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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 451 records · Page 25
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Integrating Safety, Security, and Nuclear Operations for Advanced Reactors

The traditional separation between safety, security, and operations teams has created significant barriers to achieving optimal outcomes. When security considerations are introduced late in the design process, they often conflict with already-established architectural, operational, or engineering parameters. Retrofitting security measures can lead to increased costs, schedule delays, and compromises in security effectiveness. For instance, the need to retrofit physical barriers or surveillance systems often results in trade-offs that could have been avoided with earlier input from security professionals. Delayed integration can also affect regulatory processes and result in licensing delays. Security reviews conducted at later stages frequently identify gaps that necessitate significant redesign efforts, impacting not only scope, schedule, and budget, but also adding risk and lowering stakeholder confidence in the project. This paper aims to address these challenges by identifying practical opportunities for integrating security considerations seamlessly with design and operations teams throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear facilities—from conceptual design to commissioning and beyond. The research emphasizes the value of early and continuous collaboration among stakeholders to ensure that security measures are robust, operationally effective, and cost-efficient. By examining case studies, analyzing past incidents, and leveraging best practices from other high-security industries, this study highlights actionable strategies for bridging the gap between safety, security, and operations teams.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗
DOE OSTI2013

Requirements for Prognostic Health Management of Passive Components in Advanced Small Modular Reactors

Advanced small modular reactors (aSMRs), which are based on modularization of advanced reactor concepts, may provide a longer-term alternative to traditional light-water reactors and near term small modular reactors (SMRs), which are based on integral pressurized water reactor (iPWR) concepts. aSMRs are conceived for applications in remote locations and for diverse missions that include providing process or district heating, water desalination, and hydrogen production. Several challenges exist with respect to cost-effective operations and maintenance (O&M) of aSMRs, including the impacts of aggressive operating environments and modularity, and limiting these costs and staffing needs will be essential to ensuring the economic feasibility of aSMR deployment. In this regard, prognostic health management (PHM) systems have the potential to play a vital role in supporting the deployment of aSMR systems. This paper identifies requirements and technical gaps associated with implementation of PHM systems for passive aSMR components.

Nondestructive Evaluation↗
DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Capabilities in Support of Advanced Reactor Development [Slides]

A primary mission of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) is to support the next generation of nuclear reactors. This is an overview of ATR irradiation capabilities in support of advanced reactor development. Topics include an overview of the ATR facility and reactor, experiment design overview, thermal and fast spectrum testing, as well as advanced material testing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Assessment of ASI-developed Sensors for Inclusion in METL Testing

The Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (ASI) program facilitates the development of new sensors for both conventional and advanced reactors. Advanced reactor concepts utilize coolants other than light water, such as molten salts, liquid sodium, and high-temperature helium. Qualification of sensors developed for these advanced reactors is complicated by the relatively small number of facilities available that can provide relevant testing conditions (e.g., temperature, flow, and coolant chemistry). This report identifies sensors that were developed under the ASI program and may be tested in one available testbed: the Mechanisms Engineering Test Loop (METL) at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL), a non-nuclear liquid sodium flow facility.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2013

Technical Needs for Enhancing Risk Monitors with Equipment Condition Assessment for Advanced Small Modular Reactors

Advanced small modular reactors (aSMRs) can provide the United States with a safe, sustainable, and carbon-neutral energy source. The controllable day-to-day costs of aSMRs are expected to be dominated by operation and maintenance costs. Health and condition assessment coupled with online risk monitors can potentially enhance affordability of aSMRs through optimized operational planning and maintenance scheduling.

Advanced Small Modular Reactor↗
DOE OSTI2013

Incorporating Equipment Condition Assessment in Risk Monitors for Advanced Small Modular Reactors

Advanced small modular reactors (aSMRs) can complement the current fleet of large light-water reactors in the USA for baseload and peak demand power production and process heat applications (e.g., water desalination, shale oil extraction, hydrogen production). The day-to-day costs of aSMRs are expected to be dominated by operations and maintenance (O&M); however, the effect of diverse operating missions and unit modularity on O&M is not fully understood. These costs could potentially be reduced by optimized scheduling, with risk-informed scheduling of maintenance, repair, and replacement of equipment. Currently, most nuclear power plants have a “living” probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which reflects the as-operated, as-modified plant and combine event probabilities with population-based probability of failure (POF) for key components. “Risk monitors” extend the PRA by incorporating the actual and dynamic plant configuration (equipment availability, operating regime, environmental conditions, etc.) into risk assessment. In fact, PRAs are more integrated into plant management in today’s nuclear power plants than at any other time in the history of nuclear power. However, population-based POF curves are still used to populate fault trees; this approach neglects the time-varying condition of equipment that is relied on during standard and non-standard configurations. Equipment condition monitoring techniques can be used to estimate the component POF. Incorporating this unit-specific estimate of POF in the risk monitor can provide a more accurate estimate of risk in different operating and maintenance configurations. This enhanced risk assessment will be especially important for aSMRs that have advanced component designs, which don’t have an available operating history to draw from, and often use passive design features, which present challenges to PRA. This paper presents the requirements and technical gaps for developing a framework to integrate unit-specific estimates of POF into risk monitors, resulting in enhanced risk monitors that support optimized operation and maintenance of aSMRs.

Advanced Small Modular Reactors↗
DOE OSTI2013

On Enhancing Risk Monitors for Advanced Small Modular Reactors

Advanced small modular reactors (AdvSMRs) can contribute to safe, sustainable, and carbon-neutral energy production. However, the economics of AdvSMRs suffer from the loss of economy-of-scale for both construction and operation. The controllable day-to-day costs of AdvSMRs are expected to be dominated by operations and maintenance (O&M) costs. These expenses could potentially be managed through optimized scheduling of O&M activities for components, reactor modules, power blocks, and the full plant. Accurate, real-time risk assessment with integrated health monitoring of key active components can support scheduling of both online and offline inspection and maintenance activities.

Advanced SMR↗
DOE OSTI2021

Seismic isolation: A pathway to standardized advanced nuclear reactors

Standardizing advanced nuclear reactors is a pathway to substantially reducing their overnight capital cost and achieving parity with other power sources, including renewables and fossil fuels. The seismic load case has thwarted standardization of nuclear power plants because site-specific seismic hazard and local near-surface geology has triggered soil-structure-interaction analysis, design, equipment qualification, regulatory review, and licensing, ensuring that each build is different. To achieve standardized or site-independent certified advanced reactor designs, the impact of the seismic load case on the engineering and construction cost and time must be substantially mitigated. Seismic isolation is a mature technology that has been used for more than 30 years in non-nuclear sectors to substantially reduce earthquake demands in buildings and other infrastructure. In this paper, seismic isolation is used to enable standardization of advanced reactor designs, aimed at the complete re-use of a site-independent, certified design and repeated procurement of safety-class equipment. A pathway to standardized designs using seismic isolation is demonstrated for two fundamentally different advanced reactors: a molten salt reactor and a high temperature gas reactor. Each reactor building is equipped with three specialized pieces of safety-class equipment, namely, a reactor vessel, a steam generator, and a control rod drive mechanism housing that is attached to the reactor head. Analysis is performed per ASCE and ASME standards to design the buildings and the equipment for two base conditions: conventional (fixed base) and base isolated. The impact of the seismic load case is characterized for the reinforced concrete walls in the buildings and for the equipment, measured using vessel wall thickness and horizontal accelerations. Here the analysis results show that the fixed-base buildings, designed for a site of low seismic hazard (peak ground acceleration, PGA = 0.15 g) could be constructed at a site of much greater seismic hazard (PGA = 0.7 g) if seismic base isolation is employed. Importantly, the scope of the site-specific analysis, design, and qualification would be limited to the seismic isolators and the isolated substructure, drastically reducing plant-specific engineering, review, and licensing, and time to construction start. Regulatory challenges and opportunities with standardized reactor designs are identified.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

​​Integrity Enhancing Protocols (IEP) Evaluation Framework​

​Protocols play an essential role in Advance Reactor systems. A diverse set of protocols are available to these reactors. Advanced Reactors benefit from technologies that can minimize their resource utilization and costs. Evaluation frameworks are often used when assessing protocols and processes related to cryptographic security systems. The following report discusses the various characteristics associated with these protocol evaluation frameworks, and derives a novel evaluative framework.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗