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Integrated Air Activity Derived Response Levels for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Air Monitoring Stations

This report was developed to help the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency understand the radionuclide detection requirements necessary to establish air monitoring systems that can detect airborne radionuclide activity at levels that could warrant protective actions.. The report provides representative integrated air activity derived response levels that correspond to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's protective action guidelines for the Early Phase (0-96 h) following a release to the environment. Environmental releases from nuclear fallout, nuclear power plants, and radiological dispersal devices are considered.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lidar Observations of Raman Scattering from S02 in a Power Plant Stack Plume

LIDAR techniques have been successfully applied to the detection of the Raman backscatter from S02 in the plume of a 200 megawatt coal-burning electrical- generating plant from a distance of 210 meters. The LIDAR system used consists of a 61-centimeter-diameter, f /4 Newtonian telescope and a 1.0-1.5-joules per pulse, 1-pulse-per-second ruby laser. Narrow band interference filters are used to select the 7546-angstrom v (sub 1) vibrational line of S02. The signal from a photomultiplier tube was sequentially applied to each 254-nanosecond-wide channel of a 15-cihannel photon counting system, resulting in a direct correlation between channel number and range increment. Photon counts were accumulated from the backscatter of a number of laser pulses (typically 50 or 100), and the accumulated counts per channel printed on paper tape. One sequence of measurements was made during a two-hour period while the plant electrical output was being reduced by approximately 50 percent. Although the Raman system had not been quantitatively calibrated, the LIDAR data correlated well with the varying plant electrical output. N2 scattering observations were also made and an approximate quantitative S02 concentration obtained by ratioing the S02 data to N2 data. This ratio compared well to the in-situ measurements made during the same period by Environmental Protection Agency sampling instruments.

Brumfield, M. L.↗

One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval And Delivery Of The Hanford Tank Wastes For Vitrification In The Waste Treatment Plant

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction ofWTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration & Controls, Front-End Design & Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety & Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH&QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant Foundation-configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Demolition of the K-27 Building at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) - 17423

On February 8, 2016, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) initiated the demolition of the East Tennessee Technology Park's (ETTP's) final gaseous diffusion building in DOE's Oak Ridge Environmental Management program. Building K-27 was a 35,582 m{sup 2} (383,000 ft{sup 2}) gaseous diffusion building that contained approximately 92,903 m{sup 2} (1 million ft{sup 2}) of floor space. It was one of five gaseous diffusion buildings at the site, formerly known as the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The actual demolition of this facility took approximately seven months to complete; however, planning and preparation took more than three years. The deactivation process was a critical element in preparing the building for demolition. UCOR's K-27 deactivation activities began in April 2012 with the installation of safe walking paths and fall protection systems to allow safe work access. Next, all mechanical and electrical systems associated with the facility were shut down and isolated, a process known as 'cold and dark.' More than 19.3 km (12 mi) of process piping and components were marked and measured. Additionally, workers performed nondestructive assay (NDA) and vent-purge-and-drain activities and applied foam to piping and components as needed [1]. Based on characterization results, approximately 4.8 km (3 mi) of process piping, and 372 converters and compressors were removed and shipped offsite prior to demolition. Lower-hazard materials and equipment were demolished with the building structure and transported to onsite disposal facilities. Upfront waste characterization and ongoing monitoring were key to the successful disposal of demolition debris at onsite facilities. Due to process improvements in waste loading recommended by work crews, the project achieved a 50 percent improvement in the daily hauling rate during the 9,000-truckload shipping campaign. Crews worked in high-risk, high-hazard conditions and were exposed to radiological and chemical contaminants, extreme temperatures, and deteriorating infrastructure. However, the hazard controls that were put in place, based on the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) walk-downs and hazard determination, made the effort manageable. The overall safety performance during demolition of the facility was excellent, with no significant injuries, and exceeded industry standards and DOE target levels. Outstanding safety performance was a testament to the dedication of the workforce, given the significant hazards presented by the demolition of the Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility. Another key element to the success of the K-27 demolition was the support and approval of all stakeholders involved in this effort, including DOE, the surrounding communities, the State of Tennessee, the UCOR management team, and, most importantly, the workforce that performed this highly hazardous work. This $52 million demolition project was completed ahead of schedule with no significant injuries and in compliance with all DOE orders, site procedures, and environmental controls. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

System Performance Testing of the Pulse-Echo Ultrasonic Instrument for Critical Velocity Determination during Hanford Tank Waste Transfer Operations - 13584

The delivery of Hanford double-shell tank waste to the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is governed by specific Waste Acceptance Criteria that are identified in ICD 19 - Interface Control Document for Waste Feed. Waste must be certified as acceptable before it can be delivered to the WTP. The fluid transfer velocity at which solid particulate deposition occurs in waste slurry transport piping (critical velocity) is a key waste acceptance parameter that must be accurately characterized to determine if the waste is acceptable for transfer to the WTP. Washington River Protection Solutions and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have been evaluating the ultrasonic PulseEcho instrument since 2010 for its ability to detect particle settling and determine critical velocity in a horizontal slurry transport pipeline for slurries containing particles with a mean particle diameter of ≥14 micrometers (μm). In 2012 the PulseEcho instrument was further evaluated under WRPS’ System Performance test campaign to identify critical velocities for slurries that are expected to be encountered during Hanford tank waste retrieval operations or bounding for tank waste feed. This three-year evaluation has demonstrated the ability of the ultrasonic PulseEcho instrument to detect the onset of critical velocity for a broad range of physical and rheological slurry properties that are likely encountered during the waste feed transfer operations between the Hanford tank farms and the WTP.

Critical Velocity↗

System Performance Testing of the Pulse-Echo Ultrasonic Instrument for Critical Velocity Determination during Hanford Tank Waste Transfer Operations - 13584

The delivery of Hanford double-shell tank waste to the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is governed by specific Waste Acceptance Criteria that are identified in ICD 19 - Interface Control Document for Waste Feed. Waste must be certified as acceptable before it can be delivered to the WTP. The fluid transfer velocity at which solid particulate deposition occurs in waste slurry transport piping (critical velocity) is a key waste acceptance parameter that must be accurately characterized to determine if the waste is acceptable for transfer to the WTP. Washington River Protection Solutions and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have been evaluating the ultrasonic PulseEcho instrument since 2010 for its ability to detect particle settling and determine critical velocity in a horizontal slurry transport pipeline for slurries containing particles with a mean particle diameter of =14 micrometers (μm). In 2012 the PulseEcho instrument was further evaluated under WRPS' System Performance test campaign to identify critical velocities for slurries that are expected to be encountered during Hanford tank waste retrieval operations or bounding for tank waste feed. This three-year evaluation has demonstrated the ability of the ultrasonic PulseEcho instrument to detect the onset of critical velocity for a broad range of physical and rheological slurry properties that are likely encountered during the waste feed transfer operations between the Hanford tank farms and the WTP. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Approach and Model Used to Represent a Timeline Analysis for Security Design Enhancements

Next-generation reactors will be able to use risk to inform and performance base the licensing of many aspects of the reactor, facility, and site design, including attributes of physical security. There are several factors related to security, including site topography, reactor design, and physical protection system components, to consider when designing the physical protection system into the overall facility design and plan of operation. With the versatility of advanced reactors, especially micro reactors, methods are needed to simplify and quickly evaluate potential timelines for designing a site configuration. This report describes an approach to generate qualitative and quantitative insights using a risk-informed simulation. The modeling process is described in detail, focusing on three aspects: (1) the facility mission time (the time required to control the plant until safe), (2) the attacker timeline (the time to potential sabotage), and (3) the response timeline (the time to counter the facility attack). The modeling capabilities also are extended to include facility physical phenomena such as thermal-hydraulics and heat transfer to capture realistic representation of dynamic changes to a facility. While the plant models and examples are hypothetical and do not represent a real facility, these modeling approaches could be used for future security-by-design engineering in advanced reactors. The outputs and insights from the modeling approach may be used to modify and optimize the security posture of a facility by efficiently making modifications to the model and seeing the overall impact from the modification. Lastly, use of the approach described in this report can also provide the technical basis for a physical protection program, describing how the facility and security strategy will cope with off-normal events.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Test and Validate Distributed Coaxial Cable Sensors for in situ Condition Monitoring of Coal-Fired Boiler Tubes

This project aims to test, validate, and advance the technology readiness level (from TRL5 to TRL7) of a novel low-cost distributed stainless-steel/ceramic coaxial cable sensing (SSC-CCS) technology for in situ monitoring of the boiler tube temperature in existing coal-fired power plants. The novel SSC-CCS sensing technology and associated condition-based monitoring (CBM) software to be demonstrated in this project will lead to an improved understanding of the boiler tube failure mechanisms and a prognostic system to improve the overall performance, reliability, and flexibility of the nation’s coal-fired power plant fleet. A boiler tube monitoring system with distributed coaxial cable temperature sensors and a sensor acquisition system was constructed. The high-temperature coaxial cable sensor with a length of 1.3m was made by using a quartz tube (1mm inner diameter (ID) and 6mm outer diameter (OD)) to concentrically separate a 304 stainless-steel (SS) rod (1mm OD) and SS tube (7.94mm OD and 6.16mm ID). The sensor acquisition system includes a vector network analyzer (VNA), a radio frequency (RF) power amplifier, multiple switches and a USB hub. The distributed stainless-steel quartz coaxial cable sensor (SSQ-CCS) had a linear response to temperature with a resolution uncertainty of σ = 0.77℃. To withstand the harsh conditions of 3,300 steam pressures and 800℃ high temperatures, the sensor was shielded by a protective tube made of the same material as the boiler tube. The protection tube had an OD of 1.5 inches and a thickness of 0.25 inches. In the laboratory tests, the sensor showed good sensitivity and fast response. The drift was bounded between +0.33% and -0.67% during a test at 600℃ for 350 hours, indicating good stability of the sensor. A field test was conducted where four sensors were welded on four superheat tubes (SH-Ts) at a coal-fired power station over 400 days. Conventional thermocouples were welded to the superheater tubes alongside the coaxial cable sensors for the purpose of comparison. Two sensors were capable of distributed sensing, with three multiplexed sensing sections. The other two sensors were single section. During the 400-day test period, the power plant experienced startups and shutdowns. At the steady state operations, the temperature of the boiler tube is about 600℃ (1112°F). The sensors recorded the entire coal-firing processes (start-up, steady state, and shut-down) and the glitch event. A GSM modem and a Watchdog were added to the system to ensure reliable data recording. The GSM modem sent daily messages to plant managers and Clemson team to inform the status of the sensor system. If the system was not normally working, the Watchdog would reboot the system automatically. The new coaxial cable based distributed sensing technology has been proven to be successful in both laboratory and field tests. A comprehensive four-stage multi-physics computational framework has been developed to assist the design, optimization, installation, and operation of SSQ-CCS. With the consideration of various operation conditions, we predict the distributions of flue gas temperatures within coal-fired boilers, the temperature correlation between the boiler tube and SSQ-CCS, and the safety of SSQ-CCS. A conditional-based monitoring system is implemented as well. The computational framework developed in this work can guide the future operation of coal-fired plants and other power plants for the safety prediction of boiler operations.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Personnel Safety for Future Magnetic Fusion Power Plants

The safety of personnel at existing fusion experiments is an important concern that requires diligence. Looking to the future, fusion experiments will continue to increase in power and operating time until steady state power plants are achieved; this causes increased concern for personnel safety. This paper addresses four important aspects of personnel safety in the present and extrapolates these aspects to future power plants. The four aspects are personnel exposure to ionizing radiation, chemicals, magnetic fields, and radiofrequency (RF) energy. Ionizing radiation safety is treated well for present and near-term experiments by the use of proven techniques from other nuclear endeavors. There is documentation that suggests decreasing the annual ionizing radiation exposure limits that have remained constant for several decades. Many chemicals are used in fusion research, for parts cleaning, as use as coolants, cooling water cleanliness control, lubrication, and other needs. In present fusion experiments, a typical chemical laboratory safety program, such as those instituted in most industrialized countries, is effective in protecting personnel from chemical exposures. As fusion facilities grow in complexity, the chemical safety program must transition from a laboratory scale to an industrial scale program that addresses chemical use in larger quantity. It is also noted that allowable chemical exposure concentrations for workers have decreased over time and, in some cases, now pose more stringent exposure limits than those for ionizing radiation. Allowable chemical exposure concentrations have been the fastest changing occupational exposure values in the last thirty years. The trend of more restrictive chemical exposure regulations is expected to continue into the future. Other issues of safety importance are magnetic field exposure and RF energy exposure. Magnetic field exposure limits are consensus values adopted as best practices for worker safety; a typical exposure value is ~1000 times the Earth’s magnetic field, but the Earth’s field is a very low value. Allowable static magnetic field exposure limits have remained constant over the recent past and would appear to remain constant for the foreseeable future. Some existing fusion experiments have suffered from RF energy leakage from waveguides, the typical practice to protect personnel is establishing personnel exclusion areas when systems are operating. RF exposure limits have remained fairly constant for overall body exposures, but have become more specific in the exposure frequency values. This paper describes the occupational limits for those types of exposure, how these exposures are managed, and also discusses the likelihood of more restrictive regulations being promulgated that will affect the design of future fusion power plants and safety of their personnel.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Advanced High-Temperature Reactor Dynamic System Model Development: April 2012 Status

The Advanced High-Temperature Reactor (AHTR) is a large-output fluoride-salt-cooled high-temperature reactor (FHR). An early-phase preconceptual design of a 1500 MW(e) power plant was developed in 2011 [Refs. 1 and 2]. An updated version of this plant is shown as Fig. 1. FHRs feature low-pressure liquid fluoride salt cooling, coated-particle fuel, a high-temperature power cycle, and fully passive decay heat rejection. The AHTR is designed to be a “walk away” reactor that requires no action to prevent large off-site releases following even severe reactor accidents. This report describes the development of dynamic system models used to further the AHTR design toward that goal. These models predict system response during warmup, startup, normal operation, and limited off-normal operating conditions. Severe accidents that include a loss-of-fluid inventory are not currently modeled. The scope of the models is limited to the plant power system, including the reactor, the primary and intermediate heat transport systems, the power conversion system, and safety-related or auxiliary heat removal systems. The primary coolant system, the intermediate heat transport system and the reactor building structure surrounding them are shown in Fig. 2. These systems are modeled in the most detail because the passive interaction of the primary system with the surrounding structure and heat removal systems, and ultimately the environment, protects the reactor fuel and the vessel from damage during severe reactor transients. The reactor silo also plays an important role during system warmup. The dynamic system modeling tools predict system performance and response. The goal is to accurately predict temperatures and pressures within the primary, intermediate, and power conversion systems and to study the impacts of design changes on those responses. The models are design tools and are not intended to be used in reactor qualification. The important details to capture in the primary system relate to flows within the reactor vessel during severe events and the resulting temperature profiles (temperature and duration) for major components. Critical components include the fuel, reactor vessel, primary piping, and the primary-to-intermediate heat exchangers (P-IHXs). The major AHTR power system loops are shown in Fig. 3. The intermediate heat transfer system is a group of three pumped salt loops that transports the energy produced in the primary system to the power conversion system. Two dynamic system models are used to analyze the AHTR. A Matlab/Simulink-based model initiated in 2011 has been updated to reflect the evolving design parameters related to the heat flows associated with the reactor vessel. The Matlab model utilizes simplified flow assumptions within the vessel and incorporates an empirical representation of the Direct Reactor Auxiliary Cooling System (DRACS). A Dymola/Modelica model incorporates a more sophisticated representation of primary coolant flow and a physics-based representation of the three-loop DRACS thermal hydraulics. This model is not currently operating in a fully integrated mode. The Matlab model serves as a prototype and provides verification for the Dymola model, and its use will be phased out as the Dymola model nears completion. The heat exchangers in the system are sized using spreadsheet-based, steady-state calculations. The detail features of the heat exchangers are programmed into the dynamic models, and the overall dimensions are used to generate realistic plant designs. For the modeling cases where the emphasis is on understanding responses within the intermediate and primary systems, the power conversion system may be modeled as a simple boundary condition at the intermediate-to-power conversion system heat exchangers.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Development of Defenses against False Data Injection Attacks for Nuclear Power Plants

With the recent successful attempts against the digital control systems of critical infrastructures, there is a need to develop new defense strategies that recognize two important realities, 1) state- sponsored attackers can rely on a number of techniques including espionage, social engineering, and brute force techniques, etc. to gain access to the raw data used to control system behavior, 2) attackers can falsify operational data in manners that do not trigger conventional outlier/anomaly detection techniques in order to go undetected, which is referred to as false data injection attacks. Therefore, there is a strong need to explore another class of defense measures, referred to as physical process defense, serving as a new line of defense in the event existing defenses relying on information protection measures are breached. This physical process defenses utilize the physics and engineering models of the system to build unique signatures for genuine system behavior. If successful, the signatures would be able to detect attacks that falsify the operational data and render them harmless before they can inflict physical damage on the system. This report is focused on exploring the feasibility of physical process defenses for nuclear reactors, and their associated functional requirements to maximize their resiliency against state-sponsored, or equivalent, attackers.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval and Delivery of Hanford Tank Wastes for Vitrification in the Waste Treatment Plant - 13234

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety-conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction of WTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration and Controls, Front-End Design and Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety and Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH and QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant{sup R} Foundation-Configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

K-25 D and D Challenges - 12170

Decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) of the K-25 former gaseous diffusion plant provides lessons learned applicable to other D and D projects in the DOE Complex. The 175,000- square-meter, 1.6-kilometer-long building is contaminated with highly enriched uranium (HEU), Tc-99, trace quantities of other fission products, asbestos, PCBs, and other hazardous wastes. Safety challenges include deteriorated electrical systems, significant structural degradation, and criticality and exposure risks. The project completely revised the D and D approach after a worker fell through an operating floor and was seriously injured. For protection from deteriorated building conditions, the project reduced the number of workers in the facility, limited their hours in the building, and installed nets and barriers to protect them from falls through weakened floors and from falling material. The new plan involved removing high-risk components, removing motors and compressors, and demolishing the building from the outside with heavy equipment with most of the piping and components inside the building during demolition. The team provided temporary electrical power; reconfigured the criticality alarm system; upgraded security; performed sampling and analysis to locate and characterize HEU deposits and Tc-99; and, to establish 'criticality incredible' conditions, conducted a nondestructive assay program and injected foam into equipment and piping as a contamination fixative. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Performance Assessment Results for the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility - 19134

In 2014, the US DOE Office of River Protection and its contractors began to develop a performance assessment for the near-surface disposal of low-level and mixed low-level waste at the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility. The Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility is a doubly-lined landfill that was constructed between 2004 and 2006 to be the disposal facility for the vitrified low-activity waste containers that will be produced at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. The disposal facility is also expected to receive solid secondary waste produced at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant and other solid wastes from site activities. The constructed facility is awaiting authorization to receive waste. Although no waste destined for the facility is currently being generated, operations cannot begin until the facility has received a Disposal Authorization Statement from US DOE and a permit modification from the State of Washington Department of Ecology. Both the Disposal Authorization Statement and permit modification require a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for the next 1,000 to 10,000 years. Based on the analyses presented in the Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment, US DOE issued a conditional Disposal Authorization Statement for the facility in June 2018. Demonstrating the long-term performance of the facility to be protective of human health and the environment was evaluated under the requirements of US DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. Computer simulations were performed to evaluate whether or not the disposal facility would comply with the performance objectives specified in the order. The evaluation was performed using numerical models to simulate source term releases from vitrified and cement-based waste forms. Source term releases were subsequently transported through an air pathway and a groundwater pathway to a point of compliance 100 meters from the disposed of waste. In addition, an analysis evaluating the consequences of an inadvertent intrusion into the waste was also performed. In accordance with US DoE's technical standard for performance assessments, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate that the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility, together with the engineered features of the waste forms and natural features of the selected site, provides a reasonable expectation that the low-level waste and mixed low-level waste disposal will meet the radiological performance objectives established by US DOE. Post-closure doses to future members of the public were evaluated after the time of closure and included a 100-year period of institutional controls that limited exposure immediately following closure of the facility. Calculated doses to a future member of the public from the air pathway were below the 100 μSv/yr dose performance objective. Calculated doses to a future member of the public from all exposure pathways, including the air pathway and the groundwater pathway, were below the 250 μSv/yr dose performance objective. Doses following an inadvertent intrusion into the facility after the institutional control period were below the 5 mSv acute dose performance measure and the 1 mSv/yr chronic dose performance measure. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

U.S. Effort Support to Examinations at Fukushima - Meeting Notes with Updated Information Requests (FY2020)

Much is still not known about the end-state of core materials in each unit that was operating on March 11, 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Daiichi). Information obtained from Daiichi is required to inform Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, improving the ability of the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Incorporated (TEPCO Holdings) to characterize potential hazards and to ensure the safety of workers involved with cleanup activities. This document, which has been updated to include Fiscal Year 2020 (FY2020) information, summarizes results from a U.S. effort to review Daiichi information and extract insights to enhance the safety of existing and future nuclear power plant designs. This U.S. effort, which was initiated in 2014 by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), is completed by a group of experts in reactor safety and plant operations that identify examination needs and evaluate recent Daiichi examination data to address these needs. Since its inception, comprehensive annual reports were issued that document significant safety insights being obtained in areas of special emphasis: system and component performance, radionuclide surveys and sampling, debris end-state location, combustible gas effects, and plant operations and maintenance. In addition to reducing uncertainties related to severe accident modeling progression, these insights have and continue to be used to update guidance for severe accident prevention, mitigation, and emergency planning. Reduced uncertainties in modeling the events at Daiichi improve the realism of reactor safety evaluations that inform future D&D activities. For FY2020, it was decided that the program would gain more benefit from a more concise report that emphasizes new information and insights that affect prior findings and recommendations from the U.S. experts participating in this effort. A key aspect of prior U.S. efforts, the updated list of information requests, is included in this letter report to ensure that they are transmitted to organizations within Japan. In addition, findings and associated recommendations are provided regarding information presented by TEPCO Holdings, Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF), and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). This letter report also continues to emphasize how information obtained from the affected reactors at Daiichi has been and will continue to be used to update severe accident management strategies, improve maintenance activities (especially in areas of radiation protection) and reduce uncertainties in systems analysis code models. In addition, recommendations are included that would expand the use of this information to provide insights regarding maintenance, radiation protection, design, and siting activities of existing and new reactors.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Diagnostics for machine protection of DEMO

DEMO aims to (i) integrate, demonstrate and validate all relevant technology necessary to convert fusion energy to electrical energy and (ii) that the machine and its operations are economically and environmentally acceptable. To maintain the efficiency and availability of the machine, there are several physics and combined physics/technology issues as well as the engineering issues. Machine Protection (also known as Protection of Investment) addresses both the risks to plant (to avoid costly repair or replacement) and the risks to normal operating time (to avoid loss of productivity and the return on investment). The plasma-related Machine Protection issues involve measurement and control of plasma stability, plasma purity, and plasma-wall interactions. Machine Protection aims to avoid hitting catastrophic limits by using early warning alarm systems, and controlled termination or avoidance, involving coordinated actions of the magnets, gas and auxiliary heating or current-drive systems. This article outlines the key processes, some of which are used in present-day tokamaks and some of which are new specifically for DEMO (e.g. First wall and divertor power handling) and reveals the need to research and develop new science and technology for Machine Protections in DEMO's high radiation and thermal fields. This work was funded by the RCUK Energy Programme under grant EP/I501045 and the European Communities under the contract of Association between EURATOM and CCFE and conducted partly under EFDA PPPT (WP13-DAS04). The views and opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗