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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2010

Constellation Program Design Challenges as Opportunities for Educational Outreach- Lessons Learned

The Texas Space Grant Consortium (TSGC) and the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) Education Office both have programs that present design challenges for university senior design classes that offer great opportunities for educational outreach and workforce development. These design challenges have been identified by NASA engineers and scientists as actual design problems faced by the Constellation Program in its exploration missions and architecture. Student teams formed in their senior design class select and then work on a design challenge for one or two semesters. The senior design class follows the requirements set by their university, but it must also comply with the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) in order to meet the class academic requirements. Based on a one year fellowship at a TSGC university under the NASA Administrator's Fellowship Program (NAFP) and several years of experience, lessons learned are presented on the NASA Design Challenge Program.

Trevino, Robert C.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Selected Lessons Learned over the ISS Design, Development, Assembly, and Operations: Applicability to International Cooperation for Standardization

This slide presentation reviews some of the lessons learned in the sphere of international cooperation during the development, assembly and operation of the International Space Station. From the begining all Partners shared a common objective to build, operate and utilize a crewed laboratory in low orbit as an international partnership. The importance of standards is emphasized.

Hirsch, David B.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Space Shuttle Program Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) Success Legacy -Major Accomplishments and Lessons Learned

This presentation has shown the accomplishments of the PASS project over three decades and highlighted the lessons learned. Over the entire time, our goal has been to continuously improve our process, implement automation for both quality and increased productivity, and identify and remove all defects due to prior execution of a flawed process in addition to improving our processes following identification of significant process escapes. Morale and workforce instability have been issues, most significantly during 1993 to 1998 (period of consolidation in aerospace industry). The PASS project has also consulted with others, including the Software Engineering Institute, so as to be an early evaluator, adopter, and adapter of state-of-the-art software engineering innovations.

Orr, James K.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Alvin (Al) Sieff: Thoughts About and Lessons from a Great Engineer

Alvin (Al) Seiff was known as a world-class atmospheric scientist during the last three decades of his life. Equally deserving, however, were his prior achievements as an innovative engineer, an exceptional technical manager, and a mentor of young engineers at NASA Ames Research Center. This paper outlines Al's role in developing Ames ballistic range facilities, probably the most advanced in the world at that time, and his seminal 1963 report that contained the concepts used to reconstruct the atmospheres of Mars, Venus, Jupiter and Titan. Also discussed is my affiliation with Al after he hired me in 1962, including our joint work on Mars missions and investigating the feasibility that a Jupiter probe could survive entry, work that eventually led to the development of the Galileo probe. Finally, suggestions are offered for speeding the analysis and design of thermal protection systems based on lessons learned from successful probes and landers.

Tauber, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2003

Lessons Learned from Mir - A Payload Perspective

Among the principal objectives of the Phase 1 NASA/Mir program were for the United States to gain experience working with an international partner, to gain working experience in long-duration space flight, and to gain working experience in planning for and executing research on a long-duration space platform. The Phase 1 program was to provide to the US early experience prior to the construction and operation of the International Space Station (Phase 2 and 3). While it can be argued that Mir and ISS are different platforms and that programmatically Phase 1 and ISS are organized differently, it is also clear that many aspects of operating a long-duration research program are platform independent. This can be demonstrated by a review of lessons learned from Skylab, a US space station program of the mid-1970's, many of which were again "learned" on Mir and are being "learned" on ISS. Among these are optimum crew training strategies, on-orbit crew operations, ground support, medical operations and crew psychological support, and safety certification processes

Uri, John J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for four of the five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study's lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project's ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2010

Heritage Systems Engineering Lessons from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for all five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to be the result of technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the systemwide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study s lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project s ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗
NASA NTRS2010

Hypergolic Propellants: The Handling Hazards and Lessons Learned from Use

Several unintentional hypergolic fluid related spills, fires, and explosions from the Apollo Program, the Space Shuttle Program, the Titan Program, and a few others have occurred over the past several decades. Spill sites include the following government facilities: Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS), Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), Little Rock AFB, and McConnell AFB. Until now, the only method of capturing the lessons learned from these incidents has been "word of mouth" or by studying each individual incident report. Through studying several dozen of these incidents, certain root cause themes are apparent. Scrutinizing these themes could prove to be highly beneficial to future hypergolic system testing, checkout, and operational use.

Nufer, Brian↗
NASA NTRS2010

Shuttle Lesson Learned - Toxicology

This is a script for a video about toxicology and the space shuttle. The first segment is deals with dust in the space vehicle. The next segment will be about archival samples. Then we'll look at real time on-board analyzers that give us a lot of capability in terms of monitoring for combustion products and the ability to monitor volatile organics on the station. Finally we will look at other issues that are about setting limits and dealing with ground based lessons that pertain to toxicology.

James, John T.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Challenger and Columbia Lessons Learned

The Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia accidents resulted in tragic loss of life and national assets, and investigations into both accidents produced important lessons to prevent future accidents

Hoffman, William C., III↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA Astronauts on Soyuz: Experience and Lessons for the Future

The U. S., Russia, and, China have each addressed the question of human-rating spacecraft. NASA's operational experience with human-rating primarily resides with Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station. NASA s latest developmental experience includes Constellation, X38, X33, and the Orbital Space Plane. If domestic commercial crew vehicles are used to transport astronauts to and from space, Soyuz is another example of methods that could be used to human-rate a spacecraft and to work with commercial spacecraft providers. For Soyuz, NASA's normal assurance practices were adapted. Building on NASA's Soyuz experience, this report contends all past, present, and future vehicles rely on a range of methods and techniques for human-rating assurance, the components of which include: requirements, conceptual development, prototype evaluations, configuration management, formal development reviews (safety, design, operations), component/system ground-testing, integrated flight tests, independent assessments, and launch readiness reviews. When constraints (cost, schedule, international) limit the depth/breadth of one or more preferred assurance means, ways are found to bolster the remaining areas. This report provides information exemplifying the above safety assurance model for consideration with commercial or foreign-government-designed spacecraft. Topics addressed include: U.S./Soviet-Russian government/agency agreements and engineering/safety assessments performed with lessons learned in historic U.S./Russian joint space ventures

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2010

Results and Lessons from a Decade of Terra MODIS On-Orbit Spectral Characterization

Since its launch in December 1999, the NASA EOS Terra MODIS has successfully operated for more than a decade. MODIS makes observations in 36 spectral bands from visible (VIS) to longwave infrared (LWIR) and at three nadir spatial resolutions: 250m (2 bands), 500m (5 bands), and 1km (29 bands). In addition to its on-board calibrators designed for the radiometric calibration, MODIS was built with a unique device, called the spectro-radiometric calibration assembly (SRCA). It can be configured in three different modes: radiometric, spatial, and spectral. When it is operated in the spectral modes, the SRCA can monitor changes in Sensor spectral performance for the VIS and near-infrared (NIR) spectral bands. For more than 10 years, the SRCA operation has continued to provide valuable information for MODIS on-orbit spectral performance. This paper briefly describes SRCA on-orbit operation and calibration activities; it presents decade-long spectral characterization results for Terra MODIS VIS and NIR spectral bands in terms of chances in their center wavelengths (CW) and bandwidths (BW). It is shown that the SRCA on-orbit wavelength calibration capability remains satisfactory. For most spectral bands, the changes in CW and BW are less than 0.5 and 1 nm, respectively. Results and lessons from Terra MODIS on-orbit spectral characterization have and will continue to benefit its successor, Aqua MODIS, and other future missions.

Xiong, X.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from Three Recent Sample Return Missions

We share lessons learned from participation on the Science Teams and Recovery/Preliminary Examination/Curation teams for three recent sample return missions: (1) the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), which returned to Earth with interplanetary dust and spacecraft debris particles in 1990, (2) the Stardust Mission, which returned grains from comet Wild-2 and fresh interstellar dust to Earth in 2006, and (3) the Hayabusa Mission, which returned regolith grains from asteroid Itokawa in 2010.

Zolensky, Michael E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Hayabusa Recovery, Curation and Preliminary Sample Analysis: Lessons Learned from Recent Sample Return Mission

I describe lessons learned from my participation on the Hayabusa Mission, which returned regolith grains from asteroid Itokawa in 2010 [1], comparing this with the recently returned Stardust Spacecraft, which sampled the Jupiter Family comet Wild 2. Spacecraft Recovery Operations: The mission Science and Curation teams must actively participate in planning, testing and implementing spacecraft recovery operations. The crash of the Genesis spacecraft underscored the importance of thinking through multiple contingency scenarios and practicing field recovery for these potential circumstances. Having the contingency supplies on-hand was critical, and at least one full year of planning for Stardust and Hayabusa recovery operations was necessary. Care must be taken to coordinate recovery operations with local organizations and inform relevant government bodies well in advance. Recovery plans for both Stardust and Hayabusa had to be adjusted for unexpectedly wet landing site conditions. Documentation of every step of spacecraft recovery and deintegration was necessary, and collection and analysis of launch and landing site soils was critical. We found the operation of the Woomera Text Range (South Australia) to be excellent in the case of Hayabusa, and in many respects this site is superior to the Utah Test and Training Range (used for Stardust) in the USA. Recovery operations for all recovered spacecraft suffered from the lack of a hermetic seal for the samples. Mission engineers should be pushed to provide hermetic seals for returned samples. Sample Curation Issues: More than two full years were required to prepare curation facilities for Stardust and Hayabusa. Despite this seemingly adequate lead time, major changes to curation procedures were required once the actual state of the returned samples became apparent. Sample databases must be fully implemented before sample return for Stardust we did not adequately think through all of the possible sub sampling and analytical activities before settling on a database design - Hayabusa has done a better job of this. Also, analysis teams must not be permitted to devise their own sample naming schemes. The sample handling and storage facilities for Hayabusa are the finest that exist, and we are now modifying Stardust curation to take advantage of the Hayabusa facilities. Remote storage of a sample subset is desirable. Preliminary Examination (PE) of Samples: There must be some determination of the state and quantity of the returned samples, to provide a necessary guide to persons requesting samples and oversight committees tasked with sample curation oversight. Hayabusa s sample PE, which is called HASPET, was designed so that late additions to the analysis protocols were possible, as new analytical techniques became available. A small but representative number of recovered grains are being subjected to in-depth characterization. The bulk of the recovered samples are being left untouched, to limit contamination. The HASPET plan takes maximum advantage of the unique strengths of sample return missions

Zolensky, Michael E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Constellation Lessons Learned Executive Summary

This slide presentation reviews the lessons learned from the Constellation Program (CxP) and identified several factors that contributed to the inability of the CxP to meet the cost and schedule commitments. The review includes a significant section on the context in which the CxP operated since new programs are likely to experience the same constraints.

Thomas, L. Dale↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned for Planning and Estimating Operations Support Requirements

Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead projects to focus on hardware development schedules and costs, de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations, and any LCC growth can directly impact the programs ability to fund new missions. The D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center recently studied cost overruns for 7 D&NF missions related to phase C/D development of operational capabilities and phase E mission operations. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential operations risks and controlling the associated impacts to operations development and execution costs. The study found that the drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This presentation summarizes the study and the results, providing a set of lessons NASA can use to improve early estimation and validation of operations costs.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗
NASA NTRS2011

SOFIA Program SE and I Lessons Learned

Once a "Troubled Project" threatened with cancellation, the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) Program has overcome many difficult challenges and recently achieved its first light images. To achieve success, SOFIA had to overcome significant deficiencies in fundamental Systems Engineering identified during a major Program restructuring. This presentation will summarize the lessons learn in Systems Engineering on the SOFIA Program. After the Program was reformulated, an initial assessment of Systems Engineering established the scope of the problem and helped to set a list of priorities that needed to be work. A revised Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) was written to address the new Program structure and requirements established in the approved NPR7123.1A. An important result of the "Technical Planning" effort was the decision by the Program and Technical Leadership team to re-phasing the lifecycle into increments. The reformed SOFIA Program Office had to quickly develop and establish several new System Engineering core processes including; Requirements Management, Risk Management, Configuration Management and Data Management. Implementing these processes had to consider the physical and cultural diversity of the SOFIA Program team which includes two Projects spanning two NASA Centers, a major German partnership, and sub-contractors located across the United States and Europe. The SOFIA Program experience represents a creative approach to doing "System Engineering in the middle" while a Program is well established. Many challenges were identified and overcome. The SOFIA example demonstrates it is never too late to benefit from fixing deficiencies in the System Engineering processes.

Ray, Ronald J.↗