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At least 487 records · Page 27

Trajectory Design Considerations for Exploration Mission 1

Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) will be the first mission to send an uncrewed Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) to cislunar space in the fall of 2019. EM-1 was originally conceived as a lunar free-return mission, but was later changed to a Distant Retrograde Orbit (DRO) mission as a precursor to the Asteroid Redirect Mission. To understand the required mission performance (i.e., propellant requirement), a series of trajectory optimization runs was conducted using JSC's Copernicus spacecraft trajectory optimization tool. In order for the runs to be done in a timely manner, it was necessary to employ a parallelization approach on a computing cluster using a new trajectory scan tool written in Python. Details of the scan tool are provided and how it is used to perform the scans and post-process the results. Initially, a scan of daily due east launched EM-1 DRO missions in 2018 was made. Valid mission opportunities are ones that do not exceed the useable propellant available to perform the required burns. The initial scan data showed the propellant and delta-V performance patterns for each launch period. As questions were raised from different subsystems (e.g., power, thermal, communications, flight operations, etc.), the mission parameters or data that were of interest to them were added to the scan output data file. The additional data includes: (1) local launch and landing times in relation to sunrise and sunset, (2) length of eclipse periods during the in-space portion of the mission, (3) Earth line of sight from cislunar space, (4) Deep Space Network field of view looking towards cislunar space, and (5) variation of the downrange distance from Earth entry interface to splashdown. Mission design trades can also be performed based on the information that the additional data shows. For example, if the landing is in darkness, but the recovery operations team desires a landing in daylight, then an analysis is performed to determine how to change the mission design to meet this request. Also, subsystems request feasibility of alternate or contingency mission designs, such as adding an Orion main engine checkout burn or Orion completing all of its burns using only its auxiliary thrusters. This paper examines and presents the evolving trade studies that incorporate subsystem feedback and demonstrate the feasibility of these constrained mission trajectory designs and contingencies.

Dawn, Timothy F.↗

Safe2Ditch Autonomous Crash Management System for Small Unmanned Aerial Systems: Concept Definition and Flight Test Results

Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have the potential for a large array of highly-beneficial applications. These applications are too numerous to comprehensively list, but include search and rescue, fire spotting, precision agriculture, etc. to name a few. Typically sUAS vehicles weigh less than 55 lbs and will be performing flight operations in the National Air Space (NAS). Certain sUAS applications, such as package delivery, will include operations in the close proximity of the general public. The full benefit from sUAS is contingent upon the resolution of several technological areas in order to provide an acceptable level of risk for widespread sUAS operations. Operations of sUAS vehicles pose risks to people and property on the ground as well as manned aviation. Several of the more significant sUAS technological areas include, but are not limited to: autonomous sense and avoid and deconfliction of sUAS from other sUAS and manned aircraft, communications and interfaces between the vehicle and human operators, and the overall reliability of the sUAS and constituent subsystems. While all of the technological areas listed contribute significantly to the safe execution of the sUAS flight operations, contingency or emergency systems can greatly contribute to sUAS risk mitigations to manage situations where the vehicle is in distress. The Safe2Ditch (S2D) system is an autonomous crash management system for sUAS. Its function is to enable sUAS to execute emergency landings and avoid injuring people on the ground, damaging property, and lastly preserving the sUAS and payload. A sUAS flight test effort was performed to test the integration of sub-elements of the S2D system with a representative sUAS multi-rotor.

Glaab, Louis J.↗

Effectiveness of Redundant Communications Systems in Maintaining Operational Control of Small Unmanned Aircraft

NASA has been researching prototype technologies for an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) system to facilitate enabling of safe and efficient civilian low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, in a series of Technical Capability Levels (TCL) activities that are increasingly complex. In TCL1, completed in 2015, visual line-of-sight operations such as agriculture, firefighting and infrastructure monitoring were addressed with a focus on geofencing and operations scheduling. Technologies and requirements needed for beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS) operations in sparsely populated areas were examined in TCL2 in 2016, and those for operations over moderately populated areas in TCL3 in 2017 and 2018. TCL4 will build on the earlier TCLs and focus on technologies and requirements for operations in higher-density urban areas for tasks such as news gathering, package delivery and for managing large-scale contingencies. This paper describes a communications test conducted in TCL3 and discusses insights gained from the test. In the test, operators were directed to equip UAS with redundant Command and Control (C2) communications systems, send a maneuver command to Unmanned Aircraft (UA) via the primary system, then verify execution of the sent command. This exercise was repeated with each redundant system. The test was designed to assess effectiveness of redundant C2 systems in maintaining operational control of UA. Several UAS were configured with varying arrangements to achieve redundancy, including two identical radio modems using the same frequency band, WiFi and Long-Term Evolution (LTE) cellular modems, etc. From the test, digital data such as time maneuver command sent, time maneuver verified, etc., were collected. Descriptions of methods to detect loss of C2 communications and contingency steps for such event were collected and assessed. The final paper will include a detailed analysis of the collected data leading to the following insights. First, effectiveness of redundant C2 systems depends on several factors, such as operational environment and communications service availability. For example, use of two identical point-to-point radio to connect operator and UA on the same frequency band can be effective in mitigating radio malfunction when operating in an environment where possibility of Radio Frequency (RF) interference is low, such as over open plains. However, the same arrangement may not be effective where high level of RF transmissions in broad spectrum ranges can be expected, such as over or near urban areas. For redundant systems that consist of external communications services, such as cellular and satellite communications network, redundancy is maintained only in the areas where more than one services are available. Therefore, UAS operators should have the means to plan for and monitor the performance of external communications services they are relying on to control UA. Second, communications performance needs, such as the minimum data transfer rate and the maximum tolerable latency, should be assessed to reflect the potential hazard that can come from loss of UA control. For example, UA operations over desolate area pose less hazard to people than operations over densely populated area and performance need for the former would be less than the latter.

Jung, Jaewoo↗

A Concept of Operations (ConOps) of an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)

The growth of new emerging operations involving Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) necessitates developing a perspective for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). This perspective advances from the National Academies report on IASMS and its recommendation for developing a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for IASMS. A ConOps has been developed for In-time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) from which the IASMS ConOps pivots to provide a robust scope commensurate with the broad vision defined by the National Academies. The IASMS ConOps focuses on emerging operations and spans innovations in Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and an increasingly complex ecosystem comprised of a widening mix of vehicles and technologies, Urban Air Mobility (UAM) with industry-federated services, traditional operations, as well as new supersonic aircraft and space launch systems.The challenge for the IASMS ConOps is to be broad to encompass innovations in the coming years and decades while agile to ensure levels of safety compatible with operational and certification requirements of the National Airspace System (NAS). The IASMS ConOps interweaves increasing complexity of operational safety capabilities and unlocking UAS Maturity Levels (UMLs). The relationships between increased complexity of automation and automated systems, fewer operators who are not as traditionally higher skilled, more complex operational environments, and aviation operations management with mixed aircraft and equipage pose a multi-dimensional space for IASMS capabilities essential for safety assurance and risk management. Instantiating IASMS capabilities and how they would be integral to AAM operations and increasing maturity of UAM could be accomplished through a series of Safety Demonstrators. These Safety Demonstrators could provide increased understanding and insight into use of controls for risk mitigation, means of compliance for certification, and operational experience with safety services such as in relation to contingency management. The IASMS capabilities can be viewed as initially residing with the vehicle, airspace, and Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP). For example, vehicle capabilities include communications including the command and control link, Remote Identification (ID), conflict advisory/alerting, and UAS system monitoring. These capabilities monitor and assess data such as battery health, aircraft state, and human performance. Complexity of ISAMS capabilities depends on a number of factors. These factors are intendedonly as a notional categorization with the purpose being to reflect the complexity of the AAM ecosystem that would drive up the complexity of ISSA capabilities including systems, sensors, models, standards, and controls. Factors could include the Vehicle Flight Management, Environment, Airspace, and Contingency Management. Each of these factors can be comprised of multiple sub-factors that contribute to increasing complexity. For example, Airspace at a lower level of complexity could be dedicated to UTM operations that are unmonitored, and at a higher level of complexity could involve mixed UTM and ATM operations. The IASMS concept includes safety services that provide data and information to different participants in AAM. The roles and responsibilities of participants can be defined using the Responsible-Accountable-Consulted-Informed (RACI) analysis. For example, for the safety service involving the Remote ID, the Operator would be accountable for providing the data, the Vehicle would be responsible for transmitting it, and the USS, SDSP, Vertiports, FIMS (FAA), and Public Entities such as safety services would be informed by receiving the data. The IASMS ConOps identifies the capabilities needed for risk mitigation and safety assurance in the increasingly complex national airspace. The ConOps serves as a pathway for engaging with industry to gain operational experience including through the Safety Demonstrator series, the RACI analysis, and operational complexity factors. The ConOps serves to integrate these different perspectives to build a cohesive and cogent approach to an AAM safety management system.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗

Deep Learning-Based Negotiation Strategy Selection for Cooperative Conflict Resolution in Urban Air Mobility

This paper presents a collaborative conflict resolution technique using deep neural network-based intelligent search of the solution space. This approach offers a rapid convergence to a mutually acceptable solution for real-time conflict resolution, suitable for urban air mobility operations. Furthermore, the presented technique allows operational flexibility to the urban air mobility agents where these agents can collaboratively devise the solution via integrative negotiation, based on their local utility functions, as long as such a solution does not violate the global safety thresholds. The presented machine-to-machine negotiation method is built on our prior work on holistic assessment of the airspace and potential conflict detection implemented at-the-edge, onboard the unmanned aircraft systems. This paper extends the prior work to augment decision-making at-the-edge, thereby, promising a true distributed control architecture for urban air mobility. In this approach, each agent (a) builds a potential in-flight conflict map, (b) identifies the conflicting agents, (c) dynamically prepares a list of alternatives based on its current utility functions, (d) negotiates with the conflicting agents to pick one of these alternatives, and (e) implements the negotiated alternative to mutually resolve the conflict. Note that such an approach does not require a contingency plan to be made pre-flight, as the conflict resolution strategies are decided and negotiated in real time based on the present state of the agent. The contingency plan, if available, can serve as an input to the real-time conflict resolution strategy formulation, and also can be used as a fallback plan in case the negotiation fails and the impacted agents need to switch to a rule-based/supervisory resolution mode from the discussed distributed resolution mode. The presented collaborative negotiation-based conflict resolution technique incorporates a time-dependent reward function to catalyze collaborative resolution by incentivizing the agents with local and global rewards beneficial to their business operations.

Advanced Air Mobility↗

Trajectory design for the Genesis backup orbit and proposed extended mission

In September 2004, the Genesis spacecraft will return to Earth with its collection of solar wind samples. If for some reason there are any difficulties with returning the samples to Earth during the nominal entry sequence, a contingency plan is in place for a second chance at a successful recovery. This paper will detail the processes used to generate possible backup trajectories, and provide a comparison of the contingency options examined through the course of the study.

Chung, Min-Kun J.↗

Maneuver design overview of the 2018 InSight Mars lander mission

Launched on May 5, 2018, the Interior Exploration using Seismic Investigations, Geodesy, and Heat Transport (InSight) spacecraft landed safely on Mars on November 26, 2018. To deliver the lander accurately to the landing site, six trajectory correction maneuvers (TCMs) were planned along the reference trajectory from Earth launch to Mars entry. For the last two TCMs, there were two corresponding contingency TCMs planned that could be executed in the event that the corresponding nominal one failed. There were also twenty pre-designed menu TCMs available for execution at the time of the last contingency TCM, about 8 hours before the Mars entry, descent, and landing. This navigation paper overviews the maneuver design of each TCM, as well as how each one actually performed during operations.

Wallace, Mark↗

Validation of Fault-Tolerant Plans for Europa Clipper

The Europa Clipper mission will explore that icy moon in a series of brief flybys through the Jovian radiation belts. A single event upset in the spacecraft flight computer during these critical scientific periods could jeopardize the success of the mission. Rather than safing and awaiting operator intervention, the Clipper mission envisions limited onboard autonomy that can restore spacecraft state sufficiently to resume the encounter observation plan as rapidly as possible. The contingency plan is contained in an Activity Restart Timeline (ART) that is transmitted in parallel with the nominal plan, which must be co-validated jointly against all spacecraft state and resource constraints amid unpredictable fault timing. A prototype validation tool was built that leverages declarative spacecraft models and automated search techniques to find such potential inconsistencies in the unified contingent mission plan. Early validation results within motivating scenarios are presented.

Ferguson, Eric↗

m:N ConOps/R&R Remote Simulation

This presentation details the experimental design of an investigation of small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) operations involving multiple vehicle management by a remote operator. The study is part of an ongoing effort to explore multiple vehicle control by multiple operators, i.e., the control of N vehicles by m operators (m:N operations). For this effort, NASA and collaborators have developed prototypes of a concept of operations (ConOps), roles and responsibilities (R&R) for operators and supervisors, and a ground control station (GCS), including software displays and interfaces. Participants in this study acted as the pilot-in-command of twelve aircraft flying pre-approved routes in a simulation of a food delivery operation utilizing sUAS in the San Diego, CA area. Each participant experienced four experimental trials. Twice within the course of each trial, participants were responsible for responding to a sudden, unanticipated, and high-priority contingency: an airspace restriction for sUAS operations known as a UAS Volume Reservation (UVR). Upon issuance of a UVR, pilots were expected to reroute affected vehicles around the airspace. The level of automation (LoA) and workload of the flight rerouting task were varied. The LoA was manipulated by providing reroute suggestions ("auto" condition) for aircraft or by requiring pilots to manually reroute ("manual" condition) affected vehicles. Workload was varied as a function of the number of vehicles affected by the UVR contingencies: 2 vehicles ("low workload" condition) versus 4 vehicles ("high workload" condition). Additionally, some vehicles required pilots to adjust for terrain conflicts while avoiding the UVR region. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in-person data collection for this study was not possible. Researchers adapted to this circumstance through the development of remote data collection protocol. Participants were able to view adapted GCS displays using the Microsoft Teams teleconferencing platform and responded to events by using a verbal protocol developed for the experiment. Using this protocol, participants provided instructions for actions to a researcher, referred to as the surrogate, to carry out on their behalf. This presentation describes the experiment design, including special details for remote data collection via a subject-surrogate configuration, and concludes with planned data analysis and results to be presented at a later date.

multi-UAS↗

A Cognitive Walkthrough of Multiple Drone Delivery Operations

Advances of early twenty-first century aviation and transportation technologies provide opportunities for enhanced aerial projects, and the overall integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS) has applications across a wide range of operations. Through these, remote operators have learned to manage several UAS at the same time in a variety of operational environments. The present work details a component piece of an ongoing body of research into multi-UAS operations. Beginning in early 2020, NASA has collaborated with Uber Technologies to design and develop concepts of operations, roles and responsibilities, and ground control station (GCS) concepts to enable food delivery operations via multiple, small UAS (sUAS). A cognitive walkthrough was chosen as the method for data collection. This allowed information to be gathered from UAS subject matter experts (SMEs) that could further mature designs for future human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations; in addition, it allowed information to be collected remotely during the stringent restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the described cognitive walkthrough activity utilized remote data collection protocols mediated through the usage of programs designed for presentation and telecommunications. Scenarios were designed, complete with airspace, contingencies, and remedial actions, to be presented to the SMEs. Information was collected using a combination of rating scales and open-ended questions. Results received from the SMEs revealed expected hazards, workloads, and information concerns inherent in the contingency scenarios. SMEs also provided insight into the design of GCS tools and displays as well as the duties and relationships of human operators (i.e., monitors) and automation (i.e., informers and flight managers). Implications of these findings are discussed.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

A Cognitive Walkthrough of Multiple Drone Delivery Operations

Advances of early twenty-first century aviation and transportation technologies provide opportunities for enhanced aerial projects, and the overall integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS) has applications across a wide range of operations. Through these, remote operators have learned to manage several UAS at the same time in a variety of operational environments. The present work details a component piece of an ongoing body of research into multi-UAS operations. Beginning in early 2020, NASA has collaborated with Uber Technologies to design and develop concepts of operations, roles and responsibilities, and ground control station (GCS) concepts to enable food delivery operations via multiple, small UAS (sUAS). A cognitive walkthrough was chosen as the method for data collection. This allowed information to be gathered from UAS subject matter experts (SMEs) that could further mature designs for future human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations; in addition, it allowed information to be collected remotely during the stringent restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the described cognitive walkthrough activity utilized remote data collection protocols mediated through the usage of programs designed for presentation and telecommunications. Scenarios were designed, complete with airspace, contingencies, and remedial actions, to be presented to the SMEs. Information was collected using a combination of rating scales and open-ended questions. Results received from the SMEs revealed expected hazards, workloads, and information concerns inherent in the contingency scenarios. SMEs also provided insight into the design of GCS tools and displays as well as the duties and relationships of human operators (i.e., monitors) and automation (i.e., informers and flight managers). Implications of these findings are discussed.

unmanned aircraft systems↗

IMPACT 1.0—Task Impairment: A Novel Approach for Assessing Impairment during Exploration-Class Missions

Exploration-class and International Space Station (ISS) missions have significantly different levels of associated medical risk for crewmembers. The Integrated Medical Model (IMM), the probabilistic risk assessment tool used for ISS medical trade-space analyses, uses a Functional Impairment (FI) metric to determine quality time lost should a crewmember be afflicted with a medical condition. While IMM-based FI has been successful for ISS operations, it has limitations when applied to exploration-class missions. As the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) looks ahead to Gateway, Artemis, and Martian missions, a novel, dynamic, and mission-appropriate impairment paradigm is necessary for accurate contingency planning. This paradigm, Task Impairment (TI), fulfills that need by utilizing mission-specific tasks. TI will allow future capability for a loss of mission metric, previously not available with IMM. TI serves as a replacement metric for FI within IMPACT, the next-generation trade-space analysis tool suite created to replace the IMM. IMPACT significantly increases the fidelity of probabilistic risk assessment for exploration-class missions. The Human Exploration of Mars Preliminary List of Crew Tasks (MTL, a source of 1100+ exploration-class mission-specific tasks for crewmembers) was used to calculate TI. Using the Task List, 18 individual Human System Categories were identified as being required to perform each task (e.g., Cardiopulmonary, Cognitive, etc.). Each of the 1200+ tasks were mapped to the Human System categories listed in the Task List. The total number of tasks in each category were tallied to determine how many tasks required each Human System. Lastly, each of the 120 medical conditions from the IMPACT condition list were mapped to the Human System categories to complete the TI calculation. NASA subject matter experts across five medical specialties established consensus for the mapping of each condition. The resulting total tasks impaired by each condition were used to calculate discrete TI values. This process was repeated for each of the four severity/resource utilization variants of each condition, and for each of the three phases of clinical care. Through this process, discrete TI values were calculated for each of the 120 IMPACT medical conditions and their variants. The Task Impairment metric provides higher fidelity, dynamic utility, and quicker analysis of medical impairment compared to the previous Functional Impairment metric used for the Integrated Medical Model. TI will be used for higher fidelity medical impairment analysis and contingency planning during Lunar, Martian, and other long-term exploration-class missions.

William L Fernandez↗

A Global Evaluation of IMERG Precipitation Occurrence Using SMAP Detected Soil Moisture Change

A globally consistent ground validation method for remotely sensed precipitation products is crucial for building confidence in these products. This study develops a new methodology to validate the IMERG precipitation products through the use of SMAP soil moisture changes as a proxy for precipitation occurrence. Using a standard 2x2 contingency table method, preliminary results provide confidence in SMAP’s ability to be utilized as a validation tool for IMERG as results are comparable to previous validation studies. However, the method allows for an overestimate of false alarm frequency due to light precipitation events that can evaporate before the subsequent SMAP overpass and changes in overpass-to-overpass SMAP soil moisture that are within the range of SMAP uncertainty. To counter these issues, a 3x3 contingency table is used to reduce noise and extract more signal from the detection method. Through the use of this novel approach, the validation method produces a global mean POD of 0.64 and global mean FAR of 0.40, the first global-scale ground validation skill scores for the IMERG products. Advancing the method to validate precipitation quantity and the development of a real-time validation for the IMERG Early product are the crucial next developments.

Precipitation↗

Moon to Mars (M2M) Habitation Considerations: A Snap Shot As of January 2022

The following NASA Technical Memorandum (TM) is intended to provide a snapshot in time of NASA’s current considerations (ground rules and assumptions, functional allocations, logistics) for habitation systems for the lunar surface (non-roving) and Mars transits. As NASA continues to refine the reference designs to meet the needs of an evolving architecture, it is expected that this information will also be updated as a result. Where appropriate, relevant publicly released documents will be referenced to provide further detail. NASA’s human lunar exploration plan under the Artemis program calls for achieving the goal of sending the first woman and first person of color to the surface of the Moon in the mid- 2020s and working toward sustainable exploration by the end of the decade. Working with both commercial and international partners, NASA will establish a permanent human presence on the Moon to uncover new scientific discoveries and lay the foundation for private companies to build a lunar economy. Longer duration missions on the lunar surface and in lunar orbit will also serve as a test bed for technologies to support future Mars exploration campaigns. The agency will use what we learn on the Moon to prepare for humanity's next giant leap – sending astronauts to Mars. NASA intends to establish a sustained lunar presence with the development of the Artemis Base Camp to prove technologies and capabilities that will one day enable humans to live and work on Mars, beginning with core elements including the Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV), the Pressurized Rover (PR), the lunar Surface Habitat (SH), power systems, and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) systems. For in space operations and eventual transport of humans to Mars, NASA will utilize a Mars Transit Habitat (TH). Following deployment, the TH will complete a series of longer duration missions and shakedown testing while docked at Gateway, leveraging Gateway’s habitation redundancy for safety measures. Proposed Gateway-TH missions will far exceed the longest duration cislunar human missions to date. They will be the first operational readiness tests of our long-duration deep space systems, and of the split crew (two crew on the surface, two crew in space) operations that are vital to the approach for the first human Mars mission. Both the SH and TH are major architectural elements of NASA’s Moon to Mars (M2M) approach, each with very different concepts of operation. The SH is intended for use on the lunar surface as a home for astronauts, surface operations base, science facility, hub for communications, extravehicular activity (EVA) equipment repair site, waste processing facility, and supply hub. It serves as an enabler for a sustained surface presence and preparation for partial gravity operations during Mars missions. The SH will be designed to be self-sufficient for operations on the lunar surface. The SH will independently provide several functions, including its own power generation, energy storage capability, sleep quarters, hygiene areas, work areas, and dining areas. It will be capable of communicating with surface assets, orbital assets, and directly with Earth ground stations. It is planned to operate with two crew in the habitat for ~28- day stays with crew swap-outs in which the PR crew of two trades places with the habitat crew. During the swap-out, the habitat will nominally support four crew for a short period of time. For contingency scenarios, the habitat must also be capable of supporting four crew for up to 7 days. The TH will be designed to be capable of up to ~1,200-day Mars missions with the ability to carry all food and supplies needed to support a crew of four for this duration. An assumed Mars mission profile for the TH is to carry crew and supplies for ~850-day roundtrips between Earth and Mars orbit that allows 30-day stays on the Martian surface. To test the systems for this long journey, the TH will be used to extend the duration of missions at Gateway, enabling the orbiting outpost to be used as a Mars analog. These analog missions will be accomplished by attaching the TH to Gateway and conducting lunar surface operations from the TH. The TH may also need to perform free-flying shakedown missions to test out all systems prior to leaving for Mars. The habitat provides many critical functions including: a contingency airlock, crew quarters, galley, hygiene areas, safe haven capability, and science equipment. It can receive docked items from either axial end or on a radial port.

Habitat↗

Design and Testing of an Approach to Automated In-Flight Safety Risk Management for sUAS Operations

An onboard risk management automation design is presented based on run-time assurance principles, as well as the concept for In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS) as described by the National Academies. The automation is designed to operate independently of the autopilot and perform real-time risk assessment spanning multiple classes of hazards, predict constraint violations, and track autopilot states. In the event of elevated risk conditions or predicted constraint violations, the automation will select from a set of available contingencies and trigger autopilot mode changes if necessary to mitigate risk exposure. The onboard automation also informs the remote operator/pilot of what the independent monitor is observing and any contingency decisions or actions that may arise during flight. Details of an implementation of this design and results of verification and validation activities, as required to meet stringent NASA software and system assurance standards, are also presented. This includes simulation and flight testing using small unmanned aircraft systems.

Ersin Ancel↗

A Remote, Human-in-the-Loop Evaluation of a Multiple-Drone Delivery Operation

Over time, advances in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have enabled a shift in the operational paradigm from one operator managing one aircraft to that of multiple operators working together to manage multiple aircraft. This shift has highlighted the need for effective human-autonomy teaming methods to maintain manageable workload levels for operators as well as high standards of system performance and safety. This paper presents a study aimed at evaluating whether automation can help operators manage workload during small UAS (sUAS) package delivery scenarios featuring contingency situations. These contingency situations, resulting from unplanned UAS Volume Reservations (UVRs), required flight path reroutes for multiple aircraft simultaneously. The study manipulated the number of aircraft affected by the UVRs and the level of automation support. The presence of terrain conflicts was also controlled within each scenario. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, subjects were not able to gain direct access to the Ground Control System (GCS). Therefore, the study was conducted using a subject-surrogate paradigm that required subjects to relay commands through a verbal protocol from remote locations outside of the lab to a researcher surrogate who had direct control of the GCS interfaces at the lab location. Results show that the automated support condition was associated with faster reroute response times, more efficient reroute maneuvers, and significantly lower levels of perceived workload than the manual reroute condition. However, the automation support level did not significantly impact pilots’ ability to avoid the UVR successfully; pilots were overwhelmingly capable of avoiding the UVR in all conditions. The presence of terrain conflicts primarily impacted pilot performance by leading to multiple uploads per vehicle, which was not typically required when pilots only needed to maneuver laterally. Although subjects did not have direct control over the GCS, subjective ratings indicate that the displays under test provided them with sufficient information to manage their aircraft and promptly respond to the unplanned UVRs. Overall, the objective and subjective data strongly suggest that the verbal protocol and subject-surrogate paradigm were effective methods for collecting data remotely amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

multi-UAS↗

Human Mars Mission Transit Abort Options for Ballistic High Thrust and Hybrid Transportation Systems

Throughout the entire history of human spaceflight, astronauts have never been more than a few day's journey from Earth. For missions to the International Space Station, or even to the Moon, aborting the mission and returning home is a relatively straightforward operation in the event of a life-threatening contingency. But on the journey to Mars, a mission abort is complicated by a single factor: the sheer distance to Mars that will take time to cover regardless of how powerful the propulsion system is. In a significant departure from the entire human spaceflight experience to date, a Mars mission abort will not mean an immediate return to Earth due to the heliocentric nature of the transit. After escaping Earth’s gravity and entering heliocentric space, aborting a mission to Mars will be measured in months not days even if the abort is initiated relatively early in the mission. This represents a fundamental shift in the way mission aborts are utilized to reduce mission risks and this change must be part of the narrative when discussing reliability, crew risk, contingency planning, and mission operations. Abort capability will vary between transportation propulsion systems depending on final design, operational implementation, and actual mission parameters such as departure date, but the difference is relatively insignificant given that ``mission abort'' in the heliocentric frame of reference is a wildly different paradigm than that historically used for Earth-centric missions which rely on abort as a risk mitigation strategy. The primary objective of this paper is to provide a clearer definition of human Mars mission aborts from a celestial physics and orbital mechanics perspective in the context of different propulsion systems.

Mars Architecture Team↗

Launching and Deploying the James Webb Space Telescope

On December 25, 2021, at 12:20 UTC, the James Webb Space Telescope lifted off and onward to its destination in orbit at the second Lagrange point. With more than two decades in development, and an international collaboration between NASA, CSA, and ESA, Webb is one of the most anticipated science missions ever launched. After a dramatic and flawless launch, Webb's toughest and riskiest days lie ahead. Unprecedented in its complexity and ambition, over the next two weeks Webb would undergo the most complex on-orbit deployment sequence ever attempted, with any single deployment anomaly carrying the risk of full mission failure. An exquisite design, years of ground testing, a exhaustively trained and rehearsed operations and engineering team, and an unprecedented level of contingency planning, all resulted in a fully and successfully deployed Webb observatory, on its way to L2, and nominally cooling to its cryogenic temperatures. Although Webb still had many more months of commissioning left, there was a collective sigh of relief heard round the world. This incredible achievement was not by chance but was years in the making. We go behind the scenes of Webb's first month on orbit, starting with the unique and challenging launch itself, the time criticality of its mid-course corrections, and a summary of nearly 14 days to undergo nearly 50 major deployments. We discuss what went better than planned and how years of robust and detailed contingency planning were prepared for unanticipated events and on-orbit spacecraft behavior. And finally, we provide a brief overview of the entire commissioning process which successfully completed on July 10th, 2022.

Keith A Parrish↗