal Protection System) nominal performance is not the key challenge. The main difficulty for designers is the need to verify unprecedented reliability for the entry system: current guidelines for prevention of backward contamination require that the probability of spores larger than 1 micron diameter escaping into the Earth environment be lower than 1 million for the entire system, and the allocation to TPS would be more stringent than that. For reference, the reliability allocation for Orion TPS is closer to 11000, and the demonstrated reliability for previous human Earth return systems was closer to 1100. Improving reliability by more than 3 orders of magnitude is a grand challenge indeed. The TPS community must embrace the possibility of new architectures that are focused on reliability above thermal performance and mass efficiency. MSR (Mars Sample Return) EEV (Earth Entry Vehicle) will be hit with MMOD (Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris) prior to reentry. A chute-less aero-shell design which allows for self-righting shape was baselined in prior MSR studies, with the assumption that a passive system will maximize EEV robustness. Hence the aero-shell along with the TPS has to take ground impact and not break apart. System verification will require testing to establish ablative performance and thermal failure but also testing of damage from MMOD, and structural performance at ground impact. Mission requirements will demand analysis, testing and verification that are focused on establishing reliability of the design. In this proposed talk, we will focus on the grand challenge of MSR EEV TPS and the need for innovative approaches to address challenges in modeling, testing, manufacturing and verification.

Design and Verification for Reliability↗