Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Deep Learning”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 469 records · Page 26

Lunar and Planetary Science XXXV: Martian Aeolian and Mass Wasting Processes: Blowing and Flowing

The session Martian Aeolian and Mass Wasting Processes: BLowing and Flowing included the following topics: 1) Three Decades of Martian Surface Changes; 2) Thermophysical Properties of Isidis Basin, Mars; 3) Intracrater Material in Eastern Arabia Terra: THEMIS, MOC, and MOLA Analysis of Wind-blown Deposits and Possible High-Inertia Source Material; 4) Thermal Properties of Sand from TES and THEMIS: Do Martian Dunes Make a Good Control for Thermal Inertia Calculations? 5) A Comparative Analysis of Barchan Dunes in the Intra-Crater Dune Fields and the North Polar Sand Sea; 6) Diluvial Dunes in Athabasca Valles, Mars: Morphology, Modeling and Implications; 7) Surface Profiling of Natural Dust Devils; 8) Martian Dust Devil Tracks: Inferred Directions of Movement; 9) Numerical Simulations of Anastomosing Slope Streaks on Mars; 10) Young Fans in an Equatorial Crater in Xanthe Terra, Mars; 11) Large Well-exposed Alluvual Fans in Deep Late-Noachian Craters; 12) New Evidence for the Formation of Large Landslides on Mars; and 13) What Can We Learn from the Ages of Valles Marineris Landslides on Martian Impact History?

Source record↗

Deep Space 1 flight experience: adventures on an ion drive (AAS 02-072)

This paper provides a brief overview of the DSI attitude control subsystem, shares a few lessons-learned, and describes some of the many daunting challenges faced by our tiny flight team during the course of the mission. Special focus will be given to the nuances of flying a spacecraft with ion propulsion, our nick-of-time rewrite of the attitude determination software after the failure of the on-board star tracker in late 1999, and DSl's subsequent successful flyby of comet Borrelly on September 22, 2001.

SEP ion propulsion DS1 flight experience↗

Flight Dynamics and Navigation Performance of the BioSentinel Mission

BioSentinel was one of the ten 6U CubeSats launched by the Space Launch System (SLS) as part of the Artemis-I mission on November 16th, 2022. The spacecraft was deployed after the trans-lunar injection imparted by the upper stage of SLS, and performed a lunar flyby that provided the necessary energy to escape the Earth-Moon system into heliocentric space. The BioSentinel mission required flight dynamics support prior to flight to assess the deployment conditions and the trajectory design, as well as navigation support during flight, to provide orbit determination solutions for the mission and the Deep Space Network (DSN). This paper discusses the BioSentinel mission flight dynamics campaign, from mission design to the challenges and lessons learned encountered during flight.

Astrodynamics↗

Gateway to the Future: Lessons Learned in Development of the Refueling Systems for NASA's First Lunar Space Station

Developed in collaboration with international and commercial partners, Gateway will be humanity’s first space station around the Moon as a vital component of NASA’s deep space exploration plans to the Moon, Mars and beyond. As part of it’s focus on developing a sustainable, long term lunar capability, both it’s Xenon based Solar Electric Propulsion System, as well as it’s bi-propellant Reaction Control System of the Gateway are designed to be on-orbit refuellable. Through design studies, numerical modeling, hardware development, and early testing, the system architecture has undergone significant changes to meet mission requirements and utilize evolving hardware capabilities between concept formulation and it’s successful completion of it’s Critical Design Review. This paper presents key lessons learned during this process, highlighting specific design elements and test results that contribute to a robust and adaptable refueling system for the Gateway.

Christopher Radke↗

Delay/Disruption Tolerance Networking (DTN) Implementation and Utilization Options on the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) is in an operational configuration and nearing final assembly. With its maturity and diverse payloads onboard, the opportunity exists to extend the orbital lab into a facility to exercise and demonstrate Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN). DTN is an end-to-end network service providing communications through environments characterized by intermittent connectivity, variable delays, high bit error rates, asymmetric links and simplex links. The DTN protocols, also known as bundle protocols, provide a store-and-forward capability to accommodate end-to-end network services. Key capabilities of the bundling protocols include: the Ability to cope with intermittent connectivity, the Ability to take advantage of scheduled and opportunistic connectivity (in addition to always up connectivity), Custody Transfer, and end-to-end security. Colorado University at Boulder and the Huntsville Operational Support Center (HOSC) have been developing a DTN capability utilizing the Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus (CGBA) payload resources onboard the ISS, at the Boulder Payload Operations Center (POC) and at the HOSC. The DTN capability is in parallel with and is designed to augment current capabilities. The architecture consists of DTN endpoint nodes on the ISS and at the Boulder POC, and a DTN node at the HOSC. The DTN network is composed of two implementations; the Interplanetary Overlay Network (ION) and the open source DTN2 implementation. This paper presents the architecture, implementation, and lessons learned. By being able to handle the types of environments described above, the DTN technology will be instrumental in extending networks into deep space to support future missions to other planets and other solar system points of interest. Thus, this paper also discusses how this technology will be applicable to these types of deep space exploration missions.

Holbrook, Mark↗

Human Flight to Lunar and Beyond - Re-Learning Operations Paradigms

For the first time since the Apollo era, NASA is planning on sending astronauts on flights beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO). The Human Space Flight (HSF) program started with a successful initial flight in Earth orbit, in December 2014. The program will continue with two Exploration Missions (EM) to Lunar orbit: EM-1 will be unmanned and EM-2, carrying astronauts, will follow. NASA established a multi-center team to address the communications, and related navigation, needs. This paper will focus on the lessons learned in the team, planning for the missions' parts that are beyond Earth orbit. Many of these lessons had to be re-learned, as the HSF program after operated for many years in Earth orbit. Fortunately, the experience base from tracking robotic missions in deep space by the Deep Space Network (DSN) and close interaction with the HSF community to understand the unique needs (e.g. 2-way voice) resulted in a ConOps that leverages of both the deep space robotic and the Human LEO experiences. Several examples will be used to highlight the unique operational needs for HSF missions beyond Earth Orbit, including: - Navigation. At LEO, HSF missions can rely on Global Positioning System (GPS) devices for orbit determination. For Lunar-and-beyond HSF missions, techniques such as precision 2-way and 3-way Doppler and ranging, Delta-Difference-of-range, and eventually on-board navigation will be used. - Impact of latency - the delay associated with Round-Trip-Light-Time (RTLT). Imagine trying to have a 2-way discussion (audio or video) with an astronaut, with a 2-3 sec delay inserted (for Lunar distances) or 20 minutes delay (for Mars distances). - Balanced communications link. For robotic missions, there has been a heavy emphasis on the downlink data rates, bringing back science data from the instruments on-board the spacecraft. Uplink data rates were of secondary importance, used to send commands to the spacecraft. The ratio of downlink-to-uplink data rates was often 10:1 or more. For HSF, rates for uplink and downlink, at least for high-quality video, need to be similar.

Kenny, Ted↗

NASA's Moon to Mars Autonomous Habitat Status

NASA is developing a strategy for sending humans to the Mars vicinity, known broadly as the Moon to Mars (M2M) Campaign. A critical part of this campaign is the development of in-space and surface habitation systems capable of substantially extending human presence beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Mars missions feature an in-space transit habitat capable of supporting crews of four on ~850-1200-day missions, including transit to and from Mars and time in Mars orbit. Surface and transit habitats are complex elements which must keep crewmembers healthy and productive in deep-space environments with limited resources, long rescue times in contingency situations, and communication delays; all within constrained mass, volume, and power budgets. These habitats provide crew both living and workspace as well as most of the resources needed to support crew life. For deep space habitats, automation needs to be employed due to latency and for significant amounts of time when the habitats are uncrewed. Automation of systems is possible in space applications, but there are limitations. Outside of the Earth’s (or any) magnetosphere, radiation environments are harsh to both the physical hardware and the software components. Radiation (charged particles and ionizing electromagnetic waves) degrades and damages the hardware and causes single event upsets (SEUs) in software. If the hardware is damaged, data can be lost, or control actions not made. For software, SEUs cause algorithms to result in different solutions, or incorrect commands to be sent out. This means that algorithms and hardware used for deep space systems are different than what is used on Earth. Radiation-tolerant hardware is generations behind the current state-of-the-art hardware. Recent NASA missions, such as James Webb Space Telescope, continue to rely on older technologies such as the RAD750 processor, and the most advanced processors are still single core and less than 1.5 GHz. There have been attempts to use higher performance processors, but these often take multiple mitigation steps to handle the radiation environments, which limits the processing power and/or throughput. Current techniques for radiation mitigation have been redundancies, voting, physical separation of hardware, encasing materials, under-clocking hardware, and more. Some radiation mitigation techniques do provide benefits such as having a redundant system to improve the probability that a system will be available when needed. Autonomous software systems will have fewer interactions with humans on deep space missions and therefore need to be able to handle more off-nominal conditions. Microgravity also complicates the autonomous aspects of the mission because autonomous systems are usually built from known deterministic states, but microgravity causes physical objects to shift and move changing the location an autonomous system placed the object. Not only does the software need to be reliable and deterministic, losing resources due to a software error is not only costly but detrimental to reputation. The combination of having lower performance hardware and having to be able to verify and deterministically run software and an ever-changing environment makes deep space autonomous systems more complicated. Multiple gaps have been identified including verification of autonomous software algorithms (including artificial intelligence and machine learning), higher performance processors (graphics and general purpose), high speed networks (onboard and transmissions), memory, power distribution, data security, and variations from these. These gaps need to be closed for more advanced systems to be deployed and reduce the size, weight, and power impacts on the habitats.

Scott B. Tashakkor↗

Lunar Surface Position Determination using Perceived Signal Strength

The purpose of this project is to evaluate the feasibility of transmitters and receivers on the lunar surface for Position Determination (PD) without any form of lunar Global Positioning System (GPS). The early Artemis program may lack GPS satellites orbiting the Moon, and it is critical that activities with the lander, rover, and crew EVA identify their position on the lunar surface at all times. This project creates a prototype system that trilaterates user position based upon the perceived signal from at least 3 nearby transmission towers, called “Lunar Access Points”. The application of perceived signal strength for surface PD has historically been used in terrestrial systems such as Long Range Navigation (LORAN), which was popular with the maritime industry prior to the Global Positioning System (GPS). The ease of installing such a local system for early Artemis missions provides a critical resource until satellite-based position determination systems are deployed. A surface-based PD can also be used in GPS-denied environments such as deep craters or lava tubes where satellite visibility is compromised. By demonstrating the basic capability of surface PD, this student team has learned about issues with power, distance, thermal, dust, radiation, data processing, and communication problems applicable to the lunar surface. This knowledge can feed into future NASA requirements to improve the capability of a LunaNET implementation for the Artemis program. This project follows 10 years of successful collaboration between NASA JSC/ARES, Texas Space, Technology, Applications and Research (T STAR) and Texas A&M University in a Public, Private, Academic (PPA) Partnership. NASA funds T STAR to mentor undergraduate Capstone teams in the College of Engineering Department to design, built, and test prototypes meeting NASA requirements. TAMU faculty lead the student teams in their academic class, and NASA Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) provide T STAR and students insight on requirements evolution, prior design projects, and future development goals.

Position Determination↗

Spitzer Space Telescope Sequencing Operations Software, Strategies, and Lessons Learned

The Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF) was launched in August, 2003, and renamed to the Spitzer Space Telescope in 2004. Two years of observing the universe in the wavelength range from 3 to 180 microns has yielded enormous scientific discoveries. Since this magnificent observatory has a limited lifetime, maximizing science viewing efficiency (ie, maximizing time spent executing activities directly related to science observations) was the key operational objective. The strategy employed for maximizing science viewing efficiency was to optimize spacecraft flexibility, adaptability, and use of observation time. The selected approach involved implementation of a multi-engine sequencing architecture coupled with nondeterministic spacecraft and science execution times. This approach, though effective, added much complexity to uplink operations and sequence development. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) manages Spitzer s operations. As part of the uplink process, Spitzer s Mission Sequence Team (MST) was tasked with processing observatory inputs from the Spitzer Science Center (SSC) into efficiently integrated, constraint-checked, and modeled review and command products which accommodated the complexity of non-deterministic spacecraft and science event executions without increasing operations costs. The MST developed processes, scripts, and participated in the adaptation of multi-mission core software to enable rapid processing of complex sequences. The MST was also tasked with developing a Downlink Keyword File (DKF) which could instruct Deep Space Network (DSN) stations on how and when to configure themselves to receive Spitzer science data. As MST and uplink operations developed, important lessons were learned that should be applied to future missions, especially those missions which employ command-intensive operations via a multi-engine sequence architecture.

missions operations↗

Deep Drilling and Sampling via the Wireline Auto-Gopher Driven by Piezoelectric Percussive Actuator and EM Rotary Motor

The ability to penetrate subsurfaces and perform sample acquisition at depths of meters is critical for future NASA in-situ exploration missions to bodies in the solar system, including Mars and Europa. A corer/sampler was developed with the goal of acquiring pristine samples by reaching depths on Mars beyond the oxidized and sterilized zone. To developed rotary-hammering coring drill, called Auto-Gopher, employs a piezoelectric actuated percussive mechanism for breaking formations and an electric motor rotates the bit to remove the powdered cuttings. This sampler is a wireline mechanism that is incorporated with an inchworm mechanism allowing thru cyclic coring and core removal to reach great depths. The penetration rate is being optimized by simultaneously activating the percussive and rotary motions of the Auto-Gopher. The percussive mechanism is based on the Ultrasonic/Sonic Drill/Corer (USDC) mechanism that is driven by piezoelectric stack and that was demonstrated to require low axial preload. The Auto-Gopher has been produced taking into account the a lessons learned from the development of the Ultrasonic/Sonic Gopher that was designed as a percussive ice drill and was demonstrated in Antarctica in 2005 to reach about 2 meters deep. A field demonstration of the Auto-Gopher is currently being planned with objective of reaching as deep as 3 to 5 meters in tufa subsurface.

Auto-Gopher↗

Attitude Control Approach for Solar Cruiser, a Large, Deep Space Solar Sail

Solar Cruiser is a small satellite Technology Demonstration Mission (TDM) to mature solar sail propulsion technology using a solar sail larger than 1600 square meters, demonstrating performance as a propulsion system and a stable pointing platform for science observations in an artificial halo orbit sunward of the Sun-Earth Lagrange Point 1 (sub-L1). For the “sailcraft” to meet mission objectives, there are several unique attitude control challenges that the Attitude Determination and Control System (ADCS) must overcome. Large disturbance torques, primarily due to sail deformations coupled with off-sun pointing angles, make it more difficult to maintain adequate controls performance and manage accumulated momentum on the control actuators. The large-amplitude, low-frequency flexible body modes of the sail, in concert with noisy sensors and actuators, make it challenging to mitigate control-structure interactions and maintain fine pointing capabilities. Stability and control performance during sail deployment is complicated by rapidly and widely varying inertias. The Solar Cruiser ADCS effectively addresses these challenges using a simple, traditional control system – including momentum management actuators that use bang-bang control to constrain internal accumulated momentum, a low-pass controls filter and an attitude determination Kalman Filter (KF) that blends multiple star tracker solutions, and a reaction wheel assembly (RWA) with controller gains tuned to specific configurations or inertias. Solar Cruiser’s attitude control approach, and lessons learned from its development, establishes a state of the art of high value to future solar sail missions and other small spacecraft with large deployable structures operating in deep space.

solar sail↗

Lessons Learned During the Refurbishment and Testing of an Observatory After Long-Term Storage

Thermal Fluids Analysis Workshop (TFAWS) 2015, Silver Spring, MD NCTS 21070-15. This paper addresses the lessons learned during the refurbishment and testing of the thermal control system for a spacecraft which was placed into long-term storage. The DSCOVR (Deep Space Climate Observatory) Observatory (formerly known as Triana) was originally scheduled to launch on the Space Shuttle in 2002. With the Triana spacecraft nearly complete, the mission was canceled and the satellite was abruptly put into storage in 2001. In 2008 the observatory was removed from storage to begin refurbishment and testing. Problems arose associated with hardware that was not currently manufactured, coatings degradation, and a significant lack of documentation. Also addressed is the conversion of the thermal and geometric math models for use with updated thermal analysis software tools.

Thermal Control System↗

Flight Dynamics and Navigation Performance of the BioSentinel Mission

BioSentinel was one of ten CubeSats launched by the Space Launch System (SLS) as part of the Artemis I campaign on 16 November 2022. A lunar flyby gave BioSentinel the needed energy to escape the Earth-Moon system into heliocentric space. The biological payload contains yeast cells designed to measure radiation in deep space beyond the reach of Earth’s magnetosphere. This paper discusses in detail the BioSentinel flight performance, as well as challenges and lessons learned prior to, and during the mission.

BioSentinel↗

Technical Challenges of Drilling on Mars

In the last year, NASA's Mars science advisory committee (MEPAG: Mars Exploration Payload Advisory Group) has formally recommended that deep drilling be undertaken as a priority investigation to meet astrobiology and geology goals. This proposed new dimension in Mars exploration has come about for several reasons. Firstly, geophysical models of the martian subsurface environment indicate that we may well find liquid water (in the form of brines) under ground-ice at depths of several kilometers near the equator. On Earth we invariably find life forms associated with any environmental niche that supports liquid water. New data from the Mars Global Surveyor have shown that the most recent volcanism on Mars is very young so we cannot rule out contemporary volcanism -- in which case subsurface temperatures consistent with having water in its liquid phase may be found at relatively shallow depths. Secondly, in recent decades we have learned to our surprise that the Earth's subsurface (microbial) biosphere extends to depths of many kilometers and this discovery provides the basis for planning to explore the martian subsurface in search of ancient or even extant microbial life forms. We know (from Viking measurements) that all the biogenic elements (C, H, O, N, P, S) are available on Mars. What we therefore hope to learn is whether or not the evolution of life is inevitable given the necessary ingredients and, by implication, whether the Universe may be teeming with life. The feasibility of drilling deep into the surface of Mars has been the subject of increasing attention within NASA (and more recently among some of its international partners) for several years and this led to a broad-based feasibility study carried out by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and, subsequently, to the development of several hardware prototypes. This paper is intended to provide a general survey of that activity.

Briggs, Geoffrey↗

Attitude Control Approach for Solar Cruiser, a Large, Deep Space Solar Sail

Solar Cruiser is a small satellite Technology Demonstration Mission (TDM) to mature solar sail propulsion technology using a solar sail larger than 1600 square meters, demonstrating performance as a propulsion system and a stable pointing platform for science observations in an artificial halo orbit sunward of the Sun-Earth Lagrange Point 1 (sub-L1). For the “sailcraft” to meet mission ob- jectives, there are several unique attitude control challenges that the Attitude De- termination and Control System (ADCS) must overcome. Large disturbance tor- ques, primarily due to sail deformations coupled with off-sun pointing angles, make it more difficult to maintain adequate controls performance and manage accumulated momentum on the control actuators. The large-amplitude, low- frequency flexible body modes of the sail, in concert with noisy sensors and ac- tuators, make it challenging to mitigate control-structure interactions and main- tain fine pointing capabilities. Stability and control performance during sail de- ployment is complicated by rapidly and widely varying inertias. The Solar Cruiser ADCS effectively addresses these challenges using a simple, traditional control system – including momentum management actuators that use bang- bang control to constrain internal accumulated momentum, a low-pass controls filter and an attitude determination Kalman Filter (KF) that blends multiple star tracker solutions, and a reaction wheel assembly (RWA) with controller gains tuned to specific configurations or inertias. Solar Cruiser’s attitude control ap- proach, and lessons learned from its development, establishes a state of the art of high value to future solar sail missions and other small spacecraft with large de- ployable structures operating in deep space.

solar sail↗

NASA's In Space Propulsion Technology Program Accomplishments and Lessons Learned

NASA's In-Space Propulsion Technology (ISPT) Program was managed for 5 years at the NASA MSFC and significant strides were made in the advancement of key transportation technologies that will enable or enhance future robotic science and deep space exploration missions. At the program's inception, a set of technology investment priorities were established using an NASA-wide, mission-driven prioritization process and, for the most part, these priorities changed little - thus allowing a consistent framework in which to fund and manage technology development. Technologies in the portfolio included aerocapture, advanced chemical propulsion, solar electric propulsion, solar sail propulsion, electrodynamic and momentum transfer tethers, and various very advanced propulsion technologies with significantly lower technology readiness. The program invested in technologies that have the potential to revolutionize the robotic exploration of deep space. For robotic exploration and science missions, increased efficiencies of future propulsion systems are critical to reduce overall life-cycle costs and, in some cases, enable missions previously considered impossible. Continued reliance on conventional chemical propulsion alone will not enable the robust exploration of deep space - the maximum theoretical efficiencies have almost been reached and they are insufficient to meet needs for many ambitious science missions currently being considered. By developing the capability to support mid-term robotic mission needs, the program was to lay the technological foundation for travel to nearby interstellar space. The ambitious goals of the program at its inception included supporting the development of technologies that could support all of NASA's missions, both human and robotic. As time went on and budgets were never as high as planned, the scope of the program was reduced almost every year, forcing the elimination of not only the broader goals of the initial program, but also of funding for over half of the technologies in the original portfolio. In addition, the frequency at which the application requirements for the program changed exceeded the development time required to mature technologies: forcing sometimes radical rescoping of research efforts already halfway (or more) to completion. At the end of its fifth year, both the scope and funding of the program were at a minimum despite the program successfully meeting all of it's initial high priority objectives. This paper will describe the program, its requirements, technology portfolio, and technology maturation processes. Also discussed will be the major technology milestones achieved and the lessons learned from managing a $100M+ technology program.

Johnson, Les C.↗

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

Human-Rating↗

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗