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Hazards and Probabilistic Risk Assessments of Advanced Nuclear Reactors Coupled with Industrial Facilities

This report provides a roadmap and tool kit for site specific risk assessments across a broad range of industrial customers co-located with advanced nuclear power plants (ANPP) that are not currently built and operating in the U.S. This report builds upon the body of work sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) Integrated Energy Systems Pathway that has produced industrial requirements studies and techno-economic assessments on the topics of feasibility of ANPP supported industrial processes. This report also leverages the DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program that has presented hazards assessment and generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) to light-water reactors (LWRs) co-located with hydrogen production facilities. Many of the hazard assessments and risk assessments performed for the LWRS report are agnostic to whether the nuclear reactor is an ANPP or were adapted to the ANPP focus. The report performs hazards assessments to include industrial facilities: an oil refinery, a methanol plant, a synthetic fuel (synfuel) plant, the production of synthetic gas (syngas) as part of the methanol and synfuel plants, wood pulp and paper mills, and hydrogen production. Hydrogen production facilities are assessed in depth through prior reports in the LWRS program and the results are leveraged in this report. All these facilities are specified through industrial process and requirements research performed by national laboratories, universities, and interaction with industry. Many of the processes used in this report are pre-conceptual designs to use for decarbonization of the current technology facilities. A process of failure modes and effects analysis (what can go wrong) and accidentology (what has historically gone wrong) was used to determine the hazards presented to the nuclear power plant by the addition of the HES and the industrial customer. Chemical properties of feedstocks and products are summarized as part of the hazards assessment. Example analysis procedures are provided for each of the hazard types identified. These deterministic analyses can be used to assess adherence to licensing criteria. They can also be used to meet other safety goals like protection of the public, workers, or industrial facility equipment. A modular high temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) PRA only existing on paper was modeled and verified in modern PRA software. This will provide a tool for representative ANPP probabilistic analyses for future research.

10 SYNTHETIC FUELS↗

Proposed guidance for preparing and reviewing a molten salt non-power production or utilization facility application

Development of non-power molten salt reactors (MSRs) are under consideration to further establish an MSR experience base, support the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.43(e), and provide any additional analyses needed for development of a full-scale MSR. Guidance provided in this report is based on MSRs operating with liquid fuel (i.e., fuel dissolved within a molten salt). These reactors, unless owned by the DOE or DOD, will require licensing by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. Standard review plan (SRP) guidance for large light water reactors (LWRs) is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants; Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, NRC staff observed that NUREG-0800 is very cumbersome to apply to non-power reactors “because of the great differences in complexity and hazards between non-power reactors and nuclear power plants.” Therefore, a program to develop performance-based guidance applicable to non-power reactors was initiated. In 1996, NUREG-1537, Parts 1 and 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, was published. Part 1, the format and content guide, suggests a uniform format for presenting information in non-power reactor applications that is acceptable to the NRC staff, but conformance with the format and content is not required. Part 2, the SRP, ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff review of an application. Unfortunately, the application guidelines and SRP do not provide adequate guidance for all advanced non-LWR technologies and applications. This discrepancy eventually led to the 2012 development of interim staff guidance (ISG) for NUREG-1537, which includes criteria for describing and reviewing aqueous homogeneous reactors (AHRs). Specifically, NUREG-1537 ISG, 2012 expanded the original document to address three areas: 1. updated criteria for heterogeneous non-power reactors, 2. criteria for licensing AHRs, and 3. criteria for licensing a Part 50-licensed isotope production facility. In 2015, the US Department of Energy (DOE) opted to build on the AHR NUREG-1537 ISG experience by performing a gap analysis of the guidance that would be used to license a non-power MSR. MSRs represent one of the advanced non-LWR technologies selected by DOE for development through a multiyear cost share award with Southern Company Services. Under this Advanced Reactor Concepts 2015 (DOE Advanced Reactor Concepts [ARC] 15) award program, the DOE tasked Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the guidance changes that the NRC may need to consider when licensing an MSR non-power reactor. ORNL staff, with support from Boston Government Services, LLC, focused on five system-related chapters in NUREG-1537 that were considered most relevant to inform the effort that would be required for a non-power MSR applicant. ORNL documented this review in a technical report, ORNL/TM-2018/834, Proposed Guidance for Preparing and Reviewing Molten Salt Non-Power Reactor License Applications (NUREG-1537). The report was subsequently shared with industry and the NRC. The 2018 review was limited in scope, focusing on key system chapters based on the expected significance of each chapter relative to expected differences in addressing advanced non-LWR technologies, specifically non-power MSRs, compared with heterogeneously fueled non-power reactors. In the ORNL report, proposed generic adaptations were suggested for the following NUREG-1537 chapters: Chapter 4, “Reactor Description”; Chapter 5, “Reactor Coolant Systems”; Chapter 6, “Engineered Safety Features”; Chapter 9, “Auxiliary Systems”; Chapter 11, “Radiation Protection Program and Waste Management” The inclusion of Chapter 11 in the previous review effort was intended to provide guidance for categorizing the waste-handling process for an MSR operating with homogenous fuel. The introductions from Parts 1 and 2 of the 2012 NUREG-1537 ISG provide guidance for the application and review of production facilities. After a period of operation, non-power MSRs with homogenous fuel will include gaseous and soluble fission products. The gaseous fission products will be collected and held for decay in an off-gas system. There might also be an initiative to polish or filter the soluble fission products in the fuel salt by some mechanical or chemical means. The treatment and handling of fission products in the non-power MSR fuel salt and the description of this process in the safety analysis report (SAR) must be very precise to avoid the waste treatment facility being construed as a co-located special nuclear material (SNM) fuel cycle facility (see Section 2.3 of this report). Subsequent to the release of ORNL/TM-2018/834, NRC staff expressed a desire to continue the regulatory gap analysis that was begun in that report. This would provide additional clarity and information addressed in certain sections of the original report, while also providing new guidance on certain topics not addressed in the original report. This revision would benefit the NRC staff reviewing applications involving non-power MSR designs and would help developers understand how the NRC staff might approach the review of such applications. The focus of this report is to provide infrastructure support to the NRC staff for the regulatory review of non-power MSRs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

System Study: Residual Heat Removal 1998–2018

This report presents an unreliability evaluation of the residual heat removal (RHR) system in two modes of operation (low-pressure injection in response to a large loss-of-coolant accident and post-trip shutdown-cooling) at 104 U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Demand, run hours, and failure data from calendar years 1998 through 2018 for selected components were obtained from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS), formerly the INPO Consolidated Events Database (ICES). The unreliability results are trended for the most recent 10 year period while yearly estimates for system unreliability are provided for the entire active period. No statistically significant increasing or decreasing trends were identified in the RHR results.

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 2, March-April 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Incorporation of Thermal Hydraulic Models for Thermal Power Dispatch into a PWR Power Plant Simulator

This report describes the development, modeling, and results of a generic pressurized water reactor power plant simulator that incorporates coupled electrical and thermal power dispatch to an industrial process located approximately one kilometer from the nuclear power plant. The simulator is a commercial PWR simulator that has been modified to include thermal power dispatch as described in past milestone reports [ , ]. The commercial PWR simulator is a generic simulator available from GSE SYSTEMS® (Sykesville, MD, USA) that is built using RELAP5-HDTM Real-Time Solution and in-house software developed by GSE Systems. This generic PWR (GPWR) simulator performs real-time simulation of the complete power plant from the reactor neutronics to the electricity generation and distribution. All primary, secondary, and auxiliary systems are modeled including all control logic in order to provide the most accurate representation of actual nuclear power plant (NPP) operation, and the simulator results have been rigorously verified by an actual NPP operating at approximately 1 GWe. This report is a continuation of worked performed in previous years, and supplemental information from previous reports is included in the appendix for reference.

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Re-evaluating the Thermal-Spectrum Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor Fuel Cycle in a Modern Context

The current need to rapidly and substantially expand clean power production combined with limited capability for domestic uranium enrichment results in a U.S. nuclear power production planning environment similar to that of the first nuclear era. The U.S. thermal-spectrum molten-salt breeder reactor (TS-MSBR) program emerged during the first nuclear era as means to support rapid nuclear power expansion while minimizing demand on fissile resources. The primary reasons that the TS-MSBR program was discontinued in the 1970s were the comparatively large amount of required effort to mature its technology sufficiently for commercial deployment and the access to separated fissile material provided by the design of its integrated fuel cycle. The slowdown in U.S. electrical load growth after 1980 and the abundance of inexpensive fossil fuels inhibited reconsideration of TS-MSBR development for decades. The purpose of this discussion is to re-examine the value and technical challenges of TS-MSBRs with integrated fuel salt chemical processing considering the renewed need for rapid expansion of clean energy production worldwide, the current state of technology, the challenge of actinide wastes, and the continuing need to maintain a high degree of proliferation resistance and to integrate safeguards into the design.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

ADVANCED CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE (ACTI)

Advanced reactor technologies have attracted considerable financial support, catalyzing innovation in the nuclear energy landscape. These next generation reactors are designed with enhanced passive safety systems and the potential for cost reductions. As these advanced reactors approach technological maturity, their commercial success also requires focused examination and essential support. Economic assessments in the nuclear energy sector often emphasize construction costs and the risk of scheduling delays as primary contributors to deployment expenditures. Traditionally, vital elements of nuclear energy deployment including civil/structural engineering, design sophistication and automation have been either undervalued or postponed in the development cycles. Additionally, the nuclear industry’s collective experience in nuclear project execution has diminished over the past several decades due to the infrequency of new plant constructions. Hence, The National Reactor Innovation Center’s (NRIC) Advanced Construction Technology Initiative (ACTI) program aims to reduce cost overruns and schedule slippages that have plagued the construction of nuclear power plant projects. With this initiative, NRIC is facilitating the development of advanced nuclear plant construction technologies and approaches through partnerships that would provide game-changing benefits to the construction of advanced nuclear power plants.

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Enhanced Component Performance Study: Turbine-Driven Pumps 1998–2018

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of turbine-driven pumps (TDPs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2018 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Consolidated Events Database (ICES). The TDP failure modes considered are failure to start (FTS), failure to run less than or equal to one hour (FTR≤1H), failure to run more than one hour (FTR>1H), and normally running systems FTS and failure to run (FTR). The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period. A highly statistically significant decreasing trend was identified in the standby TDP unavailability estimates.

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Enhanced Component Performance Study: Motor Driven Pumps 1998-2024

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of motor-driven pumps (MDPs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2024 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS). The MDP failure modes considered for standby systems are fail to start (FTS), fail to run (FTR) for one hour of operation (FTR=1H), FTR after one hour of operation (FTR>1H), and for normally running systems FTS and FTR. An eight-hour unreliability estimate is also calculated and trended. The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period.

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Enhanced Component Performance Study: Motor Operated Valves 1998–2022

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of motor-operated valves (MOVs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2022 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS). The MOV failure modes considered are fail to open or close (FTOC), fail to operate or control (FTOP), and spurious operation (SO). The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period. The following increasing trend was identified for MOVs for the most recent 10-year period: • Low-demand MOV frequency of FTOC demands (demands per reactor year). The following decreasing trends were identified for MOVs for the most recent 10-year period: • Low-demand MOV FTOC failure probability • Low-demand MOV frequency of FTOC events (failures per reactor year).

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Enhanced Component Performance Study: Turbine-Driven Pumps 1998-2024

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of turbine driven pumps (TDPs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2024 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS). The TDP failure modes considered for standby systems are fail to start (FTS), fail to run (FTR) for one hour of operation (FTR=1H), FTR after one hour of operation (FTR>1H), and for normally running systems FTS and FTR. An eight hour unreliability estimate is also calculated and trended. The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10 year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period. No increasing trends were identified for TDPs for the most recent 10 year period.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Enhanced Component Performance Study: Motor-Operated Valves 1998-2020

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of motor-operated valves (MOVs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2020 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS). The MOV failure modes considered are fail to open or close (FTOC), fail to operate or control (FTOP), and spurious operation (SO). The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period. The following increasing trend was identified for MOVs for the most recent 10-year period: • Low-demand MOV frequency of FTOC demands (demands per reactor year). The following increasing trends were identified for MOVs for the most recent 10-year period: • Low-demand MOV FTOC failure probability • Low-demand MOV frequency of FTOC events (failures per reactor year).

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Enhanced Component Performance Study: Air Operated Valves 1998–2022

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of air operated valves (AOVs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2022 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS). The AOV failure modes considered are fail to open or close (FTOC), fail to operate or control (FTOP), and spurious operation (SO). The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10 year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period. The following increasing trends were identified for AOVs for the most recent 10 year period: • Low demand AOV frequency of FTOC demands (demands per reactor year) • High demand AOV frequency of FTOC demands. The following decreasing trends were identified for AOVs for the most recent 10 year period: • Low demand AOV FTOC failure probability • Low demand AOV FTOP failure rate • Low demand AOV frequency of FTOC events (failures per reactor year) • Low demand AOV frequency of FTOP events.

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Enhanced Component Performance Study: Motor-Operated Valves 1998-2024

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of motor-operated valves (MOVs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2024 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS). The MOV failure modes considered are fail to open or close (FTOC), fail to operate or control (FTOP), and spurious operation (SO). The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period. The following increasing trend was identified for MOVs for the most recent 10-year period: • Low-demand MOV frequency of FTOC demands (demands per reactor year). The following decreasing trends were identified for MOVs for the most recent 10-year period: • Low-demand MOV FTOC failure probability • High-demand MOV SO failure rate • Low-demand MOV frequency of FTOC events (failures per reactor year) • High-demand MOV frequency of SO events (failures per reactor year).

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Enhanced Component Performance Study: Turbine-Driven Pumps 1998-2020

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of turbine-driven pumps (TDPs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2020 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS). The TDP failure modes considered for standby systems are fail to start (FTS), fail to run (FTR) for one hour of operation (FTR≤1H), FTR after one hour of operation (FTR>1H), and for normally running systems FTS and FTR. An eight-hour unreliability estimate is also calculated and trended. The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period. No increasing trends were identified for TDPs for the most recent 10-year period: The following decreasing trends were identified for TDPs for the most recent 10-year period: • Standby TDP FTR>1H failure rate • Standby TDP unavailability • Standby MDP total unreliability (8-hour mission) • Standby TDP frequency of FTR>1H events (failures per reactor year) • Normally running TDP frequency of start demands (demands per reactor year) • Normally running TDP frequency of run hours (hours per reactor year).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Enhanced Component Performance Study: Turbine Driven Pumps 1998–2022

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of turbine driven pumps (TDPs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2022 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS). The TDP failure modes considered for standby systems are fail to start (FTS), fail to run (FTR) for one hour of operation (FTR=1H), FTR after one hour of operation (FTR>1H), and for normally running systems FTS and FTR. An eight hour unreliability estimate is also calculated and trended. The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10 year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period. No increasing trends were identified for TDPs for the most recent 10 year period: The following decreasing trends were identified for TDPs for the most recent 10 year period: • Standby TDP FTR>1H failure rate • Normally running TDP FTR failure rate • Standby TDP unavailability • Standby MDP total unreliability (8-hour mission) • Standby TDP frequency of start demands (demands per reactor year) • Standby TDP frequency of FTR=1H hours (hours per reactor year) • Standby TDP frequency of FTR>1H events (failures per reactor year) • Normally running TDP frequency of start demands • Normally running TDP frequency of run hours • Normally running TDP frequency of FTR events.

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Enhanced Component Performance Study: Motor Driven Pumps 1998–2022

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of motor-driven pumps (MDPs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2022 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS). The MDP failure modes considered for standby systems are fail to start (FTS), fail to run (FTR) for one hour of operation (FTR=1H), FTR after one hour of operation (FTR>1H), and for normally running systems FTS and FTR. An eight-hour unreliability estimate is also calculated and trended. The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period. The following increasing trends were identified for MDPs for the most recent 10-year period: (1) Standby MDP frequency of start demands (demands per reactor year), (2) Standby MDP frequency of FTR=1H hours (hours per reactor year), (3) Standby MDP frequency of FTR>1H hours, and (4) Normally running MDP frequency of run hours. The following decreasing trends were identified for MDPs for the most recent 10-year period: (1) Standby MDP FTR=1H failure probability, (2) Normally running MDP FTR failure rate, (3) Standby MDP unavailability, (4) Standby MDP total unreliability (8-hour mission), and (5) Normally running MDP total unreliability (8-hour mission).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Enhanced Component Performance Study: Motor-Driven Pumps 1998-2020

This report presents an enhanced performance evaluation of motor-driven pumps (MDPs) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The data used in this study are based on the operating experience failure reports from calendar year 1998 through 2020 as reported in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS). The MDP failure modes considered for standby systems are fail to start (FTS), fail to run (FTR) for one hour of operation (FTR≤1H), FTR after one hour of operation (FTR>1H), and for normally running systems FTS and FTR. An eight-hour unreliability estimate is also calculated and trended. The component reliability estimates and the reliability data are trended for the most recent 10-year period while yearly estimates for reliability are provided for the entire study period. The following increasing trends were identified for MDPs for the most recent 10-year period: • Standby MDP frequency of start demands (demands per reactor year) • Standby MDP frequency of FTR≤1H hours (hours per reactor year) • Standby MDP frequency of FTR>1H hours • Normally running MDP frequency of run hours. The following decreasing trends were identified for MDPs for the most recent 10-year period: • Standby MDP FTR≤1H failure probability • Normally running MDP FTR failure rate • Standby MDP unavailability • Normally running MDP total unreliability (8-hour mission) • Standby MDP frequency of FTR≤1H events (failures per reactor year) • Normally running MDP frequency of FTR events.

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