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DOE OSTI2023

A Supply Chain Road Map for Offshore Wind Energy in the United States

"A Supply Chain Road Map for Offshore Wind Energy in the United States" identifies pathways to developing a domestic offshore wind supply chain that can manufacture and deploy the major components needed to set the United States on a pathway to installing 30 GW of offshore wind by 2030 and 110 GW by 2050. The report estimates that this supply chain could require an investment of at least $\$$22.7 billion this decade to meet an annual demand for components, ports, and vessels in 2030. Although this is a considerable investment, it could allow the industry to install around $\$$100 billion worth of offshore wind this decade by reducing risk of delays due to global supply chain bottlenecks and creating a robust network of assets that will continue to be effective well beyond 2030. The United States would need at least 34 manufacturing facilities employing 10,000 workers, 39,000 jobs in the supporting supply chain, 10 marshaling ports, 4-6 dedicated wind turbine installation vessels, 4-6 dedicated heavy-lift vessels, and 4-8 U.S.-flagged specialized feeder barges to come online this decade to support an average annual deployment of 4-6 gigawatts offshore wind capacity per year. This supply chain could be developed in 6-9 years, but would require near-term decision making and efficient permitting and planning to strategically develop these resources by 2030. Additional investment and expansion would be required in the 2030s as the sector expands into new regions (such as the Gulf of Mexico) and new technologies (such as larger wind turbines and floating wind energy projects). Furthermore, the planning process needs to meaningfully engage with communities that will be impacted by supply chain expansion to achieve just outcomes and maximize benefits to these stakeholders, which will result in a more equitable and sustainable supply chain. While U.S. offshore wind has made significant progress in recent years, remaining supply chain challenges include uncertainty surrounding deployment and procurement timelines; a lack of port and vessel infrastructure; and limitations in the available workforce, supporting supplier networks, and energy justice best practices. However, many of these problems can be addressed through improved communication between key stakeholder groups, support from federal and state governments, and forward-thinking designs of supply chain assets to accommodate future technology changes for fixed-bottom and floating offshore wind. Although it is a significant task, developing these domestic capabilities represents a once-in-a-generation opportunity to contribute to a decarbonized energy future and also create massive economic benefits that are distributed throughout the country.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

NASA NTRS1974

Space shuttle/food system study. Volume 2, Appendix A: Active heating system-screening analysis. Appendix B: Reconstituted food heating techniques analysis

Technical data are presented which were used to evaluate active heating methods to be incorporated into the space shuttle food system design, and also to evaluate the relative merits and penalties associated with various approaches to the heating of rehydrated food during space flight. Equipment heating candidates were subject to a preliminary screening performed by a selection rationale process which considered the following parameters; (1) gravitational effect; (2) safety; (3) operability; (4) system compatibility; (5) serviceability; (6) crew acceptability; (7) crew time; (8) development risk; and (9) operating cost. A hot air oven, electrically heated food tray, and microwave oven were selected for further consideration and analysis. Passive, semi-active, and active food preparation approaches were also studied in an effort to determine the optimum method for heating rehydrated food. Potential complexity, cost, vehicle impact penalties, and palatability were considered in the analysis. A summary of the study results is provided along with cost estimates for each of the potential sytems

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2012

An Altair Overview: Designing a Lunar Lander for 21st Century Human Space Exploration

Altair, the lunar lander element of NASA's Constellation program, was conducted in a different design environment than many other NASA projects of similar scope. Because of this relatively unique approach, there are a number of significant success stories that should be considered during the development of any future lunar landers or human spacecraft. This paper is divided into two separate themes; the first is the approach used during the conceptual design studies, including the systematic analysis cycles and the decision making process associated with each: and the second is a summary of the resulting lessons learned that were compiled after looking back at the lifetime of the Project. Altair was terminated before entering Phase B of its design, and was often criticized for being a very heavy and very large vehicle. While there was specific rationale for all of the decisions that led up to that configuration, future design cycles were specifically planned to re-address the mass challenge. Had the project continued, the deliberate, stepwise design process would have converged on an optimized lander design that balanced mass, risk, cost and capabilities. Some of the specific items that will be addressed in this paper include project development strategy, organizational approach and team dynamics, risk-informed design process, mission architecture constraints, mission key driving requirements, model-based systems engineering process, configuration studies, contingency considerations, subsystem overviews and key trade studies. The paper will conclude with a summary of the lessons identified during the Altair project and make suggestions for application to future studies.

Brown, Kendall K.↗

NASA NTRS2019

An Operational Algorithm for Evaluating Satellite Collision Consequence

Risk is properly considered as the combination of likelihood and consequence; but conjunction assessment has usually limited itself to the consideration of only collision likelihood. When considered from an orbital regime protection perspective, the focus shifts to the question of the amount of debris that a collision might produce (the “consequence”). The present paper presents an operational algorithm for determining the expected amount of debris production should a conjunction result in a collision, and an assessment of the algorithm’s fidelity against a database of characterized objects.

Lechtenberg, Travis↗

NASA NTRS2019

An Operational Algorithm for Evaluating Satellite Collision Consequence

Lechtenberg, Travis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Multi-Party Flight Trajectory Negotiation for Upper Class E Traffic Management

A new operational concept has been proposed in Upper Class E airspace at or above 60,000 feet (Flight Level / FL600), which will allow operators of diverse vehicle characteristics to cooperatively manage and share their operational intents with neighboring operators to avoid conflict. There is a consensus in the community that negotiation for strategic deconfliction is needed, but there are no specific guidelines for how the negotiation should be conducted. There is a need for a structured and cooperative way to resolve the conflict between a wide variety of aircraft projected to be operating in Upper Class E for the negotiation to be carried out routinely. The use of negotiation models are a promising solution that can resolve conflict risks during flight in real-time while taking into account the uncertainty of future vehicle positions and dynamic business considerations. A two-party negotiation model has been researched, but as the traffic demand grows, there is a higher likelihood of conflict involving multiple aircraft that would require a method to handle multi-party conflict. This paper proposes a cooperative multi-party negotiation model inspired by game theory concepts for application to flight trajectory negotiation in Upper Class E traffic management. This model can be applied in flight with operators communicating directly after a potential conflict is detected. Some of the model’s benefits include allowing business costs to be private to operators, allowing operators to collaborate together to find conflict-free flight trajectories, and being compatible with different aircraft and operation types. This model provides a structured procedure for conflict resolution that can handle conflict involving multiple parties, assuming each operator is willing to take on a small cost to themselves in order to reduce the total cost to the group.

Upper Class E Traffic Management (ETM)↗

NASA NTRS2026

Moon Base Transportation - Deliveries to the Lunar Surface

Development of the Moon Base will enable a home away from home for astronauts who will live and work at humanity’s first lunar outpost. In this effort, NASA’s Moon Transportation Office is responsible for enabling the transformational missions required to deliver habitats, supplies, science payloads, and all other elements needed to cultivate a permanent presence on the Lunar Surface. The Mission Concept (MC) is characterized through evaluation of an end-to-end architecture that can successfully deliver a generalized heavy large-volume payload, in excess of 4000 kg, to a precision landing and touchdown on the lunar surface. The mission architecture utilizes a single launch configuration of a Lunar Lander (LL) with a unique propellant system. The LL has an integral orbital transfer capability and features jettisonable elements. The design circumvents the need for prop transfer on orbit and multiple launch configurations. The launch vehicle (LV) for this work will assume the capability to deliver a payload in excess of 40,000 kg to orbit, affording multiple LV solutions. Considerations for the LL and payload deployment from the fairing are assumed to be handled through compliance with a launch providers’ Interface Requirements Document (IRD). The MC will span from launch at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) to terminal descent and touchdown on the lunar surface, requiring a total ΔV on the order of 6 km/s beyond what is required to get the vehicle stack to a 200 km circular Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Major mission phases include: launch and launch vehicle separation, transfer operations, pre-landing navigation, and lunar descent and touchdown. A Concept of Operations (ConOps) is used as the primary design driver for defining architecture of the vehicles necessary to achieve final payload delivery. Numerous ground rules and assumptions will be provided for each phase of the mission. Concept designs for the LL is presented. An emphasis of the design maximizes a feasible path for maturation, manufacturing, and operation. A self-imposed practical consideration for this effort is the incorporation of legacy designed hardware to minimize expensive, time-intensive, and high-risk hardware development cycles. The propulsion system of the LL adopts a conventional storable bipropellant configuration of monomethyl hydrazine (MMH) and mixed oxides of nitrogen (MON3). This effort will showcase a unique propellant delivery system to minimize the reliance on propellant management devices (PMDs) during descent. Numerous key constraints have been considered, across the multiple segments of the mission. These include the unique aspects of center of gravity (CG) management, thruster plume effects including self-impingement, propulsion system hardware limitations, navigation during multiple mission phases, and landing gear geometry for uneven terrain. These constraints shape the trades necessary for precision landing of heavy cargo and ensure compatibility with broader Moon Base Transportation concepts. The resulting insights inform future transportation strategies for the Moon and beyond; directly contributing to the development of cargo‑delivery standards that will support the long‑term buildup of a sustainable, continuously inhabited Moon Base.

Lunar Habitat↗

DOE OSTI2024

Assessing the Impacts of CO 2 Reduction and Utilization Technologies on Regional Freshwater Resources

This work, a product of the Bioenergy Technologies Office (BETO)-supported multi-lab CO 2 Reduction and Upgrading for e-Fuels Consortium (CO 2 RUe), focuses on advanced research and development and cross-cutting evaluation of environmental, economic, and social sustainability for CO 2 reduction and upgrading for fuels and chemicals. The Consortium develops and de-risks advanced technologies that use renewable electricity to convert CO 2 into e-fuels and commodity chemicals. One key aspect of environmental sustainability consideration is water resources. This report summarizes a three-year study that analyzed the impacts of water consumption in select CO 2 reduction and utilization technologies in two future scenarios using a pair of water indices—water availability index and water stress footprint. The analyses also account for projected electricity grid mixes and their water withdrawal and water consumption demand in grid regions. The work identifies drivers, challenges, and critical areas in water sustainability, along with valuable insights into technological and regional factors. The study also explores the potential of using non-traditional water resources to reduce water stress and increase availability. These findings are intended to support industry stakeholders and BETO with the knowledge needed for informed decision-making, contributing to strategies to mitigate risks associated with the implementation of CO 2 utilization technologies.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Assessing the Impacts of CO 2 Reduction and Utilization Technologies on Regional Freshwater Resources

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2026

SDN-Based Dynamic Cybersecurity Framework of IEC-61850 Communications in Smart Grid

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have experienced a series of cyber-attacks, leading to temporary, widespread blackouts of considerable magnitude. Since most substations are unmanned and have limited physical security protection, cyber breaches into power grid substations present a risk. Nowadays, the susceptibility of SDN architecture to cyber-attacks has exhibited a notable increase in recent years, as indicated by research findings. This suggests a growing concern regarding the potential for cybersecurity breaches within the SDN framework. In this paper, we propose a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS)-integrated SDN architecture for detecting and preventing the injection of malicious IEC 61850-based generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages in a digital substation. Additionally, this program locates the fault’s location and, as a form of mitigation, disables a certain port. Furthermore, implementation examples are demonstrated and verified using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed that mimics the functioning of a digital substation.

Liu, Chen-Ching [Virginia Tech] (ORCID:00000002894↗

DOE OSTI2020

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

Safety Analysis for the Versatile Test Reactor Conceptual Design

Safety analysis simulations have been carried out using the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis code system to update the baseline set of results for the Versatile Test Reactor conceptual design. Results from a previous revision of this work provided input for the Conceptual Safety Design Report summarizing the overall safety basis for the VTR. This work will also support future analyses that will be required for Chapter 13, “Accident Analysis,” of a preliminary safety analysis report. A number of transients have been evaluated based on categories of postulated accident sequences suggested for consideration in NUREG-1537. Ultimately, the full spectrum of event initiators and subsequent accident sequences will be defined through a probabilistic risk assessment of the plant design following the implementation of the Licensing Modernization Project guidelines as described in the VTR Safety Design Strategy. Since that process is ongoing, the present analysis addresses several transients that are expected to be bounding accident scenarios that represent the three key ways to perturb a reactor: through changes to the core inlet temperature, mass flow rate, or reactivity. These correspond to a loss of heat sink (LOHS), loss of flow (LOF) or station blackout (SBO), and transient overpower (TOP), respectively. Both Protected and Unprotected versions of these transients have been evaluated, along with additional transients that include transient overpower with one stuck rod, pump coast-down failures, seismic events, and overcooling events. At the current stage of design, transient simulation results for the Versatile Test Reactor indicate that large safety margins exist for many event initiators. However, several “enabling” assumptions have been made, in terms of both design features and design limits, in order to perform the analyses; and these assumptions will need to be revised as the design matures. In addition, a larger spectrum of events needs to be evaluated as part of the on-going probabilistic risk assessment process.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NASA NTRS2005

The Systems Engineering Process for Human Support Technology Development

Systems engineering is designing and optimizing systems. This paper reviews the systems engineering process and indicates how it can be applied in the development of advanced human support systems. Systems engineering develops the performance requirements, subsystem specifications, and detailed designs needed to construct a desired system. Systems design is difficult, requiring both art and science and balancing human and technical considerations. The essential systems engineering activity is trading off and compromising between competing objectives such as performance and cost, schedule and risk. Systems engineering is not a complete independent process. It usually supports a system development project. This review emphasizes the NASA project management process as described in NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 7120.5B. The process is a top down phased approach that includes the most fundamental activities of systems engineering - requirements definition, systems analysis, and design. NPR 7120.5B also requires projects to perform the engineering analyses needed to ensure that the system will operate correctly with regard to reliability, safety, risk, cost, and human factors. We review the system development project process, the standard systems engineering design methodology, and some of the specialized systems analysis techniques. We will discuss how they could apply to advanced human support systems development. The purpose of advanced systems development is not directly to supply human space flight hardware, but rather to provide superior candidate systems that will be selected for implementation by future missions. The most direct application of systems engineering is in guiding the development of prototype and flight experiment hardware. However, anticipatory systems engineering of possible future flight systems would be useful in identifying the most promising development projects.

Jones, Harry↗

NASA NTRS2011

An Alternative Approach to Human Servicing of Manned Earth Orbiting Spacecraft

As manned spacecraft have grown larger and more complex, they have come to rely on spacewalks or Extravehicular Activities (EVA) for both mission success and crew safety. Typically these spacecraft maintain all of the hardware and trained personnel needed to perform an EVA on-board at all times. Maintaining this capability requires volume and up-mass for storage of EVA hardware, crew time for ground and on-orbit training, and on-orbit maintenance of EVA hardware . This paper proposes an alternative methodology to utilize launch-on-need hardware and crew to provide EVA capability for space stations in Earth orbit after assembly complete, in the same way that most people would call a repairman to fix something at their home. This approach would not only reduce ground training requirements and save Intravehicular Activity (IVA) crew time in the form of EVA hardware maintenance and on-orbit training, but would also lead to more efficient EVAs because they would be performed by specialists with detailed knowledge and training stemming from their direct involvement in the development of the EVA. The on-orbit crew would then be available to focus on the immediate response to the failure as well as the day-to-day operations of the spacecraft and payloads. This paper will look at how current ISS unplanned EVAs are conducted, including the time required for preparation, and offer alternatives for future spacecraft utilizing lessons learned from ISS. As this methodology relies entirely on the on-time and on-need launch of spacecraft, any space station that utilized this approach would need a robust transportation system including more than one launch vehicle capable of carrying crew. In addition the fault tolerance of the space station would be an important consideration in how much time was available for EVA preparation after the failure. Each future program would have to weigh the risk of on-time launch against the increase in available crew time for the main objective of the spacecraft.

Mularski, John↗

NASA NTRS2016

In-Space Structural Assembly: Applications and Technology

As NASA exploration moves beyond earth's orbit, the need exists for long duration space systems that are resilient to events that compromise safety and performance. Fortunately, technology advances in autonomy, robotic manipulators, and modular plug-and-play architectures over the past two decades have made in-space vehicle assembly and servicing possible at acceptable cost and risk. This study evaluates future space systems needed to support scientific observatories and human/robotic Mars exploration to assess key structural design considerations. The impact of in-space assembly is discussed to identify gaps in structural technology and opportunities for new vehicle designs to support NASA's future long duration missions.

Belvin, W. Keith↗

NASA NTRS2017

An Alternative Approach to Human Servicing of Crewed Earth Orbiting Spacecraft

As crewed spacecraft have grown larger and more complex, they have come to rely on spacewalks, or Extravehicular Activities (EVA), for mission success and crew safety. Typically, these spacecraft maintain all of the hardware and trained personnel needed to perform an EVA on-board at all times. Maintaining this capability requires volume and up-mass for storage of EVA hardware, crew time for ground and on-orbit training, and on-orbit maintenance of EVA hardware. This paper proposes an alternative methodology, utilizing launch on-need hardware and crew to provide EVA capability for space stations in Earth orbit after assembly complete, in the same way that one would call a repairman to fix something at their home. This approach would reduce ground training requirements, save Intravehicular Activity (IVA) crew time in the form of EVA hardware maintenance and on-orbit training, and lead to more efficient EVAs because they would be performed by specialists with detailed knowledge and training stemming from their direct involvement in the development of the EVA. The on-orbit crew would then be available to focus on the immediate response to the failure as well as the day-to-day operations of the spacecraft and payloads. This paper will look at how current unplanned EVAs are conducted, including the time required for preparation, and offer alternatives for future spacecraft. As this methodology relies on the on-time and on-need launch of spacecraft, any space station that utilized this approach would need a robust transportation system including more than one launch vehicle capable of carrying crew. In addition, the fault tolerance of the space station would be an important consideration in how much time was available for EVA preparation after the failure. Each future program would have to weigh the risk of on-time launch against the increase in available crew time for the main objective of the spacecraft.

Mularski, John R.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Engineering Trade-off Considerations Regarding Design-for-Security, Design-for-Verification, and Design-for-Test

The United States government has identified that application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware are at risk from a variety of adversary attacks. This finding affects system security and trust. Consequently, processes are being developed for system mitigation and countermeasure application. The scope of this tutorial pertains to potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures within the ASIC/FPGA design cycle. The presentation demonstrates how design practices can affect the risk for the adversary to: change circuitry, steal intellectual property, and listen to data operations. An important portion of the design cycle is assuring the design is working as specified or as expected. This is accomplished by exhaustive testing of the target design. Alternatively, it has been shown that well established schemes for test coverage enhancement (design-for-verification (DFV) and design-for-test (DFT)) can create conduits for adversary accessibility. As a result, it is essential to perform a trade between robust test coverage versus reliable design implementation. The goal of this tutorial is to explain the evolution of design practices; review adversary accessibility points due to DFV and DFT circuitry insertion (back door circuitry); and to describe common engineering trade-off considerations for test versus adversary threats.

Design for reliability (DFR)↗