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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 469 records · Page 26
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System) User Guide -- Version 4.0

The MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) is used by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This User Guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/WinMACCS model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 4.0. Features that have been added to MACCS in subsequent versions are described in separate documentation. This User Guide provides a brief description of the model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Use Machine Learning to Improve Burnup Measurement in Pebble Bed Reactors

Advanced pebble bed reactor (PBR) designs post new challenges in material control and accountancy (MC&A) because the fuel materials, distributed in many discrete pebbles, are continuously circulated through the reactor core and the refueling path compared to the bulk fuel assembly design in conventional reactors, e.g., light water reactors. In pebble bed reactors, there are hundreds of thousands of fuel pebbles in the reactor core during the normal operation, and the burnup of each pebble is measured when ejected from the core. Accurate burnup measurement is an important step in material control and spent fuel disposition. The measurement is usually based on detection of radiation signatures of fission products accumulated in the pebble fuel over irradiation in the core. Previous research has shown that height of photopeaks of fission products, such as 134 Cs, 137 Cs, 154 Eu, etc., can be used independently or in combination to infer or predict the level of burnup in the fuel. However, it remains challenging to measure such complex sources due to self-shielding effects, strong radiation background and intervening materials. Another operational challenge is the required high throughput of pebbles undergoing burnup measurement, which necessitates limited measurement time and thus impacts quality of measured gamma-ray spectra. Hence, advanced spectral analysis methods are needed to analyze the noisy gamma spectra and predict the burnup values.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Stochastic Approaches for Calculating and Aggregating Detection Probabilities for Nuclear Material Diversion

The authors built and tested a stochastic simulation to estimate achieved detection probabilities (DPs) on a stratum basis, over a tailorable range of diverted amounts from 0 to 2 significant quantities (SQ), using typical International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection data: i.e., SQ in stratum, number of items, number of gross/partial/bias defect measurements conducted, and realistic relative standard deviation (RSD) values for typical IAEA verification measurements. For bulk strata, the model calculates achieved DP at 0.01 SQ diversion increments; for item strata, the model calculates DP using the smallest realistic diversion increment (e.g., a plate, pin, or coupon). After successfully benchmarking against IAEA deterministic models, the simulation was used to test the sensitivity of DP to certain standard assumptions and selected input parameters. First, the equal defect assumption was tested; the results suggest significant complexity in the effectiveness of partial defect measurements. Next, the authors explored the sensitivity of DP to the assumed RSD of attribute tests. Then, the authors compared non-normal models for instrument performance (e.g., logistic, step, or arbitrary functions) to the typical results from a normal distribution (characterized by RSD). This last comparison was supplemented with experimentally derived performance data for an HM-5 gamma spectrometer. The HM-5 was used to make enrichment measurements on both LEU and HEU MTR fuel elements as plates were removed, and the results fit with logistic and step curves and applied in the simulation. These stochastic DP results were compared to DP estimates from a deterministic model assuming a normal curve and typical RSD, yielding insights that could improve effectiveness in the field. These early results illustrate the potential of stochastic models to better understand achieved DP and to improve safeguards effectiveness.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent in 2030 and Beyond: Fit for Purpose?

The 13th annual Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century (SW21) workshop brought together a mixture of senior officials from the laboratory, policy, military, and expert communities to promote a high-level focus and well-informed discussion on key deterrence challenges for the U.S. nuclear deterrent over the coming decade and beyond. It brought together interested stakeholders from the national security laboratories, federal government, military, think tank, and academic communities, as well as allied counterparts, to share perspectives in an unclassified setting.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Open Data for Nuclear Explosion Monitoring (NEM) [Slides]

The data sources tend to have the highest quality data and metadata, particularly for more recent data sets. Early data from sources such as IRIS tend to have some metadata issues.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

1st Quarter Emergency Drill at SERF: Player's Briefing [Slides]

The purpose of this briefing is to provide drill information to players participating in the 1st Quarter Emergency Drill at SERF as follows: Communicate general drill information and conduct expectations; Outline roles and responsibilities; and Provide safely and securely guidance to ensure unsafe act or security violation does not occur during the drill.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Human Factors and Reliability [Slides]

People come to work, wanting, expecting, and planning to do a good job, but people tend to do what makes sense to them in their context. Understanding basic human factors and establishing controls to prevent common human factors issues helps ensure that a criticality accident will never happen again.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Comprehensive Chemical Fingerprinting by Multidimensional GC and Supervised Machine Learning

This project leveraged advances in machine learning based data analysis techniques and untargeted analytical methods for organic analysis to progress nuclear nonproliferation technologies beyond current capabilities. The developed approaches can be used to detect and identify complex chemical fingerprints of facilities of interest. These techniques have been developed for fields such as metabolomics and genomics but have not been applied to nuclear nonproliferation applications. Adaptation of these techniques for volatile organic compound analysis has far reaching application within the scientific community including environmental chemistry, atmospheric physics, and climate sciences.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

INECP Case Studies [Slides]

The following “INECP Case Studies” document contains two case studies: Corrosion-Resistant Valves and Case Study: Dual-Use Items for Gas Centrifuge. The content of both of these case studies was approved for unlimited release in 2013. The case studies have been reorganized or slightly altered to make them more easily presentable during virtual or in-person International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) programmatic trainings and engagements. The document also contains the original case studies with LA-UR release numbers. The original studies were included in the document as a reference for derivative classification and export control.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

FY2021 Report on Magnetic Microcalorimeter Development for the IAEA NML

The goal of this project is to develop high-resolution decay energy spectroscopy (DES) of actinides using magnetic microcalorimeters (MMCs). This requires testing different techniques to fully enclose a source inside an absorber and coupling it to an MMC with optimized energy resolution and speed. The goal is to develop DES with MMCs to allow its transfer to the IAEA Nuclear Materials Laboratory (NML).

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Physical Lab Security: Before and After World War II

Physical security during World War II was important to maintaining the secrecy of the Manhattan Project, the government’s wartime effort to create the atomic bomb. In a perceived race against Nazi Germany to do so, physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, the Lab’s first director, and General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, needed a secluded place to build the clandestine Lab.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Quantum Sensing and its Potential for Nuclear Safeguards

Quantum sensing has the potential to provide ultrasensitive measurements of physical phenomenon. Unlike quantum computing, quantum sensing is available now, though in general at research laboratories. A notable commercially-available quantum sensing device is the ubiquitous Superconducting Quantum Interference Device (SQUID), which can measure faint magnetic fields such as found in the human brain. Quantum sensing is used for direct measurement of environmental phenomenon, such as electromagnetic fields and accelerations, which then are used for certain applications. For example, quantum sensing of accelerations is useful for Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) applications. It is not clear, however, how quantum sensing can be useful for nuclear safeguards. This report provides first a background in quantum sensing, followed by a survey of potential safeguards utilizations of quantum sensing. Several potential safeguards applications are identified and explored.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2022

The Optics of Deterrence: How Science Assures the Nuclear Stockpile's Reliability In Lieu of Testing

When designing a product intended to perform a certain function and satisfy some set of criteria, the standard engineering method to assess its ability to perform is to test it. This nearly universal concept works consistently, assuring proper function and generally avoiding or mitigating the consequence of failure to within acceptable limits. What would happen if the product developers were told that they must continue to certify and validate the performance without testing it, that the landscape in which the product must serve its purpose is constantly evolving, and that the product in question is the United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile? This is the position the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) finds itself in; the reliability of the stockpile must be verified without actually testing it to see if it works as intended.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Sodium Fire Collaborative Study Progress CNWG Fiscal Year 2021

This report discusses the progress on the collaboration between Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) and Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) on the sodium fire research in fiscal year (FY) 2021 and is a continuation of the FY2020 progress report. In this report, we only report the changes made to the current sodium pool fire model in MELCOR. We modified and corrected many control functions to enhance the current model from the FY2020 report. This year’s enhancements relate to better agreement of the suspended aerosol measurement from JAEA’s F7 series tests. Staff from Sandia and JAEA conducted the validation studies of the sodium pool fire model in MELCOR. To validate this pool fire model with the latest enhancement, JAEA sodium pool fire experiments (F7-1 and F7-2) were used. The results of the calculation, including the code-to-code comparisons are discussed as well as suggestions for further model improvement. Finally, recommendations are made for new MELCOR simulations for FY2022.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Implementation of IAEA Safeguards

The historical evolution of safeguards implementation, Four safeguards strengthening measures implemented by the IAEA post-Iraq, The importance of an additional protocol

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Treatment of uncertainties for security-related design aspects of advanced reactors when using a risk-informed licensing approach

Sabotage of nuclear plants and theft of special nuclear material are different from many other issues potentially affecting public health and safety, and some of those differences drive the content of the present report. A high-level indication of these differences is provided in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety Goal Policy. Promulgated in the mid-1980’s, when it had become reasonably clear that risk analysis had improved to the point where it was possible to understand the risks associated with plant operation, the Safety Goal Policy articulates qualitative safety goals and quantitative health objectives that are meant to guide regulatory and risk management activities, with the following key exceptions noted in the original policy statement: The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goals. At present there is no basis on which to provide a measure of risk on these matters. It is the Commission’s intention that everything that is needed will be done to keep these types of risks at their present very low level; and it is the Commission’s expectation that efforts on this point will continue to be successful. With these exceptions, it is the Commission’s intent that the risks from all the various initiating mechanisms be considered to the best of the capability of current evaluation techniques. The present report discusses extensions of classical risk management to address some of the special issues that arise in the context of security. Although the present emphasis is on physical security, some attention will be paid to cyber security. A particular focus of the report is on quantitative framework to manage and address uncertainties. This framework is demonstrated via a couple of hypothetical examples.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗