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NASA NTRS2021

Operational Modal Analysis of the Space Launch System Mobile Launcher on the Crawler Transporter ISVV-010 Rollout

NASA is developing an expendable heavy lift launch vehicle capability, the Space Launch System, to support lunar and deep space exploration. To support this capability, an updated ground infrastructure is required including modifying an existing Mobile Launcher system. The Mobile Launcher is a very large heavy beam/truss steel structure designed to support the Space Launch System during its buildup and integration in the Vehicle Assembly Building, transportation between the Vehicle Assembly Building and launch pad 39B by the Crawler Transporter, and provides the launch platform at the launch pad. As part of the Verification and Validation of the Mobile Launcher and Crawler Transporter, two rollouts of the Mobile Launcher transported by the Crawler Transporter, Integrated System Verification and Validation (ISVV) 005 and 010, have been performed to demonstrate the Crawler Transporter’s ability to transport the Mobile Launcher. ISVV-005 occurred in September 2018 and ISVV-010 occurred in late June 2019. ISVV-005 and ISVV-010 also provided the opportunity to gather data that can be used identify the Mobile Launcher on the Crawler Transporter rollout modal characteristics and refine the estimates of the Artemis I integrated launch vehicle rollout forcing functions. While the rollout environment has historically produced relatively small launch vehicle structural loads for the Saturn/Apollo and Space Shuttle programs in comparison to launch and ascent loads, these relatively small structural loads are inputs to structural fatigue analyses. The same holds true for the Space Launch System. Because the rollout forces acting on the Mobile Launcher and the Crawler Transporter are not directly measurable, Operational Modal Analysis techniques, instead of traditional Experimental Modal Analysis techniques, provide an empirical means to identify the Mobile Launcher on the Crawler Transporter rollout modal characteristics. The ISVV-010 rollout modal characteristics provide important supplemental modal information, which along with the Mobile Launcher modal test that was performed in June 2019 immediately prior to ISVV-010 rollout, combine to reduce uncertainty in the test correlated Mobile Launcher on the Crawler Transporter finite element model. A well test correlated finite element model will play a key role in the Building Block approach the Space Launch System program has implemented as part of its certification process for the Artemis I flight and in refining the Artemis I rollout forcing functions. At the time of the ISVV-005 rollout in September 2018, the Mobile Launcher was still undergoing construction, and therefore its modal characteristics are not directly comparable to those of the Mobile Launcher during the June 2019 Mobile Launcher modal test and subsequent ISVV-010 rollout. Hence the ISVV-005 rollout modal characteristics will not be looked at in this paper. This paper will briefly describe the Mobile Launcher and Crawler Transporter physical characteristics, ISVV-010 rollout data collection, the challenges in implementing Operational Modal Analysis techniques due in part to the Crawler Transporter harmonics, and how these challenges were overcome to obtain the ISVV-010 Mobile Launcher on the Crawler Transporter rollout modal characteristics.

Apollo↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operational Modal Analysis of the Space Launch System Mobile Launcher on the Crawler Transporter ISVV-010 Rollout

Apollo↗

NASA NTRS1995

STS-67 Space Shuttle mission report

The STS-67 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report provides the results of the orbiter vehicle performance evaluation during this sixty-eighth flight of the Shuttle Program, the forty-third flight since the return to flight, and the eighth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Endeavour (OV-105). In addition, the report summarizes the payload activities and the performance of the External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB), Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME). The serial numbers of the other elements of the flight vehicle were ET-69 for the ET; 2012, 2033, and 2031 for SSME's 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and Bl-071 for the SRB's. The left-hand RSRM was designated 360W043A, and the right-hand RSRM was designated 360L043B. The primary objective of this flight was to successfully perform the operations of the ultraviolet astronomy (ASTRO-2) payload. Secondary objectives of this flight were to complete the operations of the Protein Crystal Growth - Thermal Enclosure System (PCG-TES), the Protein Crystal Growth - Single Locker Thermal Enclosure System (PCG-STES), the Commercial Materials Dispersion Apparatus ITA Experiments (CMIX), the Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-2 (SAREX-2), the Middeck Active Control Experiment (MACE), and two Get-Away Special (GAS) payloads.

Fricke, Robert W., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Common Cause Case Study: An Estimated Probability of Four Solid Rocket Booster Hold-Down Post Stud Hang-ups

Until Solid Rocket Motor ignition, the Space Shuttle is mated to the Mobil Launch Platform in part via eight (8) Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) hold-down bolts. The bolts are fractured using redundant pyrotechnics, and are designed to drop through a hold-down post on the Mobile Launch Platform before the Space Shuttle begins movement. The Space Shuttle program has experienced numerous failures where a bolt has hung up. That is, it did not clear the hold-down post before liftoff and was caught by the SRBs. This places an additional structural load on the vehicle that was not included in the original certification requirements. The Space Shuttle is currently being certified to withstand the loads induced by up to three (3) of eight (8) SRB hold-down experiencing a "hang-up". The results of loads analyses performed for (4) stud hang-ups indicate that the internal vehicle loads exceed current structural certification limits at several locations. To determine the risk to the vehicle from four (4) stud hang-ups, the likelihood of the scenario occurring must first be evaluated. Prior to the analysis discussed in this paper, the likelihood of occurrence had been estimated assuming that the stud hang-ups were completely independent events. That is, it was assumed that no common causes or factors existed between the individual stud hang-up events. A review of the data associated with the hang-up events, showed that a common factor (timing skew) was present. This paper summarizes a revised likelihood evaluation performed for the four (4) stud hang-ups case considering that there are common factors associated with the stud hang-ups. The results show that explicitly (i.e. not using standard common cause methodologies such as beta factor or Multiple Greek Letter modeling) taking into account the common factor of timing skew results in an increase in the estimated likelihood of four (4) stud hang-ups of an order of magnitude over the independent failure case.

Cross, Robert↗

NASA NTRS1987

Research opportunities in microgravity science and applications during shuttle hiatus

The opportunity to conduct microgravity and related research still exists, even with the temporary delay in the U.S. Space Shuttle program. Several ground-based facilities are available and use of these facilities is highly recommended for the preparation of near and far term shuttle or space station experiments. Drop tubes, drop towers, aircraft, sounding rockets and a wide variety of other ground-based equipment can be used to simulate microgravity. This paper concentrates on the materials processing capabilities available at NASA Lewis Research Center (NASA Lewis), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and the California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Also included is information on gaining access to these facilities.

Rosenthal, Bruce N.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Research opportunities in microgravity science and applications during Shuttle hiatus

The opportunity to conduct microgravity and related research still exists, even with the temporary delay in the U.S. Space Shuttle program. Several ground-based facilities are available, and use of these facilities is highly recommended for the preparation of near and far term Shuttle or Space Station experiments. Drop tubes, drop towers, aircraft, sounding rockets, and a wide variety of other ground-based equipment can be used to simulate microgravity. This paper concentrates on the materials processing capabilities available at NASA Lewis Research Center (NASA Lewis), Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and the California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Also included is information on gaining access to these facilities.

Rosenthal, Bruce N.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Common Cause Case Study: An Estimated Probability of Four Solid Rocket Booster Hold-down Post Stud Hang-ups

Until Solid Rocket Motor ignition, the Space Shuttle is mated to the Mobil Launch Platform in part via eight (8) Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) hold-down bolts. The bolts are fractured using redundant pyrotechnics, and are designed to drop through a hold-down post on the Mobile Launch Platform before the Space Shuttle begins movement. The Space Shuttle program has experienced numerous failures where a bolt has "hung-up." That is, it did not clear the hold-down post before liftoff and was caught by the SRBs. This places an additional structural load on the vehicle that was not included in the original certification requirements. The Space Shuttle is currently being certified to withstand the loads induced by up to three (3) of eight (8) SRB hold-down post studs experiencing a "hang-up." The results af loads analyses performed for four (4) stud-hang ups indicate that the internal vehicle loads exceed current structural certification limits at several locations. To determine the risk to the vehicle from four (4) stud hang-ups, the likelihood of the scenario occurring must first be evaluated. Prior to the analysis discussed in this paper, the likelihood of occurrence had been estimated assuming that the stud hang-ups were completely independent events. That is, it was assumed that no common causes or factors existed between the individual stud hang-up events. A review of the data associated with the hang-up events, showed that a common factor (timing skew) was present. This paper summarizes a revised likelihood evaluation performed for the four (4) stud hang-ups case considering that there are common factors associated with the stud hang-ups. The results show that explicitly (i.e. not using standard common cause methodologies such as beta factor or Multiple Greek Letter modeling) taking into account the common factor of timing skew results in an increase in the estimated likelihood of four (4) stud hang-ups of an order of magnitude over the independent failure case.

Cross, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2009

A Near-Term, High-Confidence Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle

The use of well understood, legacy elements of the Space Shuttle system could yield a near-term, high-confidence Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle that offers significant performance, reliability, schedule, risk, cost, and work force transition benefits. A side-mount Shuttle-Derived Vehicle (SDV) concept has been defined that has major improvements over previous Shuttle-C concepts. This SDV is shown to carry crew plus large logistics payloads to the ISS, support an operationally efficient and cost effective program of lunar exploration, and offer the potential to support commercial launch operations. This paper provides the latest data and estimates on the configurations, performance, concept of operations, reliability and safety, development schedule, risks, costs, and work force transition opportunities for this optimized side-mount SDV concept. The results presented in this paper have been based on established models and fully validated analysis tools used by the Space Shuttle Program, and are consistent with similar analysis tools commonly used throughout the aerospace industry. While these results serve as a factual basis for comparisons with other launch system architectures, no such comparisons are presented in this paper. The authors welcome comparisons between this optimized SDV and other Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle concepts.

Rothschild, William J.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Launch Pad Flame Trench Refractory Materials

The launch complexes at NASA's John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are critical support facilities for the successful launch of space-based vehicles. These facilities include a flame trench that bisects the pad at ground level. This trench includes a flame deflector system that consists of an inverted, V-shaped steel structure covered with a high temperature concrete material five inches thick that extends across the center of the flame trench. One side of the "V11 receives and deflects the flames from the orbiter main engines; the opposite side deflects the flames from the solid rocket boosters. There are also two movable deflectors at the top of the trench to provide additional protection to shuttle hardware from the solid rocket booster flames. These facilities are over 40 years old and are experiencing constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and environmental exposure. The refractory material currently used in launch pad flame deflectors has become susceptible to failure, resulting in large sections of the material breaking away from the steel base structure and creating high-speed projectiles during launch. These projectiles jeopardize the safety of the launch complex, crew, and vehicle. Post launch inspections have revealed that the number and frequency of repairs, as well as the area and size of the damage, is increasing with the number of launches. The Space Shuttle Program has accepted the extensive ground processing costs for post launch repair of damaged areas and investigations of future launch related failures for the remainder of the program. There currently are no long term solutions available for Constellation Program ground operations to address the poor performance and subsequent failures of the refractory materials. Over the last three years, significant liberation of refractory material in the flame trench and fire bricks along the adjacent trench walls following Space Shuttle launches have resulted in extensive investigations of failure mechanisms, load response, ejected material impact evaluation, and repair design analysis (environmental and structural assessment, induced environment from solid rocket booster plume, loads summary, and repair integrity), assessment of risk posture for flame trench debris, and justification of flight readiness rationale. Although the configuration of the launch pad, water and exhaust direction, and location of the Mobile Launcher Platform between the flame trench and the flight hardware should protect the Space Vehicle from debris exposure, loss of material could cause damage to a major element of the ground facility (resulting in temporary usage loss); and damage to other facility elements is possible. These are all significant risks that will impact ground operations for Constellation and development of new refractory material systems is necessary to reduce the likelihood of the foreign object debris hazard during launch. KSC is developing an alternate refractory material for the launch pad flame trench protection system, including flame deflector and flame trench walls, that will withstand launch conditions without the need for repair after every launch, as is currently the case. This paper will present a summary of the results from industry surveys, trade studies, life cycle cost analysis, and preliminary testing that have been performed to support and validate the development, testing, and qualification of new refractory materials.

Calle, Luz M.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Anomaly Analysis: NASA's Engineering and Safety Center Checks Recurring Shuttle Glitches

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), set up in the wake of the Columbia accident to backstop engineers in the space shuttle program, is reviewing hundreds of recurring anomalies that the program had determined don't affect flight safety to see if in fact they might. The NESC is expanding its support to other programs across the agency, as well. The effort, which will later extend to the International Space Station (ISS), is a principal part of the attempt to overcome the normalization of deviance--a situation in which organizations proceeded as if nothing was wrong in the face of evidence that something was wrong--cited by sociologist Diane Vaughn as contributing to both space shuttle disasters.

Morring, Frank, Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Damage Control Plan for International Space Station Recharge Tank Assembly Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel

As NASA has retired the Space Shuttle Program, a new method of transporting compressed gaseous nitrogen and oxygen needed to be created for delivery of these crucial life support resources to the International Space Station (ISS). One of the methods selected by NASA includes the use of highly pressurized, unprotected Recharge Tank Assemblies (RTAs) utilizing Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs). A COPV consists of a thin liner wrapped with a fiber composite and resin or epoxy. It is typically lighter weight than an all metal pressure vessel of similar volume and therefore provides a higher-efficiency means for gas storage. However COPVs are known to be susceptible to damage resulting from handling, tool drop impacts, or impacts from other objects. As a result, a comprehensive Damage Control Plan has been established to mitigate damage to the RTA COPV throughout its life cycle. The DCP is intended to evaluate and mitigate defined threats during manufacturing, shipping and handling, test, assembly level integration, shipment while pressurized, launch vehicle integration and mission operations by defining credible threats and methods for preventing potential damage while still maintaining the primary goal of resupplying ISS gas resources. A comprehensive threat assessment is performed to identify all threats posed to the COPV during the different phases of its lifecycle. The threat assessment is then used as the basis for creating a series of general inspection, surveillance and reporting requirements which apply across all phases of the COPV's life, targeted requirements only applicable to specific work phases and a series of training courses for both ground personnel and crew aboard the ISS. A particularly important area of emphasis deals with creating DCP requirements for a highly pressurized, large and unprotected RTA COPV for use during Inter Vehicular Activities (IVA) operations in the micro gravity environment while supplying pressurized gas to the ISS for crew life support.

Cook, Anthony J.↗

NASA NTRS2008

The 2006 Kennedy Space Center Range Reference Atmosphere Model Validation Study and Sensitivity Analysis to the Performance of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Space Shuttle Vehicle

The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Range Reference Atmosphere (RRA) is a statistical model that summarizes wind and thermodynamic atmospheric variability from surface to 70 km. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Shuttle program, which launches from KSC, utilizes the KSC RRA data to evaluate environmental constraints on various aspects of the vehicle during ascent. An update to the KSC RRA was recently completed. As part of the update, the Natural Environments Branch at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) conducted a validation study and a comparison analysis to the existing KSC RRA database version 1983. Assessments to the Space Shuttle vehicle ascent profile characteristics were performed by JSC/Ascent Flight Design Division to determine impacts of the updated model to the vehicle performance. Details on the model updates and the vehicle sensitivity analyses with the update model are presented.

Burns, Lee↗

NASA NTRS1987

Dynamics formulations for the real-time simulation of constrained motion

The Space Shuttle program has relied heavily on simulation throughout all phases of development and operation. Real-time, man-in-the-loop simulation has served the NASA manned space flight program by providing the means to evaluate systems design and integrated systems performance in a simulated flight environment as well as provide a means to train flight crews. New challenges are presented by the development and operation of a permanently manned space station. The assembly of the space station, the transferral of payloads and the use of the space station manipulator to berth the Orbiter are operations critical to the success of the space station. All these operations are examples of constrained motion among the bodies associated with the Orbiter and space station system. The state of the art of formulating the governing dynamical equations of motion for constrained systems are described. The uses of the two basic problems in multibody dynamics are discussed. The most efficient formulations of the equations of motion are addressed from the point of view of completeness. The issues surrounding incorporating the constraints into the equation of motion are presented.

Kelly, Frederick A.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Space Shuttle Crawler Transporter Truck Shoe Qualification Tests and Analyses for Return-to-Flight

A vital element to Launch Complex 39 (LC39) and NASA's Kennedy Space Center (KSC) mobile launch transfer operation is a 3 million kilogram behemoth known as the Crawler Transporter (CT). Built in the 1960's, two CT's have accumulated over 1700+ miles each and have been used for the Apollo and the Space Shuttle programs. Recent observation of fatigue cracks on the CT shoes led to a comprehensive engineering, structural and metallurgical evaluation to assess the root cause that necessitated procurement of over 1000 new shoes. This paper documents the completed dynamic and compression tests on the old and new shoes respectively, so as to certify them for Space Shuttle's return-to-flight (RTF). Measured strain data from the rollout tests was used to develop stress/loading spectra and static equivalent load for qualification testing of the new shoes. Additionally, finite element analysis (FEA) was used to conduct sensitivity analyses of various contact parameters and structural characteristics for acceptance of new shoes.

Margasahayam, Ravi N.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Helium Conservation by Diffusion Limited Purging of Liquid Hydrogen Tanks

Recently, the new 1.2-million-gallon liquid hydrogen (LH 2 ) storage tank at the Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39 was purged, replacing nitrogen with helium, using a piston purge process. This purging approach had been used on Space Shuttle External Tanks (ET) in the past, but not on one of the large LH 2 tanks. The result was a huge success, potentially saving more than 1 million cubic feet of helium and significant labor. To better understand this result, a diffusion-based purge model was developed. The model predictions accurately match the helium concentration data, providing understanding of the helium savings and suggesting how to better optimize the purging of this large tank for future operations. The model was then applied to the piston purging of the Space Shuttle ETs, showing that these purges were not optimal, but that the amount of wasted helium was not excessive and that additional helium might have been saved by small changes to the process. The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) has ended, but these results are applicable to the purging of future large cylindrical LH 2 tanks. Finally, data have been obtained on inerting the Space Launch System (SLS) Core Stage (CS) LH 2 tank, replacing hydrogen with helium after an aborted launch. This is a more complicated case, but the model predicts that substantial helium might be saved by modifying the current purging process.

Helium Conservation↗

NASA NTRS1973

Space Shuttle booster recovery planning.

At the initiation of the Space Shuttle Program, recoverable solid rocket boosters were base-lined, with an estimated savings of 30 per cent over expendable solid rockets. Present studies indicate that the solid rocket boosters in the 142-inch diameter range can be recovered using state-of-the-art recovery systems. Marshall Space Flight Center is conducting extensive studies to establish the most cost effective recovery system for the present Shuttle boosters. Model drop testing, in various facilities, and structural load testing are being conducted with model sizes ranging from 6 inches to 120 inches in diameter.

Godfrey, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Dust collection on serviceable satellites

One rationale for the Space Shuttle program which was dramatically realized during the repair of the Solar Maximum Mission (SMM) is the efficiency of in-orbit satellite servicing. An unexpected benefit of this repair mission was the return of parts of the Solar Max satellite which had been exposed for four years to the space environment. Studies conducted on these parts have yielded valuable data on the micrometeorite flux and composition at shuttle altitudes during this time period. The scientific results from studies of the cosmic dust component of the observed particle impacts are not yet complete but it is clear from the preliminary data available that such studies will be a valuable adjunct to the studies of cosmic dust particles collected in the atmosphere. The success of the initial studies of particles collected during repairs of the SMM spacecraft on a surface not specifically designed as a particle collector nor retrieved in a manner intended to minimize or eliminate local contamination raises the possibility that even more interesting results might be obtained if serviceable satellites were initially designed with these objectives in mind. All designs for modern satellites utilize some form of thermal blanket material in order to minimize thermal stresses inside the spacecraft. It is proposed that all future satellites be designed with standardized removeable sections of thermal blanket material which could be replaced during on-orbit servicing and returned to earth for detailed study.

Nuth, J. A., III↗

NASA NTRS2010

The Evolution of Utilizing Manual Throttling to Avoid Excessively Low LH2 NPSP at the SSME Inlet

In the late 1970s, years before the Space Shuttle flew its maiden voyage, it was understood low liquid hydrogen (LH2) Net Positive Suction Pressure (NPSP) at the inlet to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) could have adverse effects on engine operation. A number of failures within both the External Tank (ET) and the Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) could result in a low LH2 NPSP condition, which at extremely low levels can result in cavitation of SSME turbomachinery. Operational workarounds were developed to take advantage of the onboard crew s ability to manually throttle down the SSMEs (via the Pilot s Speedbrake/Throttle Controller), which alleviated the low LH2 NPSP condition. Manually throttling the SSME to a lower power level resulted in an increase in NPSP, mainly due to the reduction in frictional flow losses while at the lower throttle setting. Early in the Space Shuttle Program s history, the relevant Flight Rule for the Booster flight controller in Mission Control did not distinguish between ET and Orbiter MPS failures and the same crew action was taken for both. However, after a review of all Booster operational techniques following the Challenger disaster in the late 1980s, it was determined manually throttling the SSME to a lower power was only effective for Orbiter MPS failures and the Flight Rule was updated to reflect this change. The Flight Rule and associated crew actions initially called for a single throttle step to minimum power level when a low threshold for NPSP was met. As engineers refined their understanding of the NPSP requirements for the SSME (through a robust testing program), the operational techniques evolved to take advantage of the additional capabilities. This paper will examine the evolution of the Flight rule and associated procedure and how increases in knowledge about the SSME and the Space Shuttle vehicle as a whole have helped shape their development. What once was a single throttle step when NPSP decreased to a certain low threshold has now become three throttle steps, each occurring at a lower NPSP threshold. Additionally the procedure, which for early Space Shuttle missions required a Return-to-Launch-Site abort, now results in a nominal Main Engine Cut Off and no loss of mission objectives.

Henfling, Rick↗