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Use of an ISOCS-based Waste Assay System for Decommissioning Waste at Trawsfynydd - 19526

Magnox UK Ltd. are decommissioning the former Magnox nuclear power stations in the UK, a process that generates a significant amount of radioactive waste, much of it in the Low Level or Very Low Level categories. It is therefore necessary to perform radiometric assay of the decommissioning waste in order to determine the disposal route and to identify items of waste that are Out of Scope of regulatory control and can therefore be free-released. They have recently commissioned a Canberra On Site Assay System (OSAS) for this purpose. OSAS is a high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometry based waste assay system, which makes use of the ISOCS methodology in order to perform the necessary efficiency calibration of the system for use when assaying the various different containers for the decommissioning waste employed at Trawsfynydd: 210 litre drums, Dolav boxes, wheeled bins and Pac-Tec bulk bags of heavier waste. This publication describes the approach used by Magnox in the processing of the decommissioning waste at Trawsfynydd. It also presents details of the OSAS system and how it was calibrated along with the results from the proof testing of the new system, involving comparison with the results from the assay of waste previously assayed using other monitors. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

METHODS FOR THE SAFE STORAGE, HANDLING, AND DISPOSAL OF PYROPHORIC LIQUIDS AND SOLIDS IN THE LABORATORY

Pyrophoric reagents represent an important class of reactants because they can participate in many different types of reactions. They are very useful in organic synthesis and in industrial applications. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) define Pyrophorics as substances that will self-ignite in air at temperatures of 130 F (54.4 C) or less. However, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) uses criteria different from the auto-ignition temperature criterion. The DOT defines a pyrophoric material as a liquid or solid that, even in small quantities and without an external ignition source, can ignite within five minutes after coming in contact with air when tested according to the United Nations Manual of Tests and Criteria. The Environmental Protection Agency has adopted the DOT definition. Regardless of which definition is used, oxidation of the pyrophoric reagents by oxygen or exothermic reactions with moisture in the air (resulting in the generation of a flammable gas such as hydrogen) is so rapid that ignition occurs spontaneously. Due to the inherent nature of pyrophoric substances to ignite spontaneously upon exposure to air, special precautions must be taken to ensure their safe handling and use. Pyrophoric gases (such as diborane, dichloroborane, phosphine, etc.) are typically the easiest class of pyrophoric substances to handle since the gas can be plumbed directly to the application and used remotely. Pyrophoric solids and liquids, however, require the user to physically manipulate them when transferring them from one container to another. Failure to follow proper safety precautions could result in serious injury or unintended consequences to laboratory personnel. Because of this danger, pyrophorics should be handled only by experienced personnel. Users with limited experience must be trained on how to handle pyrophoric reagents and consult with a knowledgeable staff member prior to performing the experimental task. The purpose of this article is three fold: (1) to provide guidelines and general safety precautions to avoid accidents, (2) describe proper techniques on how to successfully handle, store, and dispose of pyrophoric liquids and solids, and (3) illustrate best practices for working with this class of reactants in a laboratory environment.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 106: Areas 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 106 is located in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 106 comprises the five corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: •05-23-02, GMX Alpha Contaminated Area •05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able •05-45-01, Atmospheric Test Site - Hamilton •05-45-04, 306 GZ Rad Contaminated Area •05-45-05, 307 GZ Rad Contaminated Area These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on January 19, 2010, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 106. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 106 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. The CAU includes land areas impacted by the release of radionuclides from a weapons-effect tower test (CAS 05-45-01), a weapons-related airdrop test (CAS 05-23-05), “equation of state” experiments (CAS 05-23-02), and unknown support activities at two sites (CAS 05-45-04 and CAS 05-45-05). Surface-deposited radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose (TED) at sample plot locations to the dose-based final action level. The TED will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external doses. Results from the analysis of soil samples collected from sample plots will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at the center of each sample plot will be used to measure external radiological dose. The presence and nature of contamination from other types of releases (such as migration and excavation as well as any potential releases discovered during the investigation) will be evaluated using soil samples collected from the locations most likely containing contamination, if present. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. The scope of the corrective action investigation for CAU 106 includes the following activities: •Conduct radiological surveys. •Collect and submit environmental samples for laboratory analysis to determine internal dose rates and the presence of contaminants of concern. •If contaminants of concern are present, collect additional samples to define the extent of the contamination and determine the area where TED at the site exceeds final action levels (i.e., corrective action boundary). •Collect samples of investigation-derived waste, as needed, for waste management purposes.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 134: Aboveground Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan identifies the activities required for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 134, Aboveground Storage Tanks. CAU 134 is currently listed in Appendix III of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO, 1996; as amended February 2008) and consists of four Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 3, 15, and 29 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) (Figure 1): (1) CAS 03-01-03, Aboveground Storage Tank; (2) CAS 03-01-04, Tank; (3) CAS 15-01-05, Aboveground Storage Tank; and (4) CAS 29-01-01, Hydrocarbon Stain. CAS 03-01-03 consists of a mud tank that is located at the intersection of the 3-07 and the 3-12 Roads in Area 3 of the NTS. The tank and its contents are uncontaminated and will be dispositioned in accordance with applicable federal, state, and local regulations. This CAS will be closed by taking no further action. CAS 03-01-04 consists of a potable water tank that is located at the Core Complex in Area 3 of the NTS. The tank will be closed by taking no further action. CAS 15-01-05 consists of an aboveground storage tank (AST) and associated impacted soil, if any. This CAS is located on a steep slope near the Climax Mine in Area 15 of the NTS. The AST is empty and will be dispositioned in accordance with applicable federal, state, and local regulations. Soil below the AST will be sampled to identify whether it has been impacted by chemicals at concentrations exceeding the action levels. It appears that the tank is not at its original location. Soil will also be sampled at the original tank location, if it can be found. If soil at either location has been impacted at concentrations that exceed the action levels, then the extent of contamination will be identified and a use restriction (UR) will be implemented. The site may be clean closed if contamination is less than one cubic yard in extent and can be readily excavated. If action levels are not exceeded, then no further action is required. CAS 29-01-01 consists of soil that has been impacted by a release or operations from an active diesel AST that fuels the generator at the Shoshone Receiver Site in Area 29 of the NTS. Soil below the AST will be sampled to identify whether it has been impacted at concentrations exceeding the action levels. If it is, then the extent of contamination will be identified and a UR will be implemented. The site may be clean closed if contamination is less than one cubic yard in extent, can be readily excavated, and it is determined that clean closure is feasible based upon site conditions. If action levels are not exceeded, then no further action is required. Based on review of the preliminary assessment information for CAU 134 and recent site inspections, there is sufficient process knowledge to close CAU 134 using the SAFER process.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Postclosure Inspection and Monitoring Report for Surface Corrective Action Unit 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, Site

This report presents results of the biennial postclosure site inspection conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) at the surface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 417 at the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, site. The report has been prepared in accordance with the Post-Closure Monitoring Plan contained in the CAU 417 Closure Report (NNSA/NV 2001) and a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO 1996). Responsibility for environmental site restoration of the CNTA was transferred from the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office to LM on October 1, 2006. This report summarizes investigation activities associated with CAU 417 that LM conducted from July 2014 through July 2016. A postclosure inspection was conducted in 2016 to document the physical condition of the CAU 417 soil covers, monuments, signs, fencing, and use-restricted areas.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Analysis of molybdenum-99 production capability in the materials test station

The United States of America currently relies on foreign suppliers to meet all of it needs for molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) used in medical diagnostic procedures. The current US demand is at least 5000 six-day curies per week. Neutronics calculations have been performed to assess whether the proposed Materials Test Station (MTS) could potentially generate Mo-99. Two target material options have been explored for Mo-99 production in the MTS: low enriched uranium (LEU) and Tc-99. For LEU, scoping calculations indicate that MTS can supply nearly half of the current US demand with only minor neutronic impact on the MTS primary mission. For the Tc-99 option, the MTS could produce about one-tenth of the US demand.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

RCRA Part A and Part B Permit Application for Waste Management Activities at the Nevada Test Site: Proposed Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWSU)

The proposed Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU) will be located within the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). Existing facilities at the RWMC will be used to store low-level mixed waste (LLMW). Storage is required to accommodate offsite-generated LLMW shipped to the Nevada Test Site (NTS) for disposal in the new Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU) currently in the design/build stage. LLMW generated at the NTS (onsite) is currently stored on the Transuranic (TRU) Pad (TP) in Area 5 under a Mutual Consent Agreement (MCA) with the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Federal Facilities (NDEP/BFF). When the proposed MWSU is permitted, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) will ask that NDEP revoke the MCA and onsite-generated LLMW will fall under the MWSU permit terms and conditions. The unit will also store polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) waste and friable and non-friable asbestos waste that meets the acceptance criteria in the Waste Analysis Plan (Exhibit 2) for disposal in the MWDU. In addition to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements, the proposed MWSU will also be subject to Department of Energy (DOE) orders and other applicable state and federal regulations. Table 1 provides the metric conversion factors used in this application. Table 2 provides a list of existing permits. Table 3 lists operational RCRA units at the NTS and their respective regulatory status.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 105: Area 2 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 105 is located in Area 2 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. CAU 105 is a geographical grouping of sites where there has been a suspected release of contamination associated with atmospheric nuclear testing. This document describes the planned investigation of CAU 105, which comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 02-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site - Whitney • 02-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site T-2A • 02-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site T-2B • 02-23-08, Atmospheric Test Site T-2 • 02-23-09, Atmospheric Test Site - Turk These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 30, 2012, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 105. The site investigation process will also be conducted in accordance with the Soils Activity Quality Assurance Plan, which establishes requirements, technical planning, and general quality practices to be applied to this activity. The potential contamination sources associated with all CAU 105 CASs are from atmospheric nuclear testing activities. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 105 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose at sample locations to the dose-based final action level. The total effective dose will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at the center of each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS. This Corrective Action Investigation Plan has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; DOE, Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, this Corrective Action Investigation Plan will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for approval. Fieldwork will be conducted after the plan is approved.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 557: Spills and Tank Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 557, Spills and Tank Sites, in Areas 1, 3, 6, and 25 of the Nevada Test Site, Nevada, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Corrective Action Unit 557 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs): • 01-25-02, Fuel Spill • 03-02-02, Area 3 Subdock UST • 06-99-10, Tar Spills • 25-25-18, Train Maintenance Bldg 3901 Spill Site The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to identify and provide the justification and documentation that supports the recommendation for closure of the CAU 557 CASs with no further corrective action. To achieve this, a corrective action investigation (CAI) was conducted from May 5 through November 24, 2008. The CAI activities were performed as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 557: Spills and Tank Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 569: Area 3 Yucca Flat Atmospheric Test Sites Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 569 is located in Area 3 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 569 comprises the nine numbered corrective action sites (CASs) and one newly identified site listed below: (1) 03-23-09, T-3 Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Annie, Franklin, George, and Moth); (2) 03-23-10, T-3A Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Harry and Hornet); (3) 03-23-11, T-3B Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Fizeau); (4) 03-23-12, T-3S Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Rio Arriba); (5) 03-23-13, T-3T Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Catron); (6) 03-23-14, T-3V Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Humboldt); (7) 03-23-15, S-3G Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Coulomb-B); (8) 03-23-16, S-3H Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Coulomb-A); (9) 03-23-21, Pike Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Pike); and (10) Waste Consolidation Site 3A.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

FIELD TEST INSTRUCTION 100-NR-2 OPERABLE UNIT DESIGN OPTIMIZATION STUDY FOR SEQUESTRATION OF SR-90 SATURATED ZONE APATITE PERMEABLE REACTIVE BARRIER EXTENSION

The objective of this field test instruction is to provide technical guidance for aqueous injection emplacement of an extension apatite permeable reactive barrier (PRE) for the sequestration of strontium-90 (Sr-90) using a high concentration amendment formulation. These field activities will be conducted according to the guidelines established in DOE/RL-2010-29, 100-NR-2 Design Optimization Study, hereafter referred to as the DOS. The DOS supports the Federal Facility Agreement Consent Order (EPA et al., 1989), Milestone M-16-06-01, and 'Complete Construction of a Permeable Reactive Barrier at 100-N.' Injections of apatite precursor chemicals will occur at an equal distance intervals on each end of the existing PRE to extend the PRB from the existing 91 m (300 ft) to at least 274 m (900 ft). Field testing at the 100-N Area Apatite Treatability Test Site, as depicted on Figure 1, shows that the barrier is categorized by two general hydrologic conceptual models based on overall well capacity and contrast between the Hanford and Ringold hydraulic conductivities. The upstream portion of the original barrier, shown on Figure 1, is characterized by relatively low overall well specific capacity. This is estimated from well development data and a lower contrast in hydraulic conductivity between the Hanford formation and Ringold Formations. Comparison of test results from these two locations indicate that permeability contrast between the Hanford formation and Ringold Formation is significantly less over the upstream one-third of the barrier. The estimated hydraulic conductivity for the Hanford formation and Ringold Formation over the upstream portion of the barrier based on observations during emplacement of the existing 91 m (300 ft) PRB is approximately 12 and 10 m/day (39 and 32 ft/day), respectively (PNNL-17429). However, these estimates should be used as a rough guideline only, as significant variability in hydraulic conductivity is likely to be observed in the barrier extension wells, particularly those in the Ringold formation. The downstream portion of the original barrier, shown on Figure 1, is characterized by generally higher well specific capacity and a larger hydraulic conductivity contrast between the Hanford formation and Ringold Formation. Hydraulic conductivity rates for the Hanford formation and Ringold Formation over the downstream portion of the barrier were estimated at 29 and 9 m/day (95 and 29 ft/day), respectively (with the Hanford formation hydraulic conductivity being greater in the downstream portion than the upstream portion). Once again, it should be noted that the actual conductivities may vary significantly, and the values state above should only be used as a rough initial estimates. Optimum apatite emplacement has been shown to occur when injections targeting the Hanford formation and the Ringold Formation are performed separately. The remainder of this test instruction provides details for conducting these formation-targeted injections.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

VCTR: A Versatile Coupled Test Reactor Concept

The United States has currently no domestic fast neutron test and irradiation capabilities necessary to pursue a strong research and development program related to fast neutron reactors. This lack prevents the testing of fast reactor fuels in a prototypic environment, the testing of new safety features and of new coolants. A new irradiation test reactor is a costly investment that will operate for several decades and the initial specifications are crucial to ensure the relevance of such a facility in the long run. This new test reactor should be highly reconfigurable and allow operation as a fast test reactor or a thermal test reactor or a cou-pled fast-thermal test reactor. This report presents the on-going effort at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to design a versatile coupled test reactor (VCTR—pronounced Victor) that could fulfill the R&D needs requiring high fast neutron fluxes but also high thermal neutron fluxes in configurations that could not be met in current thermal neutron test reactors such as ATR. The objective of this report is to summarize the efforts undertaken at INL from May 2015 to March 2016 aimed at understanding the main options for designing and building a versatile test reactor, with a primary mission to provide thermal and fast neutrons for irradiation of fuels and materials in a manner complementary to the ATR and HFIR reactors. Other missions can also be considered, including the validation of computer codes and the development of specific reactor technologies.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Accelerated testing of module-level power electronics for long-term reliability

This work has applied a suite of long-term-reliability accelerated tests to a variety of module-level power electronics (MLPE) devices (such as microinverters and optimizers) from five different manufacturers. This dataset is one of the first (only the paper by Parker et al. entitled “Dominant factors affecting reliability of alternating current photovoltaic modules,” in Proc. 42nd IEEE Photovoltaic Spec. Conf., 2015, is reported for reliability testing in the literature), as well as the largest, experimental sets in public literature, both in the sample size (five manufacturers including both dc/dc and dc/ac units and 20 units for each test) and the number of experiments (six different experimental test conditions) for MLPE devices. The accelerated stress tests (thermal cycling test per IEC 61215 profile, damp heat test per IEC 61215 profile, and static temperature tests at 100 and 125 °C) were performed under powered and unpowered conditions. The first independent long-term experimental data regarding damp heat and grid transient testing, as well as the longest term (>9 month) testing of MLPE units reported in the literature for thermal cycling and high-temperature operating life, are included in these experiments. Additionally, this work is the first to show in situ power measurements, as well as periodic efficiency measurements over a series of experimental tests, demonstrating whether certain tests result in long-term degradation or immediate catastrophic failures. Lastly, the result of this testing highlights the performance of MLPE units under the application of several accelerated environmental stressors.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

TANK 18 AND 19-F TIER 1A EQUIPMENT FILL MOCK UP TEST SUMMARY

The United States Department of Energy (US DOE) has determined that Tanks 18-F and 19-F have met the F-Tank Farm (FTF) General Closure Plan Requirements and are ready to be permanently closed. The high-level waste (HLW) tanks have been isolated from FTF facilities. To complete operational closure they will be filled with grout for the purpose of: (1) physically stabilizing the tanks, (2) limiting/eliminating vertical pathways to residual waste, (3) discouraging future intrusion, and (4) providing an alkaline, chemical reducing environment within the closure boundary to control speciation and solubility of select radionuclides. Bulk waste removal and heel removal equipment remain in Tanks 18-F and 19-F. This equipment includes the Advance Design Mixer Pump (ADMP), transfer pumps, transfer jets, standard slurry mixer pumps, equipment-support masts, sampling masts, dip tube assemblies and robotic crawlers. The present Tank 18 and 19-F closure strategy is to grout the equipment in place and eliminate vertical pathways by filling voids in the equipment to vertical fast pathways and water infiltration. The mock-up tests described in this report were intended to address placement issues identified for grouting the equipment that will be left in Tank 18-F and Tank 19-F. The Tank 18-F and 19-F closure strategy document states that one of the Performance Assessment (PA) requirements for a closed tank is that equipment remaining in the tank be filled to the extent practical and that vertical flow paths 1 inch and larger be grouted. The specific objectives of the Tier 1A equipment grout mock-up testing include: (1) Identifying the most limiting equipment configurations with respect to internal void space filling; (2) Specifying and constructing initial test geometries and forms that represent scaled boundary conditions; (3) Identifying a target grout rheology for evaluation in the scaled mock-up configurations; (4) Scaling-up production of a grout mix with the target rheology (16 second flow cone value) from 0.25 cubic feet to 4.3 cubic feet. (Ten 0.43 cubic batches were produced because full-scale equipment was not available for the Tier 1A test.); (5) Demonstrating continuous gravity filling of the ADMP mock up test form; (6) Demonstrating continuous gravity filling of 1 inch and 2 inch schedule 40 pipe; and (7) Demonstrating filling of 1 inch and 2 inch schedule 40 pipe from the bottom up by discharging through a tube inserted into the pipes. The Tier 1A mock-up test focused on the ADMP and pipes at least one inch in diameter. The ADMP which is located in center riser of Tank 18-F is a concern because the column for this long-shaft (55 ft) pump is unique and modification to the pump prior to placing it in service limited the flow path options for filling by creating a single flow path for filling and venting the ADMP support column. The large size, vertical orientation, and complicated flow path in the ADMP warrants a detailed description of this piece of ancillary equipment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Fabrication and Pre-irradiation Characterization of a Minor Actinide and Rare Earth Containing Fast Reactor Fuel Experiment for Irradiation in the Advanced Test Reactor

The United States Department of Energy, seeks to develop and demonstrate the technologies needed to transmute the long-lived transuranic actinide isotopes contained in spent nuclear fuel into shorter lived fission products, thereby decreasing the volume of material requiring disposal and reducing the long-term radiotoxicity and heat load of high-level waste sent to a geologic repository. This transmutation of the long lived actinides plutonium, neptunium, americium and curium can be accomplished by first separating them from spent Light Water Reactor fuel using a pyro-metalurgical process, then reprocessing them into new fuel with fresh uranium additions, and then transmuted to short lived nuclides in a liquid metal cooled fast reactor. An important component of the technology is developing actinide-bearing fuel forms containing plutonium, neptunium, americium and curium isotopes that meet the stringent requirements of reactor fuels and materials.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Robust Design of Reliability Test Plans Using Degradation Measures.

With short production development times, there is an increased need to demonstrate product reliability relatively quickly with minimal testing. In such cases there may be few if any observed failures. Thus, it may be difficult to assess reliability using the traditional reliability test plans that measure only time (or cycles) to failure. For many components, degradation measures will contain important information about performance and reliability. These measures can be used to design a minimal test plan, in terms of number of units placed on test and duration of the test, necessary to demonstrate a reliability goal. Generally, the assumption is made that the error associated with a degradation measure follows a known distribution, usually normal, although in practice cases may arise where that assumption is not valid. In this paper, we examine such degradation measures, both simulated and real, and present non-parametric methods to demonstrate reliability and to develop reliability test plans for the future production of components with this form of degradation.

Lane, Jonathan Wesley↗

Test Results and Comparison of Triaxial Strength Testing of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Clean Salt

This memorandum documents laboratory thermomechanical triaxial strength testing of Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) clean salt. The limited study completed independent, adjunct laboratory tests in the United States to assist in validating similar testing results being provided by the German facilities. The testing protocol consisted of completing confined triaxial, constant strain rate strength tests of intact WIPP clean salt at temperatures of 25°C and 100°C and at multiple confining pressures. The stratigraphy at WIPP also includes salt that has been labeled “argillaceous.” The much larger test matrix conducted in Germany included both the so-called clean and argillaceous salts. When combined, the total database of laboratory results will be used to develop input parameters for models, assess adequacy of existing models, and predict material behavior. These laboratory studies are also consistent with the goals of the international salt repository research program. The goal of this study was to complete a subset of a test matrix on clean salt from the WIPP undertaken by German research groups. The work was performed at RESPEC in Rapid City, South Dakota. A rigorous Quality Assurance protocol was applied, such that corroboration provides the potential of qualifying all of the test data gathered by German research groups.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RCT: Module 2.06, Air Sampling Program and Methods, Course 8772

The inhalation of radioactive particles is the largest cause of an internal radiation dose. Airborne radioactivity measurements are necessary to ensure that the control measures are and continue to be effective. Regulations govern the allowable effective dose equivalent to an individual. The effective dose equivalent is determined by combining the external and internal dose equivalent values. Typically, airborne radioactivity levels are maintained well below allowable levels to keep the total effective dose equivalent small. This course will prepare the student with the skills necessary for RCT qualification by passing quizzes, tests, and the RCT Comprehensive Phase 1, Unit 2 Examination (TEST 27566) and will provide in-the-field skills.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗