Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Waste Packaging”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 433 records · Page 24

Secondary Waste Form Down Selection Data Package – Ceramicrete

As part of high-level waste pretreatment and immobilized low activity waste processing, liquid secondary wastes will be generated that will be transferred to the Effluent Treatment Facility on the Hanford Site for further treatment. These liquid secondary wastes will be converted to stable solid waste forms that will be disposed in the Integrated Disposal Facility. Currently, four waste forms are being considered for stabilization and solidification of the liquid secondary wastes. These waste forms are Cast Stone, Ceramicrete, DuraLith, and Fluidized Bed Steam Reformer. The preferred alternative will be down selected from these four waste forms. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is developing data packages to support the down selection process. The objective of the data packages is to identify, evaluate, and summarize the existing information on the four waste forms being considered for stabilization and solidification of the liquid secondary wastes. The information included will be based on information available in the open literature and from data obtained from testing currently underway. This data package is for the Ceramicrete waste form. Ceramicrete is a relatively new engineering material developed at Argonne National Laboratory to treat radioactive and hazardous waste streams (e.g., Wagh 2004; Wagh et al. 1999a, 2003; Singh et al. 2000). This cement-like waste form can be used to treat solids, liquids, and sludges by chemical immobilization, microencapsulation, and/or macroencapsulation. The Ceramicrete technology is based on chemical reaction between phosphate anions and metal cations to form a strong, dense, durable, low porosity matrix that immobilizes hazardous and radioactive contaminants as insoluble phosphates and microencapsulates insoluble radioactive components and other constituents that do not form phosphates. Ceramicrete is a type of phosphate-bonded ceramic, which are also known as chemically bonded phosphate ceramics. The Ceramicrete binder is formed through an acid-base reaction between calcined magnesium oxide (MgO; a base) and potassium hydrogen phosphate (KH{sub 2}PO{sub 4}; an acid) in aqueous solution. The reaction product sets at room temperature to form a highly crystalline material. During the reaction, the hazardous and radioactive contaminants also react with KH{sub 2}PO{sub 4} to form highly insoluble phosphates. In this data package, physical property and waste acceptance data for Ceramicrete waste forms fabricated with wastes having compositions that were similar to those expected for secondary waste effluents, as well as secondary waste effluent simulants from the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant were reviewed. With the exception of one secondary waste form formulation (25FA+25 W+1B.A. fabricated with the mixed simulant did not meet the compressive strength requirement), all the Ceramicrete waste forms that were reviewed met or exceeded Integrated Disposal Facility waste acceptance criteria.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NNSSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NNSS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project at (702) 295-7063 or fax to (702) 295-1153.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Shielded Payload Containers Will Enhance the Safety and Efficiency of the DOE's Remote Handled Transuranic Waste Disposal Operations

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) disposal operation currently employs two different disposal methods: one for Contact Handled (CH) waste and another for Remote Handled (RH) waste. CH waste is emplaced in a variety of payload container configurations on the floor of each disposal room. In contrast, RH waste is packaged into a single type of canister and emplaced in pre-drilled holes in the walls of disposal rooms. Emplacement of the RH waste in the walls must proceed in advance of CH waste emplacement. This poses a significant logistical constraint on waste handling operations by requiring significant coordination between waste characterization and preparations for shipping among the various generators. To improve operational efficiency, the Department of Energy (DOE) is proposing a new waste emplacement process for certain RH waste streams that can be safely managed in shielded containers. RH waste with relatively low gamma-emitting activity would be packaged in lead-lined containers, shipped to WIPP in existing certified transportation packages for CH waste, and emplaced in WIPP among the stacks of CH waste containers on the floor of a disposal room. RH waste with high gamma-emitting activity would continue to be emplaced in the boreholes along the walls. The new RH container appears essentially the same as a nominal 208-liter drum, but is built with about 2.5 cm of lead, sandwiched between thick steel sheet. The top and bottom are made of very thick plate steel, for strengthening the package to meet transportation requirements, and provide similar gamma attenuation. This robust configuration provides an overpack for waste that otherwise would be remotely handled. Up to a 3:1 reduction in number of shipments is projected if RH waste were transported in the proposed shielded containers. This paper describes the container design and testing, as well as the regulatory approach used to meet the requirements that apply to WIPP and its associated transportation system. This paper describes the RH transuranic waste inventory that may be candidates for packaging and emplacement in shielded containers. DOE does not propose to use shielded containers to increase the amount of RH waste allowed at WIPP. DOE's approach to gain approval for the transportation of shielded containers and to secure regulatory approval for use of shielded containers from WIPP regulators is discussed. Finally, the paper describes how DOE proposes to count the waste packaged into shielded containers against the RH waste inventory and how this will comply with the volume and radioactivity limitations imposed in the many and sometimes overlapping regulations that apply to WIPP. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC), Rev. 7-01

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC). The NTSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada Test Site (NTS) will accept low-level radioactive waste and mixed low-level waste for disposal. The NTSWAC includes requirements for the generator waste certification program, characterization, traceability, waste form, packaging, and transfer. The criteria apply to radioactive waste received at the NTS Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex for disposal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Advantages of the shielded containers at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) disposal operations currently employ two different disposal methods: one for Contact Handled (CH) waste and another for Remote Handled (RH) waste. CH waste is emplaced in a variety of payload container configurations on the floor of each disposal room. In contrast, RH waste is packaged into a single type of canister and emplaced in pre-drilled holes in the walls of disposal rooms. Emplacement of the RH waste in the walls must proceed in advance of CH waste emplacement and therefore poses logistical constraints, in addition to the loss of valuable disposal capacity. To improve operational efficiency and disposal capacity, the Department of Energy (DOE) has proposed a shielded container for certain RH waste streams. RH waste with relatively low gammaemitting activity would be packaged in lead-lined containers, shipped to WIPP in existing certified transportation packages for CH waste and emplaced in WIPP among the stacks of CH waste containers on the floor of a disposal room. RH waste with high gamma-emitting activity would continue to be emplaced in the boreholes along the walls. The new RH container is similar to the nominal 208-liter (55-gallon) drum, however it includes about 2.5 cm (1 in) of lead, sandwiched between thick steel sheets. Furthermore, the top and bottom are made of thick plate steel to strengthening the package to meet transportation requirements. This robust configuration provides an overpack for materials that otherwise would be RH waste. This paper describes the container and the regulatory approach used to meet the requirements imposed by regulations that apply to WIPP. This includes a Performance Assessment used to evaluate WIPP's long-term performance and the DOE's approach to gain approval for the transportation of shielded containers. This paper also describes estimates of the DOE's RH transuranic waste inventory that may be packaged and emplaced in shielded containers. Finally, the paper includes a discussion of how the DOE proposes to track the waste packaged into shielded containers against the RH waste inventory and how this will comply with the regulated volume.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Python Package for Fuel Cycle and Waste Management Analysis - 19545

The future of nuclear power utilization in the United States may involve a transition from the once-through light water reactor fuel cycle to a so-called advanced fuel cycle. An advanced fuel cycle may offer improvements in natural resource utilization, reactor safety, and environmental impact. In addition, adoption of an advanced fuel cycle will result in changes in the amount, composition, and disposal of the nuclear wastes they produce. Characteristics intrinsic to the wastes themselves, such as mass and radioactivity at specific times, were used as waste management metrics in the Department of Energy 2014 Fuel Cycle Evaluation and Screening (FCES) study. Binning of these metrics informed fuel cycle according to relative potential benefit. However, waste properties alone cannot qualify management strategy. Therefore, comparing fuel cycles from the perspective of waste management can provide additional insights. To that end, an object-oriented Python package has been developed to perform fuel cycle waste management calculations. The package, named nwpy (short for Nuclear Waste analysis in Python), mimics the mass flow operations reported in the FCES study and interfaces with the ORIGEN-S code to assess metric data as reported in the FCES. In addition, this Python package determines the loading of waste streams into forms suitable for final disposal in a geological repository and uses such data for repository performance assessment. This work describes the Python package methodology, assumptions, and capabilities. As input data, the package requires information about the fuel cycle such as the mass of fuel discharged, the cooling time between reactor discharge and subsequent operations, and the separations process efficiencies and waste forms it produces. In addition, the isotopic composition of the reactor discharge stream, such as that available from the FCES database, is required. With that, it can perform prescribed mass flow and decay operations throughout the back end of the fuel cycle, the latter carried out by the ORIGEN-S code distributed with the SCALE6.2 software suite. The result is time-dependent data characterizing the waste on a per-package basis. Package loading for waste streams depends on the stream form (i.e. UNF vs. HLW, or glass HLW from aqueous reprocessing vs. ceramic HLW from electrochemical processing) and is based on literature review and engineering assumption. As an example of the application of the code, calculations for the areal footprint of direct-contact repositories for different fuel cycles is shown. Development is ongoing, and the package is expected to grow incorporating capabilities for waste management analyses such as waste transportation and radionuclide transport through the biosphere. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Transporting Non-Compliant TRU Wastes in the OPTIMUS{sup TM} Packages - 20493

The OPTIMUS{sup TM} product line of packages was developed with the purpose of providing a versatile and modular packaging option for shipping problematic wastes and fissile material contents. The product line includes a high-activity design in the OPTIMUS-H and a low activity design in the OPTIMUS-L. The two variants utilize a singular containment vessel design, that is enclosed in different protective components that offer different levels of shielding along with thermal and impact protection. The thick shielding provided by the OPTIMUS-H packaging allows for higher activity contents than the OPTIMUS-L to be transported. But the lightweight design of the OPTIMUS-L packaging allows for more packages to be transported in a single shipment. The containment vessel design shared between the two packages provides leak-tight containment of all radioactive contents along with the capabilities to easily leak test and the option to inert and backfill the contents, as necessary, prior to each shipment of the package. Together the OPTIMUS package designs offer significant flexibility and are capable of handling a wide variety of waste materials and other radioactive contents. One of the primary contents covered in the initial design effort for these packages is TRU waste contents beyond the standard waste materials that are compliant with the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria. More specifically, the initial content of interest is TRU Waste drums containing sealed containers with potentially flammable gases. While there are multiple other packaging options available for transporting standard WIPP compliant TRU wastes, the goal of the OPTIMUS packages is to offer a superior option for transporting both standard TRU wastes as well as the more problematic non-compliant wastes, among other contents. The non-compliant TRU waste contents explicitly included for the OPTIMUS packages are standard aerosol cans and DOT 3E lecture bottles. However, the methods applied for the package containment can be easily adjusted to cover other sealed container types with potentially flammable gases. The primary challenges with including these items are both the obvious issue of potential for flammable gases (e.g. aerosol propellants) in the package, but also the uncertainty in the exact state of the contents. Because these desired contents are waste materials, the characterization of the materials present in the waste may include some uncertainties. For example, though it may be known that there are one or more aerosol cans in a TRU waste drum, it may not be known if this can is full, spent, or anywhere in between. Also there may be equal uncertainty in the contents of the aerosol can, specifically in the potentially flammable propellant remaining in the can. To include these types of non-compliant items as acceptable contents for the package, the methods utilized in the safety analyses of the OPTIMUS packages must consider all of the uncertainties in the characterization of the waste. The methods utilized cover a range of concerns with transporting contents of this nature including pressure buildup, gas generation, and gaseous combustion for demonstrating the containment of the package. The ability to transport these problematic contents in the OPTIMUS packages gives TRU waste generating sites the option to relocate these drums to an offsite location where the non-compliant items can be properly managed through removal or destruction. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Waste Form Release Data Package for the 2005 Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment. Erratum

This report refers to or contains K g values for glasses LAWA44, LAWB45 and LAWC22 affected by calculations errors as identified by Papathanassiu et al. (2011). The corrected K g values are reported in an erratum included in the revised version of the original report. The revised report can be referenced as follows: Pierce E. M. et al. (2004) Waste Form Release Data Package for the 2005 Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment. PNNL-14805 Rev. 0 Erratum. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA, USA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Container Approval for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste with Negligible Heat Generation in the German Konrad Repository - 12148

Since the license for the Konrad repository was finally confirmed by legal decision in 2007, the Federal Institute for Radiation Protection (BfS) has been performing further planning and preparation work to prepare the repository for operation. Waste conditioning and packaging has been continued by different waste producers as the nuclear industry and federal research institutes on the basis of the official disposal requirements. The necessary prerequisites for this are approved containers as well as certified waste conditioning and packaging procedures. The Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM) is responsible for container design testing and evaluation of quality assurance measures on behalf of BfS under consideration of the Konrad disposal requirements. Besides assessing the container handling stability (stacking tests, handling loads), design testing procedures are performed that include fire tests (800 deg. C, 1 hour) and drop tests from different heights and drop orientations. This paper presents the current state of BAM design testing experiences about relevant container types (box shaped, cylindrical) made of steel sheets, ductile cast iron or concrete. It explains usual testing and evaluation methods which range from experimental testing to analytical and numerical calculations. Another focus has been laid on already existing containers and packages. The question arises as to how they can be evaluated properly especially with respect to lack of completeness of safety assessment and fabrication documentation. At present BAM works on numerous applications for container design testing for the Konrad repository. Some licensing procedures were successfully finished in the past and BfS certified several container types like steel sheet, concrete until cast iron containers which are now available for waste packaging for final disposal. However, large quantities of radioactive wastes had been placed into interim storage using containers which are not already licensed for the Konrad repository. Safety assessment of these so-called 'old' containers is a big challenge for all parties because documentation sheets about container design testing and fabrication often contain gaps or have not yet been completed. Appropriate solution strategies are currently under development and discussion. Furthermore, BAM has successfully initiated and established an information forum, called 'ERFA QM Konrad Containers', which facilitates discussions on various issues of common interest with respect to Konrad container licensing procedures as well as the interpretation of disposal requirements under consideration of operational needs. Thus, it provides additional, valuable supports for container licensing procedures. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Developments that are making the Versa-Pac Indeed More Versatile (and More Useful to Industry) - 16267

Daher-TLI acquired the assets and employees of Century Industries, a radioactive material packaging manufacturing facility, in 2013. Included in that acquisition was the Versa-Pac Shipping Package. The Versa-Pac is an NRC licensed Type AF packaging (Certificate of Compliance no. USA/9342/AF-96) and was originally designed as a replacement for standard 7A drum-type transportation packaging. It can be used directly or in conjunction with pails, drums or inserts that can be manufactured to accommodate a variety of smaller containers and vessels. The Versa-Pac comes in two sizes, the VP-55 (i.e., 55-gallon drum version) and VP-110 (i.e., 110-gallon drum version). It features a patented design concept in combination with the drum exterior to provide enhanced structural protection to payloads under Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC), per 10CFR71.71 and 10CFR71.73 respectively. Since its introduction in 2010, the Versa-Pac has been utilized mainly as a one-time use package for disposing of radioactive waste. The package is also designed as a reusable package for transporting front-end materials. Discussions with current and prospective clients have resulted in numerous improvements, accomplished and planned, to the package's payload capability through additional engineering analyses and actual design modifications. Revision 10 to the NRC Certificate of Compliance, dated August 6, 2015, introduces an enrichment-loading table that allows shipping larger quantities of U-235 for enrichments less than 100 wt.%. It also authorizes shipment of natural thorium. Other planned and proposed improvements include provisions to transport UF{sub 6} in 1S, 2S, and 5B cylinders, design changes that further increases the amount of U-235 at enrichments less than 100 wt.%, increasing the capacity of the VP-110, developing a lighter 30-gallon version, the VP-30, and introducing content limits specific to uranium-oxides in multiple forms. This paper traces the engineering and design efforts involved in expanding the Versa-Pac's versatility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Issues and Challenges for the Disposal of Solid Radioactive Waste in the UK - 16597

The latest UK radioactive waste inventory describes the UK as having roughly 4.5 million m{sup 3} of solid radioactive waste - waste that either exists now or which will arise in future. This quantity excludes the potential waste that could be generated from the final site clearance of nuclear sites, estimated to be at least 3 times the current inventory volume. Most solid radioactive waste (by volume) is managed in the near-surface, at the national Low Level Waste Repository (LLWR) or in other appropriately permitted landfill sites. The UK has yet to develop solutions for the final disposal of Higher Activity Radioactive Waste (HAW) but has established arrangements for packaging of waste now for storage while maximising the probability that these packages will be disposable once a solution is provided. Irrespective of the final disposal solution, the principles that govern the safe management of solid radioactive waste are common across the UK. Recent experience in the UK, including from the review of the environmental safety case for the LLWR, identified a number of issues relevant to solid waste disposal which are pertinent to other existing Low Activity Radioactive Waste (LAW) disposal sites as well as the development of safety cases for HAW disposal facilities. These issues include: scoping the extent of 'wastes' included in any assessment (e.g. whether to include the 'package' as well as its contents); the importance of understanding the waste heterogeneity; non-radioactive characteristics of waste, and understanding of external factors such as climate and landscape change. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Experimental Study of Diffusivity of Technetium-99 in Hanford Vadose Zone Sediments

One of the methods being considered at the Hanford site in Washington for safely disposing of low-level radioactive wastes (LLW) is to encase the waste in concrete and entomb the packages in the Hanford vadose zone sediments. The current plan for waste isolation consists of stacking low-level waste packages on a trench floor, surrounding the stacks with reinforced steel, and encasing these packages with concrete. Any failure of the concrete encasement may result in water intrusion and consequent mobilization of radionuclides from the waste packages. The mobilized radionuclides may escape from the encased concrete by mass flow and/or diffusion and move into the surrounding subsurface sediments. It is therefore necessary to conduct an assessment of the performance of the concrete encasement structure and the surrounding soil’s ability to retard radionuclide migration. The retardation factors for radionuclides contained in the waste packages can be determined from measurements of diffusion coefficients for these contaminants through concrete and fill material. Because of their anionic nature in aqueous solutions, the radionuclides, 99Tc and 129I were identified as long-term dose contributors in LLW. The leachability and/or diffusion of these radionuclide species must be measured in order to assess the long-term performance of waste grouts when contacted with vadose-zone porewater or groundwater. To measure the diffusivity, a set of experiments were conducted using 99Tc-spiked concrete (with 0 and 4% metallic iron additions) in contact with unsaturated soil half-cells that reflected the typical moisture contents of Hanford vadose zone sediments. The 99Tc diffusion profiles in the soil half cells were measured after a time lapse of ~1.9 yr. Using the concentration profiles, the 99Tc diffusivity coefficients were calculated based on Fick’s Second Law.

techetium, diffusion, vadose zone sediments↗

Secondary Waste Form Development and Data Package for Hanford's Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment - 16479

The Hanford Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Vitrification facility is planned to immobilize Hanford tank waste for on-site, near-surface disposal at Hanford's Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF). During this process, liquid and solid secondary wastes will be generated which are also slated for disposal at the IDF. In order to receive authorization to dispose of the waste in the IDF, a Performance Assessment (PA) must be completed in accordance with DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, and its accompanying Manual. The PA must include calculations of potential doses to a member of the public for a 1,000-year period to provide a reasonable expectation that performance objectives will not be exceeded and that the waste will be managed in a manner that is protective of worker and public health and safety, and the environment. Liquid and solid secondary wastes are planned to be immobilized within cementitious waste forms similar to those used elsewhere in the United States and around the world for permanent disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW). Data packages and supporting documents are being developed to provide the technical underpinning for the analyses of contaminant releases to the environment from these waste forms for the IDF PA. Traditionally, releases from cementitious waste forms have utilized a diffusion-limited release model using contaminant-specific diffusivities measured in standard leach tests as inputs. More mechanistic modeling techniques are under development to increase the rigor of the PA analyses. In addition, recent testing has shown diffusivities of key contaminants can be reduced by several orders-of-magnitude through optimized formulation of the waste form and use of additives to bind specific contaminants. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Immobilized Low-Activity Waste Glass Release Data Package for the Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment

The Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State has been used extensively by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to produce nuclear materials for the U.S. defense arsenal. A large inventory of radioactive and mixed waste has accumulated in 177 buried single- and double-shell tanks. Liquid waste recovered from the tanks will be pretreated to separate the low-activity fraction from the high-level and transuranic wastes. The low-activity waste (LAW) is planned to be immobilized in glass, via vitrification, and placed into a near-surface disposal system on the Hanford Site. Before the immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW) can be placed into the disposal system, DOE must approve a performance assessment (PA), which documents the assumptions and provides the quantitative demonstration of compliance with the performance objectives for the long-term protection of the public and the environment. A critical component of the PA will be to demonstrate that releases from the selected glass waste form do not result in the performance objectives being exceeded. The PA must also, for purposes of establishing limits on radionuclides that may be buried near-surface, assess impacts to a hypothetical intruder and impacts to water resources. The key information presented in this data package consists of the specific glass compositions and associated glass dissolution rate law parameters for five ILAW glasses. In addition, the results of geochemical modeling performed on several glasses that are not specifically described in this document are provided as supplemental data to help identify potential end-point alteration phases that may form during the weathering of ILAW glasses. These data (glass compositions, rate law parameters, and potential alteration phases) will be used to identify contaminant release source terms for the Integrated Disposal Facility PA. In addition, a general discussion on nuclear waste glass corrosion and a brief overview of modeling approaches and corresponding uncertainties are discussed. Table ES.1 through Table ES.4 provide the specific data to be used to support the 2017 PA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Processing Plan for Potentially Reactive/Ignitable Remote Handled Transuranic Waste at the Idaho Cleanup Project - 12090

Remote Handle Transuranic (RH-TRU) Waste generated at Argonne National Laboratory - East, from the examination of irradiated and un-irradiated fuel pins and other reactor materials requires a detailed processing plan to ensure reactive/ignitable material is absent to meet WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria prior to shipping and disposal. The Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) approach to repackaging Lot 2 waste and how we ensure prohibited materials are not present in waste intended for disposal at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 'WIPP' uses an Argon Repackaging Station (ARS), which provides an inert gas blanket. Opening of the Lot 2 containers under an argon gas blanket is proposed to be completed in the ARS. The ARS is an interim transition repackaging station that provides a mitigation technique to reduce the chances of a reoccurrence of a thermal event prior to rendering the waste 'Safe'. The consequences, should another thermal event be encountered, (which is likely) is to package the waste, apply the reactive and or ignitable codes to the container, and store until the future treatment permit and process are available. This is the same disposition that the two earlier containers in the 'Thermal Events' were assigned. By performing the initial handling under an inert gas blanket, the waste can sorted and segregate the fines and add the Met-L-X to minimize risk before it is exposed to air. The 1-gal cans that are inside the ANL-E canister will be removed and each can is moved to the ARS for repackaging. In the ARS, the 1-gal can is opened in the inerted environment. The contained waste is sorted, weighed, and visually examined for non compliant items such as unvented aerosol cans and liquids. The contents of the paint cans are transferred into a sieve and manipulated to allow the fines, if any, to be separated into the tray below. The fines are weighed and then blended with a minimum 5:1 mix of Met-L-X. Other debris materials found are segregated from the cans into containers for later packaging. Recoverable fissile waste material (Fuel and fuel-like pieces) suspected of containing sodium bonded pieces) are segregated and will remain in the sieve or transferred to a similar immersion basket in the ARS. The fuel like pieces will be placed into a container with sufficient water to cover the recoverable fissile waste. If a 'reactive characteristic' is present the operator will be able to observe the formation of 'violent' hydrogen gas bubbles. When sodium bonded fuel-like pieces are placed in water the expected reaction is a non-violent reaction that does not meet the definition of reactivity. It is expected that there will be a visible small stream of bubbles present if there is any sodium-bonded fuel-like piece placed in the water. The test will be completed when there is no reaction or the expected reaction is observed..At that point, the fuel like pieces complete the processing cycle in preparation for characterization and shipment to WIPP. If a violent reaction occurs, the fuel-like pieces will be removed from the water, split into the required fissile material content, placed into a screened basket in a 1 gallon drum and drummed out of the hot cell with appropriate RCRA codes applied and placed into storage until sodium treatment is available. These 'violent' reactions will be evidenced by gas bubbles being evolved at the specimen surface where sodium metal is present. The operators will be trained to determine if the reaction is 'violent' or 'mild'. If a 'violent' reaction occurs, the sieve will be immediately removed from the water, placed in a 1 gallon paint can, canned in the argon cover gas and removed from the hot cell to await a future treatment. If the reaction is 'mild', the sieve will then be removed from the water; the material weighed for final packaging and allowed to dry by air exposure. Lot 2 waste cans can be opened, sorted, processed, and weighed while mitigating the potential of thermal events that could occur prior to exposing to air. Exposure to air is a WIPP compliance step demonstrating the absence of reactive or ignitable characteristics. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fuel Matrix Degradation Model Development Update: Alloy Corrosion Rates and Hydrogen Generation

This work is being performed as part of the DOE NE Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign, Argillite and Crystalline Rock R&D work packages: SF-19AN01030101 and SF-19AN01030201. This document meets the milestone M4SF-19AN010301013 for Argillite R&D and the milestone M4SF-19AN010302013 for Crystalline R&D. The fuel matrix degradation (FMD) model calculates the degradation rate of spent UO2 fuel based on fundamental electrochemical theory and thermodynamics. The model provides the quantitative basis for radionuclide source term predictions in the generic disposal system analysis (GDSA) performance assessment (PA) model. The FMD model has been implemented in a manner that facilitates its integration with the GDSA-PA code and a preliminary, integrated FMD-GDSA model has been successfully tested (Jerden et al., 2017). The specific focus of on-going work is to accurately and quantitatively represent the generation of H2 in a breached waste package and its effect on the spent fuel degradation rate so that this key process can be accurately represented in PA models. It has been shown experimentally that millimolar concentrations of dissolved H2 in contact with spent fuel will inhibit oxidative dissolution and decrease the fuel degradation rates by as much as three orders of magnitude (e.g., Röllin et al., 2001, Ollila, 2008). This will lead to a significant decrease in the radionuclide source term values used in repository PA models. Sensitivity studies using the FMD model have shown that the dissolved H2 concentration is the dominant environmental variable affecting the UO2 spent fuel dissolution rate as long as a source of H2 persists in the breached waste package (Jerden et al., 2015). Therefore, on-going experimental and modeling efforts focus on H2 production, accumulation and interfacial reactions within a breached waste package. The anoxic corrosion of metallic engineering materials within a breached waste package will be the main source of H2 in crystalline and argillite rock repository systems. The most important H2-producing alloys present within a waste package include stainless steel, carbon steel, and aluminum alloys and the Zircaloy fuel cladding. A steel corrosion module was added to the FMD model to account for these H2 sources and couple the H2 generation rate with fuel degradation processes (Jerden et al., 2017). As discussed below, there is a need for experimental data from electrochemical corrosion tests to quantify the H2 generation rates due to the corrosion of these waste package alloys as a function of key environmental variables (Eh, pH, groundwater chemistry). This report presents results from series of electrochemical corrosion tests with materials present in waste packages that provide information needed to parameterize and validate the FMD model. The alloys tested include 316L stainless steel (316SS), AISI 4320 carbon steel (C-steel) and Zircaloy-4 fuel cladding (unirradiated). Potentiodynamic polarization and potentiostatic polarization tests were performed in buffer solutions at pH 4, 7 and 10 with NaCl concentrations of 0, 4 and 100 millimolar (mM). The potentiostatic tests were performed at voltages varying from 0.5 volts down to -0.66 volts, vs the standard hydrogen electrode (SHE), and all tests were performed at laboratory ambient temperatures (~22 °C). The corrosion rates measured during the electrochemical tests were used as direct input to a new FMD/in-package chemistry model that is being developed to provide accurate long-term spent fuel degradation rates as chemical conditions (Eh, pH, speciation) evolve within a breached waste package. This new model was developed by coupling the FMD model with the reactive transport code X1t, which is a module within the Geochemist’s Workbench (GWB) reaction path modeling code (Jerden et al., 2019). The reactive transport model consists of a 1D domain discretized with 21 reaction diffusion cells and includes a single waste packag

Jerden, James↗

French Industrial Management Plan for Low and Intermediate Short-lived Wastes (LISLW) - 18012

Disposal pathway for low and intermediate short-lived wastes (LILSL) was the first to be operational in France. Successive evolutions - from the Manche disposal facility, close by La Hague to the Aube disposal facility (East of France) - allowed a steady pace of operation to be reached both in terms of volumes, type of waste and packaging. After 25 years of operation the Andra's Aube disposal facility waste management plan is intended to assess how this approach can be updated as new needs and new issues are emerging as tritiated wastes or decommissioning wastes. The disposal system could evolve to meet these needs as far as waste management should indeed be considered in an overall approach. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RH Packaging Program Guidance

The purpose of this program guidance document is to provide the technical requirements for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the RH-TRU 72-B Waste Shipping Package (also known as the "RH-TRU 72-B cask") and directly related components. This document complies with the requirements as specified in the RH-TRU 72-B Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9212. If there is a conflict between this document and the SARP and/or C of C, the C of C shall govern. The C of C states: "...each package must be prepared for shipment and operated in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 7.0, Operating Procedures, of the application." It further states: "...each package must be tested and maintained in accordance with the procedures described in Chapter 8.0, Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program of the Application." Chapter 9.0 of the SARP tasks the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Management and Operating (M&O) Contractor with assuring the packaging is used in accordance with the requirements of the C of C. Because the packaging is NRC-approved, users need to be familiar with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §71.8, "Deliberate Misconduct." Any time a user suspects or has indications that the conditions of approval in the C of C were not met, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) shall be notified immediately. The CBFO will evaluate the issue and notify the NRC if required.In accordance with 10 CFR Part 71, "Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material," certificate holders, packaging users, and contractors or subcontractors who use, design, fabricate, test, maintain, or modify the packaging shall post copies of (1) 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," regulations, (2) Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and (3) NRC Form 3, Notice to Employees. These documents must be posted in a conspicuous location where the activities subject to these regulations are conducted. This document details the instructions to be followed to operate, maintain, and test the RH-TRU 72-B packaging. This Program Guidance standardizes instructions for all users. Users shall follow these instructions or equivalent approved instructions. Following these instructions assures that operations meet the requirements of the SARP.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗