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DOE OSTI2019

Chapter 4: Drivetrain Analysis for Reliable Design

This chapter described common design practices for the wind-turbine gearboxes and main bearings, along with modelling and simulation techniques employed to support and evaluate the development process. These design criteria and requirements are based on several major failure modes for gears and bearings. However, not all of the failure modes are understood well enough to be included in the design standards primarily because of the complexity of the modelling and loading conditions. Drivetrain modelling for design was discussed, and most of the modelling tools used in design are static in nature.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of instrumental subsystem FMEA/CIL

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Instrumentation hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter Instrumentation hardware are documented. The IOA product for Instrumentation analysis consisted of 107 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 22 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the Pre 51-L NASA baseline with 14 Post 51-L FMEAs added, which consists of 96 FMEAs and 18 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 25 FMEAs which caused differences in 5 CIL items.

Gardner, J. R.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Fatigue damage accumulation in various metal matrix composites

The purpose of this paper is to review some of the latest understanding of the fatigue behavior of continuous fiber reinforced metal matrix composites. The emphasis is on the development of an understanding of different fatigue damage mechanisms and why and how they occur. The fatigue failure modes in continuous fiber reinforced metal matrix composites are controlled by the three constituents of the system: fiber, matrix, and fiber/matrix interface. The relative strains to fatigue failure of the fiber and matrix will determine the failure mode. Several examples of matrix, fiber, and self-similar damage growth dominated fatigue damage are given for several metal matrix composite systems. Composite analysis, failure modes, and damage modeling are discussed. Boron/aluminum, silicon-carbide/aluminum, FP/aluminum, and borsic/titanium metal matrix composites are discussed.

Johnson, W. S.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Simulation Assisted Risk Assessment: Blast Overpressure Modeling

A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach has been developed and applied to the risk analysis of capsule abort during ascent. The PRA is used to assist in the identification of modeling and simulation applications that can significantly impact the understanding of crew risk during this potentially dangerous maneuver. The PRA approach is also being used to identify the appropriate level of fidelity for the modeling of those critical failure modes. The Apollo launch escape system (LES) was chosen as a test problem for application of this approach. Failure modes that have been modeled and/or simulated to date include explosive overpressure-based failure, explosive fragment-based failure, land landing failures (range limits exceeded either near launch or Mode III trajectories ending on the African continent), capsule-booster re-contact during separation, and failure due to plume-induced instability. These failure modes have been investigated using analysis tools in a variety of technical disciplines at various levels of fidelity. The current paper focuses on the development and application of a blast overpressure model for the prediction of structural failure due to overpressure, including the application of high-fidelity analysis to predict near-field and headwinds effects.

Lawrence, Scott L.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Qualification and Issues with Space Flight Laser Systems and Components

The art of flight quality solid-state laser development is still relatively young, and much is still unknown regarding the best procedures, components, and packaging required for achieving the maximum possible lifetime and reliability when deployed in the harsh space environment. One of the most important issues is the limited and unstable supply of quality, high power diode arrays with significant technological heritage and market lifetime. Since Spectra Diode Labs Inc. ended their involvement in the pulsed array business in the late 1990's, there has been a flurry of activity from other manufacturers, but little effort focused on flight quality production. This forces NASA, inevitably, to examine the use of commercial parts to enable space flight laser designs. System-level issues such as power cycling, operational derating, duty cycle, and contamination risks to other laser components are some of the more significant unknown, if unquantifiable, parameters that directly effect transmitter reliability. Designs and processes can be formulated for the system and the components (including thorough modeling) to mitigate risk based on the known failures modes as well as lessons learned that GSFC has collected over the past ten years of space flight operation of lasers. In addition, knowledge of the potential failure modes related to the system and the components themselves can allow the qualification testing to be done in an efficient yet, effective manner. Careful test plan development coupled with physics of failure knowledge will enable cost effect qualification of commercial technology. Presented here will be lessons learned from space flight experience, brief synopsis of known potential failure modes, mitigation techniques, and options for testing from the system level to the component level.

Ott, Melanie N.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Qualification and Issues with Space Flight Laser Systems and Components

The art of flight quality solid-state laser development is still relatively young, and much is still unknown regarding the best procedures, components, and packaging required for achieving the maximum possible lifetime and reliability when deployed in the harsh space environment. One of the most important issues is the limited and unstable supply of quality, high power diode arrays with significant technological heritage and market lifetime. Since Spectra Diode Labs Inc. ended their involvement in the pulsed array business in the late 199O's, there has been a flurry of activity from other manufacturers, but little effort focused on flight quality production. This forces NASA, inevitably, to examine the use of commercial parts to enable space flight laser designs. System-level issues such as power cycling, operational derating, duty cycle, and contamination risks to other laser components are some of the more significant unknown, if unquantifiable, parameters that directly effect transmitter reliability. Designs and processes can be formulated for the system and the components (including thorough modeling) to mitigate risk based on the known failures modes as well as lessons learned that GSFC has collected over the past ten years of space flight operation of lasers. In addition, knowledge of the potential failure modes related to the system and the components themselves can allow the qualification testing to be done in an efficient yet, effective manner. Careful test plan development coupled with physics of failure knowledge will enable cost effect qualification of commercial technology. Presented here will be lessons learned from space flight experience, brief synopsis of known potential failure modes, mitigation techniques, and options for testing from the system level to the component level.

Ott, Melanie N.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Probabilistic model for fracture mechanics service life analysis

The service longevity of complex propulsion systems, such as the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), can be at risk from several competing failure modes. Conventional life assessment practice focuses upon the most severely life-limited feature of a given component, even though there may be other, less severe, potential failure locations. Primary, secondary, tertiary failure modes, as well as their associated probabilities, must also be considered. Futhermore, these probabilities are functions of accumulated service time. Thus a component may not always succumb to the most severe, or even the most probable failure mode. Propulsion system longevity must be assessed by considering simultaneously the actions of, and interactions among, life-limiting influences. These include, but are not limited to, high frequency fatigue (HFF), low cycle fatigue (LCF), and subsequent crack propagation, thermal and acoustic loadings, and the influence of less-than-ideal nondestructive evaluation (NDE). An outline is provided for a probabilistic model for service life analysis, and the progress towards its implementation is reported.

Annis, Charles↗

DOE OSTI2012

Resistance spot welding of ultra-fine grained steel sheets produced by constrained groove pressing: Optimization and characterization

Constrained groove pressing as a severe plastic deformation method is utilized to produce ultra-fine grained low carbon steel sheets. The ultra-fine grained sheets are joined via resistance spot welding process and the characteristics of spot welds are investigated. Resistance spot welding process is optimized for welding of the sheets with different severe deformations and their results are compared with those of as-received samples. The effects of failure mode and expulsion on the performance of ultra-fine grained sheet spot welds have been investigated in the present paper and the welding current and time of resistance spot welding process according to these subjects are optimized. Failure mode and failure load obtained in tensile-shear test, microhardness, X-ray diffraction, transmission electron microscope and scanning electron microscope images have been used to describe the performance of spot welds. The region between interfacial to pullout mode transition and expulsion limit is defined as the optimum welding condition. The results show that optimum welding parameters (welding current and welding time) for ultra-fine grained sheets are shifted to lower values with respect to those for as-received specimens. In ultra-fine grained sheets, one new region is formed named recrystallized zone in addition to fusion zone, heat affected zone and base metal. It is shown that microstructures of different zones in ultra-fine grained sheets are finer than those of as-received sheets. - Highlights: Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Resistance spot welding process is optimized for joining of UFG steel sheets. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Optimum welding current and time are decreased with increasing the CGP pass number. Black-Right-Pointing-Pointer Microhardness at BM, HAZ, FZ and recrystallized zone is enhanced due to CGP.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

NASA NTRS1981

Reliability-based optimization under random vibration environment

A methodology of formulating the optimum design problem for structural systems with random parameters and subjected to random vibration as a mathematical programming problem is presented. The proposed method is applied to the optimum design of a cantilever beam with a tip mass and a truss structure supporting a water tank. The excitations are assumed to be Gaussian processes and the geometric and material properties are taken to be normally distributed random variables. The probabilistic constraints are specified for individual failure modes since it is easier to specify the reliability level for each failure mode keeping in view the consequences of failure in that particular mode. The time parameter appearing in the random vibration based constraints is eliminated by replacing the probabilities of failure by suitable upper bounds. The numerical results demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of applying the reliability-based design concepts to structures with random parameters and operating in random vibration environment.

Rao, S. S.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Gear Crack Propagation Path Studies-- Guidelines Developed for Ultrasafe Design

Effective gear designs balance strength, durability, reliability, size, weight, and cost. However, unexpected gear failures may occur even with adequate gear tooth design. To design an extremely safe system, the designer must ask and address the question "What happens when a failure occurs?" With regard to gear-tooth bending fatigue, tooth or rim fractures may occur. For aircraft, a crack that propagated through a rim would be catastrophic, leading to the disengagement of a rotor or propeller, the loss of an aircraft, and possible fatalities. This failure mode should be avoided. However, a crack that propagated through a tooth might or might not be catastrophic, depending on the design and operating conditions. Also, early warning of this failure mode might be possible because of advances in modern diagnostic systems. An analysis was performed at the NASA Glenn Research Center to develop design guidelines to prevent catastrophic rim fracture failure modes in the event of gear-tooth bending fatigue. The finite element method was used with principles of linear elastic fracture mechanics. Crack propagation paths were predicted for a variety of gear tooth and rim configurations. The effects of rim and web thicknesses, initial crack locations, and gear-tooth geometry factors such as diametral pitch, number of teeth, pitch radius, and tooth pressure angle were considered. Design maps of tooth and rim fracture modes, including the effects of gear geometry, applied load, crack size, and material properties were developed. The occurrence of rim fractures significantly increased as the backup ratio (rim thickness divided by tooth height) decreased. The occurrence of rim fractures also increased as the initial crack location was moved down the root of the tooth. Increased rim and web compliance increased the occurrence of rim fractures. For gears with constant-pitch radii, coarser-pitch teeth increased the occurrence of tooth fractures over rim fractures. Also, 25 degree pressure angle teeth increased the occurrence of tooth fractures over rim fractures in comparison to 20 pressure angle teeth. For gears with a constant number of teeth or for gears with constant diametral pitch, varying size had little or no effect on crack propagation paths.

Lewicki, David G.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the elevon actuator subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Elevon Subsystem hardware, generating draft failure modes, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Elevon hardware. The IOA product for the Elevon analysis consisted of 25 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 17 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA FMEA/CIL, which consisted of 23 FMEAs and 13 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the crew equipment subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Crew Equipment hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Crew Equipment hardware. The IOA product for the Crew Equipment analysis consisted of 352 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 78 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 351 FMEAs and 82 CIL items.

Saxon, H.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the landing/deceleration (LDG/DEC) subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Landing/Deceleration (LDG/DEC) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter LDG/DEC hardware. The IOA product for the LDG/DEC analysis consisted of 259 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 124 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 267 FMEA's and 120 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all but 75 FMEA's which caused differences in 51 CIL items.

Odonnell, R. A.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Parameter Analysis of Lunar Surface Navigation Utilizing Dilution-of-Precision Methodology With Lunar Orbiters

With the NASA Vision for Space Exploration focusing on the return of astronauts to the Moon and eventually to Mars, architectures for new navigation concepts must be derived and analyzed. One such concept, developed by the Space Communications Architecture Working Group (SCAWG), is to place a constellation of satellites around the Moon. Previously completed analyses examined the performance of multiple satellite constellations and recommended a constellation oriented as a Walker polar 6/2/1 with a semimajor axis (SMA) of 9250 km. One requirement of the constellations that were examined was that they have continuous access to any location on the lunar surface. In this report, the polar 6/2/1 and polar 8/2/1, with equal SMAs, are examined in greater detail. The dilution-of-precision (DoP) methodology is utilized to examine the effects of longitude surface points, latitude surface points, elevation requirements, and modified failure modes for these two constellations with regard to system availability. Longitude study results show that points along a meridian closely approximate the results of a global set of data points. Latitude study results show that previous assumptions with regard to latitude spacing are adequate to simulate global system availability. Elevation study results show that global system availability curves follow a reverse sigmoid function. Modified failure mode study results show that the benefits of reorienting a failure mode constellation depend on the type of navigation system and the length of the integration period being used.

Welch, Bryan W.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the reaction control system, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Reaction Control System (RCS). The purpose of the RCS is to provide thrust in and about the X, Y, Z axes for External Tank (ET) separation; orbit insertion maneuvers; orbit translation maneuvers; on-orbit attitude control; rendezvous; proximity operations (payload deploy and capture); deorbit maneuvers; and abort attitude control. The RCS is situated in three independent modules, one forward in the orbiter nose and one in each OMS/RCS pod. Each RCS module consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization Subsystem; Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem; Thruster Subsystem; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem. Of the failure modes analyzed, 307 could potentially result in a loss of life and/or loss of vehicle.

Burkemper, V. J.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the communication and tracking subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. The IOA product for the Communication and Tracking consisted of 1,108 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 298 critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consists of 697 FMEAs and 239 CIL items. The comparison determined if there were any results which had been found by IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced agreement on all but 407 FMEAs which caused differences in 294 CIL items. Volume 1 contains the subsystem description, assessment results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Long, W. C.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the Orbiter Experiment (OEX) subsystem

Compton, J. M.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the body flap subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Body Flap (BF) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BF hardware. The IOA product for the BF analysis consisted of 43 failure mode worksheets that resulted in 19 potential critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline which consisted of 34 FMEAs and 15 CIL items. This comparison produced agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement.

Wilson, R. E.↗