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At least 469 records · Page 26

Evaluation of 1950s-Era Architectural Resources in Blocks 10, 11, and 17, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to modernize the Mercury town site at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada, to meet current and future National Weapons Science, Global and Homeland Security Programs, and Environmental Management mission requirements. These plans, including anticipated demolitions, consolidations, and rebuilding at Mercury, are considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 U.S.C. § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 U.S.C. § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, 36 C.F.R. Part 800. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recording, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing components (Reno et al. 2018). This district was recommended eligible to the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP or National Register) under Criteria A and C but was unevaluated under Criteria B and D at that time. The Mercury Historic District contains 154 individual landscapes, buildings, and structures. Of these resources, DRI recommends all except one as contributing elements of the historic district during its period of significance corresponding to nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. During most of the Cold War, the land now called the NNSS was formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS). This report is concerned with evaluating resources dating to the 1950s in Blocks 10, 11, and 17 in Mercury prior to the proposed demolition of 22 resources in Blocks 10 and 11 as a phase of the larger modernization program mentioned above. Although the Mercury Historic District as a whole is eligible to the National Register, further evaluation of these properties as detailed in this report indicates that none are individually eligible under any of the Secretary of Interior’s Significance Criteria, either at the national or local level. This is one report in the report series "Evaluation, Finding of Effect, and Mitigation Documentation for 1950s-Era Architectural Resources, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada".

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Defining and Computing a Valued Based Cyber Security Measure

In earlier works (Ben-Aissa et al. 2010; Abercrombie et al. 2008; Sheldon et al. 2009), we presented a value based measure of cybersecurity that quantifies the security of a system in concrete terms, specifically, in terms of how much each system stakeholder stands to lose (in dollars per hour of operation) as a result of security threats and system vulnerabilities; our metric varies according to the stakes that each stakeholder has in meeting each security requirement. In this paper, we discuss the specification and design of a system that collects, updates, and maintains all the information that pertains to estimating our cybersecurity measure, and offers stakeholders quantitative means to make security-related decisions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Defining and Computing a Value Based Cyber-Security Measure

In past work, we presented a value based measure of cybersecurity that quantifies the security of a system in concrete terms, specifically, in terms of how much each system stakeholder stands to lose (in dollars per hour of operation) as a result of security threats and system vulnerabilities\; our metric varies according to the stakes that each stakeholder has in meeting each security requirement. In this paper we discuss the specification and design of a system that collects, updates and maintains all the information that pertains to estimating our cybersecurity measure, and offers stakeholders quantitative means to make security-related decisions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Global Security & Strategic Partnership Programs

Long, proud history of expertise in uranium, lithium, high explosives, assembly/disassembly, and nuclear security and a vital part of today’s nuclear security enterprise Integral role in sustaining U.S. nuclear deterrent and reducing global nuclear threats with unique security and nonproliferation research capabilities NN and GSP Missions Bring Fresh Ideas and Solves Important National Security Problems NN and GSP Missions Keep Our Technology and People Sharp and Ready for New Challenges

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Identification of Strategies to Leverage Public and Private Resources for National Security Workforce Development

This report documents the identification of strategies to leverage public and private resources for the development of an adequate national security workforce as part of the National Security Preparedness Project (NSPP).There are numerous efforts across the United States to develop a properly skilled and trained national security workforce. Some of these efforts are the result of the leveraging of public and private dollars. As budget dollars decrease and the demand for a properly skilled and trained national security workforce increases, it will become even more important to leverage every education and training dollar. The leveraging of dollars serves many purposes. These include increasing the amount of training that can be delivered and therefore increasing the number of people reached, increasing the number and quality of public/private partnerships, and increasing the number of businesses that are involved in the training of their future workforce.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Governance and Resilience: A Holistic Approach to Systems Security in Complex and Chaotic Environments

Here, a systems governance approach emphasizes a holistic perspective that identifies and navigates the interdependencies and conflicts between security and operational needs. Governance is defined as a collection of metasystems that provide the necessary constraints and processes to support, steer, adapt, transform, and sustain a system (Keating et al. 2022). Utilizing the Cynefin framework, which distinguishes between simple, complicated, complex, and chaotic environments (Snowden and Boone 2007), the article highlights the challenges faced by nuclear power plants in predatory contexts and the importance of integrating security objectives into governance frameworks. By incorporating security as a fundamental aspect of governance, the article underscores its significance for persistence, adaptation, and transformation in the face of uncertainty. Additionally, it introduces key heuristics of systems security, such as the importance of context, knowledge‐based decision‐making, and organization‐specific sociological factors (Williams and Caskey 2024). Ultimately, this work provides valuable insights into enhancing resilient operations in complex environments by reinforcing the connection between effective governance and security in systems engineering.

Caskey, Susan A. [Sandia National Laboratories (SN↗

Flexible visualization of a 3rd party Intrusion Prevention (Security) tool: A use case with the ELK stack

A difficult aspect of cyber security is the ability to achieve automated real time intrusion prevention across various sets of systems. To this extent, several companies are offering comprehensive solutions that leverage an "accuracy of scale" and moving much of the intelligence and detection on the Cloud, relying on an ever-growing set of data and analytics to increase decision accuracy. Often, they provide tools to visualize the decision workflows in attack prevention (as well as tune the algorithm) but those solutions are not always practical as companies see the problem as "global" that is, from a unified Cyber-security standpoint. However, a key to a successful Cyber-security program is transparency and trust: from an experimental team viewpoint, this specifically means having the ability to immediately see what and from where, who has been blocked and being able to inform the community in case of a revoked access without the need for filing a "ticket" (that may eventually be answered) – in other words, rapid response to their user-base is essential but solutions targeting "sub-groups" in an organization are not often available. We have come up with a versatile solution leveraging the ELK stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, & Kibana) and an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) based WAF (Web Application Firewall) from Signal Sciences. Signal Science allows the streaming of detailed logs in a Logstash format suitable for custom solutions for visualization. By combining these two tools, we have strengthened our security posture and enabled individual experiments to monitor their own traffic. Specifically, the IPS WAF provides unique data such as country of origin, protocol, response code, source IP, and paths accessed. In this contribution, we will show how we engineered a visualization solution so experiment groups could access a dashboard with predefined graphs but also, where they can create individual customizable dashboards used to display blocked traffic and troubleshoot latency issues. We will discuss the details and procedures for developing and configuring these tools and how it benefits cyber security postures across our scientific based environment.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Semi-device-independent security of one-way quantum key distribution

By testing nonlocality, the security of entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) can be enhanced to being ''device-independent.'' Here we ask whether such a strong form of security could also be established for one-way (prepare and measure) QKD. While fully device-independent security is impossible, we show that security can be guaranteed against individual attacks in a semi-device-independent scenario. In the latter, the devices used by the trusted parties are noncharacterized, but the dimensionality of the quantum systems used in the protocol is assumed to be bounded. Our security proof relies on the analogies between one-way QKD, dimension witnesses, and random-access codes.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Security proof of practical quantum key distribution with detection-efficiency mismatch

Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols with threshold detectors are driving high-performance QKD demonstrations. The corresponding security proofs usually assume that all physical detectors have the same detection efficiency. However, the efficiencies of the detectors used in practice might show a mismatch depending on the manufacturing and setup of these detectors. A mismatch can also be induced as the different spatial-temporal modes of an incoming signal might couple differently to a detector. Here we develop a method that allows to provide security proofs without the usual assumption. Our method can take the detection-efficiency mismatch into account without having to restrict the attack strategy of the adversary. Especially, we do not rely on any photon-number cutoff of incoming signals such that our security proof is directly applicable to practical situations. We illustrate our method for a receiver that is designed for polarization encoding and is sensitive to a number of spatial-temporal modes. In our detector model, the absence of quantum interference between any pair of spatial-temporal modes is assumed. For a QKD protocol with this detector model, we can perform a security proof with characterized efficiency mismatch and without photon-number cutoff assumption. Our method also shows that in the absence of efficiency mismatch in our detector model, the key rate increases if the loss due to detection inefficiency is assumed to be outside of the adversary's control, as compared to the view where for a security proof this loss is attributed to the action of the adversary.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Quantum Security for the Physical Layer

The physical layer describes how communication signals are encoded and transmitted across a channel. Physical security often requires either restricting access to the channel or performing periodic manual inspections. In this tutorial, we describe how the field of quantum communication offers new techniques for securing the physical layer. We describe the use of quantum seals as a unique way to test the integrity and authenticity of a communication channel and to provide security for the physical layer. We present the theoretical and physical underpinnings of quantum seals including the quantum optical encoding used at the transmitter and the test for non-locality used at the receiver. We describe how the envisioned quantum physical sublayer senses tampering and how coordination with higher protocol layers allow quantum seals to influence secure routing or tailor data management methods. We conclude by discussing challenges in the development of quantum seals, the overlap with existing quantum key distribution cryptographic services, and the relevance of a quantum physical sublayer to the future of communication security.

quantum optics↗

MetaPoL: Immersive VR based Indoor Patterns of Life (PoL) and Anomalies Data Generation for Insider Threat Modeling in Nuclear Security

Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges that nuclear and radiological security systems face. Insiders pose such a great threat due to their access, authority, and knowledge, granting them opportunities to bypass dedicated nuclear and radiological security elements. For example, in one of the latest major insider threat incidents to nuclear security, the Doel-4 nuclear powerplant in Belgium suffered a shutdown, the threat of nuclear materials diversion, and long-term loss of tens of millions of dollars. Seven years of investigation concluded that it was an inside job and attempted sabotage. In this regard, there is an immediate need for R&D and technology integration in the domain of modeling indoor Patterns-of-Life (PoL) and anomaly detection. This can be achieved by using datasets of facility users’ mobility and activity, which can support the design of algorithms for insider threat modeling and detection. However, due to classification, privacy, sensitivity, and safety protocols, such datasets from real physical nuclear reactor facilities are not only hard to share, but also not always feasible to deploy and collect. Aiming to find an alternate solution, our proposed demonstration work - MetaPoL, is the first-ever (for the application space) immersive VR (virtual reality) environment of a real-world secure facility and allows users to move-and-stay through the designed indoor physical layout and also encounter NPCs (non-player characters) that emulate other facility users. In the MetaPoL an interactive user performs realistic spatio-temporal movement, dwelling and activities using a Meta Quest Pro VR headset, and that generates high-frequency (in time) high-resolution (in space) indoor spatial-temporal datasets that are valuable for PoL modeling and anomaly detection research specifically for insider threat modeling and detection mission. Such generated realistic, rich in context, and mission specific datasets can boost AI/Machine Learning based research for modeling and detecting insider threats in nuclear security and nonproliferation.

Gunaratne, Chathika↗

Reconciling food security and bioenergy: priorities for action

Abstract Understanding the complex interactions among food security, bioenergy sustainability, and resource management requires a focus on specific contextual problems and opportunities. The United Nations’ 2030 Sustainable Development Goals place a high priority on food and energy security; bioenergy plays an important role in achieving both goals. Effective food security programs begin by clearly defining the problem and asking, ‘What can be done to assist people at high risk?’ Simplistic global analyses, headlines, and cartoons that blame biofuels for food insecurity may reflect good intentions but mislead the public and policymakers because they obscure the main drivers of local food insecurity and ignore opportunities for bioenergy to contribute to solutions. Applying sustainability guidelines to bioenergy will help achieve near‐ and long‐term goals to eradicate hunger. Priorities for achieving successful synergies between bioenergy and food security include the following: (1) clarifying communications with clear and consistent terms, (2) recognizing that food and bioenergy need not compete for land and, instead, should be integrated to improve resource management, (3) investing in technology, rural extension, and innovations to build capacity and infrastructure, (4) promoting stable prices that incentivize local production, (5) adopting flex crops that can provide food along with other products and services to society, and (6) engaging stakeholders to identify and assess specific opportunities for biofuels to improve food security. Systematic monitoring and analysis to support adaptive management and continual improvement are essential elements to build synergies and help society equitably meet growing demands for both food and energy.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Development of an Automated Security Risk Assessment Methodology Tool for Critical Infrastructures

This document presents the security automated Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) prototype tool developed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). This work leverages SNL's capabilities and skills in security risk analysis and the development of vulnerability assessment/risk assessment methodologies to develop an automated prototype security RAM tool for critical infrastructures (RAM-CI™). The prototype automated RAM tool provides a user-friendly, systematic, and comprehensive risk-based tool to assist CI sector and security professionals in assessing and managing security risk from malevolent threats. The current tool is structured on the basic RAM framework developed by SNL. It is envisioned that this prototype tool will be adapted to meet the requirements of different CI sectors and thereby provide additional capabilities.

Jaeger, Calvin Dell↗

Consequences of a Weak Nuclear Security Culture [Slides]

(U) The enclosed presentation on nuclear security culture is based on current IAEA guidelines and content of the 2010 Nuclear Summit, both of which underscore the importance of promoting strong security culture at a nuclear facility. The presentation provides definitions of both nuclear security and nuclear security culture, and goes on to examine indications of weak nuclear security culture. The presentation is part of the Department of State's outreach program to foreign countries that intend to establish civilian nuclear programs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Summary Report for the Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School 2014

Executive Summary The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) hosted students from across the United States at the 3rd Radiation Detection for Nuclear Security Summer School from 16 – 27 June 2014. The summer school provided students with a unique understanding of nuclear security challenges faced in the field and exposed them to the technical foundations, analyses, and insight that will be required by future leaders in technology development and implementation. The course heavily emphasized laboratory and field demonstrations including direct measurements of special nuclear material. Student evaluations and feedback from student advisors indicates that the summer school achieved its objectives of 1) exposing students to the range of nuclear security applications for which radiation detection is necessary, 2) articulating the relevance of student research into the broader context, and 3) exciting students about the possibility of future careers in nuclear security. In fact, we are beginning to see previous students both enroll in graduate programs (former undergraduates) and complete internships at agencies like the National Nuclear Security Administration.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Selecting RMF Controls for National Security Systems

In 2014, the United States Department of Defense started transitioning the way it performs risk management and accreditation of information systems to a process entitled Risk Management Framework for DoD Information Technology or RMF for DoD IT. There are many more security and privacy controls (and control enhancements) from which to select in RMF, than there were in the previous Information Assurance process. This report is an attempt to clarify the way security controls and enhancements are selected. After a brief overview and comparison of RMF for DoD IT with the previously used process, this report looks at the determination of systems as National Security Systems (NSS). Once deemed to be an NSS, this report addresses the categorization of the information system with respect to impact levels of the various security objectives and the selection of an initial baseline of controls. Next, the report describes tailoring the controls through the use of overlays and scoping considerations. Finally, the report discusses organization-defined values for tuning the security controls to the needs of the information system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber Security Research Frameworks For Coevolutionary Network Defense

Several architectures have been created for developing and testing systems used in network security, but most are meant to provide a platform for running cyber security experiments as opposed to automating experiment processes. In the first paper, we propose a framework termed Distributed Cyber Security Automation Framework for Experiments (DCAFE) that enables experiment automation and control in a distributed environment. Predictive analysis of adversaries is another thorny issue in cyber security. Game theory can be used to mathematically analyze adversary models, but its scalability limitations restrict its use. Computational game theory allows us to scale classical game theory to larger, more complex systems. In the second paper, we propose a framework termed Coevolutionary Agent-based Network Defense Lightweight Event System (CANDLES) that can coevolve attacker and defender agent strategies and capabilities and evaluate potential solutions with a custom network defense simulation. The third paper is a continuation of the CANDLES project in which we rewrote key parts of the framework. Attackers and defenders have been redesigned to evolve pure strategy, and a new network security simulation is devised which specifies network architecture and adds a temporal aspect. We also add a hill climber algorithm to evaluate the search space and justify the use of a coevolutionary algorithm.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Material Protection, Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT) Implementation Plan: Lab-Scale Demonstration of Advanced Safeguard and Security Systems

The Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign is working towards the goal of developing and demonstrating the next generation of nuclear materials management for the peaceful use of civilian nuclear energy. A major milestone of the campaign is the “Lab-scale demonstration of an advanced safeguards and security system,” due in 2020. This implementation plan describes how tools developed in the MPACT campaign will be used to meet this milestone. These tools consist of instrumentation and devices as well as computer software for modelling, simulation and integration of data and information for safeguard and security analysis. The plan is focused on demonstrating an advanced safeguard and security systems for electrochemical processing plants, but also identifies activities needed to address advanced reactor, aqueous processing and other advanced fuel cycle facilities. A key component to achieving the 2020 milestone is the development of a virtual distributed test bed that incorporates the instruments, data, analysis tools, and models currently under development and provides a framework to link and normalize the data in a way that simulates a facility, including uncertainty quantification. This virtual distributed test bed will integrate computer simulated facilities that make up a fuel cycle of interest, with distributed test beds located in actual operating facilities and laboratories. The MPACT campaign recently issued roadmaps for both Modelling & Simulation and Advanced Integration which address this component, and activities necessary to achieve the 2020 milestone. Research, development and testing of specific technologies have been supported by the MPACT campaign in coordination with other DOE-NE and DOE-NNSA programs. These technologies provide the essential data needed by the safeguard and security systems, and feed into the data analysis and facility models. This plan will identify these technologies, their current status and activities needed to demonstrate the technologies at the laboratory scale. Wherever possible, test of technologies in field conditions using suitable nuclear materials will be used to define performance. Where necessary, surrogate materials and/or simulation will be used to provide useful information for the demonstration. When completed, the 2020 milestone will provide a demonstration of advanced safeguard and security technologies, including advanced modelling, simulation and analysis approaches, applied to electrochemical processing. It will also identify applications of the technology and approaches in other advanced fuel cycle and reactor concepts.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗