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Determination of saccharides and ethanol from biomass conversion using Raman spectroscopy: Effects of pretreatment and enzyme composition

This dissertation focuses on the development of facile and rapid quantitative Raman spectroscopy measurements for the determination of conversion products in producing bioethanol from corn stover. Raman spectroscopy was chosen to determine glucose, xylose and ethanol in complex hydrolysis and fermentation matrices. Chapter 1 describes the motives and main goals of this work, and includes an introduction to biomass, commonly used pretreatment methods, hydrolysis and fermentation reactions. The principles of Raman spectroscopy, its advantages and applications related to biomass analysis are also illustrated. Chapter 2 and 3 comprise two published or submitted manuscripts, and the thesis concludes with an appendix. In Chapter 2, a Raman spectroscopic protocol is described to study the efficiency of enzymatic hydrolysis of cellulose by measuring the main product in hydrolysate, glucose. Two commonly utilized pretreatment methods were investigated in order to understand their effect on glucose measurements by Raman spectroscopy. Second, a similar method was set up to determine the concentration of ethanol in fermentation broth. Both of these measurements are challenged by the presence of complex matrices. In Chapter 3, a quantitative comparison of pretreatment protocols and the effect of enzyme composition are studied using systematic methods. A multipeak fitting algorithm was developed to analyze spectra of hydrolysate containing two analytes: glucose and xylose. Chapter 4 concludes with a future perspective of this research area. An appendix describes a convenient, rapid spectrophotometric method developed to measure cadmium in water. This method requires relatively low cost instrumentation and can be used in microgravity, such as space shuttles or the International Space Station. This work was performed under the supervision of Professor Marc Porter while at Iowa State University. Research related to producing biofuel from bio-renewable resources, especially bioethanol from biomass, has grown significantly in the past decade due to the high demand and rising costs of fossil fuels. More than 3 percent of the energy consumption in the U.S. is derived from renewable biomass, mostly through industrial heat and steam production by the pulp and paper industry, and electricity generation from municipal solid waste (MSW) and forest industry residues. The utilization of food-based biomass to make fuels has been widely criticized because it may increase food shortages throughout the world and raise the cost of food. Thus, nonfood-based and plentiful lignocellulosic feedstocks, such as corn stover, perennial grass, bagasse, sorghum, wheat/rice straw, herbaceous and woody crops, have great potential to be new bio-renewable sources for energy production. Given that many varieties of biomass are available, there is need for a rapid, simple, high-throughput method to screen the conversion of many plant varieties. The most suitable species for each geographic region must be determined, as well as the optimal stage of harvest, impacts of environmental conditions (temperature, soil, pH, etc.). Various genetically modified plants should be studied in order to establish the desired biomass in bioethanol production. The main screening challenge, however, is the complexity of plant cell wall structures that make reliable and sensitive analysis difficult. To date, one of the most popular methods to produce lignocellulosic ethanol is to perform enzymatic hydrolysis followed by fermentation of the hydrolysate with yeast. There are several vital needs related to the field of chemistry that have been suggested as primary research foci needed to effectively improve lignocellulosic ethanol production. These topics include overcoming the recalcitrance of cellulosic biomass, the pervasiveness of pretreatment, advanced biological processing and better feedstocks. In this thesis, a novel approach using Raman spectroscopy has been developed to address important issues related to bioethanol generation, which will aid the research aimed to solve the topics mentioned above.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 371: Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit 371, Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe, located within Areas 11 and 18 at the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 371 comprises two corrective action sites (CASs): • 11-23-05, Pin Stripe Contamination Area • 18-45-01, U-18j-2 Crater (Johnnie Boy) The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 371 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls was implemented at both CASs. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 8, 2009, through February 16, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 371: Johnnie Boy Crater and Pin Stripe. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides and investigation of other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 371 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were not found to be present in the surface soil. However, it was assumed that radionuclides are present in subsurface media within the Johnnie Boy crater and the fissure at Pin Stripe. Due to the assumption of radiological dose exceeding the FAL, corrective actions were undertaken that consist of implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at each site. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 371. • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 371. • Corrective Action Unit 371 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 408: Bomblet Target Area Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 408: Bomblet Target Area (TTR), Tonopah Test Range, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 408 is located at the Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, and consists of Corrective Action Site (CAS) TA-55-002-TAB2, Bomblet Target Areas. This CAS includes the following seven target areas: • Mid Target • Flightline Bomblet Location • Strategic Air Command (SAC) Target Location 1 • SAC Target Location 2 • South Antelope Lake • Tomahawk Location 1 • Tomahawk Location 2 The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and data confirming that the closure objectives for the CAS within CAU 408 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Review the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Document Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 408 issued by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. From July 2009 through August 2010, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 408: Bomblet Target Area, Tonopah Test Range (TTR), Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Identify and remove munitions of explosive concern (MEC) associated with DOE activities. • Investigate potential disposal pit locations. • Remove depleted uranium-contaminated fragments and soil. • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels to determine COCs for CAU 408. Assessment of the data indicated COCs are not present at CAS TA-55-002-TAB2; therefore, no corrective action is necessary. No use restrictions are required to be placed on this CAU because the investigation showed no evidence of remaining soil contamination or remaining debris/waste upon completion of all investigation activities. The MEC was successfully removed and dispositioned as planned using current best available technologies. As MEC guidance and general MEC standards acknowledge that MEC response actions cannot determine with 100 percent certainty that all MEC and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are removed, the clean closure of CAU 408 will implement a best management practice of posting UXO hazard warning signs near the seven target areas. The signs will warn future land users of the potential for encountering residual UXO hazards. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, provides the following recommendations: • A Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 408. • Corrective Action Unit 408 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Application of the DG-1199 methodology to the ESBWR and ABWR.

Appendix A-5 of Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1199 'Alternative Radiological Source Term for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors' provides guidance - applicable to RADTRAD MSIV leakage models - for scaling containment aerosol concentration to the expected steam dome concentration in order to preserve the simplified use of the Accident Source Term (AST) in assessing containment performance under assumed design basis accident (DBA) conditions. In this study Economic and Safe Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) and Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) RADTRAD models are developed using the DG-1199, Appendix A-5 guidance. The models were run using RADTRAD v3.03. Low Population Zone (LPZ), control room (CR), and worst-case 2-hr Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) doses were calculated and compared to the relevant accident dose criteria in 10 CFR 50.67. For the ESBWR, the dose results were all lower than the MSIV leakage doses calculated by General Electric/Hitachi (GEH) in their licensing technical report. There are no comparable ABWR MSIV leakage doses, however, it should be noted that the ABWR doses are lower than the ESBWR doses. In addition, sensitivity cases were evaluated to ascertain the influence/importance of key input parameters/features of the models.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2009

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NTS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NTS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NTS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NTS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of tritium were also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NTS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy facility to 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation not related to NTS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements or from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides. The NTS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for use on the NTS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NTS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration of each detected radionuclide at each of these locations is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. At any one location, if multiple radionuclides are detected, then compliance with NESHAP is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2009, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NTS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was a maximum of 1.69 mrem/yr, well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all six critical receptor stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values listed in Table 2 in Appendix E of 40 CFR 61. Concentrations ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 17 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides approximately 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NTS, concentrations at this location would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NTS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000044 mrem/yr, 230,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2009

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NTS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NTS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NTS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NTS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of tritium were also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NTS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy facility to 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation not related to NTS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements or from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides. The NTS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for use on the NTS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NTS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration of each detected radionuclide at each of these locations is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. At any one location, if multiple radionuclides are detected, then compliance with NESHAP is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2009, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NTS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was a maximum of 1.69 mrem/yr, well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all six critical receptor stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values listed in Table 2 in Appendix E of 40 CFR 61. Concentrations ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 17 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides approximately 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NTS, concentrations at this location would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NTS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000044 mrem/yr, 230,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Manhattan Project 1940s research on the prompt fission neutron spectrum

We describe how the prompt fission neutron spectrum (PFNS) was determined for the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos. Early work before World War II at American and British universities is described, together with theoretical work by Feather at Cambridge and Bethe at Los Alamos. As the Manhattan Project was being planned in 1942, two experiments on natural uranium were commissioned that proved to be influential: 1) An integral experiment at Chicago by Christy and Manley that accurately determined the average PFNS spectrum energy, 2.2 ± 0.2 MeV; 2) Bloch and Staub’s Stanford cyclotron measurement of the PFNS spectrum, which obtained an average energy of 1.70 ± 0.34 MeV. These two papers, previously unavailable outside of Los Alamos, are reproduced in the Supplementary Appendix. From these data, at the beginning of the project in 1943 Serber estimated an average 235 U PFNS energy of 2 MeV, and indeed this agrees with today’s best estimate. The challenges facing the scientists involved both the availability of only very small samples of enriched uranium and plutonium targets, and fast neutron detection technologies. During the project, 235 U and 239 Pu PFNS were measured by Nicodemus and Staub. These also proved to be quite accurate and gave an average spectrum energy of 2 MeV for 235 U. [This is not reproduced in the Appendix because it was published after the war in Physical Review 89, 1288 (1953)]. New methods were developed to enable more accurate measurements, and this paper describes how the PFNS was determined surprisingly well by 1945. We end by describing the post-war measurements in the 50s, including the PFNS data used by Ford and Wheeler in their simulations in 1951, the Bonner 1952 data, the seminal 1952 Watt paper with a new empirical parametrization of the PFNS, and the accurate PFNS measurement undertaken at Los Alamos by Cranberg et al. in 1956. We compare the measurements with our best understanding today as embodied in the Evaluated Nuclear Data File ENDF/B-VIII.0. Some images from historical documents in our Los Alamos National Security Research Center (NSRC) archives are shown.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

MuCol Milestone Report No. 7: Consolidated Parameters

This document is comprised of a collection of consolidated parameters for the key parts of the muon collider. These consolidated parameters follow on from the October 2024 Preliminary Parameters Report. Attention has been given to a high-level consistent set of baseline parameters throughout all systems of the complex, following a 10 TeV center-of-mass design. Additional details of the designs contributing to this baseline design are featured in the appendix. Likewise, explorative variations from this baseline set can be found in the appendix. The data is collected from a collaborative spreadsheet and transferred to overleaf.

Taylor, Rebecca [CERN]↗

RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY STATION DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PIT DISASSEMBLY AND CONVERSION PROJECT

The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has developed prototype equipment to demonstrate remote surveying of Inner and Outer DOE Standard 3013 containers for fixed and transferable contamination in accordance with DOE Standard 3013 and 10 CFR 835 Appendix B. When fully developed the equipment will be part of a larger suite of equipment used to package material in accordance with DOE Standard 3013 at the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Project slated for installation at the Savannah River Site. The prototype system consists of a small six-axis industrial robot with an end effector consisting of a force sensor, vacuum gripper and a three fingered pneumatic gripper. The work cell also contains two alpha survey instruments, swipes, swipe dispenser, and other ancillary equipment. An external controller interfaces with the robot controller, survey instruments and other ancillary equipment to control the overall process. SRNL is developing automated equipment for the Pit Disassembly and Conversion (PDC) Project that is slated for the Savannah River Site (SRS). The equipment being developed is automated packaging equipment for packaging plutonium bearing materials in accordance with DOE-STD-3013-2004. The subject of this paper is the development of a prototype Radiological Survey Station (RSS). Other automated equipment being developed for the PDC includes the Bagless transfer System, Outer Can Welder, Gantry Robot System (GRS) and Leak Test Station. The purpose of the RSS is to perform a frisk and swipe of the DOE Standard 3013 Container (either inner can or outer can) to check for fixed and transferable contamination. This is required to verify that the contamination levels are within the limits specified in DOE-STD-3013-2004 and 10 CFR 835, Appendix D. The surface contamination limit for the 3013 Outer Can (OC) is 500 dpm/100 cm2 (total) and 20 dpm/100 cm2 (transferable). This paper will concentrate on the RSS developments for the 3013 OC but the system for the 3013 Inner Can (IC) is nearly identical.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

ADDITIONAL STRESS AND FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSES OF PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL NOZZLES

In past years, the authors have undertaken various studies of nozzles in both boiling water reactors (BWRs) and pressurized water reactors (PWRs) located in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) adjacent to the core beltline region. Those studies described stress and fracture mechanics analyses performed to assess various RPV nozzle geometries, which were selected based on their proximity to the core beltline region, i.e., those nozzle configurations that are located close enough to the core region such that they may receive sufficient fluence prior to end-of-life (EOL) to require evaluation of embrittlement as part of the RPV analyses associated with pressure-temperature (P-T) limits. In this paper, additional stress and fracture analyses are summarized that were performed for additional PWR nozzles with the following objectives: To expand the population of PWR nozzle configurations evaluated, which was limited in the previous work to just two nozzles (one inlet and one outlet nozzle). To model and understand differences in stress results obtained for an internal pressure load case using a two-dimensional (2-D) axi-symmetric finite element model (FEM) vs. a three-dimensional (3-D) FEM for these PWR nozzles. In particular, the ovalization (stress concentration) effect of two intersecting cylinders, which is typical of RPV nozzle configurations, was investigated. To investigate the applicability of previously recommended linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) hand solutions for calculating the Mode I stress intensity factor for a postulated nozzle corner crack for pressure loading for these PWR nozzles. These analyses were performed to further expand earlier work completed to support potential revision and refinement of Title 10 to the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix G, Fracture Toughness Requirements, and are intended to supplement similar evaluation of nozzles presented at the 2008, 2009, and 2011 Pressure Vessels and Piping (PVP) Conferences. This work is also relevant to the ongoing efforts of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code, Section XI, Working Group on Operating Plant Criteria (WGOPC) efforts to incorporate nozzle fracture mechanics solutions into a revision to ASME B&PV Code, Section XI, Nonmandatory Appendix G.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

In-service Inspection Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds for Assessing Flaw Density and Size Distribution per 10 CFR 50.61a, Alternate Fracture Toughness Requirements

Pressurized thermal shock (PTS) events are system transients in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) in which there is a rapid operating temperature cool-down that results in cold vessel temperatures with or without repressurization of the vessel. The rapid cooling of the inside surface of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) causes thermal stresses that can combine with stresses caused by high pressure. The aggregate effect of these stresses is an increase in the potential for fracture if a pre-existing flaw is present in a material susceptible to brittle failure. The ferritic, low alloy steel of the reactor vessel beltline adjacent to the core, where neutron radiation gradually embrittles the material over the lifetime of the plant, can be susceptible to brittle fracture. The PTS rule, described in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Section 50.61 (§50.61), “Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events,” adopted on July 23, 1985, establishes screening criteria to ensure that the potential for a reactor vessel to fail due to a PTS event is deemed to be acceptably low. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a research program that concluded that the risk of through-wall cracking due to a PTS event is much lower than previously estimated. The NRC subsequently developed a rule, §50.61a, published on January 4, 2010, entitled “Alternate Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events” (75 FR 13). Use of the new rule by licensees is optional. The §50.61a rule differs from §50.61 in that it requires licensees who choose to follow this alternate method to analyze the results from periodic volumetric examinations required by the ASME Code, Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection (ISI) of Nuclear Power Plants. These analyses are intended to determine if the actual flaw density and size distribution in the licensee’s reactor vessel beltline welds are bounded by the flaw density and size distribution values used in the PTS technical basis. Under a contract with the NRC, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been working on a program to assess the ability of current inservice inspection (ISI)-ultrasonic testing (UT) techniques, as qualified through ASME Code, Appendix VIII, Supplements 4 and 6, to detect small fabrication or inservice-induced flaws located in RPV welds and adjacent base materials. As part of this effort, the investigators have pursued an evaluation, based on the available information, of the capability of UT to provide flaw density/distribution inputs for making RPV weld assessments in accordance with §50.61a. This paper presents the results of an evaluation of data from the 1993 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 3, Spirit of Appendix VIII reactor vessel examination, a comparison of the flaw density/distribution from this data with the distribution in §50.61a, possible reasons for differences, and plans and recommendations for further work in this area.

alloy 82/182↗

Risk considerations for WIPP passive institutional controls - 15173

The regulatory assurance measures for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) include such things as active and passive institutional controls, monitoring, waste retrieval/removal capabilities and engineered barriers. Passive Institutional Controls (PICs) are an assurance measure intended to reduce the likelihood of humans unintentionally intruding the WIPP geologic radioactive waste disposal system for thousands of years after it is closed. The waste repository is designed such that it should not pose a significant risk to future populations if it is left undisturbed. The design has also been demonstrated through a performance assessment (PA) analysis to not pose a significant risk to future generations even if it is intruded upon by an inadvertent drilling intrusion [1, Appendix PA]. Through PA, it has been determined that the overall risk of the disposal system to people and the environment is small. The intent of the regulatory Assurance Requirements and PICs is to provide additional confidence that the repository will perform as expected after closure. However, the actual implementation of the proposed PICs design may pose a greater risk to the current population than they would potentially reduce for future generations. Specifically, the risks due to industrial accidents, construction and transportation risks incurred during the fabrication and construction of the permanent markers system may be greater than the overall reduction in risk to future generations due to the existence of the permanent markers. If this were true, implementation of the current PICs design may be counter to the intention of the regulatory requirement to include such assurance measures. As such, provisions for assurance measures used in geologic radioactive waste disposal facilities, such as PICs, should consider risk impacts. A provision of any disposal program's Regulatory Assurance Requirements should address the impacts of the known risks from all the components of the assurance-related systems. The initial WIPP PICs design was developed as part of the regulatory certification process in 1996 with the intent of being revised when the WIPP closes several decades from now [2, Appendix PIC]. The revised design that will be developed at closure should address the design's potential reduction to long-term risks from the repository and the risks due to the implementation of the final design. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Certification of RadICS FPGA-based platform under US NRC requirements - 386

The paper discusses approach, applicable to certify digital instrumentation and control (I and C) platform under US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. Currently, Radics LLC is certifying its Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)-based RadICS Platform using Platform-based test specimen. The Platform has been recently certified under IEC 61508 to meet Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 3 requirements. Up to now Radics LLC has developed a number of FPGA-based I and C applications based on RadICS Platform. Those applications include applications based on customer's specification and reverse engineering applications (Fit, Form and Function reproduction of existing equipment). The life cycles of applications include independent verification and validation of FPGA-based I and C systems/components, Commercial Grade Dedication of components for FPGA-based I and C systems, turnkey implementation of I and C project, supply of hardware, engineering tools and application design process. The paper also describes in details certification approach, which is based on Digital I and C-ISG- 06 and includes the following stages: general agreement with the US NRC, Topical Report submittal, timely responses and successful audits, and timely issuance of approved Topical Report. Such approach is supported by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Quality Management System, which is also discussed in the paper. In addition, an overview of RadICS Platform Topical Report is presented, including its overview and structure, certification scope and obligatory appendixes. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Evaluating Age Effects on HEPA Filter Performance

Nuclear grade high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are routinely employed as the final control element in confinement ventilation systems. The traditional HEPA filter utilizes a pleated filter medium of fibrous glass that has been produced in a manner analogous to manufacturing paper. These filters are the physically weakest element in a containment ventilation system. Containment ventilation systems are designed to condition the air-stream (temperature, relative humidity, moisture, particle size distribution of aerosols, and aerosol concentration) to levels/conditions that fibrous glass HEPA filters can handle. Approximately 6000 nuclear grade HEPA filters are purchased each year for use in the DOE/NNSA complex. Additional filters are purchased for use in commercial nuclear power generation and ventilation systems of other nuclear applications. These filters are designed and tested in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) AG-1 Code Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment. This code establishes design requirements and qualification procedures. Qualification testing of axial flow filters is described in paragraphs 5000 and following of AG-1. The series of qualification tests are intended to describe the operating envelope of HEPA filters and verify the reliability of a filter design. AG-1 qualification also confirms the pedigree of components used in manufacture for that filter design. The collective set of qualification tests establishes the assumed operating envelope for AG-1 filters. The effects of age on HEPA filter performance have been a concern for at least two decades. A combination of physical evaluation of aged filter media and a review of filter failure records resulted in Appendix C of the Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook (NACH), Determination of HEPA Filter Life. This states that HEPA filters are not to be used beyond 10 years from the date of manufacture. Additionally, filters put into service in locations where they may become wet are to be taken out of service five years from date of manufacture. Filters that have become wet are to be taken out of service immediately. Finally, it should also be pointed out that filters held in Level B storage are subject to the same 10-year service life. Very limited bench-scale testing in the 1990's raised concern that aging HEPA filters do not have the strength to withstand an accident scenario. In May of 1999, the DNFSB released a Technical Report 23 entitled HEPA Filters Used in the Department of Energy's Hazardous Facilities. This report expressed concerns for the potential vulnerability of HEPA filters in vital safety systems. Concerns and uncertainty associated with degradation of HEPA filter performance over time led the DOE sites to limit HEPA filter service life to 10 years from the date of manufacture or five years in cases where filters may become wet. Establishment of a conservative service life needs to be based on data from a structured series of tests comparing the performance envelope of new and aged full-scale filters. A service life that is insufficiently conservative endangers workers and the public. One that is excessively conservative costs can cause hundreds of otherwise unnecessary filter changes. This increases exposure of employees, disrupts facility operations, and increase disposal costs by millions of dollars annually. Conclusive data are needed to resolve uncertainty associated with the damaging effects of aging on durability of HEPA filters. Therefore, this study needs to provide a sufficient body of evidence to allow DOE and site professionals to make prudent decisions. An updated version of ASME AG-1 Section FC included a non-mandatory appendix that would include the DOE guidance for service life of HEPA filters. Balloting of this revision generated significant resistance to inclusion of any kind of service life language citing the lack of supporting experimental data. Efforts to resolve negative votes failed and resistance to acceptance of the language increased. The result has been to not include service language in Section FC and requests to remove it from sections that already include such language. The recent activity of the ASME AG-1 Committee on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment effectively de-emphasizes following DoE's service life guidelines. The DOE Office of Nuclear Safety under its NSR and D program provided the Mississippi State University Institute for Clean Energy Technology (ICET) finding to initiate a study to determine the effects of aging on AG-1 axial flow filters just prior to actions taken within the AG-1 committee regarding service life. The NSR and D funding facilitated timely development of a national technical working group comprised of members from the regulatory community, DOE complex, and commercial power to resolve uncertainty associated with effects of aging. The Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) has been funding the ICET to evaluate the performance envelope for AG-1 HEPA filters. ICET is one of DOE-EM's qualified suppliers. Synergy has been achieved by associating the NSR and D aged filter activities to testing activities evaluating the performance envelopes of separator and separator-less AG-1 HEPA filters funded by DOE-EM. The DOE-EM funded activities establish baseline data for the aged filter study and future EM funding will provide long term support for testing additional aged filters. EM funding of new filters includes analytical evaluation of media tensile strength by thermal analysis to establish baseline values and determine mass loss of moisture resistance and acrylic binders due to use. All of these values can be used for comparison of test results for aged filters. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

A New Look at Historic CRAC 'Divergence' Experiments - Implications for a CAAS Minimum Accident of Concern

This paper examines power history parameters and results based on historic fissile solution criticality 'divergence' experiments (referenced here as Divergence Experiments) from the 1960's-70's' Consequences Radiologiques d'un Accident de Criticite' (CRAC) campaign. The results from specific Divergence Experiments have implications for an ANSI/ANS-8.3 (1997) Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Minimum Accident of Concern (MAC). Specifically, this paper examines select CRAC Divergence Experiments in conjunction with 'qualifying reactivity additions' for a MAC defined by an absolute time constraint. A previous paper presented at the 2011 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality (ICNC 2011) illustrated the differences in 'qualifying reactivity additions' above delayed critical (and below prompt) for a variety of MAC constructs. That paper was the first to examine delayed critical kinetics in greater detail over a range of process and MAC considerations. The ICNC2011 work did not consider an absolute MAC time constraint from the excursion onset and assumed an initial excursion power. That study evaluated MAC constructs based on 'relative time differences' between reaching a specific fission rate and total fissions. The work presented here thus picks up where the ICNC2011 study left off. The primary focus of this work provides simulated power histories for specific Divergence Experiments that served as a basis for justifying a MAC noted in ANS-8.3 Appendix A. This paper documents computational modeling and dynamic multiphysics simulation with known Divergence Experiment parameters for reactivity additions at, below, and above the reported terminal reactivity. The initial step considers replicating what could be a reasonable power history for the terminal reactivity addition to the extent the same peak power and total fissions are obtained over the total time considered. Power histories for all other reactivity additions are simulated by varying the input reactivity and solution heights for the same model. A relationship is obtained between reactivity addition and the time to reach specific MAC power and fission levels within a given time constraint (e.g. 60 s). The 'qualifying reactivity addition' is determined for the total MAC fissions within that time. This value is then compared to the historic terminal value (e.g. $0.33) or any other values (e.g. 'excess reactivity of only a few cents') noted in ANS-8.3 Appendix A. In general, calculated MAC power levels have ranged from 1.8 kW to 173 kW depending on material type and form, H/U, enrichment, critical volume, and dose response function. A minimum accident consideration noted a SHEBA experiment with an excess reactivity 7 cents above delayed critical (TD ∼110 s). This excursion provided an additional 10{sup 15} fissions after an undetermined buildup time resulting in a 'few times 10{sup 15} fissions'. ICNC 2011 LEU solutions calculations show 0.2 Gy in air corresponds to 1.4 x10{sup 16} fissions. Thus, while historically, 0.2 Gy has been loosely associated with 'several times 10{sup 15} fissions', in reality, the actual total fissions could be an order of magnitude larger, and the power associated with 0.2 Gy/min (7.5 kW) larger as well. The reactivity addition required to obtain the actual 0.2 Gy total fissions over 60 s could be much larger than considered. Another reason the qualifying reactivity level could be larger than previously noted, involves temperature reactivity feedback. Compensated reactivity results in a departure from a pure exponential power rise, increasing the doubling time (TD) as the excursion approaches peak power. Uncompensated reactivity additions and constant TD have been traditionally assumed for a pure exponential power rise through the kW range to determine either total MAC fissions, power, or arrival time to these values.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Criticality Safety Controls and the Safety Basis at PFP

With the implementation of DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, and DOE-STD-3007-2007, 'Guidelines for Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities', a new requirement was imposed that all criticality safety controls be evaluated for inclusion in the facility Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and that the evaluation process be documented in the site Criticality Safety Program Description Document (CSPDD). At the Hanford site in Washington State the CSPDD, HNF-31695, 'General Description of the FH Criticality Safety Program', requires each facility develop a linking document called a Criticality Control Review (CCR) to document performance of these evaluations. Chapter 5, Appendix 5B of HNF-7098, Criticality Safety Program, provided an example of a format for a CCR that could be used in lieu of each facility developing its own CCR. Since the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) is presently undergoing Deactivation and Decommissioning (D&D), new procedures are being developed for cleanout of equipment and systems that have not been operated in years. Existing Criticality Safety Evaluations (CSE) are revised, or new ones written, to develop the controls required to support D&D activities. Other Hanford facilities, including PFP, had difficulty using the basic CCR out of HNF-7098 when first implemented. Interpretation of the new guidelines indicated that many of the controls needed to be elevated to TSR level controls. Criterion 2 of the standard, requiring that the consequence of a criticality be examined for establishing the classification of a control, was not addressed. Upon in-depth review by PFP Criticality Safety staff, it was not clear that the programmatic interpretation of criterion 8C could be applied at PFP. Therefore, the PFP Criticality Safety staff decided to write their own CCR. The PFP CCR provides additional guidance for the evaluation team to use by clarifying the evaluation criteria in DOE-STD-3007-2007. In reviewing documents used in classifying controls for Nuclear Safety, it was noted that DOE-HDBK-1188, 'Glossary of Environment, Health, and Safety Terms', defines an Administrative Control (AC) in terms that are different than typically used in Criticality Safety. As part of this CCR, a new term, Criticality Administrative Control (CAC) was defined to clarify the difference between an AC used for criticality safety and an AC used for nuclear safety. In Nuclear Safety terms, an AC is a provision relating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, assessment, and reporting necessary to ensure safe operation of a facility. A CAC was defined as an administrative control derived in a criticality safety analysis that is implemented to ensure double contingency. According to criterion 2 of Section IV, 'Linkage to the Documented Safety Analysis', of DOESTD-3007-2007, the consequence of a criticality should be examined for the purposes of classifying the significance of a control or component. HNF-PRO-700, 'Safety Basis Development', provides control selection criteria based on consequence and risk that may be used in the development of a Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) to establish the classification of a component as a design feature, as safety class or safety significant, i.e., an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), or as equipment important to safety; or merely provides defense-in-depth. Similar logic is applied to the CACs. Criterion 8C of DOE-STD-3007-2007, as written, added to the confusion of using the basic CCR from HNF-7098. The PFP CCR attempts to clarify this criterion by revising it to say 'Programmatic commitments or general references to control philosophy (e.g., mass control or spacing control or concentration control as an overall control strategy for the process without specific quantification of individual limits) is included in the PFP DSA'. Table 1 shows the PFP methodology for evaluating CACs. This evaluation process has been in use since February of 2008 and has proven to be simple and effective. Each control identified in the applicable new/revised CSE is evaluated via the table. The results of this evaluation are documented in tables attached to the CCR as an appendix, for each CSE, to the base document.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Ground-source Heat Pumps Applied to Commercial Buildings

Ground-source heat pumps can provide an energy-efficient, cost-effective way to heat and cool commercial facilities. While ground-source heat pumps are well established in the residential sector, their application in larger, commercial-style, facilities is lagging, in part because of a lack of experience with the technology by those in decision-making positions. Through the use of a ground-coupling system, a conventional water-source heat pump design is transformed to a unique means of utilizing thermodynamic properties of earth and groundwater for efficient operation throughout the year in most climates. In essence, the ground (or groundwater) serves as a heat source during winter operation and a heat sink for summer cooling. Many varieties in design are available, so the technology can be adapted to almost any site. Ground-source heat pump systems can be used widely in commercial-building applications and, with proper installation, offer great potential for the commercial sector, where increased efficiency and reduced heating and cooling costs are important. Ground-source heat pump systems require less refrigerant than conventional air-source heat pumps or air-conditioning systems, with the exception of direct-expansion-type ground-source heat pump systems. This chapter provides information and procedures that an energy manager can use to evaluate most ground-source heat pump applications. Ground-source heat pump operation, system types, design variations, energy savings, and other benefits are explained. Guidelines are provided for appropriate application and installation. Two case studies are presented to give the reader a sense of the actual costs and energy savings. A list of manufacturers and references for further reading are included for prospective users who have specific or highly technical questions not fully addressed in this chapter. Sample case spreadsheets are provided in Appendix A. Additional appendixes provide other information on the ground-source heat pump technology.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

ANSI/ASHRAE/IES Standard 90.1-2010 Performance Rating Method Reference Manual

This document is intended to be a reference manual for the Appendix G Performance Rating Method (PRM) of ANSI/ASHRAE/IES Standard 90.1- 2010 (Standard 90.1-2010).The PRM is used for rating the energy efficiency of commercial and high-rise residential buildings with designs that exceed the requirements of Standard 90.1. The procedures and processes described in this manual are designed to provide consistency and accuracy by filling in gaps and providing additional details needed by users of the PRM. It should be noted that this document is created independently from ASHRAE and SSPC 90.1 and is not sanctioned nor approved by either of those entities . Potential users of this manual include energy modelers, software developers and implementers of “beyond code” energy programs. Energy modelers using ASHRAE Standard 90.1-2010 for beyond code programs can use this document as a reference manual for interpreting requirements of the Performance Rating method. Software developers, developing tools for automated creation of the baseline model can use this reference manual as a guideline for developing the rules for the baseline model.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗