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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 433 records · Page 24
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

24.1.3.1 - Verification of Spent Fuel Inside Dry Storage Casks by Fast/Epi-thermal Neutron Mapping

Development of a spent-fuel verification method based upon positional measurement of fast neutrons emitted from the top surface of the dry storage casks. A proof-of-principle field test on a partially loaded spent-fuel cask will be conducted by measuring the fast neutron flux on the top of the cask as a function of position using a single detector. If a useful verification signature is demonstrated, a multi-detector scanning array will be built and tested in FY2021 to demonstrate a practical rapid verification system in FY2022.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Magnetic Microcalorimeter Gamma Detectors with Ultra-High Energy Resolution (FY2021 Q2 Report)

For a follow-up project, we are currently funded by NA-241 to build a decay energy spectrometer based on the MMC technology developed in this LCP. The IAEA is specifically interested in accurate isotope analysis of small particles that decay energy (Q) spectroscopy is well-suited for. We have established an SP-1 collaboration with the IAEA that is expected to continue beyond FY20.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Misuse Detection for a Generalized SFR Test Reactor

Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) present unique challenges for international safeguards. SFRs possess neutron physics characteristics that if configured appropriately could produce more fissile material than consumed. An adversary state may choose to build an SFR, justified by a lack of domestic natural uranium and limited access or interest to procuring uranium from international markets. Once constructed, the state may choose to misuse the SFR for the purpose of diverting fissile plutonium from declared operation. This work shows that a demonstration SFR does not need to be configured as a plutonium breeder to create one Significant Quantity (SQ) of plutonium in a short amount of time (e.g., one to few years). However, such an extreme case of misuse would change the core reactivity in such a way as to be easily indicated by deviations of control rod position compared to declared operation. In this work a contrived SFR demonstration reactor was modeled for the purpose of exploring proliferation scenarios and how such misuse could be detected using the SFR's Reactor Data Acquisition System (RDAS). Typically, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have access to the control rod position, power, thermal, pressure sensing and indicating systems of nuclear power plants. However, this work shows that such data streams can be compared against a parallel detailed simulation model (a Digital Twin) to detect possible misuse.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Steps toward FNCL Cell Replacement (FY2021 Mid-Year Annual Report)

Evaluate compact replacement cells for the Fast Neutron Collar (FNCL). The current cells are 4x4x4 in 3 of EJ-309 instrumented with 8” tall PMTs, and the replacements are 4x4x3 in 3 cells instrumented with 1” tall SiPM arrays. The replacement cell materials are stilbene (organic crystal), EJ-309 (liquid scintillator), and EJ-299-33M (PSD-capable plastic).

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Methods for the Enhancement of Security Probabilistic Risk Assessments

The US Department of Energy is exploring the methods associated with probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and how they could be used to enhance physical security evaluations for nuclear facilities. A brief review of both international and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission physical security assessment methods is presented. From this review, and with an understanding of the technical elements associated with a traditional nuclear safety PRA, several observations are made pertaining to where physical security analysis methods could be enhanced. These observations principally support and enhance the answers within a physical security context to the risk triplet: (1) What can go wrong? (2) What is the likelihood? and (3) What are the consequences? Finally, benefits and technical challenges toward the development of a full security PRA are presented.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Overview of the U.S.-U.K. Portal Monitor for Authentication and Certification (PMAC) Project [Slides]

The PM designed and demonstrated under the PMAC project is a significant improvement from other existing PMs in terms of the joint host / inspector confidence provided and usability in a future hypothetical arms control regime. Based on these results, the PMAC system would be the best option currently available for a boundary control use case in a hypothetical arms control regime.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Safeguards for Reactors and Spent Fuel

It is crucial for safeguards that the amount of plutonium going to the reprocessing plant or repository is what we believe it to be.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Safeguards and Nondestructive Assay

What can we do? Encourage/ensure peaceful nuclear uses; Secure, safeguard, and/or dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological material; Detect and control the proliferation of related WMD technology and expertise.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Open Radiation Monitoring: Histogram Builder Module Design

The Open Radiation Monitoring Project seeks to develop and demonstrate a modular radiation detection architecture designed specifically for use in arms control treaty verification (ACTV) applications that will facilitate rapid development of trusted systems to meet the needs of potential future treaties. A modular architecture can be used to reduce more complex systems to a series of single purpose building blocks, thereby facilitating equipment inspection and in turn building trust in the equipment by all treaty parties. Furthermore, a modular architecture can be used to control data flow within the measurement system, reducing the risk of "hidden switches" and constraining the amount of sensitive information that could potentially be inadvertently leaked. This report details the first revision of a prototype circuit that will convert analog pulses directly into a histogrammed data set for further processing. The circuit was designed with both spectroscopy and multiplicity analysis in mind but can, in principle, be used to reduce any raw data stream into a histogram. The number of output channels is limited, and the histogram bin ranges are user configurable to allow for non-uniform and discontinuous bins, which makes it possible to restrict the information being passed down stream if desired. Pulse processing relies entirely on analog circuitry and non- programmable logic, which enables operation without the need for a central processor or other programmable control unit. The circuit remains untested under the Open Radiation Monitoring project due to the closure of the sponsoring program. However, further development and testing is scheduled to take place in support of a purpose-built trusted verification system development effort known as COGNIZANT, which demonstrates the potential benefit of developing a suite of modular trusted system components.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗