SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “acceptance”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 451 records · Page 25

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2008

Breadboard Signal Processor for Arraying DSN Antennas

A recently developed breadboard version of an advanced signal processor for arraying many antennas in NASA s Deep Space Network (DSN) can accept inputs in a 500-MHz-wide frequency band from six antennas. The next breadboard version is expected to accept inputs from 16 antennas, and a following developed version is expected to be designed according to an architecture that will be scalable to accept inputs from as many as 400 antennas. These and similar signal processors could also be used for combining multiple wide-band signals in non-DSN applications, including very-long-baseline interferometry and telecommunications. This signal processor performs functions of a wide-band FX correlator and a beam-forming signal combiner. [The term "FX" signifies that the digital samples of two given signals are fast Fourier transformed (F), then the fast Fourier transforms of the two signals are multiplied (X) prior to accumulation.] In this processor, the signals from the various antennas are broken up into channels in the frequency domain (see figure). In each frequency channel, the data from each antenna are correlated against the data from each other antenna; this is done for all antenna baselines (that is, for all antenna pairs). The results of the correlations are used to obtain calibration data to align the antenna signals in both phase and delay. Data from the various antenna frequency channels are also combined and calibration corrections are applied. The frequency-domain data thus combined are then synthesized back to the time domain for passing on to a telemetry receiver

Jongeling, Andre↗

NASA NTRS2009

Developing Ultra Reliable Life Support for the Moon and Mars

Recycling life support systems can achieve ultra reliability by using spares to replace failed components. The added mass for spares is approximately equal to the original system mass, provided the original system reliability is not very low. Acceptable reliability can be achieved for the space shuttle and space station by preventive maintenance and by replacing failed units, However, this maintenance and repair depends on a logistics supply chain that provides the needed spares. The Mars mission must take all the needed spares at launch. The Mars mission also must achieve ultra reliability, a very low failure rate per hour, since it requires years rather than weeks and cannot be cut short if a failure occurs. Also, the Mars mission has a much higher mass launch cost per kilogram than shuttle or station. Achieving ultra reliable space life support with acceptable mass will require a well-planned and extensive development effort. Analysis must define the reliability requirement and allocate it to subsystems and components. Technologies, components, and materials must be designed and selected for high reliability. Extensive testing is needed to ascertain very low failure rates. Systems design should segregate the failure causes in the smallest, most easily replaceable parts. The systems must be designed, produced, integrated, and tested without impairing system reliability. Maintenance and failed unit replacement should not introduce any additional probability of failure. The overall system must be tested sufficiently to identify any design errors. A program to develop ultra reliable space life support systems with acceptable mass must start soon if it is to produce timely results for the moon and Mars.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Synergistic Development, Test, and Qualification Approaches for the Ares I and V Launch Vehicles

The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration is designing and developing the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles for access to the International Space Station (ISS) and human exploration of the Moon. The Ares I consists of a first stage reusable five-segment solid rocket booster, a upper stage using a J-2X engine derived from heritage experience (Saturn and Space Shuttle External Tank programs), and the Orion crew exploration vehicle (CEV). The Ares V is designed to minimize the development and overall life-cycle costs by leveraging off of the Ares I design. The Ares V consists of two boosters, a core stage, an earth departure stage (EDS), and a shroud. The core stage and EDS use LH2/LO2 propellants, metallic propellant tanks, and composite dry structures. The core stage has six RS-68B upgraded Delta IV engines while the EDS uses a J-2X engine for second stage ascent and trans-lunar injection (TLI) burn. System and propulsion tests and qualification approaches for Ares V elements are being considered as follow-on extensions of the Ares I development program. Following Ares I IOC, testing will be conducted to verify the J-2X engine's orbital restart and TLI burn capability. The Ares I upper stage operation will be demonstrated through integrated stage development and acceptance testing. The EDS will undergo similar development and acceptance testing with additional testing to verify aspects of cryogenic propellant management, operation of sub-systems in a space simulation environment, and orbital re-start of the main propulsion system. RS-68B certification testing will be conducted along with integrated core stage development and acceptance testing. Structural testing of the Ares V EDS and core stage propellant tanks will be conducted similar to the Ares I upper stage. The structural qualification testing may be accomplished with separate propellant tank test articles. Structural development and qualification testing of the dry structure will be pursued as part of the design and development process. Especially critical is the development test program for the composite structures. The Ares V payload shroud will undergo acoustic, vibration, structural qualification, and deployment testing in a space simulation environment. Similar to Ares I, requirements for full-scale structural dynamic testing are being studied. Both Ares I and Ares V include validation flight testing as part of the qualification programs.

Cockrell, Charles E.↗

NASA NTRS2010

International Space Station Powered Bolt Nut Anomaly and Failure Analysis Summary

A key mechanism used in the on-orbit assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) pressurized elements is the Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM). The mechanism that effects the structural connection of the CBM halves is the Powered Bolt Assembly. There are sixteen Powered Bolt Assemblies per CBM. The CBM has a bolt which engages a self aligning Powered Bolt Nut (PBN) on the mating interface; see Figure 1. The Powered Bolt Assemblies are preloaded to approximately 19 kilo pounds (KIPs) prior to pressurization of the CBM. The PBNs mentioned below, manufactured in 2009, will be used on ISS future missions. An on orbit functional failure of this hardware would be unacceptable and in some instances catastrophic due to the failure of modules to mate and seal the atmosphere, risking loss of crew and ISS functions. The manufacturing processes which create the PBNs need to be strictly controlled. Functional (torque vs. tension) acceptance test failures will be the result of processes not being strictly followed. Without the proper knowledge of thread tolerances, fabrication techniques, and dry film lubricant application processes, PBNs will be, and have been manufactured improperly. The knowledge gained from acceptance test failures and the resolution of those failures, thread fabrication techniques and thread dry film lubrication processes can be applied to many aerospace mechanisms to enhance their performance. Test data and manufactured PBN thread geometry will be discussed for both failed and successfully accepted PBNs.

Sievers, Daniel E.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Hypersonic Turbulent Boundary-Layer and Free Sheer Database Datasets

A critical assessment and compilation of data are presented on attached hypersonic turbulent boundary layers in pressure gradients and compressible turbulent mixing layers. Extensive searches were conducted to identify candidate experiments, which were subjected to a rigorous set of acceptance criteria. Accepted datasets are both tabulated and provided in machine-readable form. The purpose of this database effort is to make existing high quality data available in detailed form for the turbulence-modeling and computational fluid dynamics communities. While significant recent data were found on the subject of compressible turbulent mixing, the available boundary-layer/pressure-gradient experiments are all older ones of which no acceptable data were found at hypersonic Mach numbers.

Settles, Gary S.↗

NASA NTRS2010

International Space Station Powered Bolt Nut Anomaly and Failure Analysis Summary

A key mechanism used in the on-orbit assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) pressurized elements is the Common Berthing Mechanism. The mechanism that effects the structural connection of the Common Berthing Mechanism halves is the Powered Bolt Assembly. There are sixteen Powered Bolt Assemblies per Common Berthing Mechanism. The Common Berthing Mechanism has a bolt which engages a self aligning Powered Bolt Nut (PBN) on the mating interface (Figure 1). The Powered Bolt Assemblies are preloaded to approximately 84.5 kN (19000 lb) prior to pressurization of the CBM. The PBNs mentioned below, manufactured in 2009, will be used on ISS future missions. An on orbit functional failure of this hardware would be unacceptable and in some instances catastrophic due to the failure of modules to mate and seal the atmosphere, risking loss of crew and ISS functions. The manufacturing processes that create the PBNs need to be strictly controlled. Functional (torque vs. tension) acceptance test failures will be the result of processes not being strictly followed. Without the proper knowledge of thread tolerances, fabrication techniques, and dry film lubricant application processes, PBNs will be, and have been manufactured improperly. The knowledge gained from acceptance test failures and the resolution of those failures, thread fabrication techniques and thread dry film lubrication processes can be applied to many aerospace mechanisms to enhance their performance. Test data and manufactured PBN thread geometry will be discussed for both failed and successfully accepted PBNs.

Sievers, Daniel E.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Aerojet - Attitude Control Engines

All the engines were both qualification and acceptance tested at Marquardt s facilities. After we won the Apollo Program contract, we went off and built two vacuum test facilities, which simulated altitude continuous firing for as long as we wanted to run an engine. They would run days and days with the same capability we had on steam ejection. We did all of the testing in both for the qualification and the acceptance test. One of them was a large ball, which was an eighteen-foot diameter sphere, evacuated again with a big steam ejector system that could be used for system testing; that s where we did the Lunar Excursion Module testing. We put the whole cluster in there and tested the entire cluster at the simulated altitude conditions. The lowest altitude we tested at - typically an acceptance test - was 105,000 feet simulated altitude. The big ball - because people were interested in what they called goop formation, which is an unburned hydrazine product migrating to cold surfaces on different parts of spacecraft - was built to address those kinds of issues. We ran long-life tests in a simulated space environment with the entire inside of the test cell around the test article, liquid nitrogen cooled, so it could act as getter for any of the exhaust products. That particular facility could pull down to about 350,000 feet (atmosphere) equivalent altitude, which was pushing pretty close to the thermodynamic triple point of the MMH. It was a good test facility. Those facilities are no longer there. When the guys at Marquardt sold the company to what eventually became part of Aerojet, all those test facilities were cut off at the roots. I think they have a movie studio there at this point. That part of it is truly not recoverable, but it did some excellent high-altitude, space-equivalent testing at the time. Surprisingly, we had very few problems while testing in the San Fernando Valley. In the early 1960s, nobody had ever seen dinitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), so that wasn't too big a deal. We really did only make small, red clouds. In all the hundreds of thousands of tests and probably well over one million firings that I was around that place for, in all that thirty-something years, we had a total of one serious injury associated with rocket engine testing and propellants. Because we were trying to figure out what propellants would really be good, we tried all of the fun stuff like the carbon tetrafluoride, chlorine pentafluoride, and pure fluorine. The materials knowledge wasn't all that great at the time. On one test, the fluorine we had didn't react well with the copper they were using for tubing, and it managed to cause another unscheduled disassembly of the facility. It was very serious. It's like one of those Korean War stories. The technician happened to be walking past the test facility when it decided to blow itself up. A piece of copper tubing pierced one cheek and came out the other. That was the only serious accident in all of the engines handled in all those years. Now, we did have a problem with the EPA later because they figured out what the brown clouds were about. We built a whole bunch of exhaust mitigation scrubbers to take care of engine testing in the daytime. In general, we operated the big shuttle (RCS) engine, the 870- pounder at nominal conditions; they scrubbed the effluents pretty well. If you operated that same 870-pound force engine at a level where you get a lot of excess oxidizer, yeah, there s a brown cloud. But, you know, it doesn't show up well in the dark. They did do some of that. But, that s gone; it was addressed one way or another. RELEASED -

Pfeifer, Gerald R.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Ultra Reliable Closed Loop Life Support for Long Space Missions

Spacecraft human life support systems can achieve ultra reliability by providing sufficient spares to replace all failed components. The additional mass of spares for ultra reliability is approximately equal to the original system mass, provided that the original system reliability is not too low. Acceptable reliability can be achieved for the Space Shuttle and Space Station by preventive maintenance and by replacing failed units. However, on-demand maintenance and repair requires a logistics supply chain in place to provide the needed spares. In contrast, a Mars or other long space mission must take along all the needed spares, since resupply is not possible. Long missions must achieve ultra reliability, a very low failure rate per hour, since they will take years rather than weeks and cannot be cut short if a failure occurs. Also, distant missions have a much higher mass launch cost per kilogram than near-Earth missions. Achieving ultra reliable spacecraft life support systems with acceptable mass will require a well-planned and extensive development effort. Analysis must determine the reliability requirement and allocate it to subsystems and components. Ultra reliability requires reducing the intrinsic failure causes, providing spares to replace failed components and having "graceful" failure modes. Technologies, components, and materials must be selected and designed for high reliability. Long duration testing is needed to confirm very low failure rates. Systems design should segregate the failure causes in the smallest, most easily replaceable parts. The system must be designed, developed, integrated, and tested with system reliability in mind. Maintenance and reparability of failed units must not add to the probability of failure. The overall system must be tested sufficiently to identify any design errors. A program to develop ultra reliable space life support systems with acceptable mass should start soon since it must be a long term effort.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Environmental Assurance Program for the Phoenix Mars Mission

The Phoenix Mars mission involves delivering a stationary science lander on to the surface of Mars in the polar region within the latitude band 65 deg N to 72 deg N. Its primary objective is to perform in-situ and remote sensing investigations that will characterize the chemistry of the materials at the local surface, subsurface, and atmosphere. The Phoenix spacecraft was launched on August 4, 2007 and will arrive at Mars in May 2008. The lander includes a suite of seven (7) science instruments. This mission is baselined for up to 90 sols (Martian days) of digging, sampling, and analysis. Operating at the Mars polar region creates a challenging environment for the Phoenix landed subsystems and instruments with Mars surface temperature extremes between -120 deg C to 25 deg C and diurnal thermal cycling in excess of 145 deg C. Some engineering and science hardware inside the lander were qualification tested up to 80 deg C to account for self heating. Furthermore, many of the hardware for this mission were inherited from earlier missions: the lander from the Mars Surveyor Program 2001 (MSP'01) and instruments from the MSP'01 and the Mars Polar Lander. Ensuring all the hardware was properly qualified and flight acceptance tested to meet the environments for this mission required defining and implementing an environmental assurance program that included a detailed heritage review coupled with tailored flight acceptance testing. A heritage review process with defined acceptance success criteria was developed and is presented in this paper together with the lessons learned in its implementation. This paper also provides a detailed description of the environmental assurance program of the Phoenix Mars mission. This program includes assembly/subsystem and system level testing in the areas of dynamics, thermal, and electromagnetic compatibility, as well as venting/pressure, dust, radiation, and meteoroid analyses to meet the challenging environment of this mission.

thermal testing↗

NASA NTRS2011

Large Aperture "Photon Bucket" Optical Receiver Performance in High Background Environments

The potential development of large aperture groundbased "photon bucket" optical receivers for deep space communications, with acceptable performance even when pointing close to the sun, is receiving considerable attention. Sunlight scattered by the atmosphere becomes significant at micron wavelengths when pointing to a few degrees from the sun, even with the narrowest bandwidth optical filters. In addition, high quality optical apertures in the 10-30 meter range are costly and difficult to build with accurate surfaces to ensure narrow fields-of-view (FOV). One approach currently under consideration is to polish the aluminum reflector panels of large 34-meter microwave antennas to high reflectance, and accept the relatively large FOV generated by state-of-the-art polished aluminum panels with rms surface accuracies on the order of a few microns, corresponding to several-hundred micro-radian FOV, hence generating centimeter-diameter focused spots at the Cassegrain focus of 34-meter antennas. Assuming pulse-position modulation (PPM) and Poisson-distributed photon-counting detection, a "polished panel" photon-bucket receiver with large FOV will collect hundreds of background photons per PPM slot, along with comparable signal photons due to its large aperture. It is demonstrated that communications performance in terms of PPM symbol-error probability in high-background high-signal environments depends more strongly on signal than on background photons, implying that large increases in background energy can be compensated by a disproportionally small increase in signal energy. This surprising result suggests that large optical apertures with relatively poor surface quality may nevertheless provide acceptable performance for deep-space optical communications, potentially enabling the construction of cost-effective hybrid RF/optical receivers in the future.

photon bucket detection↗

NASA NTRS2004

Strain-Gauge Measurement of Weight of Fluid in a Tank

A method of determining the amount of fluid in a tank is based on measurement of strains induced in tank supports by the weight of the fluid. Unlike most prior methods, this method is nonintrusive: there is no need to insert instrumentation in the tank and, hence, no need to run wires, cables, or tubes through the tank wall. Also unlike most prior methods, this method is applicable even if the fluid in the tank is at supercritical pressure and temperature, because it does not depend on the presence of a liquid/gas interface (as in liquid-level-measuring methods). The strain gauges used in this method may be of two types: foil and fiber-optic. Four foil gauges (full bridge) are mounted on each of the tank-supporting legs. As the tank is filled or emptied, the deformation in each leg increases or decreases, respectively. Measured deformations of all legs are added to obtain a composite deformation indicative of the change in weight of the tank plus fluid. An initial calibration is performed by recording data at two points (usually, empty and full) for which the mass or weight of fluid is known. It is assumed that the deformations are elastic, so that the line passing through the two points can be used as a calibration curve of mass (or weight) of fluid versus deformation. One or more fiber-optic gauges may be used instead of the foil gauges. The resolution of the fiber-optic and foil gauges is approximately the same, but the fiber-optic gauges are immune to EMI (electromagnetic interference), are linear with respect to temperature over their entire dynamic range (as defined by the behavior of the sample), and measure thermally induced deformations as predictable signals. Conversely, long term testing has demonstrated that the foil gauges exhibit an erratic behavior whenever subjected to direct sun radiation (even if protected with a rubberized cover). Henceforth, for deployment in outdoor conditions, fiber-optic gauges are the only option if one is to rely on the system for an extended period of time when a recalibration procedure may not be acceptable. A set of foil gauges had been tested on the supports of a 500-gallon (1,900-liter) tank. The gauges were found to be capable of measuring the deformations (up to 22 micro-strain) that occurred during filling and emptying of the tank. The fluid masses calculated from the gauge readings were found to be accurate within 4.5 percent. However, the reliability of the foil gauges over a few hours was not acceptable. Therefore, the foil sensor system is acceptable for use only in controlled environments (complete shade, or indoors).

Figueroa, Jorge↗

NASA NTRS2011

DCS: A Case Study of Identification of Knowledge and Disposition Gaps Using Principles of Continuous Risk Management

The Human Research Program (HRP) is formulated around the program architecture of Evidence-Risk-Gap-Task-Deliverable. Review of accumulated evidence forms the basis for identification of high priority risks to human health and performance in space exploration. Gaps in knowledge or disposition are identified for each risk, and a portfolio of research tasks is developed to fill them. Deliverables from the tasks inform the evidence base with the ultimate goal of defining the level of risk and reducing it to an acceptable level. A comprehensive framework for gap identification, focus, and metrics has been developed based on principles of continuous risk management and clinical care. Research towards knowledge gaps improves understanding of the likelihood, consequence or timeframe of the risk. Disposition gaps include development of standards or requirements for risk acceptance, development of countermeasures or technology to mitigate the risk, and yearly technology assessment related to watching developments related to the risk. Standard concepts from clinical care: prevention, diagnosis, treatment, monitoring, rehabilitation, and surveillance, can be used to focus gaps dealing with risk mitigation. The research plan for the new HRP Risk of Decompression Sickness (DCS) used the framework to identify one disposition gap related to establishment of a DCS standard for acceptable risk, two knowledge gaps related to DCS phenomenon and mission attributes, and three mitigation gaps focused on prediction, prevention, and new technology watch. These gaps were organized in this manner primarily based on target for closure and ease of organizing interim metrics so that gap status could be quantified. Additional considerations for the knowledge gaps were that one was highly design reference mission specific and the other gap was focused on DCS phenomenon.

Norcross, Jason↗

NASA NTRS2011

Large Payload Transportation and Test Considerations

Ironically, the limiting factor to a national heavy lift strategy may not be the rocket technology needed to throw a heavy payload, but rather the terrestrial infrastructure - roads, bridges, airframes, and buildings - necessary to transport, acceptance test, and process large spacecraft. Failure to carefully consider how large spacecraft are designed, and where they are manufactured, tested, or launched, could result in unforeseen cost to modify/develop infrastructure, or incur additional risk due to increased handling or elimination of key verifications. During test and verification planning for the Altair project, a number of transportation and test issues related to the large payload diameter were identified. Although the entire Constellation Program - including Altair - was canceled in the 2011 NASA budget, issues identified by the Altair project serve as important lessons learned for future payloads that may be developed to support national "heavy lift" strategies. A feasibility study performed by the Constellation Ground Operations (CxGO) project found that neither the Altair Ascent nor Descent Stage would fit inside available transportation aircraft. Ground transportation of a payload this large over extended distances is generally not permitted by most states, so overland transportation alone would not have been an option. Limited ground transportation to the nearest waterway may be permitted, but water transportation could take as long as 66 days per production unit, depending on point of origin and acceptance test facility; transportation from the western United States would require transit through the Panama Canal to access the Kennedy Space Center launch site. Large payloads also pose acceptance test and ground processing challenges. Although propulsion, mechanical vibration, and reverberant acoustic test facilities at NASA s Plum Brook Station have been designed to accommodate large spacecraft, special handling and test work-arounds may be necessary, which could increase cost, schedule, and technical risk. Once at the launch site, there are no facilities currently capable of accommodating the combination of large payload size and hazardous processing (which includes hypergolic fuels, pyrotechnic devices, and high pressure gasses).

Rucker, Michelle A.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Desert RATS 2011: Near-Earth Asteroid Human Exploration Operations

The Desert Research and Technology Studies (D-RATS) 2011 field test involved the planning and execution of a series of exploration scenarios under operational conditions similar to those that would be expected during a human exploration mission to a near-Earth asteroid (NEA). The focus was on understanding the operations tempo during simulated NEA exploration and the implications of communications latency and limited data bandwidth. Anchoring technologies and sampling techniques were not evaluated due to the immaturity of those technologies and the inability to meaningfully test them at D-RATS. Reduced gravity analogs and simulations are being used to fully evaluate Multi-Mission Space Exploration Vehicle (MMSEV) and extravehicular (EVA) operations and interactions in near-weightlessness at a NEA as part of NASA s integrated analogs program. Hypotheses were tested by planning and performing a series of 1-day simulated exploration excursions comparing test conditions all of which involved a single Deep Space Habitat (DSH) and either zero, one, or two MMSEVs; three or four crewmembers; one of two different communications bandwidths; and a 100-second roundtrip communications latency between the field site and Houston. Excursions were executed at the Black Point Lava Flow test site with a Mission Control Center and Science Support Room at Johnson Space Center (JSC) being operated with 100-second roundtrip communication latency to the field. Crews were composed of astronauts and professional field geologists and teams of Mission Operations, Science, and Education & Public Outreach (EPO) experts also supported the mission simulations each day. Data were collected separately from the Crew, Mission Operations, Science, and EPO teams to assess the test conditions from multiple perspectives. For the operations tested, data indicates practically significant benefits may be realized by including at least one MMSEV and by including 4 versus 3 crewmembers in the NEA exploration architecture as measured by increased Scientific Data Quality, EVA Exploration Time, Capability Assessment Ratings, and Overall Acceptability ratings by Crew, Mission Operations, Science, and Education & Public Outreach teams. A combination of text and voice was used to effectively communicate over the 100-second roundtrip communications latency and increased communication bandwidth yielded a small but practically significant improvement in Overall Acceptability as rated by the Science team, although the impact of bandwidth on scientific strategic planning was not assessed. No effect of increased bandwidth was observed with respect to Crew, Mission Operations, or EPO team ratings of Overall Acceptability.

Abercromby, Andrew↗

NASA NTRS2008

Metrology - Beyond the Calibration Lab

We rely on data from measurements every day; a gas-pump, a speedometer, and a supermarket weight scale are just three examples of measurements we use to make decisions. We generally accept the data from these measurements as "valid." One reason we can accept the data is the "legal metrology" requirements established and regulated by the government in matters of commerce. The measurement data used by NASA, other government agencies, and industry can be critical to decisions which affect everything from economic viability, to mission success, to the security of the nation. Measurement data can even affect life and death decisions. Metrology requirements must adequately provide for risks associated with these decisions. To do this, metrology must be integrated into all aspects of an industry including research, design, testing, and product acceptance. Metrology, the science of measurement, has traditionally focused on the calibration of instruments, and although instrument calibration is vital, it is only a part of the process that assures quality in measurement data. For example, measurements made in research can influence the fundamental premises that establish the design parameters, which then flow down to the manufacturing processes, and eventually impact the final product. Because a breakdown can occur anywhere within this cycle, measurement quality assurance has to be integrated into every part of the life-cycle process starting with the basic research and ending with the final product inspection process. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the role of metrology in the various phases of a product's life-cycle. For simplicity, the cycle will be divided in four broad phases, with discussions centering on metrology within NASA. .

Mimbs, Scott M.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Microbial Monitoring of the International Space Station

Humans living and working in the harsh environment of space present many challenges for habitability engineers and microbiologists. Spacecraft must provide an internal environment in which physical (gas composition, pressure, temperature, and humidity), chemical, and biological environmental parameters are maintained at safe levels. Microorganisms are ubiquitous and will accompany all human-occupied spacecraft, but if biological contamination were to reach unacceptable levels, long-term human space flight would be impossible. Prevention of microbiological problems, therefore, must have a high priority. Historically, prevention of infectious disease in the crew has been the highest priority, but experience gained from the NASA-Mir program showed that microbial contamination of vehicle and life-support systems, such as biofouling of water and food, are of equal importance. The major sources of microbiological risk factors for astronauts include food, drinking water, air, surfaces, payloads, research animals, crew members, and personnel in close contact with the astronauts. In our efforts to eliminate or mitigate the negative effects of microorganisms in spacecraft, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) implemented comprehensive microbial analyses of the major risk factors. This included the establishment of acceptability requirements for food, water, air, surfaces, and crew members. A robust monitoring program was then implemented to verify that the risks were within acceptable limits. Prevention of microbiological problems is preferred over mitigation of problems during flight, and preventive steps must begin very early in the design phase. Spacecraft development must include requirements to control free water from humidity, condensate, hygiene activities, and other releases. If water is available, microbes are likely to grow because sufficient nutrients are potentially available. Materials selected for the spacecraft must not promote or support microbial growth. Air filtration can dramatically reduce the number of airborne bacteria, fungi, and particulates in spacecraft breathing air. Waterborne bacteria can be reduced to acceptable levels by thermal inactivation of bacteria during water processing, along with a residual biocide, and filtration at the point of use can ensure safety. System design must include onboard capability to achieve recovery of the system from contamination. Robust housekeeping procedures that include periodic cleaning and disinfection will prevent high levels of microbial growth on surfaces. Food for consumption in space must be thoroughly tested for excessive microbial content and pathogens before launch. Thorough preflight examination of flight crews, consumables, payloads, and the environment can greatly reduce pathogens in spacecraft. Many of the lessons learned from the Space Shuttle and previous programs were applied in the early design phase of the International Space Station, resulting in the safest space habitat to date. This presentation describes the monitoring program for the International Space Station and will summarize results from preflight and on-orbit monitoring.

Pierson, Duane L.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Spacecraft Parachute Recovery System Testing from a Failure Rate Perspective

Spacecraft parachute recovery systems, especially those with a parachute cluster, require testing to identify and reduce failures. This is especially important when the spacecraft in question is human-rated. Due to the recent effort to make spaceflight affordable, the importance of determining a minimum requirement for testing has increased. The number of tests required to achieve a mature design, with a relatively constant failure rate, can be estimated from a review of previous complex spacecraft recovery systems. Examination of the Apollo parachute testing and the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster recovery chute system operation will clarify at which point in those programs the system reached maturity. This examination will also clarify the risks inherent in not performing a sufficient number of tests prior to operation with humans on-board. When looking at complex parachute systems used in spaceflight landing systems, a pattern begins to emerge regarding the need for a minimum amount of testing required to wring out the failure modes and reduce the failure rate of the parachute system to an acceptable level for human spaceflight. Not only a sufficient number of system level testing, but also the ability to update the design as failure modes are found is required to drive the failure rate of the system down to an acceptable level. In addition, sufficient data and images are necessary to identify incipient failure modes or to identify failure causes when a system failure occurs. In order to demonstrate the need for sufficient system level testing prior to an acceptable failure rate, the Apollo Earth Landing System (ELS) test program and the Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Recovery System failure history will be examined, as well as some experiences in the Orion Capsule Parachute Assembly System will be noted.

Stewart, Christine E.↗

NASA NTRS2014

The Impact of Apollo-Era Microbiology on Human Space Flight

The microbiota of crewmembers and the spacecraft environment contributes significant risk to crew health during space flight missions. NASA reduces microbial risk with various mitigation methods that originated during the Apollo Program and continued to evolve through subsequent programs: Skylab, Shuttle, and International Space Station (ISS). A quarantine of the crew and lunar surface samples, within the Lunar Receiving Laboratory following return from the Moon, was used to prevent contamination with unknown extraterrestrial organisms. The quarantine durations for the crew and lunar samples were 21 days and 50 days, respectively. A series of infections among Apollo crewmembers resulted in a quarantine before launch to limit exposure to infectious organisms. This Health Stabilization Program isolated the crew for 21 days before flight and was effective in reducing crew illness. After the program developed water recovery hardware for Apollo spacecraft, the 1967 National Academy of Science Space Science Board recommended the monitoring of potable water. NASA implemented acceptability limits of 10 colony forming units (CFU) per mL and the absence of viable E. coli, anaerobes, yeasts, and molds in three separate 150 mL aliquots. Microbiological investigations of the crew and spacecraft environment were conducted during the Apollo program, including the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project and Skylab. Subsequent space programs implemented microbial screening of the crew for pathogens and acceptability limits on spacecraft surfaces and air. Microbiology risk mitigation methods have evolved since the Apollo program. NASA cancelled the quarantine of the crew after return from the lunar surface, reduced the duration of the Health Stabilization Program; and implemented acceptability limits for spacecraft surfaces and air. While microbial risks were not a main focus of the early Mercury and Gemini programs, the extended duration of Apollo flights resulted in the increased scrutiny of impact of the space flight environment on crew health. The lessons learned during that era of space flight continue to impact microbiology risk mitigation in space programs today.

Elliott, T. F↗