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At least 451 records · Page 25

Modeling the Risk of U.S. Offshore Oil & Gas Exploration-Well Drilling, Commercial Nuclear Plants, and Human Spaceflight

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been applied in different industries for many years. Each industry and technology area presents varying challenges and priorities, and the risk models therefore need to be somewhat different. This paper compares aspects of risk modeling of offshore drilling, nuclear plant operation, and human spaceflight. Risk models in all three technology areas have certain high-level similarities: (1) they employ redundancy and diversity in their means to prevent or mitigate risk, including a mix of active and passive systems designed to respond to off-normal evolutions; (2) they are affected by human reliability; (3) their models require consideration of coupling between scenario structure and scenario phenomenology. But in examining the models in more detail, one sees important differences in methodology and emphasis. For purposes of comparison, this paper discusses aspects of a risk model of an offshore drilling operation in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, focusing on where such a development differs in important ways from models of commercial U.S. nuclear plants and models developed for human spaceflight.

Boyer, Roger L.↗

The Use of the Satellite Breakup Risk Assessment Model (SBRAM) to Characterize Collision Risk to Manned Spacecraft

NASA uses environment models such as ORDEM96 to characterize the long-term orbital debris collision hazard for spacecraft in LEO. Occasionally, however, there are breakups of satellites or rocket bodies that create enhanced collision hazard for a period of time. This enhanced collision hazard can pose increased risks to space operations - especially those involving manned missions where the tolerance for risk is very low. NASA has developed SBRAM to simulate the enhanced debris environment in the days and weeks that follow such a breakup. This simulation provides the kind of risk probabilities that can be used by mission planners to consider if changes are warranted for the mission. Announcements of breakups come to NASA from US Space Command as soon as they are identified. The pre-breakup orbit and time of breakup are used to determine the initial conditions of the explosion. SBRAM uses the latest explosion models developed at NASA to simulate a debris cloud for the breakup. The model uses a Monte Carlo technique to create a random debris cloud from the probability distributions in the breakup model. Each piece of debris randomly created in the cloud is propagated in a deterministic manner to include the effects of drag and other orbital perturbations. The detailed geometry of each simulated close approach to the target spacecraft is noted and logged and the collision probability is computed using an estimated probability density in down-range and cross-range positions of both the target spacecraft and debris object. The collision probability is computed from the overlap of these probability densities for each close-approach geometry and summed over all computed conjunctions. Cloud propagation runs over the desired time interval are then repeated until the scale of the collision risk can be estimated to a desired precision. This paper presents an overview of the SBRAM model and a number of examples, both real and hypothetical, to demonstrate its use. In addition, a number of different examples are shown how the data can be used by decision makers on issues such as spacecraft orientation and timing of EVAs.

Matney, Mark J.↗

Workflow for Developing and Operating Subsurface Hydrogen Storage Facilities in Porous Reservoirs

Long-duration (seasonal) storage of natural gas (NG), which primarily consists of methane (CH 4 ), has been practiced for more than a hundred years at underground gas storage (UGS) facilities that use depleted hydrocarbon reservoirs, saline aquifers, and salt caverns. To enable hydrogen (H 2 ) to be used as a long-duration, energy-storage medium, similar facilities are envisioned for underground H 2 storage (UHS) of either H 2 or H 2 /NG mixtures. Experience with UGS can be used to guide recommended practices for developing and operating UHS facilities in porous reservoirs. The most important factors (formation/fluid properties and engineering choices) that influence the performance of UHS reservoirs have been identified and quantified in previous studies. These factors and choices influence phenomena that determine the sweep efficiency of the stored working gas. These phenomena include viscous fingering, hysteretic capillary trapping, and gravity override of the working gas, as well as the upconing of nonproductive fluid that determine the sweep efficiency of the stored working gas. This report describes initial recommended-practices and a project-development workflow for UHS facilities that utilize porous reservoirs, based on the current state-of-knowledge about H 2 behavior in the subsurface. The workflow sequentially addresses all aspects of UHS project development, including the identification of H 2 sources and users, site ranking and down-selection, geologic and reservoir-engineering characterization, reservoir design, testing, risk management, commissioning, operations, and monitoring for a UHS facility. The goal is to enable UHS facilities to be developed in an efficient and timely manner, while carefully managing project risks. This workflow is similar to that which has been developed for UGS facilities (see Figure 1 of API, 2022), with the addition of tasks and subtasks specific to H 2 and UHS. The project-development workflow is broken down into three major stages: (1) define the H 2 use case; (2) rank, down-select, and characterize potential, candidate UHS sites; and (3) reservoir design, integrity testing, risk assessment, commissioning, operations, and monitoring for selected UHS sites. Each major stage is further broken down into tasks and subtasks, which are described at a high level. This report also provides more detailed descriptions of all tasks and subtasks that involve reservoir analysis and testing.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Using Risk Assessment Methodologies to Meet Management Objectives

Current decision making involves numerous possible combinations of technology elements, safety and health issues, operational aspects and process considerations to satisfy program goals. Identifying potential risk considerations as part of the management decision making process provides additional tools to make more informed management decision. Adapting and using risk assessment methodologies can generate new perspectives on various risk and safety concerns that are not immediately apparent. Safety and operational risks can be identified and final decisions can balance these considerations with cost and schedule risks. Additional assessments can also show likelihood of event occurrence and event consequence to provide a more informed basis for decision making, as well as cost effective mitigation strategies. Methodologies available to perform Risk Assessments range from qualitative identification of risk potential, to detailed assessments where quantitative probabilities are calculated. Methodology used should be based on factors that include: 1) type of industry and industry standards, 2) tasks, tools, and environment 3) type and availability of data and 4) industry views and requirements regarding risk & reliability. Risk Assessments are a tool for decision makers to understand potential consequences and be in a position to reduce, mitigate or eliminate costly mistakes or catastrophic failures.

DeMott, D. L.↗

Cryogenic tracer irradiation facility at the university of Texas at Austin

We report on a cryogenic gas irradiation facility in the 1.1 MW TRIGA reactor at The University of Texas at Austin. The system was designed to produce radioactive xenon and argon for environmental studies, and it can be applied to produce other gaseous radiotracers. The system design includes modeling accident scenarios to ensure operation does not risk damage to the reactor and minimizes risk of release of radioactive material. In conclusion, the SCALE code was used to model a 30-day irradiation of one liter of Xe-126 and the predicted activity is 0.9 Ci of Xe-127 at irradiation end.

Ar-37↗

Practical Issues in Implementing Software Reliability Measurement

Many ways of estimating software systems' reliability, or reliability-related quantities, have been developed over the past several years. Of particular interest are methods that can be used to estimate a software system's fault content prior to test, or to discriminate between components that are fault-prone and those that are not. The results of these methods can be used to: 1) More accurately focus scarce fault identification resources on those portions of a software system most in need of it. 2) Estimate and forecast the risk of exposure to residual faults in a software system during operation, and develop risk and safety criteria to guide the release of a software system to fielded use. 3) Estimate the efficiency of test suites in detecting residual faults. 4) Estimate the stability of the software maintenance process.

Nikora, Allen P.↗

Learning from Trending, Precursor Analysis, and System Failures

Models of reliability growth relate current system unreliability to currently accumulated experience. But “experience” comes in different forms. Looking back after a major accident, one is sometimes able to identify previous events or measurable performance trends that were, in some sense, signaling the potential for that major accident: potential that could have been recognized and acted upon, but was not recognized until the accident occurred. This could be a previously unrecognized cause of accidents, or underestimation of the likelihood that a recognized potential cause would actually operate. Despite improvements in the state of practice of modeling of risk and reliability, operational experience still has a great deal to teach us, and work has been going on in several industries to try to do a better job of learning from experience before major accidents occur. It is not enough to say that we should review operating experience; there is too much “experience” for such general advice to be considered practical. The paper discusses the following: 1. The challenge of deciding what to focus on in analysis of operating experience. 2. Comparing what different models of learning and reliability growth imply about trending and precursor analysis.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

On the Low Risk of SSR in Type III Wind Turbines Operating with Grid-Forming Control

We have shown in previous work that the risk of subsynchronous resonance between wind power plants with Type III wind turbines and series-compensated transmission lines is low when the wind turbines are operated in grid-forming (GFM) mode instead of the standard grid-following mode. This paper explains the fundamental mechanism behind the improved damping characteristics by modeling the positive- and negative-sequence impedances of Type III wind turbines in GFM control mode. Here it is discovered that the GFM control naturally acts against the negative resistance behavior of Type III wind turbines at subsynchronous frequencies that results from an interaction between the rotor-side converter current controller and negative slip. The developed impedance models in the sequence domain and the improved damping behavior are verified using PSCAD simulations of a 2.5-MW Type III GFM wind turbine. The modeling predictions are also supported by experimentally measuring the impedance response of a 2.5-MW Type III wind turbine in GFM mode.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

The criticality incident detection system omission cases for the fuel routes at EDF energy power stations - 14280

Criticality safety cases have been produced to justify the omission of criticality alarms from the fuel routes of EDF Energy's UK power stations. This work has addressed the UK regulator's expectations that adequate criticality warning systems should be provided wherever fissile material is present, unless a safety case shows that no criticality excursion could give any individual a whole body dose exceeding the annual whole body dose limit of 20 mSv, or that the predicted frequency of such excursions is acceptably low. In the UK, EDF Energy operates eight nuclear power stations; one Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and seven Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor stations (AGRs). At these stations, the term 'fuel route' is used to encompass all of the ex-reactor arrangements for the handling and storage of both new fuel and discharged irradiated fuel. These fuel routes were all designed in the 1980's (or earlier), using sound deterministic criticality safety principles, from which it was concluded that criticality alarms were not required in any of these areas. Subsequent changes to UK regulations have resulted in the need for the stations' criticality safety cases to be updated to include formal justifications for the omission of criticality alarms from these fuel routes. The EDF Energy Criticality Incident Detection System (CIDS) omission cases have been produced using the principles originally developed for UKAEA in the early 1960's by Aspinall and Daniels. These principles continue to be regarded as a best-practice approach by UK industry. Modern UK regulations also incorporate the ALARP principle, which requires operators to minimize and balance all of the safety risks from power station operations, so that the risks to both the public and to workers are As Low As is Reasonably Practicable. This paper describes how the work undertaken used the so-called Aspinall and Daniels criteria in conjunction with the requirements of the ALARP principle. The fuel storage pond at the Sizewell B PWR was addressed by dose calculations to show that, from the shielding effects of the concrete structure and the pond water, the potential consequences of a criticality accident could not result in a radiation dose in excess of 20 mSv. All of the other fuel route areas were addressed on the basis that, even if all of the active engineered and administrative criticality controls were to fail, a criticality accident would still not be reasonably expected, i.e. the predicted frequencies of all such excursions are acceptably low. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Improving online risk assessment with equipment prognostics and health monitoring

The current approach to evaluating the risk of nuclear power plant (NPP) operation relies on static probabilities of component failure, which are based on industry experience with the existing fleet of nominally similar light water reactors (LWRs). As the nuclear industry looks to advanced reactor designs that feature non-light water coolants (e.g., liquid metal, high temperature gas, molten salt), this operating history is not available. Many advanced reactor designs use advanced components, such as electromagnetic pumps, that have not been used in the US commercial nuclear fleet. Given the lack of rich operating experience, we cannot accurately estimate the evolving probability of failure for basic components to populate the fault trees and event trees that typically comprise probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. Online equipment prognostics and health management (PHM) technologies can bridge this gap to estimate the failure probabilities for components under operation. The enhanced risk monitor (ERM) incorporates equipment condition assessment into the existing PRA and risk monitor framework to provide accurate and timely estimates of operational risk.

active and passive components↗

Private financing and operation of a space station: Investment requirements, risk, government support and other primary business management considerations

Private investment in a manned space station is considered as an alternative to complete government sponsorship of such a program. The implications of manned space operations are discussed from a business perspective. The most significant problems and risks which would be faced by a private company involved in a space station enterprise are outlined and possible government roles in helping to overcome these difficulties suggested. Economic factors such as inflation and the rate of interest are of primary concern, but less obvious conditions such as antitrust and appropriate regulatory laws, government appropriations for space activities, and national security are also considered.

Simon, M.↗

Analysis of Water-Energy Issues for Nuclear Power with Industry Perspective

The water-energy nexus is a dynamic, ever evolving challenge involving technological changes, regulatory updates, economic constraints, environmental issues, and political attributes. This report expands on a previous report that gave an initial assessment of the water-energy nexus challenges facing the U.S. commercial industry. This follow-up report provides analysis and insights from stakeholder interviews focusing on the issues faced by the U.S. commercial nuclear energy industry within the water-energy nexus space. This report updates and expand the “Cooling Water Issues and Opportunities at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants” This report includes analysis on water withdrawal and consumption by operating nuclear reactors, evolving policy risks that could impact the operation of the existing commercial nuclear fleet, implications of water markets, trading and water rights, the changing energy grid, progressing environmental risks (including analysis on the possible impact of climate change on water availability and nuclear power plant performance), and opportunities to reduce water related risk. The feedback from the stakeholders’ interviews helps incorporate viewpoints from within the nuclear and related industry that can lack representation in other research areas, without constituting a comprehensive opinion survey. Stakeholders interviewed include nuclear power plants operators, water treatment providers, developers, and vendors of reactor technologies.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A review of risk and uncertainty assessment for geologic carbon storage

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) in geological formations play a key role in mitigating anthropogenic CO 2 emissions and achieving the aggressive goal of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions. Risk and uncertainty assessment is crucial for ensuring the safety and reliability of geologic carbon storage (GCS) by evaluating CO 2 migration in subsurface, forecasting potential leakage and induced seismicity risks, and optimizing operational and monitoring plans. In this review, the use and progress of risk assessment for GCS over the last few decades are examined. Here, we use the Southwest Regional Partnership on Carbon Sequestration (SWP), which is one of the seven regional partnerships supported by the United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE), as an example of large-scale CCUS projects in North America. Additionally, future trends and requirements for risk assessment in GCS are discussed. The information provided in this review can help readers understand the significance of risk and uncertainty assessment and apply it effectively in large-scale GCS projects.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Feasibility Study for a Proposed Subcritical Assembly at Oak Ridge National Laboratory [Slides]

To provide additional NCS training bandwidth, a simple feasibility study was performed for a proposed, inherently safe, subcritical assembly at ORNL for the US Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) NCSP training and education (T&E) program. The NCSP performs subcritical, delayed critical and prompt supercritical experiments to support the NCSP T&E program. ORNL performed a study to examine the feasibility of a subcritical assembly with existing fuel that meets the ANSI/ANS-8.26 standard. Section 7.4 of the standard requires NCS staff to participate in hands-on experiments meant to “…demonstrate how varying the properties of a fissionable material system can affect neutron multiplication.” This training is performed to ensure NCS, and operations staff are aware of the risks involved with conducting operations with fissionable materials outside reactors.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Mission Operations and Command Assurance: Flight Operations Quality Improvements

Flight mission operations systems place human operators in demanding, high risk environments. The objective of Mission Operations and Command Assurance (MO&CA) is to help improve the operational reliability of flight projects by reducing error -- Pareto Analysis shows that the human is the largest error category. MO&CA is a system level task reporting to project flight management and JPL Systems Assurance Division. MO&CA provides direct transfer of knowledge, continuous process improvement, and communication facilitation.

mission↗

Feasibility Study for a Proposed Subcritical Assembly at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) staff use the guidelines in the ANSI/ANS-8.26 standard to establish and maintain their training and qualifications. Section 7.4 of the standard requires NCS staff to participate in hands-on experiments meant to “…demonstrate how varying the properties of a fissionable material system can affect neutron multiplication.” This training is performed to ensure NCS and operations staff are aware of the risks involved with conducting operations with fissionable materials outside reactors. A new, inherently safe, subcritical assembly, to be housed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is being considered to augment the current training capabilities of the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP), which conducts hands-on subcritical and critical experiments to support the training and qualifications of NCS staff. This paper reports the results of a feasibility study performed by ORNL.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗