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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 469 records · Page 26
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NASA NTRS1999

10 Gbps Shuttle-to-Ground Adjunct Communication Link Capability Experiment

A 1.2 Gbps space-to-ground laser communication experiment being developed for use on an EXpedite the PRocessing of Experiments to the Space Station (EXPRESS) Pallet Adapter can be adapted to fit the Hitchhiker cross-bay-carrier pallet and upgraded to data rates exceeding 1O Gbps. So modified, this instrument would enable both real-time data delivery and increased data volume for payloads using the Space Shuttle. Applications such as synthetic aperture radar and multispectral imaging collect large data volumes at a high rate and would benefit from the capability for real-time data delivery and from increased data downlink volume. Current shuttle downlink capability is limited to 50 Mbps, forcing such instruments to store large amounts of data for later analysis. While the technology is not yet sufficiently proven to be relied on as the primary communication link, when in view of the ground station it would increase the shuttle downlink rate capability 200 times, with typical total daily downlinks of 200 GB - as much data as the shuttle could downlink if it were able to maintain its maximum data rate continuously for one day. The lasercomm experiment, the Optical Communication Demonstration and High-Rate Link Facility (OCDHRLF), is being developed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL) Optical Communication Group through support from the International Space Station Engineering Research and Technology Development program. It is designed to work in conjunction with the Optical Communication Telescope Laboratory (OCTL) NASA's first optical communication ground station, which is under construction at JPL's Table Mountain Facility near Wrightwood, California. This paper discusses the modifications to the preliminary design of the flight system that would be necessary to adapt it to fit the Hitchhiker Cross-Bay Carrier. It also discusses orbit geometries which are favorable to the OCTL and potential non-NASA ground stations, anticipated burst-error-rates and bit-error-rates, and requirements for data collection on the ground.

Ceniceros, J. M.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Shuttle Hitchhiker Experiment Launcher System (SHELS)

NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center Shuttle Small Payloads Project (SSPP), in partnership with the United States Air Force and NASA's Explorer Program, is developing a Shuttle based launch system called SHELS (Shuttle Hitchhiker Experiment Launcher System), which shall be capable of launching up to a 400 pound spacecraft from the Shuttle cargo bay. SHELS consists of a Marman band clamp push-plate ejection system mounted to a launch structure; the launch structure is mounted to one Orbiter sidewall adapter beam. Avionics mounted to the adapter beam will interface with Orbiter electrical services and provide optional umbilical services and ejection circuitry. SHELS provides an array of manifesting possibilities to a wide range of satellites.

Daelemans, Gerry↗
NASA NTRS2000

STS-99 Commander and Pilot for the SRTM Mission, Practice Flight in the Shuttle Training Aircraft

The primary objective of the STS-99 mission was to complete high resolution mapping of large sections of the Earth's surface using the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM), a specially modified radar system. This radar system produced unrivaled 3-D images of the Earth's Surface. The mission was launched at 12:31 on February 11, 2000 onboard the space shuttle Endeavour, and led by Commander Kevin Kregel. The crew was Pilot Dominic L. Pudwill Gorie and Mission Specialists Janet L. Kavandi, Janice E. Voss, Mamoru Mohri from the National Space Development Agency (Japanese Space Agency), and Gerhard P. J. Thiele from DARA (German Space Agency). This tape shows Commander Kregel and Pilot Gorie getting on board the Shuttle Training Aircraft and practicing approaches for the shuttle landing.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1973

Functional Requirements for Onboard Management of Space Shuttle Consumables

This report documents the results of the study "Functional Requirements for Onboard Management of Space Shuttle Consumables." The study was conducted for the Mission Planning and Analysis Division of the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas, between 3 July 1972 and 16 November 1973. The overall study program objective was two-fold. The first objective was to define a generalized consumable management concept which is applicable to advanced spacecraft. The second objective was to develop a specific consumables management concept for the Space Shuttle vehicle and to generate the functional requirements for the onboard portion of that concept. Consumables management is the process of controlling or influencing the usage of expendable materials involved in vehicle subsystem operation. The report consists of two volumes. Volume I presents a description of the study activities related to general approaches for developing consumable management, concepts for advanced spacecraft applications, and functional requirements for a Shuttle consumables management concept. Volume II presents a detailed description of the onboard consumables management concept proposed for use on the Space Shuttle.

Graf, P. J.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Reliability of Space-Shuttle Pressure Vessels with Random Batch Effects

In this article we revisit the problem of estimating the joint reliability against failure by stress rupture of a group of fiber-wrapped pressure vessels used on Space-Shuttle missions. The available test data were obtained from an experiment conducted at the U.S. Department of Energy Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) in which scaled-down vessels were subjected to life testing at four accelerated levels of pressure. We estimate the reliability assuming that both the Shuttle and LLL vessels were chosen at random in a two-stage process from an infinite population with spools of fiber as the primary sampling unit. Two main objectives of this work are: (1) to obtain practical estimates of reliability taking into account random spool effects and (2) to obtain a realistic assessment of estimation accuracy under the random model. Here, reliability is calculated in terms of a 'system' of 22 fiber-wrapped pressure vessels, taking into account typical pressures and exposure times experienced by Shuttle vessels. Comparisons are made with previous studies. The main conclusion of this study is that, although point estimates of reliability are still in the 'comfort zone,' it is advisable to plan for replacement of the pressure vessels well before the expected Lifetime of 100 missions per Shuttle Orbiter. Under a random-spool model, there is simply not enough information in the LLL data to provide reasonable assurance that such replacement would not be necessary.

Feiveson, Alan H.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Space Shuttle Operations and Infrastructure: A Systems Analysis of Design Root Causes and Effects

This NASA Technical Publication explores and documents the nature of Space Shuttle operations and its supporting infrastructure and addresses fundamental questions often asked of the Space Shuttle program why does it take so long to turnaround the Space Shuttle for flight and why does it cost so much? Further, the report provides an overview of the cause-and effect relationships between generic flight and ground system design characteristics and resulting operations by using actual cumulative maintenance task times as a relative measure of direct work content. In addition, this NASA TP provides an overview of how the Space Shuttle program's operational infrastructure extends and accumulates from these design characteristics. Finally, and most important, the report derives a set of generic needs from which designers can revolutionize space travel from the inside out by developing and maturing more operable and supportable systems.

McCleskey, Carey M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Effect of Clouds on Shuttle Imaging

This report describes the results of the AMU's task for determining the effect of clouds on optical imaging of the Space Shuttle launch vehicle during its ascent phase from lift-off to Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Separation. This effort was motivated by Recommendation R3.4-1 from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. The AMU developed a 3-dimensional (3D) model to forecast the probability that at any time from lift-off to SRB separation, at least three of the ascent imaging cameras would have a view of the Shuttle unobstructed by cloud. Because current observational and modeling capabilities do not permit accurate forecasts of cloud morphology and location, the AMU simulated obscuration of the lines-of-sight (LOS) from a network of cameras to the Shuttle by idealized cloud-fields placed randomly within the 3D domain. For each random realization of numerous cloud-field scenarios the number of simultaneous views of the Shuttle was computed from the LOS data between lift-off and SRB separation. The percent of time with 3 simultaneous views was averaged from 100 random realizations of each scenario. Analyses of the percent of time viewable were made to determine its sensitivity to cloud amount, cloud base height, cloud thickness, cloud horizontal dimensions, and an upgrade of the camera network.

Short, David A.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Material Issues in Space Shuttle Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV) store gases used in four subsystems for NASA's Space Shuttle Fleet. While there are 24 COPV on each Orbiter ranging in size from 19-40", stress rupture failure of a pressurized Orbiter COPV on the ground or in flight is a catastrophic hazard and would likely lead to significant damage/loss of vehicle and/or life and is categorized as a Crit 1 failure. These vessels were manufactured during the late 1970's and into the early 1980's using Titanium liners, Kevlar 49 fiber, epoxy matrix resin, and polyurethane coating. The COPVs are pressurized periodically to 3-5ksi and therefore experience significant strain in the composite overwrap. Similar composite vessels were developed in a variety of DOE Programs (primarily at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories or LLNL), as well as for NASA Space Shuttle Fleet Leader COPV program. The NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) formed an Independent Technical Assessment (ITA) team whose primary focus was to investigate whether or not enough composite life remained in the Shuttle COPV in order to provide a strategic rationale for continued COPV use aboard the Space Shuttle Fleet with the existing 25-year-old vessels. Several material science issues were examined and will be discussed in this presentation including morphological changes to Kevlar 49 fiber under stress, manufacturing changes in Kevlar 49 and their effect on morphology and tensile strength, epoxy resin strain, composite creep, degradation of polyurethane coatings, and Titanium yield characteristics.

Sutter, James K.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Preliminary Study Using Forward Reaction Control System Jets During Space Shuttle Entry

Failure or degradation of the flight control system, or hull damage, can lead to loss of vehicle control during entry. Possible failure scenarios are debris impact and wing damage that could result in a large aerodynamic asymmetry which cannot be trimmed out without additional yaw control. Currently the space shuttle uses aerodynamic control surfaces and Reaction Control System jets to control attitude. The forward jets are used for orbital maneuvering only, while the aft jets are used for yaw control during entry. This paper develops a controller for using the forward reaction control system jets as an additional control during entry, and assesses its value and feasibility during failure situations. Forward-aft jet blending logic is created, and implemented on a simplified model of the space shuttle entry flight control system. The model is validated and verified on the nonlinear, six degree-of-freedom Shuttle Engineering Simulator. A rudimentary human factors study was undertaken using the forward cockpit simulator at Johnson Space Center, to assess flying qualities of the new system and pilot workload. Results presented in the paper show that the combination of forward and aft jets provides useful additional yaw control, in addition to potential fuel savings and the ability to balance the use of the fuel in the forward and aft tanks to meet availability constraints of both forward and aft fuel tanks. Piloted simulation studies indicated that using both sets of jets while flying a damaged space shuttle reduces pilot workload, and makes the vehicle more responsive.

Restrepo, Carolina↗
NASA NTRS2006

An Overview of Spray-On Foam Insulation Applications on the Space Shuttle's External Tank: Foam Applications and Foam Shedding Mechanisms

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded that the cause of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew was a breach in the thermal protection system on the leading edge of the left wing. The breach was initiated by a piece of insulating foam that separated from the left bipod ramp of the External Tank and struck the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panel No. 8 at 81.9 seconds after launch. The CAIB conclusion has spawned numerous studies to identify the cause of and factors influencing foam shedding and foam debris liberation from the External Tank during ascent. The symposium on the Thermo-mechanics and Fracture of Space Shuttle External Tank Spray-On Foam Insulation is a collection of presentations that discuss the physics and mechanics of the ET SOFI with the objective of improving analytical and numerical methods for predicting foam thermo-mechanical and fracture behavior. This keynote presentation sets the stage for the presentations contained in this symposium by introducing the audience to the various types of SOFI applications on the Shuttle s External Tank and by discussing the various mechanisms that are believed to be the cause of foam shedding during the Shuttle s ascent to space

Sullivan, Roy M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Rendezvous and Proximity Operations of the Space Shuttle

Space Shuttle rendezous missions presented unique challenges that were not fully recognized when the Shuttle was designed. Rendezvous targets could be passive (i.e., no lights or transponders), and not designed to facilitate Shuttle rendezvous, proximity operations and retrieval. Shuttle reaction control system jet plume impingement on target spacecraft presented induced dynamics, structural loading and contamination concerns. These issues, along with limited forward reaction control system propellant, drove a change from the Gemimi/Apollo coelliptic profile heritage to a stable orbit profile, and the development of new proximity operations techniques. Multiple scientific and on-orbit servicing missions and crew exchange, assembly and replinishment flights to Mir and to the International Space Station drove further profile and piloting technique changes, including new relative navigation sensors and new computer generated piloting cues.

Goodman, John L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Comprehensive Shuttle Foam Debris Reduction Strategies

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was clear in its assessment of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia on February 3, 2003. Foam liberated from the External Tank (ET) impacting the brittle wing leading edge (WLE) of the orbiter causing the vehicle to disintegrate upon re-entry. Naturally, the CAB pointed out numerous issues affecting this exact outcome in hopes of correcting systems of systems failures any one of which might have altered the outcome. However, Discovery s recent return to flight (RTF) illustrates the primacy of erosion of foam and the risk of future undesirable outcomes. It is obvious that the original RTF focused approach to this problem was not equal to a comprehensive foam debris reduction activity consistent with the high national value of the Space Shuttle assets. The root cause is really very simple when looking at the spray-on foam insulation for the entire ET as part of the structure (e.g., actual stresses > materials allowable) rather than as some sort of sizehime limited ablator. This step is paramount to accepting the CAB recommendation of eliminating debris or in meeting any level of requirements due to the fundamental processes ensuring structural materials maintain their integrity. Significant effort has been expended to identify root cause of the foam debris In-Flight Anomaly (FA) of STS-114. Absent verifiable location specific data pre-launch (T-0) and in-flight, only a most probable cause can be identified. Indeed, the literature researched corroborates NASNTM-2004-2 13238 disturbing description of ill defined materials characterization, variable supplier constituents and foam processing irregularities. Also, foam is sensitive to age and the exposed environment making baseline comparisons difficult without event driven data. Conventional engineering processes account for such naturally occurring variability by always maintaining positive margins. Success in a negative margin range is not consistently achieved. Looking at the ET S spray-on foam insulation as part of the structural system (e.g., glass half full mentality) will create an environment where ET debris levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) can be realized. ALARA is a NASA requirements philosophy deployed for the complex, mission altering radiation exposure requirements for life safety of astronauts. In the Shuttle s case, reasonableness is established by exhaustive engineering rigor, allowable debris size/quantity, technology maturity and programmatic constraints. A more robust urethane foam thermal protection system (TPS) will enhance the hctionality of the new Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) Upper Stage. This paper will outline the strategy for a comprehensive effort to reduce ET foam debris and outline steps leading to an improved foam TPS. The NASA must remain committed to such an approach no matter what becomes of the next flight s actual debris field lest we fall back into a false sense of security. This commitment along with full implementation of all the other CAB recommendations such as orbiter hardening will significantly improve the Shuttle system, the engineering workforce, future capabilities & alternate policy offramps, national human resource protection, high value national asset protection and increase the level of service to the overall NASA mission.

Semmes, Edmund B.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Space Shuttle MMOD Threat Mitigation Techniques

Prior to each shuttle mission, threat assessments are performed to determine the risk of critical penetration, payload bay door radiator tube leak and crew module window replacement from Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD). Mission parameters, such as vehicle attitude, exposure time and altitude are used as inputs for the analysis. Ballistic limit equations, based on hypervelocity impact testing of shuttle materials are used to estimate the critical particle diameters of the outer surfaces of the vehicle. The assessments are performed using the BUMPER computer code at the NASA/JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology Facility (HITF). The most critical involves the calculation of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) risk. In recent years, NASA has implemented several techniques to reduce the risk to the Shuttle from MMOD impacts. This paper will describe on-orbit inspection of the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) regions and the methods used discern hypervelocity impact damage. Impact damage contingency plans and on-orbit repair techniques will also be discussed. The wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS) and it's role in the reduction of on-orbit risk reduction will be presented. Finally, an analysis of the effectivity of alternative shuttle flight attitudes on MMOD risk will be demonstrated.

Hyde, Justin L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Conceptual Inquiry of the Space Shuttle and International Space Station GNC Flight Controllers

The concept of Mission Control was envisioned by Christopher Columbus Kraft in the 1960's. Instructed to figure out how to operate human space flight safely, Kraft envisioned a room of sub-system experts troubleshooting problems and supporting nominal flight activities under the guidance of one Flight Director who is responsible for the success of the mission. To facilitate clear communication, MCC communicates with the crew through a Capsule Communicator (CAPCOM) who is an astronaut themselves. Gemini 4 was the first mission to be supported by such a MCC and successfully completed the first American EVA. The MCC seen on television is called the Flight Control Room (FCR, pronounced ficker) or otherwise known as the front room. While this room is the most visible aspect, it is a very small component of the entire control center. The Shuttle FCR is known as the White FCR (WFCR) and Station's as FCR-1. (FCR-1 was actually the first FCR built at JSC which was used through the Gemini, Apollo and Shuttle programs until the WFCR was completed in 1992. Afterwards FCR-1 was refurbished first for the Life Sciences Center and then for the ISS in 2006.) Along with supporting the Flight Director, each FCR operator is also the supervisor for usually two or three support personnel in a back room called the Multi-Purpose Support Room (MPSR, pronounced mipser). MPSR operators are more deeply focused on their specific subsystems and have the responsible to analyze patterns, and diagnose and assess consequences of faults. The White MPSR (WMPSR) operators are always present for Shuttle operations; however, ISS FCR controllers only have support from their Blue MPSR (BMPSR) while the Shuttle is docked and during critical operations. Since ISS operates 24-7, the FCR team reduces to a much smaller Gemini team of 4-5 operators for night and weekend shifts when the crew is off-duty. The FCR is also supported by the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) which is a collection of contractor engineers who provide analysis and long-term troubleshooting support. Each MER operator is an expert in a very small portion of a sub-system and each FCR console usually interfaces with several MER positions.

Kranzusch, Kara↗
NASA NTRS2007

Probabilistic Modeling of Space Shuttle Debris Impact

On Feb 1, 2003, the Shuttle Columbia was lost during its return to Earth. As a result of the conclusion that debris impact caused the damage to the left wing of the Columbia Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) during ascent, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that an assessment be performed of the debris environment experienced by the SSV during ascent. A flight rationale based on probabilistic assessment is used for the SSV return-to-flight. The assessment entails identifying all potential debris sources, their probable geometric and aerodynamic characteristics, and their potential for impacting and damaging critical Shuttle components. A probabilistic analysis tool, based on the SwRI-developed NESSUS probabilistic analysis software, predicts the probability of impact and damage to the space shuttle wing leading edge and thermal protection system components. Among other parameters, the likelihood of unacceptable damage depends on the time of release (Mach number of the orbiter) and the divot mass as well as the impact velocity and impact angle. A typical result is visualized in the figures below. Probability of impact and damage, as well as the sensitivities thereof with respect to the distribution assumptions, can be computed and visualized at each point on the orbiter or summarized per wing panel or tile zone.

Huyse, Luc J.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Application of Terahertz Radiation to the Detection of Corrosion under the Shuttle's Thermal Protection System

There is currently no method for detecting corrosion under Shuttle tiles except for the expensive process of tile removal and replacement; hence NASA is investigating new NDE methods for detecting hidden corrosion. Time domain terahertz radiation has been applied to corrosion detection under tiles in samples ranging from small lab samples to a Shuttle with positive results. Terahertz imaging methods have been able to detect corrosion at thicknesses of 5 mils or greater under 1" thick Shuttle tiles and 7-12 mils or greater under 2" thick Shuttle tiles.

Madaras, Eric I.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Test-Analysis Correlation for Space Shuttle External Tank Foam Impacting RCC Wing Leading Edge Component Panels

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that NASA develop, validate, and maintain a modeling tool capable of predicting the damage threshold for debris impacts on the Space Shuttle Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) wing leading edge and nosecap assembly. The results presented in this paper are one part of a multi-level approach that supported the development of the predictive tool used to recertify the shuttle for flight following the Columbia Accident. The assessment of predictive capability was largely based on test analysis comparisons for simpler component structures. This paper provides comparisons of finite element simulations with test data for external tank foam debris impacts onto 6-in. square RCC flat panels. Both quantitative displacement and qualitative damage assessment correlations are provided. The comparisons show good agreement and provided the Space Shuttle Program with confidence in the predictive tool.

Lyle, Karen H.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Cooling Properties of the Shuttle Advanced Crew Escape Spacesuit: Results of an Environmental Chamber Experiment

The shuttle crew wears the Advanced Crew Escape Spacesuit (ACES) to protect themselves from cabin decompression and to support bail out during landing. ACES is cooled by a liquid-cooled garment (LCG) that interfaces to a heat exchanger that dumps heat into the cabin. The ACES outer layer is made of Gore-Tex(Registered TradeMark), permitting water vapor to escape while containing oxygen. The crew can only lose heat via insensible water losses and the LCG. Under nominal landing operations, the average cabin temperature rarely exceeds 75 F, which is adequate for the ACES to function. Problem A rescue shuttle will need to return 11 crew members if the previous mission suffers a thermal protection system failure, preventing it from returning safely to Earth. Initial analysis revealed that 11 crew members in the shuttle will increase cabin temperature at wheel stop above 80 F, which decreases the ACES ability to keep crew members cool. Air flow in the middeck of the shuttle is inhomogeneous and some ACES may experience much higher temperatures that could cause excessive thermal stress to crew members. Methods A ground study was conducted to measure the cooling efficiency of the ACES at 75 F, 85 F, and 95 F at 50% relative humidity. Test subjects representing 5, 50, and 95 percentile body habitus of the astronaut corps performed hand ergometry keeping their metabolic rate at 400, 600, and 800 BTU/hr for one hour. Core temperature was measured by rectal probe and skin, while inside and outside the suit. Environmental chamber wall and cooling unit inlet and outlet temperatures were measured using high-resolution thermistors ( 0.2 C). Conclusions Under these test conditions, the ACES was able to protect the core temperature of all test subjects, however thermal stress due to high insensible losses and skin temperature and skin heat flow may impact crew performance. Further research should be performed to understand the impact on cognitive performance.

Hamilton, Douglas↗