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Spirit is one of two rovers, that landed on Mars in January 2004 as part of NASA's Mars Exploration Rovers mission. Since then, Spirit has traveled over 4 kilometers accross the Martian surface while investigating rocks and soils, digging trenches to examine the subsurface environment, and climbing hills to reach outcrops of bedrock.
The Rover Sequencing and Visualization Program (RSVP) is a suite of tools for sequencing of planetary rovers, which are subject to significant light time delay and thus are unsuitable for teleoperation.
This paper presents a summary of the testing and analysis used to quantify the expected airbag landing loads for the Mars Exploration Rovers. The airbag drop test setup, lander instrumentation, and the test data reduction method are discussed in order to provide an understanding of the empirical loads. A set of limiting cases that bound the empirical data are developed for use in finite element modeling of the lander and rover models.
Over three decades ago, the Apollo missions manifestly demonstrated the value of a lunar rover to expand the exploration activities of lunar astronauts. The stated plan of the new Vision for Space Exploration to establish a permanent presence on the moon in the next decades gives new impetus to providing long range roving and exploration capability in support of the siting, construction, and maintenance of future human bases. The incorporation of radioisotope power systems and telerobotic capability in the design has the potential to significantly expand the capability of such a rover, allowing continuous operation during the full lunar day/night cycle, as well as enabling exploration in permanently shadowed regions that may be of interest to humans for the resources they may hold. This paper describes a concept that builds on earlier studies originated in the Apollo program for a Dual Mode (crewed and telerobotic) Lunar Roving Vehicle (DMLRV). The goal of this vehicle would be to provide a multipurpose infrastructure element and remote science platform for the exploration of the moon. The DMLRV would be essential for extending the productivity of human exploration crews, and would provide a unique capability for diverse long-range, long-duration science exploration between human visits. With minimal reconfiguration this vehicle could also provide the basic platform to support a range of site survey and preparation activities in anticipation of the establishment of a permanent human presence on the moon. A conceptual design is presented for the DMLRV, including discussion of mission architecture, vehicle performance, representative science payload accommodation, and equipment and crew radiation considerations.
n early 2004 JPL successfully landed two Rovers, named Spirit and Opportunity, on the surface of Mars after traveling >300 million miles over a 6-7 month period. In order to operate for extended duration on the surface of Mars, both Rovers are equipped with rechargeable Lithium-ion batteries, which were designed to aid in the launch, correct anomalies during cruise, and support surface operations in conjunction with a triple-junction deployable solar arrays. The requirements of the Lithium-ion battery include the ability to provide power at least 90 sols on the surface of Mars, operate over a wide temperature range (-20 C to +40 C), withstanding long storage periods (e.g., cruise period), operate in an inverted position, and support high currents (e.g., firing pyro events). In order to determine the viability of Lithium-ion technology to meet these stringent requirements, a comprehensive test program was implemented aimed at demonstrating the performance capability of prototype cells fabricated by Lithion, Inc. (Yardney Technical Products, Inc.). The testing performed includes, determining the (a) room temperature cycle life, (b) pulse capability as a function of temperature, (e) self-discharge and storage characteristics mission profile capability, (f) cycle life under mission simulation conditions, (g) impedance characteristics, (h) impact of cell orientation, and (i) performance in 8-cell engineering batteries. As will be discussed, the Lithium-ion prototype cells and batteries were demonstrated to meet, as well as, exceed the requirements defined by the mission.
The twin Mars Exploration Rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, were launched on June 10, 2003(dagger), and July 8, 2003, from Cape Canaveral, Florida. Spirit and Opportunity were targeted for landings at Gusev Crater (arrival on January 4, 2004) and Meridiani Planum (arrival on January 25, 2004). The primary navigation challenge was to deliver each spacecraft to the desired atmospheric entry interface point with sufficient accuracy such that each lander would touch down within a specified landing ellipse (about 70 km x 5 km) determined to be safe for landing and also judged to be scientifically interesting. In order to achieve landing within the target ellipse, precise control of the inertial entry flight path angle (FPA) at atmospheric entry was required. The maximum allowable errors in FPA following TCM-5 (trajectory correction maneuver #5) at Entry (E) - 2 days were +/-0.12(deg) (3(sigma)) for Spirit and +/-0.14(deg) (3(sigma)) for Opportunity. Achieving these entry delivery accuracies necessitated significant improvements to the interplanetary avigation system used for MER. These improvements included new processes and software for orbit determination, propulsive maneuver design, and entry, descent, and landing (EDL) trajectory simulation. The actual achieved atmospheric entry accuracies for Spirit and Opportunity significantly exceeded the requirements. At the navigation data cutoff for the TCM-5 final design, the orbit determination FPA knowledge error was +/-0.028(deg) (3(sigma) ) for Spirit and +/-0.035(deg) (3(sigma)) for Opportunity. Because of exceptionally accurate navigation performance, TCM-5 (E - 2 days) and TCM-6 (E - 4 hours) were canceled for both Spirit and Opportunity. The actual landing locations (determined from in-situ Doppler tracking between the MER rovers and the Mars Odyssey orbiter) differed from the target landing points by 10.1 km (downtrack) for Spirit and 24.6 km (downtrack) for Opportunity. The majority of the landing position offsets for both landers was primarily caused by variations in atmosphere and spacecraft aerodynamic modeling from what was predicted. The amount of the landing position offset caused by navigation-only errors was only 3.3 km (uptrack) for Spirit and 9.7 km (downtrack) for Opportunity.
The twin Mars Exploration Rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, were launched on June 10, 2003, and July 8, 2003, from Cape Canaveral, Florida. Spirit and Opportunity were targeted for landings at Gusev Crater (arrival on January 4, 2004) and Meridiani Planum (arrival on January 25, 2004). The primary navigation challenge was to deliver each spacecraft to the desired atmospheric entry interface point with sufficient accuracy such that each lander would touch down within a specified landing ellipse (about 70 km x 5 km) determined to be safe for landing and also judged to be scientifically interesting. In order to achieve landing within the target ellipse, precise control of the inertial entry flight path angle (FPA) at atmospheric entry was required. The maximum allowable errors in FPA following TCM-5 (trajectory correction maneuver #5) at Entry (E) -2 days were +/-0.12 deg(3 sigma) for Spirit and +/-0.14 deg(3 sigma) for Opportunity. Achieving these entry delivery accuracies necessitated significant improvements to the interplanetary navigation system used for MER. These improvements included new processes and software for orbit determination, propulsive maneuver design, and entry, descent, and landing (EDL) trajectory simulation. The actual achieved atmospheric entry accuracies for Spirit and Opportunity significantly exceeded the requirements. At the navigation data cutoff for the TCM-5 final design, the orbit determination FPA knowledge error was 0.028 deg(3 sigma) for Spirit and 0.035 deg(3 sigma) for Opportunity. Because of exceptionally accurate navigation performance, TCM-5 (E - 2 days) and TCM-6 (E - 4 hours) were canceled for both Spirit and Opportunity. The actual landing locations (determined from in-situ Doppler tracking between the MER rovers and the Mars Odyssey orbiter) differed from the target landing points by 10.1 km (downtrack) for Spirit and 24.6 km (downtrack) for Opportunity. The majority of the landing position offsets for both landers was primarily caused by variations in atmosphere and spacecraft aerodynamic modeling from what was predicted. The amount of the landing position offset caused by navigation-only errors was only 3.3 km (uptrack) for Spirit and 9.7 km (downtrack) for Opportunity.
The primary goal of this study is to examine the feasibility of using the novel Advanced RPS-driven Stirling thermoacoustic system to enable extended science operations in the extremely hostile surface environment of Venus. The mission concept entails landing a rover onto the Venus surface, conducting science measurements in different areas on the surface, and returning the science data to Earth. The study focused on developing a rover design to satisfy the science goals with the capability to operate for 60 days. This mission life influences several design parameters, including Earth elevation angle and the maximum communications range to Earth.
The premise of the design of operations for the Mars Exploration Rovers (MER) is that the vehicles will drive each day. As a result, they will encounter some aspect of the terrain environment that cannot be anticipated or otherwise accommodated by the sequences linked onboard that day. The operations team then must correct the problem by planning then commanding the execution of a different drive the next day. Often other aspects of the operation on the surface of Mars: environmental changes, component degradation, errors in sequence design or execution, etc., lead to anomalies which must be addressed before normal operations can resume. The operational design that makes it possible to recover from a driving error each day also reduces the time needed to recover from anomalies. As an example of the efficiency achieved, less than 5% (about 30 sols out of 700 sols of operations) of the time on the surface has been devoted to recovery from anomalies for each vehicle. In this paper the major anomalies experienced by the MER rovers will be recounted and the streamlined approaches to addressing these problems described. The operational flexibility developed for these missions is also a function of the system design that anticipated a number of likely faults and conditions arising from uncertainty in sequence execution and environmental change. This design will be described as well as the considerations in operation that motivated this design. These considerations will likely be present in any future surface mission.
The Mars Exploration Rovers Spirit and Opportunity successfully landed respectively at Gusev Crater and Meridiani Planum in January 2004. The rovers are essentially robotic geologists, sent on a mission to search for evidence in the rocks and soil pertaining to the historical presence of water and the ability to possibly sustain life. In order to conduct NASA's 'follow the water' strategy on opposite sides of the planet Mars, an interplanetary journey of over 300 million miles culminated with historic navigation precision. Rigorous trajectory targeting and control was necessary to achieve the atmospheric entry requirements for the selected landing sites. The propulsive maneuver design challenge was to meet or exceed these requirements while preserving the necessary design margin to accommodate additional project concerns. Landing site flexibility was maintained for both missions after launch, and even after the first trajectory correction maneuver for Spirit. The final targeting strategy was modified to improve delivery performance and reduce risk after revealing constraining trajectory control characteristics. Flight results are examined and summarized for the six trajectory correction maneuvers that were planned for each mission.
The twin rovers of the Mars Exploration Rover Project successfully landed on the surface of Mars in January 2004, and initiated a highly successful science and exploration campaign. This marked the culmination of an unprecedented four-year effort to design, build, launch, and operate two of the most complex planetary spacecraft ever built. The project was started in the aftermath of the 1999 Mars mission failures, and was commissioned to take advantage of the highly advantageous 2003 opportunity. The development schedule from project start to launch was only 35 months, so schedule management was the most significant challenge facing the project. This problem was compounded when early assumptions about the extent of design heritage from Mars Pathfinder proved to be flawed. The project derived a number of useful lessons learned in solving these challenges that can be applied to future missions.
A viewgraph presentation on the Cassini-Huygens Mars Exploration Rover is shown. The contents include: 1) Deep Space Network (DSN); 2) Saturn Cassini-Huygens; 3) Mars Exploration Rover; and 4) References.
During Mars Exploration Rover (MER) surface operations, the scientific data gathered by the in situ instrument suite has been invaluable with respect to the discovery of a significant water history at Meridiani Planum and the hint of water processes at work in Gusev Crater. Specifically, the ability to perform precision manipulation from a mobile platform (i.e., mobile manipulation) has been a critical part of the successful operation of Spirit and Opportunity rovers. As such, this paper describes the MER Instrument Positioning System that allows the in situ instruments to operate and collect their important science data using a robust, dexterous robotic arm combined with visual target selection and autonomous software functions.
The viewgraph presentation examines propulsion line heater design and problems in the Mars Rover. Topics include a Mars Exploration Rover (MER) project description and MER spacecraft configuration, mission overview, MER cruise stage hardware, thermal design drivers in the propulsion lines, propulsion line control set points prior to launch, MER A and B flight trajectories, MER A early and mid cruise flight experience, MER A and B mid cruise flight experience, MER B late cruise flight experience, and lessons learned
Perhaps the most challenging mission phase for the Mars Exploration Rovers was the Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL). During this phase, the entry vehicle attached to its cruise stage was transformed into a stowed tetrahedral Lander that was surrounded by inflated airbags through a series of complex events. There was only one opportunity to successfully execute an automated command sequence without any possible ground intervention. The success of EDL was reliant upon the system thermal design: 1) to thermally condition EDL hardware from cruise storage temperatures to operating temperature ranges; 2) to maintain the Rover electronics within operating temperature ranges without the benefit of the cruise single phase cooling loop, which had been evacuated in preparation for EDL; and 3) to maintain the cruise stage propulsion components for the critical turn to entry attitude. Since the EDL architecture was inherited from Mars Pathfinder (MPF), the initial EDL thermal design would be inherited from MPF. However, hardware and implementation differences from MPF ultimately changed the MPF inheritance approach for the EDL thermal design. With the lack of full inheritance, the verification and validation of the EDL thermal design took on increased significance. This paper will summarize the verification and validation approach for the EDL thermal design along with applicable system level thermal testing results as well as appropriate thermal analyses. In addition, the lessons learned during the system-level testing will be discussed. Finally, the in-flight EDL experiences of both MER-A and -B missions (Spirit and Opportunity, respectively) will be presented, demonstrated how lessons learned from Spirit were applied to Opportunity.
The Mars Exploration Rover (MER) project successfully landed two identical rovers on Mars in order to remotely conduct geologic investigations, including characterization of rocks and soils that may hold clues to past water activity. Two landing sites, Gusev crater and Meridiani Planum, were selected out of nearly 200 candidate sites after balancing science returns and flight system engineering and safety. Precise trajectory targeting and control was necessary to achieve the atmospheric entry requirements for the selected landing sites within the flight system constraints. This paper discusses the expected and achieved launch vehicle performance and the impacts of that performance on the first Trajectory Correction Maneuver (TCM-1) while maintaining targeting flexibility in accommodating additional project concerns about landing site safety and possible in-flight retargeting to alternate landing sites.
For the first time ever, engineers were able to observe a heatshield on the surface of another planet after a successful entry through the atmosphere. A three-week heatshield observation campaign was conducted in December 2004 after the Mars Exploration Rover Opportunity exited "Endurance Crater." By utilizing the rover's scientific instruments, data was collected to make a qualitative assessment of the performance of the heatshield. This data was gathered to gain a better understanding of how the heatshield performed during entry through the Martian atmosphere. In addition, this unprecedented look at the heatshield offered engineers the opportunity to assess if any unexpected anomalies occurred. Once a survey of the heatshield debris was completed, multiple targets of interest were chosen for the collection of imaging data. This data was then used to assess the char depth of the thermal protection material, which compared well with design and post-flight computational predictions. Extensive imaging data was collected and showed the main seal in pristine conditions, and no observable indications of structure overheating. Additionally, unexpected vehicle dynamics during the atmospheric entry were explained by the observation of thermal blanket remnants attached to the heatshield.
The Mars Science Laboratory rover and spacecraft utilize two mechanically pumped fluid loops for heat transfer to and from the internal electronics assemblies and the Radioisotope Thermo-Electric Generator (RTG). The heat transfer fluid is Freon R-11 (CFC-11) which has a large coefficient of thermal expansion. The Freon within the heat transfer system must have a volume for safe expansion of the fluid as the system temperature rises. The device used for this function is a gas-over-liquid accumulator. The accumulator uses a metal bellows to separate the fluid and gas sections. During expansion and contraction of the fluid in the system, the bellows extends and retracts to provide the needed volume change. During final testing of a spare unit, the bellows would not extend the full distance required to provide the needed expansion volume. Increasing the fluid pressure did not loosen the jammed bellows either. No amount of stroking the bellows back and forth would get it to pass the jamming point. This type of failure, if it occurred during flight, would result in significant overpressure of the heat transfer system leading to a burst failure at some point in the system piping. A loss of the Freon fluid would soon result in a loss of the mission. The determination of the source of the jamming of the bellows was quite elusive, leading to an extensive series of tests and analyses. The testing and analyses did indicate the root cause of the failure, qualitatively. The results did not provide a set of dimensional limits for the existing hardware design that would guarantee proper operation of the accumulator. In the end, a new design was developed that relied on good engineering judgment combined with the test results to select a reliable enough solution that still met other physical constraints of the hardware, the schedule, and the rover system.