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NASA NTRS2008

Final Report on Portable Laser Coating Removal Systems Field Demonstrations and Testing

Processes currently used throughout the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to remove corrosion and coatings from structures, ground service equipment and small components results in waste streams consisting of toxic chemicals, spent media blast materials, and waste water. When chemicals are used in these processes they are typically high in volatile organic compounds (VOC) and are considered hazardous air pollutants (HAP). When blast media is used, the volume of hazardous waste generated is increased significantly. Many of the coatings historically used within NASA contain toxic metals such as hexavalent chromium, and lead. These materials are highly regulated and restrictions on worker exposure continue to increase. Most recently the EPA reduced the permissible exposure limit (PEL) for hexavalent chromium. The new standard lowers OSHA's PEL for hexavalent chromium from 52 to 5 micrograms of Cr(V1) per cubic meter of air as an 8-hour time-weighted average. Hexavalent chromium is found in the pretreatment and primer coatings used within the Shuttle Program. In response to the need to continue to protect assets within the agency and the growing concern over these new regulations, NASA is researching different ways to continue the required maintenance of both facility and flight equipment in a safe, efficient and environmentally preferable manner. The use of laser energy to remove prepare surfaces for a variety of processes, such as corrosion and coating removal, weld preparation and non destructive evaluation is a relatively new technology that has shown itself to be environmentally preferable and in many cases less labor intensive than currently used removal methods. The development of a Portable Laser Coating Removal System (PLCRS) started as the goal of a Joint Group on Pollution Prevention (JG-PP) project, led by the Air Force, where several types of lasers in several configurations were thoroughly evaluated. Following this project, NASA decided to evaluate the best performers on processes and coatings specific to the agency. Laser systems used during this project were all of a similar design, most of which had integrated vacuum systems in order to collect materials removed from substrate surfaces during operation. Due to the fact that the technology lends itself to a bide variety of processes, several site demonstrations were organized in order to allow for greater evaluation of the laser systems across NASA. The project consisted of an introductory demonstration and a more in-depth evaluation at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Additionally, field demonstrations occurred at Glenn Research Center and Kennedy Space Center. During these demonstrations several NASA specific applications were evaluated, including the removal of coatings within Orbiter tile cavities and Teflon from Space Shuttle Main Engine gaskets, removal of heavy grease from Solid Rocket Booster components and the removal of coatings on weld lines for Shuttle and general ground service equipment for non destructive evaluation (NDE). In addition, several general industry applications such as corrosion removal, structural coating removal, weld-line preparation and surface cleaning were evaluated. This included removal of coatings and corrosion from surfaces containing lead-based coatings and applications similar to launch-structure maintenance and Crawler maintenance. During the project lifecycle, an attempt was made to answer process specific concerns and questions as they arose. Some of these initially unexpected questions concerned the effects lasers might have on substrates used on flight equipment including strength, surface re-melting, substrate temperature and corrosion resistance effects. Additionally a concern was PPE required for operating such a system including eye, breathing and hearing protection. Most of these questions although not initially planned, were fully explored as a part of this project. Generally the results from tesng were very positive. Corrosion was effectively removed from steel, but less successfully from aluminum alloys. Coatings were able to be removed, with varying results, generally dark, matte and thin coatings were easier to remove. Steel and aluminum panels were able to be cleaned for welding, with no known deleterious effects and weld-lines were able to have coatings removed in critical areas for NDE while saving time as compared to other methods.

Rothgeb, Matthew J.↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA NTRS2016

Assurance of Fault Management: Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness

Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of criticality within flight software, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance for NASA projects, especially as spaceflight systems continue to increase in complexity. Insight into specific characteristics of FM architectures seen embedded within safety- and mission-critical software systems analyzed by the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program has been enhanced with an FM Technical Reference (TR) suite. Benefits are aimed beyond the IVV community to those that seek ways to efficiently and effectively provide software assurance to reduce the FM risk posture of NASA and other space missions. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IVV techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. The role FM has with regard to overall asset protection of flight software systems is being addressed with the development of an adverse condition (AC) database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities.Identification of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine how a system responds to these conditions are important aspects of hazard analysis and fault management. Understanding what ACs the mission may face, and ensuring they are prevented or addressed is the responsibility of the assurance team, which necessarily should have insight into ACs beyond those defined by the project itself. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs, and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. The repository has a firm structure, initial collection of data, and an interface established for informational queries, with plans for integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV, enabling support and accessibility across the Agency. The development of an improved workflow process for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance is currently underway.

Software Verification & Validation↗

NASA NTRS2012

Kennedy Space Center

Among 2011's many accomplishments, we safely retired the Space Shuttle Program after 30 incredible years; completed the International Space Station and are taking steps to enable it to reach its full potential as a multi-purpose laboratory; and helped to expand scientific knowledge with missions like Aquarius, GRAIL, and the Mars Science Laboratory. Responding to national budget challenges, we are prioritizing critical capabilities and divesting ourselves of assets no longer needed for NASA's future exploration programs. Since these facilities do not have to be maintained or demolished, the government saves money. At the same time, our commercial partners save money because they do not have to build new facilities. It is a win-win for everyone. Moving forward, 2012 will be even more historically significant as we celebrate the 50th Anniversary of Kennedy Space Center. In the coming year, KSC will facilitate commercial transportation to low-Earth orbit and support the evolution of the Space Launch System and Orion crew vehicle as they ready for exploration missions, which will shape how human beings view the universe. While NASA's Vision is to lead scientific and technological advances in aeronautics and space for a Nation on the frontier of discovery KSC's vision is to be the world's preeminent launch complex for government and commercial space access, enabling the world to explore and work in space. KSC's Mission is to safely manage, develop, integrate, and sustain space systems through partnerships that enable innovative, diverse access to space and inspires the Nation's future explorers.

Griffin, Amanda↗

NASA NTRS2008

Interfacing Space Communications and Navigation Network Simulation with Distributed System Integration Laboratories (DSIL)

NASA's planned Lunar missions will involve multiple NASA centers where each participating center has a specific role and specialization. In this vision, the Constellation program (CxP)'s Distributed System Integration Laboratories (DSIL) architecture consist of multiple System Integration Labs (SILs), with simulators, emulators, testlabs and control centers interacting with each other over a broadband network to perform test and verification for mission scenarios. To support the end-to-end simulation and emulation effort of NASA' exploration initiatives, different NASA centers are interconnected to participate in distributed simulations. Currently, DSIL has interconnections among the following NASA centers: Johnson Space Center (JSC), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Through interconnections and interactions among different NASA centers, critical resources and data can be shared, while independent simulations can be performed simultaneously at different NASA locations, to effectively utilize the simulation and emulation capabilities at each center. Furthermore, the development of DSIL can maximally leverage the existing project simulation and testing plans. In this work, we describe the specific role and development activities at JPL for Space Communications and Navigation Network (SCaN) simulator using the Multi-mission Advanced Communications Hybrid Environment for Test and Evaluation (MACHETE) tool to simulate communications effects among mission assets. Using MACHETE, different space network configurations among spacecrafts and ground systems of various parameter sets can be simulated. Data that is necessary for tracking, navigation, and guidance of spacecrafts such as Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV), and Lunar Relay Satellite (LRS) and orbit calculation data are disseminated to different NASA centers and updated periodically using the High Level Architecture (HLA). In addition, the performance of DSIL under different traffic loads with different mix of data and priorities are evaluated.

Traffic Measuring and Monitoring↗

NASA NTRS1992

Design definition of the Laser Atmospheric Wind Sounder (LAWS), phase 2. Volume 1: Executive summary

The LAWS phase 1 and phase 2 studies have been completed on schedule and have led to significant advances in CO2 laser development. The Phase 2 Design Definition Study has shown that a large scanning mirror/high pulse energy laser LAWS Instrument is feasible and within the existing technology. The capability to monitor wind velocities with backscatter ratios of 10(exp 11) m(exp -1) SR(exp -1) is feasible. The weight budget allocated for the baseline LAWS is adequate, and sufficient reserves exist with the potential downsized configuration. With the possible decrease in available power from the baseline of 2.2 kW guideline, power and shot management is critical for the baseline configuration (15 to 20 J). This is particularly true during the 100 day occultation period each year. With the downsized configurations (5 to 7 J), power management is still necessary during the occultation but is primarily limited to shot management over the polar regions. The breadboard effort has produced significant laser advances for a tight 18 month schedule and the minimum budgets available from NASA, Lockheed, and TDS. Using the NASA funds and Lockheed and TDS fixed assets budgets, the breadboard was designed, fabricated, and brought on-line with first laser light within 16 months after ATP. First laser beam was obtained on 21 April 1992 at a 5 J power level. Tests since then have been conducted at sustained, repetitive pulse levels of over 7 J and 20 Hz. This is an increase of over two or three times greater than any system previously developed from this type laser. Increased power levels and additional life tests will be accomplished in the next LAWS phase. The Lockheed LAWS design will operate in the gravity gradient mode on-orbit, and all possible instrument vibration and jitter modes have been considered. Adequate pointing stability and control is state-of-the-art technology for the critical time periods, frequency rates, and control responses required by LAWS. Lockheed recommends a 6-1/2 year phase C/D program for LAWS to provide adequate feedback from the engineering unit and the qualification unit to the final flight unit. Assuming a one year period for LAWS integration to the spacecraft, followed by a six-month period for launch vehicle integration, LAWS could be successfully developed and launched in eight years. Our baseline design or downsized design can be accommodated by either the Atlas 2AS or the Delta launch vehicles. Lockheed's recommendation is that, based on the successful phase 2 design study and breadboard program, a follow-on 18 month extended breadboard testing program and additional system engineering studies, primarily in interfacing with a to be defined platform, be initiated. This should be immediately followed by the phase C/D program, leading to a LAWS launch in late 2001 or early 2002.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2017

NASA's Space Launch System: Deep-Space Delivery for SmallSats

Designed for human exploration missions into deep space, NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) represents a new spaceflight infrastructure asset, enabling a wide variety of unique utilization opportunities. While primarily focused on launching the large systems needed for crewed spaceflight beyond Earth orbit, SLS also offers a game-changing capability for the deployment of small satellites to deep-space destinations, beginning with its first flight. Currently, SLS is making rapid progress toward readiness for its first launch in two years, using the initial configuration of the vehicle, which is capable of delivering more than 70 metric tons (t) to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). On its first flight, an uncrewed test of the Orion spacecraft into distant retrograde orbit around the moon, accompanying Orion on SLS will be 13 small-satellite secondary payloads, which will deploy in cislunar space. These secondary payloads will include not only NASA research, but also spacecraft from industry and international partners and academia. The payloads also represent a variety of disciplines including, but not limited to, studies of the moon, Earth, sun, and asteroids. The Space Launch System Program is working actively with the developers of the payloads toward vehicle integration. Following its first flight and potentially as early as its second, SLS will evolve into a more powerful configuration with a larger upper stage. This configuration will initially be able to deliver 105 t to LEO, and will continue to be upgraded to a performance of greater than 130 t to LEO. While the addition of the more powerful upper stage will mean a change to the secondary payload accommodations from those on the first launch, the SLS Program is already evaluating options for future secondary payload opportunities. Early discussions are also already underway for the use of SLS to launch spacecraft on interplanetary trajectories, which could open additional opportunities for small satellites. This presentation will include an overview of the SLS vehicle and its capabilities, including the current status of progress toward first launch. It will also explain the opportunities the vehicle offers for small satellites, including an overview of the CubeSat manifest for Exploration Mission-1 in 2018 and a discussion of future capabilities.

Robinson, Kimberly F.↗

NASA NTRS2005

International Cooperation in the Field of International Space Station (ISS) Payload Safety

In the frame of the International Space Station (ISS) Program cooperation, in 1998, the European Space Agency (ESA) approached the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) with the unique concept of a Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) "franchise" based at the European Space Technology Center (ESTEC), where the panel would be capable of autonomously reviewing flight hardware for safety. This paper will recount the course of an ambitious idea as it progressed into a fully functional reality. It will show how a panel initially conceived at NASA to serve a national programme has evolved into an international safety cooperation asset. The PSRP established at NASA began reviewing ISS payloads approximately in late 1994 or early 1995 as an expansion of the pre-existing Shuttle Program PSRP. This paper briefly describes the fundamental Shuttle safety process and the establishment of the safety requirements for payloads intending to use the Space Transportation System and International Space Station (ISS). The paper will also offer some historical statistics about the experiments that completed the payload safety process for Shuttle and ISS. The paper 1 then presents the background of ISS agreements and international treaties that had to be taken into account when establishing the ESA PSRP. The detailed franchising model will be expounded upon, followed by an outline of the cooperation charter approved by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, and ESA Director of Manned Spaceflight and Microgravity. The resulting ESA PSRP implementation and its success statistics to date will then be addressed. Additionally the paper presents the ongoing developments with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. The discussion will conclude with ideas for future developments, such to achieve a fully integrated international system of payload safety panels for ISS.

Heimann, Timothy↗

NASA NTRS2019

NASA's Space Launch System: Deep Space Access for CubeSats

NASA is embarking on a new generation of missions to the Moon, known as the Artemis program. The Agency’s new super heavy-lift launch vehicle, the Space Launch System (SLS), is a critical enabling capability for these efforts, which will serve as a proving ground for future crewed expeditions to Mars. SLS is designed to return astronauts to the Moon in the Orion spacecraft and to launch more mass and provide more volume for critical payloads than commercially available vehicles, giving NASA a unique asset for deep space exploration. When performance margin and volume is available, as it is on the first flight, Artemis I (previously Exploration Mission-1), SLS can offer CubeSats access to deep space, beyond Earth’s orbit. The Artemis I flight has 13 6U (14 kg) CubeSats manifested, and the Program is currently accepting proposals for 6U and 12U payloads for the Artemis II flight through the agency’s CubeSat Launch Initiative (CSLI) program. Proposals from U.S.-based payload developers to fly on Artemis II will be accepted through CSLI until November 4, 2019. When ridesharing on SLS deep space missions, CubeSats must demonstrate they will not interfere with primary mission objectives. The 13 Artemis I CubeSats that hail from industry, academia, NASA and its international partners represent an array of exciting deep space science investigations and technology demonstrations that may help inform future Artemis missions. The initial SLS Block 1 vehicle for the Artemis I flight is fully manufactured; several elements are complete and have been delivered to the Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) Program at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), which has responsibility for integrating and launching the SLS and Orion stack. Completed elements of the Artemis I vehicle include the Orion Stage Adapter (OSA), which houses the 13 Artemis I CubeSats. With the Artemis I flight hardware and software nearing completion, work is in progress for the second Block 1 launcher, designated for the crewed Artemis II flight. Hardware is being manufactured for every element of the Artemis II vehicle. In this paper, the author will review the status of the Artemis I vehicle and the payloads manifested for the initial flight. Information on the Secondary Payload Deployment System (SPDS) that the SLS Program provides to payload developers will also be included.

Creech, Stephen D.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Mars Planetary Network for Human Exploration Era – Potential Challenges and Solutions

During 2016-2017, a study was conducted under the sponsorship of the NASA’s Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Program to investigate the deep space communications capacity taking into account the needs of all the present and envisioned future missions toward 2030s. It was soon recognized that planning for human exploration to Mars would impose certain unprecedent challenges, both fiscal and technical, to the current space communications paradigm. Targeting the assumed missions concepts, i.e., Crewed Mission to Phobos (CMTP) and Mars Short Stay Mission (MSSM), a Mars Planetary Network for the human exploration era has been formulated. The activity modeling and network traffic simulation/modeling we performed gave some insight into the technical challenges in space communications for the envisioned human Mars exploration era. Chief among the potential challenges are: (1) the high demand on the deep space network (DSN) assets for achieving the high-rate links, both return and forward, from Mars farthest/farther distance (up to 2.67 AU); (2) the need for resilient, persistent communication coverage for crewed vehicles, on surface and in orbits; (3) the significant period of outage for the Mars-Earth link due to superior solar conjunction; (4) the need for on-demand, simultaneous access to the proximity link by multiple vehicles and astronauts in the exploration zone; (5) the capability of determining precise, real-time, positions of surface vehicles and astronauts by the deep space habitat and/or other tele-operations entities. Solution space to each of the above challenges has been explored and analyzed in the context of the individual problem domain and, more importantly, in conjunction with that for the other challenges. This has led to an end-to-end definition of a Mars Planetary Network that would feature: (1) the fusion of deep space Ka-band and optical communications for achieving Mars-Earth high-rate links taking advantage of the optical/RF hybrid 8m/34m antennas in DSN; (2) the integrated application of the Multiple Spacecraft Per Antenna (MSPA) technique, for return link data acquisition, and the Multiple Uplink Per Antenna (MUPA) technique, for forward link data trasnmission, to reduce the number of 34m beam-wave guide (BWG) antennas needed for the era; (3) the integration of three, arrayed, 34m beam-wave guide (BWG) antennas, to provide a high G/T aperture, with the MSPA/MUPA techniques, and a dual “trunk link”approach to cut down the needed G/T -- hence, reducing the number of 34m antennas, relative to that in the single trunk approach by 50%; (4) the deployment of two areostationary/areosynchronous Mars relay orbiters; one of them could also function as (or be served by) a notional Deep Space Habitat (DSH); (5) the opportunistic deployment of a science orbiter in a Pioneer-6 type orbit, equidistant Mars/Earth, that could also serve as an intermediary relay during the Mars superior solar conjunction perod; (6) the existence of the multi-function Mars proximity link that provides the demand-assigned, multiple access (DAMA) capability; and (7) the provision of tracking observables, by leveraging on the planned Mars orbiting and surface infrastructure, to enable the in-situ navigation for surface and orbiting vehicles. This paper provides the description of the proposed Mars Planetary Network in the human exploration era, the trade-off analysis for the various alternative architectures, and the optimal solutions to the key challenges in defining this end-to-end network.

Cheung, Kar-Ming↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

New Horizons for a Practical and Performance-Optimized Solar System Internet

The High-rate Delay Tolerant Networking (HDTN) project at the NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) is developing a performance-optimized Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) implementation using the Bundle Protocol (BP) both for infusion in modern, distributed spacecraft systems and for foundational network research purposes. While one purpose of networking is to enable a returns-to-scale with communicating assets, it is recognized that neither the protocol nor its implementations may impose a bottleneck on data delivery if expected to be implemented. With this in mind, this paper explores the current status of the HDTN software, including its capabilities and also various performance metrics at the bundle layer, the convergence layers (e.g. performance-optimized Licklider Transmission Protocol, or LTP), and bundle storage and retrieval. This includes goals of software implementations that support multi-gigabit per second communications regardless of payload size. A discussion on the current software architecture and internal scheduling and routing is included. Interoperability with such extant DTN implementations as Interplanetary Overlay Network (ION) and DTN Marshall Enterprise Implementation (DTNME) are included. The research goals of the project are also listed, including Software-Defined Networking (SDN) and the theory of DTNs. A table-based filtration system for the Bundle Protocol (BP), called BP Filter, is also explored: this addition enables table-based policies within the context of a DTN for management purposes. Infusion begins with systems testing in the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Software Development and Integration Laboratory (SDIL), which supports International Space Station (ISS) Flight Software development, integration, and verification. Observations made from the results of testing in the SDIL and in flight testing are also discussed, pointing to a path for infusion into high data return low-earth orbit (LEO) missions. The paper concludes with areas for future work.

Delay Tolerant Networking↗

NASA NTRS2006

Integrating Ideas for International Data Collaborations Through The Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) International Directory Network (IDN)

The capabilities of the International Directory Network's (IDN) version MD9.5, along with a new version of the metadata authoring tool, "docBUILDER", will be presented during the Technology and Services Subgroup session of the Working Group on Information Systems and Services (WGISS). Feedback provided through the international community has proven instrumental in positively influencing the direction of the IDN s development. The international community was instrumental in encouraging support for using the IS0 international character set that is now available through the directory. Supporting metadata descriptions in additional languages encourages extended use of the IDN. Temporal and spatial attributes often prove pivotal in the search for data. Prior to the new software release, the IDN s geospatial and temporal searches suffered from browser incompatibilities and often resulted in unreliable performance for users attempting to initiate a spatial search using a map based on aging Java applet technology. The IDN now offers an integrated Google map and date search that replaces that technology. In addition, one of the most defining characteristics in the search for data relates to the temporal and spatial resolution of the data. The ability to refine the search for data sets meeting defined resolution requirements is now possible. Data set authors are encouraged to indicate the precise resolution values for their data sets and subsequently bin these into one of the pre-selected resolution ranges. New metadata authoring tools have been well received. In response to requests for a standalone metadata authoring tool, a new shareable software package called "docBUILDER solo" will soon be released to the public. This tool permits researchers to document their data during experiments and observational periods in the field. interoperability has been enhanced through the use of the Open Archives Initiative s (OAI) Protocol for Metadata Harvesting (PMH). Harvesting of XML content through OAI-MPH has been successfully tested with several organizations. The protocol appears to be a prime candidate for sharing metadata throughout the international community. Data services for visualizing and analyzing data have become valuable assets in facilitating the use of data. Data providers are offering many of their data-related services through the directory. The IDN plans to develop a service-based architecture to further promote the use of web services. During the IDN Task Team session, ideas for further enhancements will be discussed.

Olsen, Lola M.↗

NASA NTRS2020

Neighbors on the Red Planet: Mars Science Laboratory Relay Coordination Post InSight Arrival

The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) strategic communications planning toolset selects orbiter relay opportunities that the rover will use for transmitting data back to Earth. The toolset was extensively reworked in preparation for the Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy and Heat Transport's (InSight) arrival at Mars in November 2018 and the regular use of Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution (MAVEN) and Trace Gas Orbiter (TGO) orbiters as relay assets in addition to Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) and 2001 Mars Odyssey (ODY). Overflight selection criteria was automated in the new toolset to take into account overflight deconfliction and down-selection as well as tactical timeline planning impacts and total data return. This was done while remaining flexible and configurable for changing mission priorities. As the Curiosity rover ages, the MSL planning team must overcome issues such as reduced budgets, memory bank anomalies, and reduced power availability. These are some examples of factors that affect the strategic communications planning toolset. In addition to adapting to evolving internal mission needs, the toolset must also be flexible to changes in the relay planning interface with other landers. The concept of shared relay or “split passes” was introduced when InSight began operating on Mars just 600 kilometers away and at the same longitude as MSL. This proximity meant that orbiters could now communicate with two landers during the same relay session. Over time, this new operational use-case became common practice as InSight and MSL settled into relay planning negotiations. Today, many TGO relay sessions are shared between MSL and InSight. As more orbiters pursue integrating this capability into nominal relay operations, and more landers arrive on Mars, the strategic communications process and toolsets increases in complexity. Development of a single tool that schedules relay sessions for all orbiters and landers simultaneously may become necessary as the number of Martian spacecraft increases. Examples of how toolset selection criteria and capabilities have helped or hindered MSL planning will be presented. Ongoing improvements to MSL toolsets and processes, as well as to shared relay tools such as Mars Relay Operations Service (MaROS) and General Telecom Predictor (GTP) are also discussed in this paper. Examples of how toolset selection criteria and capabilities have helped or hindered MSL planning will be presented. Ongoing improvements to MSL toolsets and processes, as well as to shared relay tools such as Mars Relay Operations Service (MaROS) and General Telecom Predictor (GTP) are also discussed in this paper.

Vandermey, Nancy↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

Human-Rating↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

artemis↗

NASA NTRS2012

A Proposed Strategy for the U.S. to Develop and Maintain a Mainstream Capability Suite ("Warehouse") for Automated/Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking in Low Earth Orbit and Beyond

The ability of space assets to rendezvous and dock/capture/berth is a fundamental enabler for numerous classes of NASA fs missions, and is therefore an essential capability for the future of NASA. Mission classes include: ISS crew rotation, crewed exploration beyond low-Earth-orbit (LEO), on-orbit assembly, ISS cargo supply, crewed satellite servicing, robotic satellite servicing / debris mitigation, robotic sample return, and robotic small body (e.g. near-Earth object, NEO) proximity operations. For a variety of reasons to be described, NASA programs requiring Automated/Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking/Capture/Berthing (AR&D) capabilities are currently spending an order-of-magnitude more than necessary and taking twice as long as necessary to achieve their AR&D capability, "reinventing the wheel" for each program, and have fallen behind all of our foreign counterparts in AR&D technology (especially autonomy) in the process. To ensure future missions' reliability and crew safety (when applicable), to achieve the noted cost and schedule savings by eliminate costs of continually "reinventing the wheel ", the NASA AR&D Community of Practice (CoP) recommends NASA develop an AR&D Warehouse, detailed herein, which does not exist today. The term "warehouse" is used herein to refer to a toolbox or capability suite that has pre-integrated selectable supply-chain hardware and reusable software components that are considered ready-to-fly, low-risk, reliable, versatile, scalable, cost-effective, architecture and destination independent, that can be confidently utilized operationally on human spaceflight and robotic vehicles over a variety of mission classes and design reference missions, especially beyond LEO. The CoP also believes that it is imperative that NASA coordinate and integrate all current and proposed technology development activities into a cohesive cross-Agency strategy to produce and utilize this AR&D warehouse. An initial estimate indicates that if NASA strategically coordinates the development of a robust AR&D capability across the Agency, the cost of implementing AR&D on a spacecraft could be reduced from roughly $70M per mission to as low as $7M per mission, and the associated development time could be reduced from 4 years to 2 years, after the warehouse is completely developed. Table 1 shows the clear long-term benefits to the Agency in term of costs and schedules for various missions. (The methods used to arrive at the Table 1 numbers is presented in Appendices A and B.)

Krishnakumar, Kalmanje S.↗

NASA NTRS2022

NASA Utilization of Space Nuclear Systems for Robotic and Human Exploration Missions: Response to EO 13972: Promoting Small Nuclear Reactors for National Defense and Space Exploration

Space Nuclear Systems (SNS) technology development offers a wide range of capabilities to support NASA’s current and future missions. Executive Order (EO) 13972, “Promoting Small Modular Reactors for National Defense and Space Exploration” [1], issued 5 January 2021, directs NASA to define requirements for NASA utilization of nuclear energy systems for human and robotic exploration missions through 2040 and analyze the costs and benefits of such requirements.” Although it is premature to define requirements and cost for future exploration missions that have not yet been formulated, this report describes planned objectives and missions by 2040 that are enabled or enhanced by nuclear systems while taking into account a number of unique considerations for nuclear energy in the space environment. Nuclear energy systems are enabling for space missions and critical capabilities where conventional forms of energy production are impractical or impossible due to mass constraints, mission duration, or distance from the Sun. Space nuclear technologies available or in development for use by 2040 utilize radioisotope decay or nuclear fission and fall into three categories: heat, power, and propulsion. Current applications utilize radioisotope power systems that provide consistent and reliable performance in the sub-kilowatt power range. More advanced SNS can enable new mission objectives where high energy density solutions are critical, or where access to solar solutions is prohibitive. Higher power radioisotope and fission systems are under development within NASA for a wide variety of human exploration and science mission applications. Planned missions designed to use radioisotope systems include Dragonfly, a rotorcraft that will explore the surface of Titan, and Persephone, a mission concept for a Pluto orbiter. Nuclear fission systems have the key advantage of providing significantly higher power, lower mass solutions from tens to even thousands of kilowatts. Fission power is enabling to a sustained human presence on the Moon and developing a robust lunar economy. Fission propulsion is enabling for missions within and beyond cis-lunar space. This report examines NASA-envisioned mission applications and associated performance needs for SNS over the next twenty years leading to 2040 along with the unique technical considerations posed by space nuclear technology development. This includes engineering and operational logistics for ground handling, thermal management, survival of the space environment, operational safety, power requirements, and service longevity. Safety to the public, the NASA work force, and agency assets remains a top priority for NASA and particular attention is given to this aspect in the design, hardware assembly, ground operation, launch, and mission operation of an SNS. NASA relies on the Department of Energy as nuclear authority and its legacy of rigorous safety procedures as standards for ground development, test, transportation, and launch site operation. The principal concern is preventing unintended radiological release to the public or environment. Radioisotope system experience has established processes, including ground operation, transportation, and launch, that are considered directly applicable to emerging fission systems; however, fission systems have unique design needs that impact the safety and performance requirements. High efficiency power conversion from both fission and radioisotope systems requires high operating temperatures necessitating both passive and active thermal management to maintain safe and nominal operating conditions. Effective cooling and waste heat rejection have special considerations for space applications, whether in zero-g or reduced gravity. Fluid and heat transfer within the reactor system is not anticipated to be impacted by reduced or zero-g environments. Cryogenic working fluids and propellant supplies utilized in some space nuclear applications will need low mass, high capacity cryocoolers to meet the long-term storage and near zero-boiloff needs. Integrated, high power density SNS capable of being packaged in a single vehicle is a key consideration for NASA. Due to concerns for complexity and reliability, in space reactor assembly and reactor refueling are not current design considerations. Expanding into a new era for space exploration depends on mass-efficient, high-energy solutions to power deep-space vehicles, operate in harsh environments, and increase mission flexibility. NASA nuclear technology investments are targeting power for surface operations and propulsion for fast-transit, deep-space missions, all with the ability to reliably operate without the need for repair or refueling. NASA’s goals, enabled by nuclear technologies, provide for exciting advances in scientific objectives and human exploration, ushering in a new space age that enables a human presence on bodies beyond our Earth.

nuclear↗