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At least 469 records · Page 26

Impact of Passive Safety on FHR Instrumentation Systems Design and Classification

Fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactors (FHRs) will rely more extensively on passive safety than earlier reactor classes. 10CFR50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, establishes minimum design requirements to provide reasonable assurance of adequate safety. 10CFR50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors, provides guidance on how the safety significance of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) should be reflected in their regulatory treatment. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has provided 10 CFR 50.69 SSC Categorization Guideline (NEI-00-04) that factors in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model insights, as well as deterministic insights, through an integrated decision-making panel. Employing the PRA to inform deterministic requirements enables an appropriately balanced, technically sound categorization to be established. No FHR currently has an adequate PRA or set of design basis accidents to enable establishing the safety classification of its SSCs. While all SSCs used to comply with the general design criteria (GDCs) will be safety related, the intent is to limit the instrumentation risk significance through effective design and reliance on inherent passive safety characteristics. For example, FHRs have no safety-significant temperature threshold phenomena, thus enabling the primary and reserve reactivity control systems required by GDC 26 to be passively, thermally triggered at temperatures well below those for which core or primary coolant boundary damage would occur. Moreover, the passive thermal triggering of the primary and reserve shutdown systems may relegate the control rod drive motors to the control system, substantially decreasing the amount of safety-significant wiring needed. Similarly, FHR decay heat removal systems are intended to be running continuously to minimize the amount of safety-significant instrumentation needed to initiate operation of systems and components important to safety as required in GDC 20. This paper provides an overview of the design process employed to develop a pre-conceptual FHR instrumentation architecture intended to lower plant capital and operational costs by minimizing reliance on expensive, safety related, safety-significant instrumentation through the use of inherent passive features of FHRs.

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Decommissioning of the high flux beam reactor at Brookhaven Lab

The high-flux beam reactor (HFBR) at the Brookhaven National Laboratory was a heavy water cooled and moderated reactor that achieved criticality on Oct. 31, 1965. It operated at a power level of 40 megawatts. An equipment upgrade in 1982 allowed operations at 60 megawatts. After a 1989 reactor shutdown to reanalyze safety impact of a hypothetical loss of coolant accident, the reactor was restarted in 1991 at 30 megawatts. The HFBR was shut down in December 1996 for routine maintenance and refueling. At that time, a leak of tritiated water was identified by routine sampling of groundwater from wells located adjacent to the reactor's spent fuel pool. The reactor remained shut down for almost three years for safety and environmental reviews. In November 1999 the United States Dept. of Energy decided to permanently shut down the HFBR. The decontamination and decommissioning of the HFBR complex, consisting of multiple structures and systems to operate and maintain the reactor, were complete in 2009 after removing and shipping off all the control rod blades. The emptied and cleaned HFBR dome, which still contains the irradiated reactor vessel, is presently under 24/7 surveillance for safety. Detailed dosimetry performed for the HFBR decommissioning during 1996-2009 is described in the paper. (authors)

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Estimation of the sub-criticality of the sodium-cooled fast reactor Monju using the modified neutron source multiplication method

The Modified Neutron Source Method (MNSM) is applied to the Monju reactor. This static method to estimate sub-criticality has already given good results on commercial Pressurized Water Reactors. The MNSM consists both in the extraction of the fundamental mode seen by a detector to avoid the effect of higher modes near sources, and the correction of flux distortion effects due to control rod movement. Among Monju's particularities that have a big influence on MNSM factors are: the presence of two californium sources and the position of the detector which is located far from the core outside of the reactor vessel. The importance of spontaneous fission and ({alpha}, n) reactions which have increased during the shutdown period of 15 years will also be discussed. The relative position of detectors and sources deeply affect the correction factors in some regions. In order to evaluate the detector count rate, an analytical propagation has been conducted from the reactor vessel. For two subcritical states, an estimation of the reactivity has been made and compared to experimental data obtained in the restart experiments at Monju (2010). (authors)

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A 100 MWe advanced sodium-cooled fast reactor core concept

An Advanced sodium-cooled Fast Reactor core concept (AFR-100) was developed targeting a small electrical grid to be transportable to the plant site and operable for a long time without frequent refueling. The reactor power rating was strategically decided to be 100 MWe, and the core barrel diameter was limited to 3.0 m for transportability. The design parameters were determined by relaxing the peak fast fluence limit and bulk coolant outlet temperature to beyond irradiation experience assuming that advanced cladding and structural materials developed under US-DOE programs would be available when the AFR-100 is deployed. With a de-rated power density and U-Zr binary metallic fuel, the AFR-100 can maintain criticality for 30 years without refueling. The average discharge burnup of 101 MWd/kg is comparable to conventional design values, but the peak discharge fast fluence of {approx}6x10{sup 23} neutrons/cm{sup 2} is beyond the current irradiation experiences with HT-9 cladding. The evaluated reactivity coefficients provide sufficient negative feedbacks and the reactivity control systems provide sufficient shutdown margins. The integral reactivity parameters obtained from quasi-static reactivity balance analysis indicate that the AFR-100 meets the sufficient conditions for acceptable asymptotic core outlet temperature following postulated unprotected accidents. Additionally, the AFR-100 has sufficient thermal margins by grouping the fuel assemblies into eight orifice zones. (authors)

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Decay heat of sodium fast reactor: Comparison of experimental measurements on the PHENIX reactor with calculations performed with the French DARWIN package

A Decay Heat (DH) experiment on the whole core of the French Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor PHENIX has been conducted in May 2008. The measurements began an hour and a half after the shutdown of the reactor and lasted twelve days. It is one of the experiments used for the experimental validation of the depletion code DARWIN thereby confirming the excellent performance of the aforementioned code. Discrepancies between measured and calculated decay heat do not exceed 8%. (authors)

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The AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant innovative features for extended station blackout mitigation

Station Blackout (SBO) is defined as 'a condition wherein a nuclear power plant sustains a loss of all offsite electric power system concurrent with turbine trip and unavailability of all onsite emergency alternating current (AC) power system. Station blackout does not include the loss of available AC power to buses fed by station batteries through inverters or by alternate AC sources as defined in this section, nor does it assume a concurrent single failure or design basis accident...' in accordance with Reference 1. In this paper, the innovative features of the AP1000 plant design are described with their operation in the scenario of an extended station blackout event. General operation of the passive safety systems are described as well as the unique features which allow the AP1000 plant to cope for at least 7 days during station blackout. Points of emphasis will include: - Passive safety system operation during SBO - 'Fail-safe' nature of key passive safety system valves; automatically places the valve in a conservatively safe alignment even in case of multiple failures in all power supply systems, including normal AC and battery backup - Passive Spent Fuel Pool cooling and makeup water supply during SBO - Robustness of AP1000 plant due to the location of key systems, structures and components required for Safe Shutdown - Diverse means of supplying makeup water to the Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) and the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) through use of an engineered, safety-related piping interface and portable equipment, as well as with permanently installed onsite ancillary equipment. (authors)

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The power of simplification: Operator interface with the AP1000{sup R} during design-basis and beyond design-basis events

The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and cost. The passive safety features are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as component cooling water, service water, compressed air or HVAC. The AP1000 passive safety features achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of a design-basis accident for 72 hours without need for operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the European Utility Requirements and the Utility Requirement Document for passive plants. Limited operator actions may be required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool (SFP) via passive means. This safety approach therefore minimizes the reliance on operator action for accident mitigation, and this paper examines the operator interaction with the Human-System Interface (HSI) as the severity of an accident increases from an anticipated transient to a design basis accident and finally, to a beyond-design-basis event. The AP1000 Control Room design provides an extremely effective environment for addressing the first 72 hours of design-basis events and transients, providing ease of information dissemination and minimal reliance upon operator actions. Symptom-based procedures including Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Alarm Response Procedures (ARPs) are used to mitigate design basis transients and accidents. Use of the Computerized Procedure System (CPS) aids the operators during mitigation of the event. The CPS provides cues and direction to the operators as the event progresses. If the event becomes progressively worse or lasts longer than 72 hours, and depending upon the nature of failures that may have occurred, minimal operator actions may be required outside of the control room in areas that have been designed to be accessible using components that have been designed to be reliable in these conditions. The primary goal of any such actions is to maintain or refill the passive inventory available to cool the core, containment and spent fuel pool in the safety-related and seismically qualified Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank (PCCWST). The seismically-qualified, ground-mounted Passive Containment Cooling Ancillary Water Storage Tank (PCCAWST) is also available for this function as appropriate. The primary effect of these actions would be to increase the coping time for the AP1000 during design basis events, as well as events such as those described above, from 72 hours without operator intervention to 7 days with minimal operator actions. These Operator actions necessary to protect the health and safety of the public are addressed in the Post-72 Hour procedures, as well as some EOPs, AOPs, ARPs and the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). Should the event continue to become more severe and plant conditions degrade further with indications of inadequate core cooling, the SAMGs provide guidance for strategies to address these hypothetical severe accident conditions. The AP1000 SAMG diagnoses and actions are prioritized to first utilize the AP1000 features that are expected to retain a damaged core inside the reactor vessel. Only one strategy is undertaken at any time. This strategy will be followed and its effectiveness evaluated before other strategies are undertaken. This is a key feature of both the symptom-oriented AP1000 EOPs and the AP1000 SAMGs which maximizes the probability of retaining a damaged core inside the reactor vessel and containment while minimizing the chances for confusion and human errors during implementation. The AP1000 SAMGs are simple and straight-forward and have been developed with considerable input from human factors and plant operations experts. Most importantly, and different from severe accident management strategies for other plants, the AP1000 SAMGs do not require diagnosis of the location of the core (i.e., whether reactor vessel failure has occurred). This is a fundamental consequence of the AP1000 In-Vessel Retention approach, which allows severe accident management to be based on fundamental principles (e.g. provide coolant as close as possible to the core) that do not change during a specific event. This eliminates the need for one of the more difficult diagnostic requirements, since reactor vessel failure does not directly relate to any measurable plant parameter, and differs from other designs in that an engineered failure of the pressure vessel' (e.g. core catcher) is never required. (authors)

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AP1000{sup R} nuclear power plant safety overview for spent fuel cooling

The AP1000{sup R} plant is an 1100-MWe class pressurized water reactor with passive safety features and extensive plant simplifications that enhance construction, operation, maintenance, safety and costs. The AP1000 design uses passive features to mitigate design basis accidents. The passive safety systems are designed to function without safety-grade support systems such as AC power, component cooling water, service water or HVAC. Furthermore, these passive features 'fail safe' during a non-LOCA event such that DC power and instrumentation are not required. The AP1000 also has simple, active, defense-in-depth systems to support normal plant operations. These active systems provide the first level of defense against more probable events and they provide investment protection, reduce the demands on the passive features and support the probabilistic risk assessment. The AP1000 passive safety approach allows the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in case of an accident for 72 hours without operator action, meeting the expectations provided in the U.S. Utility Requirement Document and the European Utility Requirements for passive plants. Limited operator actions are required to maintain safe conditions in the spent fuel pool via passive means. In line with the AP1000 approach to safety described above, the AP1000 plant design features multiple, diverse lines of defense to ensure spent fuel cooling can be maintained for design-basis events and beyond design-basis accidents. During normal and abnormal conditions, defense-in-depth and other systems provide highly reliable spent fuel pool cooling. They rely on off-site AC power or the on-site standby diesel generators. For unlikely design basis events with an extended loss of AC power (i.e., station blackout) or loss of heat sink or both, spent fuel cooling can still be provided indefinitely: - Passive systems, requiring minimal or no operator actions, are sufficient for at least 72 hours under all possible pool heat load conditions. - After 3 days, several different means are provided to continue spent fuel cooling using installed plant equipment as well as off-site equipment with built-in connections. Even for beyond design basis accidents with postulated pool damage and multiple failures in the passive safety-related systems and in the defense-in-depth active systems, the AP1000 multiple spent fuel pool spray and fill systems provide additional lines of defense to prevent spent fuel damage. (authors)

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Design study on safety protection system of JSFR

Development of Japan Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (JSFR) has been progressed in Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development (FaCT) project aiming at realizing high level of safety, reliability and economic competitiveness. For JSFR, design consideration on safety protection system has also been performed, which is essential for reactor shutdown in the case of design basis events (DBEs). In the design activity, consideration of safety protection system includes logic circuits configuration, selection of trip signals, and its setting values for reactor trip. In addition, it is necessary to evaluate the performance of the safety protection system by safety analysis taking into account the comprehensive parameter ranges. For this purpose, it has been evaluated whether adequate reactor trip signals can be ensured for satisfying safety standard regarding the fuel integrity (e.g., maximum fuel clad temperature) for DBEs. In this paper, results obtained from the design study on safety protection system of JSFR is presented focusing on the evaluation results of satisfaction of safety protection system for representative events of transient over power (TOP), loss of coolant flow (LOF) and loss of heat sink (LOHS). (authors)

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Validation of a plant dynamics code for 4S - Test analysis of natural circulation behavior

A plant transient dynamics code for a sodium-cooled fast reactor was developed by Toshiba. The code is used to evaluate the safety performance of Super-Safe, Small, and Simple reactor (4S) for Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs), Design Basis Accident (DBA) and Beyond DBA (BDBA). The code is currently undergoing verification and validation (V and V). As one of the validation, test analysis of the Shutdown Heat Removal Test (SHRT)-17 performed in the Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR)-II was conducted. The SHRT-17 is protected loss of flow test. The purpose of this validation is to confirm capability of the code to simulate natural circulation behavior of the plant. As a result, good agreements are shown between the analytical results and the measured data which were available from instrumented subassembly. The detailed validation result of the natural circulation behavior is described in this paper. (authors)

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Parametric analysis of thermal stratification during the Monju turbine trip test

CFD-based simulation techniques are evaluated using a simplified symmetric Monju model to study multi-dimensional mixing and heat transfer in the upper plenum during a turbine trip test. When the test starts and core outlet temperatures drop due to reactor shutdown, the cooler sodium is trapped near the bottom of the vessel and the hotter (less dense) primary sodium at the higher elevations stays largely stagnant for an extended period of time inhibiting natural circulation. However, the secondary flow through a set of holes on the inner barrel bypasses the thermally stratified region as a shorter path to the intermediate heat exchanger and improves the natural circulation flow rate to cool the core. The calculations with strict adherence to benchmark specifications predict a much shorter duration for thermal stratification in the upper plenum than the experimental data indicates. In this paper, the results of a parametric analysis are presented to address this discrepancy. Specifically, the role of the holes on the inner barrel is reassessed in terms of their ability to provide larger by-pass flow. Assuming inner barrel holes with rounded edge produces results more consistent with the experiments. (authors)

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An overview of the activities carried out by the IAEA Technical Working Group on Fast Reactors

The Technical Working Group on Fast Reactors (TWG-FR) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a group of experts to provide advice and support programme implementation, reflecting a global network of excellence and expertise in the area of advanced technologies and R and O for fast reactors and sub-critical hybrid systems. Consistent with its mandate, the TWG-FR assists in defining and carrying out the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear power technology development for fast reactors and sub-critical hybrid systems. It promotes the exchange of information on national and multi-national programmes and new developments and experience, with the goal to identify and review problems of importance and to stimulate and facilitate cooperation, development and practical application of fast reactors and sub-critical hybrid systems. Finally, the TWG-FR provides Member States with information about the current status and development trends of advanced technologies for fast reactors and sub-critical hybrid systems. The TWG-FR coordinates its activities with other IAEA projects and initiatives, especially those of the Technical Working Group on Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options (TWG-NFCO), the Dept. of Nuclear Safety and Security and, last but not least, the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and the Fuel Cycle INPRO. It also cooperates with FR-related initiatives implemented within the framework of other international programmes (e.g. GIF, OECD/NEA, ESNII, etc.). The paper presents the recent relevant activities of the TWG-FR as well as the status of the current Coordinated Research Projects jointly carried out by a number of organizations representing the various Member States within the TWG-FR. In particular they concern benchmark analyses of: - the sodium natural circulation tests performed during Phenix End-of-Life experiments; - the sodium natural convection in the upper plenum of the Monju reactor vessel; - an EBR-II Shutdown Heat Removal Test. (authors)

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CATHARE calculations of Phenix ultimate natural convection test

The Phenix Sodium cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) started operation in 1973 and it was stopped in 2009. Before the reactor was definitively shutdown, in order to collect experimental data for code assessments in the frame of Generation IV an intensive program of ultimate tests was set up. Among these ultimate experiments, two thermal hydraulic tests were performed: an asymmetrical test consisting in a trip on one secondary pump and a natural convection test in the primary circuit. The natural convection test has been used for an international benchmark on system codes in the frame of the IAEA. The CATHARE code - initially developed for water cooled reactors and now extended for safety analyses for other kinds of reactors, including Sodium Fast Reactor - was used by CEA for this benchmark. The paper reminds briefly the Phenix reactor with the main physical parameters and the instrumentation used during the natural convection test. Main test results are also briefly reminded including the evolution of the core and the heat exchangers inlet and outlet temperatures, and some local temperature measurements. The main developments to perform CATHARE SFR computations and the strategy of system code assessment are presented. Then the CATHARE modelling of Phenix reactor is depicted and the various assumptions are pointed out. CATHARE encountered no problem to predict the initial nominal state. Afterwards, the whole transient scenario is calculated and CATHARE calculations are compared to the Phenix measurements. The global trend is rather well predicted by the CATHARE code. Nevertheless, due to complex flow phenomena occurring in large plena and components, the system code encountered physical limitations, leading to remaining discrepancies between code prediction and plant data. Various sensitivity calculations are presented and they bring partial answers. Additional analyses are in progress to understand more deeply the complex 3D phenomena involved during the different phases of the natural convection test. Additional work for coupling CATHARE system code and TRIO-U CFD code is in progress and will bring useful information to better understand the physical phenomena involved during the natural convection test and to improve system modeling for future SFR safety analysis. (authors)

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The preliminary analysis on the steady-state and kinetic features of the molten salt pebble-bed reactor

A novel design concept of molten salt pebble-bed reactor with an ultra-simplified integral primary circuit called 'Nuclear Hot Spring' has been proposed, featured by horizontal coolant flow in a deep pool pebble-bed reactor, providing 'natural safety' features with natural circulation under full power operation and less expensive primary circuit arrangement. In this work, the steady-state physical properties of the equilibrium state of the molten salt pebble-bed reactor are calculated by using the VSOP code, and the steady-state thermo-hydraulic analysis is carried out based on the approximation of absolutely horizontal flow of the coolant through the core. A new concept of 2-dimensional, both axial and radial, multi-pass on-line fuelling scheme is presented. The result reveals that the radial multi-pass scheme provides more flattened power distribution and safer temperature distribution than the one-pass scheme. A parametric analysis is made corresponding to different pebble diameters, the key parameter of the core resistance and the temperature at the pebble center. It is verified that within a wide range of pebble diameters, the maximum pebble center temperatures are far below the safety limit of the fuel, and the core resistance is considerably less than the buoyant force, indicating that the natural circulation under full power operation is achievable and the ultra-simplified integral primary circuit without any pump is possible. For the kinetic properties, it is verified that the negative temperature coefficient is achieved in sufficient under-moderated condition through the preliminary analysis on the temperature coefficients of fuel, coolant and moderator. The requirement of reactivity compensation at the shutdown stages of the operation period is calculated for the further studies on the reactivity control. The molten salt pebble-bed reactor with horizontal coolant flow can provide enhanced safety and economical features. (authors)

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Preliminary requirements for a Fluoride Salt-Cooled High-Temperature Test Reactor (FHTR)

A Fluoride Salt-Cooled High-Temperature Test Reactor (FHTR) design is being developed at MIT to provide the first demonstration and test of a salt-cooled reactor using high-temperature fuel. The first step is to define the requirements. The top level requirements are (1) provide the confidence that a larger demonstration reactor is warranted and (2) develop the necessary data for a larger-scale reactor. Because requirements will drive the design of the FHTR, a significant effort is being undertaken to define requirements and understand the tradeoffs that will be required for a practical design. The preliminary requirements include specifications for design parameters and necessary tests of major reactor systems. Testing requirements include demonstration of components, systems, and procedures for refueling, instrumentation, salt temperature control to avoid coolant freezing, salt chemistry and volume control, tritium monitoring and control, and in-service inspection. Safety tests include thermal hydraulics, neutronics - including intrinsic core shutdown mechanisms such as Doppler feedback - and decay heat removal systems. Materials and coolant testing includes fuels (including mechanical wear and fatigue) and system corrosion behavior. Preliminary analysis indicates a thermal power output below 30 MW, an initial core using pebble-bed or prismatic-block fuel, peak outlet temperatures of at least 700 deg. C, and use of FLi{sup 7}Be ({sup 7}LiF-BeF{sub 2}) coolant. The option to change-out the reactor core, fuel type, and major components is being investigated. While the FHTR will be used for materials testing, its primary mission is as a reactor system performance test to enable the design and licensing of a FHR demonstration power reactor. (authors)

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Alternative cooling resource for removing the residual heat of reactor

The Recirculated Cooling Water (RCW) system of a Candu reactor is a closed cooling system which delivers demineralized water to coolers and components in the Service Building, the Reactor Building, and the Turbine Building and the recirculated cooling water is designed to be cooled by the Raw Service Water (RSW). During the period of scheduled outage, the RCW system provides cooling water to the heat exchangers of the Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) in order to remove the residual heat of the reactor, so the RCW heat exchangers have to operate at all times. This makes it very hard to replace the inlet and outlet valves of the RCW heat exchangers because the replacement work requires the isolation of the RCW. A task force was formed to prepare a plan to substitute the recirculated water with the chilled water system in order to cool the SDCS heat exchangers. A verification test conducted in 2007 proved that alternative cooling was possible for the removal of the residual heat of the reactor and in 2008 the replacement of inlet and outlet valves of the RCW heat exchangers for both Wolsong unit 3 and 4 were successfully completed. (authors)

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Application of the modified neutron source multiplication method to the prototype FBR Monju

The Modified Neutron Source Method (MNSM) is applied to the Monju reactor. This static method to estimate sub-criticality has already given good results on commercial Pressurized Water Reactors. The MNSM consists both in the extraction of the fundamental mode seen by a detector to avoid the effect of higher modes near sources, and the correction of flux distortion effects due to control rod movement. Among Monju's particularities that have a big influence on MNSM factors are: the presence of two californium sources and the position of the detector, which is located far from the core outside of the reactor vessel. The importance of spontaneous fission and ({alpha},n) reactions, which have increased during the shutdown period of 15 years, will also be discussed. In order to evaluate the detector count rate, an analytical propagation has been conducted from the reactor vessel. For two subcritical states, an estimation of the reactivity has been made and compared to experimental data obtained in the restart experiments at Monju (2010). Results indicate a good agreement between the MNSM reactivity and the reactivity measured with other methods. The reactivity dependence of the correction to apply to point kinetic equation is discussed. (authors)

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MANCINTAP: Time and space dependent neutron activation tool algorithm improvement and analysis of a PWR nozzle gallery

MANCINTAP [1], a fully automated tool for determining the activation patterns in complex 4D scenarios and evaluating the distribution of the ensuing radiation fields, has been improved. The constraint of forcing the user to define a single global mesh in order to approximate the whole problem, a limitation which prevented an accurate description of detail-rich geometries, has been overcome. The algorithm was improved and many limitations were relaxed. MANCINTAP is now capable of handling many different geometry elements in a given area at once, even if they have very different geometries and characteristic dimensions, thus allowing a vastly more complete and detailed analysis. Different meshes can be superimposed to the 3D geometry, allowing for an appropriate, dedicated treatment of all the relevant features of the problem, and the results are automatically combined in order to provide a global perspective. These new capabilities were accurately tested by applying the tool to the study of time-dependent radiation levels during shutdown in the upper reactor cavity and nozzle gallery regions of a 2-loop PWR reactor. (authors)

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