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DOE OSTI2021

Modeling and Analysis of the Transport and Disposal of Beryllium Moderator Blocks and Greater than Class C (GTCC) Waste

Radioactive waste in the United states is categorized based on its source, radioactivity, and security risk. The categorization method employed by the Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC) for low-level radioactive waste is not currently applied to any waste generated by the Department of Energy (DOE) or disposed of in DOE facilities. As a result, there is a large volume of DOE-generated waste with characteristics similar to the NRC’s “Greater than Class C” (GTCC) waste category which presently do not have a path for long-term disposal. Much of this waste cannot undergo the standard commercial disposition process due to it being categorized as Transuranic (TRU) waste under DOE guidelines, due to elevated concentrations of key fission products. Possible solutions to this dilemma are explored in the Environmental Impact Statement for the “Disposal of Greater-Than-Class-C Low Level Radioactive Wave” (EIS-0375). This paper analyzes several EIS possible paths for disposal for this “orphaned” waste. One example that highlights this categorization issue is the spent beryllium cladding that has been extracted from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) throughout its operational lifetime. These beryllium blocks surround the reactor’s main chambers and components and serve as neutron moderators. This paper will use this particular waste form to analyze the economic and technological viability of transporting and storing this material under the storage and transportation criteria of the Waste isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which was deemed the most feasible disposition path according to the EIS. The example of this waste form used in this paper that highlights this categorization issue is the spent beryllium cladding extracted from Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). These beryllium blocks surround the reactor’s components and serve as neutron moderators, and thus have accumulated high concentration of high-activity transuranic isotopes. This paper analyzed the viability of transporting and storing this material under the storage and transportation criteria of the five primary disposition paths covered in EIS-0375. An array of calculations was carried out to assess the viability of the various disposition paths for the beryllium shipments as well as other waste shipments that fall within the GTCC category. Modeling with MCNP 6.2 was conducted to determine whether the beryllium blocks could be safely stored and transported within a 72-B cask; the standard shipping container for remote-handled, transuranic waste, while also meeting regulatory limits at various disposition paths. A cost analysis of the transportation and long-term disposal paths mentioned in the EIS was also carried out using available data and information from similar waste shipments. Lastly, a geochemical analysis of the various geological repository discussed in the EIS was also carried out using the Geochemists Workbench Release 14. Long-term disposal of the beryllium blocks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) proved to be the most cost-effective long-term disposition option of the ones considered in the EIS. A dose rate calculation at both contact and remote-handling distances indicate that the analyzed beryllium shipments should not exceed the exposure limits at any of the considered locations. Greater-than-class-C waste has been left in a regulatory state of limbo for years, resulting in backlogs of inventory across several research sites in the United States. Due to its high activity and presence of transuranic isotopes, it is imperative to ensure that it remains inaccessible and sequestered both in its short-term interim as well as a long-term geologic time scale. The information and assessments done in the paper could potentially serve as a reference for any future shipments of this waste form at the WIPP facility as well as other disposition paths that may be considered in the future.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Drop Analysis of the Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container with Heavier Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Contents

The Advanced Test Reactor Fresh Fuel Shipping Container (ATR FFSC) is a rectangular stainless steel container used for shipping radioactive material. The container is described in the ATR FFSC Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Per the ATR FFSC SAR, the ATR FFSC is designated a Type AF-96 packaging per the definition of 10 CFR §71.4, and was originally designed to transport high enriched uranium (HEU) reactor fuel elements for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the Advanced Test Reactor Critical (ATRC) facility, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR), and the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR). The Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA), Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3) is working with the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop and qualify new low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and technologies for use in the ATR, ATRC, MITR, and MURR reactors. The LEU fuel elements will weigh significantly more than the current HEU designs and, combined with their associated Fuel Handling Enclosures for packaging, some configurations will exceed the 50 lbf used in the ATR FFSC qualifying drop tests. There are LEU versions of MITR, MURR, and ATR fuel elements. However, for this evaluation, drop analysis of the ATR FFSC with only the heavier ATR Low Enrichment (LOWE) fuel element is considered in this evaluation because the LOWE fuel element is the heaviest of the considered LEU fuel elements. The ATR HEU fuel element and the ATR LOWE fuel element are identical in every design aspect except for the fuel meat inside the 19 fuel plates. The LEU fuel meats are made using a U-10Mo high-density foil rather than uranium dispersed in aluminum in the HEU fuel elements. The high density of the uranium in the LEU fuel meat increases the LOWE fuel element weight to just under 44 lbf (versus the 22.1 lbf weight of the tested ATR HEU fuel element). ATR fuel elements are placed in a thin-gauge aluminum weldment called a "Fuel Handling Enclosure" during packaging. The Fuel Handling Enclosure is used to cover and protect the element during loading and unloading operations. The ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure weighs about 15 lbf per the drawings in the ATR FFSC SAR and the weight is accounted for in this evaluation. Transporting the heavier LEU fuel elements require evaluation of two issues. The first is the effect of the increased mass of the LEU fuel elements on the survivability of the ATR FFSC package following the requisite drop qualifications. The second is the effect of the increased mass of the fuel plates on the fuel element during the same drops. The ATR FFSC containing an ATR HEU fuel element in an ATR Fuel Handling Enclosure was physically dropped multiple times to qualify the container as a Type AF-96 package. The ATR FFSC SAR describes the drop tests performed with an actual ATR HEU fuel element weighing 22.1 lbf contained in a 14.3 lbf Fuel Handling Enclosure for a total payload of 36.4 lbf. Those drop tests showed that the ATR FFSC maintained containment of the ATR HEU fuel element and the fuel element was not significantly damaged. (Containment herein is not defined as a leak tight but is retention of the radioactive contents.) The purpose of the evaluation is to analytically show that, for a similar set of tests, the ATR FFSC maintains containment of the heavier ATR LOWE fuel element and to assess the damage to the fuel element during the drops. The approach was to create finite element analysis (FEA) models that produce the same results as the physical drops. Those models were then used as the benchmarks for the follow-on analyses using the heavier contents. FEA models of the drops of ATR FFSC using up to a 115 lbf fuel element were run and evaluated. Likewise, drops of a LOWE fuel element weighing 44 lbf in the ATR FFSC were run and evaluated. It is important to note that this report was done at the quality level necessary to be included in a nuclear facility safety basis. However, it is not the intent of this report to conclude the suitability of the ATR FFSC for transporting the heavier payloads. This report only describes the results of the FEA as related to the required drop scenarios. Incorporation of the FEA into the safety basis will be evaluated by the ATR FFSC design authority. The physical drop tests of the HEU fuel element and FEA drop analysis for the LOWE fuel element showed noteworthy damage to the fuel plates. An aluminum protective block was conceived to mitigate the damage. The concept requires the blocks to be placed in the fuel element between the end boxes and fuel plates. Additional FEA drop analyses were performed using the protective block. The addition of the blocks is primarily intended to mitigate the damage to the LOWE fuel element fuel plates. However, FEA drop analyses of the ATR HEU fuel element with the blocks were also performed and included for information.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Predictive Flow Simulation with the P2R Model for the Composite Analysis Base Case

In order to meet the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, a composite analysis (CA) must be completed for the Central Plateau at the Hanford Site. The CA requires estimates of fate and transport of radionuclides in the groundwater from multiple sources within the modeling domain. This document details the application of the Plateau-to-River (P2R) Model version 8.3 to predict the flow of groundwater on the Central Plateau for the 10,000-year simulation to support the CA. The simulated flow field will support the simulation of fate and transport of contaminants for use in predicting dose as part of the CA. This document describes the changes made to model inputs in order to simulate the predictive flow field for the CA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hanford Composite Analysis Special Studies FY2025 - Groundwater Flow Simulation for use in a Comparison of Simulated Concentrations in the Saturated Zone Estimated by the Plateau-to-River Model Versions 8.3 and 9.1

In order to meet the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, a composite analysis (CA) must be completed for the Central Plateau at the Hanford Site. The CA requires estimates of fate and transport of radionuclides in the groundwater from multiple sources within the modeling domain. This Environmental Calculation File (ECF) details the application of the Plateau-to-River (P2R) Model (CP-57037, Rev. 3, Model Package Report for the P2R Model: Version 9.1) to predict the flow of groundwater on the Central Plateau for the 10,000-year simulation to support a special analysis associated with the Hanford Site CA. The simulated flow field will support the simulation of fate and transport of contaminants for comparison to the results obtained as part of the CA to evaluate impact of the updated version of the P2R Model.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW PPT

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types, such as light- and heavy-water-moderated reactors, graphite-moderated reactors, and breeder reactors, with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and condition of SNF, a robust canister termed the DOE Standardized SNF Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard SNF Canister had four variations consisting of a 10- or 15-foot length and an 18- or 24-inch diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository these canisters were to be grouped with 24-inch diameter HLW canisters in a codisposal waste package. The 18-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The 24-inch DOE Standardized SNF Canister would take the place of one the five HLW canister on the outer ring in the codisposal waste package. No DOE Standardized SNF Canisters have been loaded, and many fuel types can be loaded in multiple canisters. Depending on the selected diameter of the DOE Standardized SNF Canister for a particular fuel, the number of potential codisposal waste packages could vary. In addition, different types of DOE SNF may be able to be combined in a single canister. This could significantly change the number of DOE SNF canisters that are loaded and result in a decrease of the number of total potential codisposal waste packages. Ultimately, if too many HLW canisters need disposition, then a reduction in the number of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will change the final total of codisposal waste packages very little. Likewise, if the ratio of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters to HLW canister produced is too high, then DOE Standardized SNF Canisters will not have enough HLW canisters to surround them in the codisposal waste package. This paper examines the results of differing loading strategies for a few DOE SNFs. It also compares the ranges of DOE Standardized SNF Canisters that may be produced to the ranges of HLW canisters that may be produced in order to determine potential scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Co-Disposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW - 20331

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Preliminary Modeling of Chloride Deposition on Spent Nuclear Fuel Canisters in Dry Storage Relevant to Stress Corrosion Cracking

This study presents a method that can be used to gain information relevant to determining the corrosion risk for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters during extended dry storage. Currently, it is known that stainless steel canisters are susceptible to chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC). However, the rate of CISCC degradation and the likelihood that it could lead to a through-wall crack is unknown. This study uses well-developed computational fluid dynamics and particle-tracking tools and applies them to SNF storage to determine the rate of deposition on canisters. The deposition rate is determined for a vertical canister system and a horizontal canister system, at various decay heat rates with a uniform particle size distribution, ranging from 0.25 to 25 µm, used as an input. In all cases, most of the dust entering the overpack passed through without depositing. Most of what was retained in the overpack was deposited on overpack surfaces (e.g., inlet and outlet vents); only a small fraction was deposited on the canister itself. These results are provided for generalized canister systems with a generalized input; as such, this paper is intended to demonstrate the technique. This study is a part of an ongoing effort funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Energy Office of Spent Fuel Waste Science and Technology, which is tasked with doing research relevant to developing a sound technical basis for ensuring the safe extended storage and subsequent transport of SNF. This work is being presented to demonstrate a potentially useful technique for SNF canister vendors, utilities, regulators, and stakeholders to utilize and further develop for their own designs and site-specific studies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Predictive Flow Simulation with the P2R Model for the Composite Analysis Base Case

In order to meet the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in DOE O 435.1 Chg.1, Radioactive Waste Management, a Composite Analysis (CA) must be completed for the Central Plateau at the Hanford Site. The CA requires estimates of fate and transport of radionuclides in the groundwater from multiple sources within the modeling domain. This document details the application of the P2R Model version 8.3 to predict the flow of groundwater on the Central Plateau for the 10,000-year simulation to support the CA. The simulated flow field will support the simulation of fate and transport of contaminants for use in predicting dose as part of the CA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

W.A. Parish Post-Combustion CO 2 Capture and Sequestration Demonstration Project (Final Technical Report)

The Petra Nova Project (Project) is a commercial scale post-combustion carbon capture project developed by a joint venture between NRG Energy, Inc. (NRG) and JX Nippon Oil Exploration (EOR) Limited (JX). The Project is designed to separate and capture carbon dioxide (CO2) from an existing coal-fired unit’s flue gas slipstream at NRG’s W.A. Parish Electric Generating Station (WAP) located southwest of Houston, Texas. The captured CO2 is dried, compressed, and transported via an 81-mile pipeline to the West Ranch oilfield (West Ranch) in Jackson County, Texas, where it is injected to boost oil production. The Project, which is partially funded by a grant (Grant) from the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) under the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI) Round 3, uses the Kansai Mitsubishi Carbon Dioxide Recovery advanced amine-based CO 2 absorption technology (KM-CDR Process®), which was jointly developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) and the Kansai Electric Power Co. Inc., to treat and capture at least ninety percent (90%) of the CO 2 from a 240-megawatt equivalent (MWe) flue gas slipstream off of Unit 8 at WAP. When operating at full capacity, the Project captures approximately 5,200 short tons of CO 2 per day, which would otherwise be emitted into the atmosphere, representing the largest commercial scale deployment of post-combustion CO2 capture technology at a coal power plant to date. Under the Grant, the Project was managed in 3 phases: (1) Phase 1: Project Definition / Front End Engineering Design (FEED) (2) Phase 2: Detailed Engineering, Procurement & Construction (3) Phase 3: Demonstration and Monitoring. On December 29, 2016, commercial operation of the Project was achieved, ending Phase 2 and starting Phase 3, a 3-year demonstration period running from January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2019. The key objectives of Phase 3 were to (a) demonstrate the specific advanced technologies constructed during Phase 2 and (b) monitor the injected CO 2 at West Ranch to demonstrate technologies and protocols for monitoring, verification, and accounting (MVA). As of the end of Phase 3, Petra Nova captured 3,904,978 short tons of CO 2 (3,542,537 metric tons) that was transported to West Ranch. To support the DOE obligation to monitor, verify, and account for the sequestered CO 2 at West Ranch, Petra Nova contracted with the Bureau of Economic Geology (in the Jackson School of Geosciences at The University of Texas at Austin) to (a) design a monitoring program, (b) draft an MVA Plan for DOE review and approval, and (c) working with Petra Nova and the operator of West Ranch to manage and report on the MVA activity. This report discussed the technical aspects of the project during each of the 3 phases of the project as identified above.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
DOE OSTI2025

EVSE Characterization: V2G EVSE Comparison

As part of the U.S. Department of Energy EVs@Scale consortium Next-Generation Profiles project, results and analysis from the characterization of high-power conductive and wireless charging infrastructure are presented. This characterization is conducted over a wide range of direct current (DC) current and DC voltage operation for nominal test conditions and off-nominal test conditions. Test plans and procedures were developed to define the test configurations and requirements, measurement parameters, and test procedures used throughout testing. Results from a 2024 study conducted on electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) characterization by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) include two bi-directional vehicle-to-grid (V2G) capable EVSEs. These EVSE are referred to as V2G-EVSE9 and V2G-EVSE10. Laboratory testing is conducted at nominal test conditions to characterize the power transfer capabilities, efficiency, power factor, and other power quality metrics of the two DC EVSEs capable of V2G bi-directional power transfer. Results from testing show the performance is consistent for V2G-EVSE9 and V2G-EVSE10 when comparing charging to discharging performance, except for V2G-EVSE10 for power transfer when operating above 70% of the rated DC current. V2G-EVSE10 efficiency is >98% while charging and <91% while discharging at the same operating conditions, near maximum-rated current, at 300VDC. In contrast, V2G-EVSE9 results are consistent for charging and discharging. This EVSE is nearly 96% efficient while charging or discharging when operating over 50% of rated AC power. V2G EVSE performance is also characterized during off-nominal AC grid conditions involving AC voltage deviation (426 VAC to 518 VAC), AC frequency deviation of +2% (58.8 Hz to 61.2 Hz), and AC voltage harmonics injection. Many test conditions have little-to-no impact on performance characteristics of the two EVSEs; however, there are a few notable findings with significant power transfer capability impacts. AC voltage harmonics injection resulted in negative impacts on power quality attributes for both EVSEs, but with no impact on power transfer capability. Off-nominal AC voltage and frequency conditions resulted in unstable or lack of power transfer capability for both EVSEs. V2G-EVSE9 is unable to transfer power when AC voltage is >300V L-N. V2G-EVSE10 is unable to transfer power when AC frequency deviation exceeds +0.8%. V2G energy management system transient response and latency are quantified during laboratory testing. V2G-EVSE9 and V2G-EVSE10 utilize cloud-based V2G energy management systems that command the power transfer level between the EVSE and EV. The latency and response characteristics of the entire systems (web-based user interface, V2G energy management system, cellular communications, and EVSE response) are quantified through laboratory testing for V2G-EVSE9 and V2G-EVSE10. V2G-EVSE9 latency ranges from 0.8 to 1.8 seconds, whereas V2G-EVSE10 latency ranges from 3.4 to 8.8 seconds. The ramp rate to a change in power transfer request also differs between the two EVSEs. V2G-EVSE10 ramp rate ranges from 50% to -250% of rated AC power per second, whereas V2G-EVSE9 rate ranges from 95% to -95% of rated AC power per second. At the highest rate of change in power transfer, V2G-EVSE10 can change from full charge power to full discharge power in less than one second. The V2G EVSE characterization presented in this report provides valuable insights and results for use by numerous entities. This includes modeling and simulation organizations, decision makers, fleet planning, industry stakeholders, and many others involved with the development and deployment of electrified transportation technologies. Additional high-power DC chargers, bidirectional chargers, and inductive power transfer EVSE characterization results are anticipated from additional EVSE brands and models, which will be detailed in future publications in support of the U.S. Department of Energy EVs@Scale consortium Next-Gen Profiles project.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2026

HdsaLib

HdsaLib performs hyper-differential sensitivity analysis in optimization problems that are constrained by partial differential equation problems. The software aids researchers in understanding the impact of uncertainties on their optimization models. The tool has been applied for use in ice sheet modeling, fluid flow modeling, atmospheric tracer transport modeling, and subsurface flow modeling. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

van Bloemen Waanders, Bart [Sandia National Lab. (↗
DOE OSTI2020

Predictive Flow Simulation with the P2R Model for the Composite Analysis Base Case

In order to meet the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in DOE O 435.1 Chg. 1, Radioactive Waste Management, a Composite Analysis (CA) must be completed for the Central Plateau at the Hanford Site. The CA requires estimates of fate and transport of radionuclides in the groundwater from multiple sources within the modeling domain. This document details the application of the P2R Model version 8.3 to predict the flow of groundwater on the Central Plateau for the 10,000-year simulation to support the CA. The simulated flow field will support the simulation of fate and transport of contaminants for use in predicting dose as part of the CA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Port of Los Angeles Zero- and Near-Zero-Emission Freight Facilities "Shore to Store" Project (Final Project Report)

The City of Los Angeles Harbor Department (Harbor Department, POLA) partnered with Equilon Enterprises LLC (d/b/a Shell Oil Products US) (Shell), Toyota Motor North America (Toyota) and Kenworth Truck Company (Kenworth) partnered with the Port of Hueneme (POH), United Parcel Service (UPS), Total Transportation Services Inc. (TTSI), Southern Counties Express (SCE), Toyota Logistics Services (TLS), Air Liquide, National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Coalition For A Safe Environment, and the South Coast Air Quality Management District (South Coast AQMD) to introduce hydrogen (H 2 ) fuel into the Southern California drayage truck market by demonstrating near-commercial heavy-duty H 2 fuel cell electric trucks at and between freight facilities throughout the region, while continuing to lay the groundwork for battery-electric operations. The "Shore to Store" (S2S) project built on project team experience to help realize our vision of zero-emission freight operations in the future. Ten Kenworth zero-emission Class 8 fuel cell electric trucks, integrated with Toyota's fuel cell drive technology, were operated by UPS, TTSI, SCE, and TLS in revenue service. The demonstration fleet fueled at the S2S hydrogen fueling stations that were built in Ontario, California and Wilmington, California. An additional station at the Port of Long Beach (Portal Station) was available for fueling the fleet. Portal Station was supported by grants from the California Energy Commission (CEC) and South Coast AQMD and used as match funding for the S2S project. POH demonstrated two battery-electric yard tractors, and TLS demonstrated two zero-emission forklifts at their warehouse facility, showcasing elements of the entire supply chain operating on zero-emissions. This project showcased a snapshot of the zero-emission supply chain of the future, providing a model by which freight facilities can support zero-emission operations.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Overview of Upcoming Process Improvement Efforts at the Saltstone Facilities at the Savannah River Site - 20474

The Saltstone Facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) process and dispose of low activity salt solution waste generated by other liquid waste facilities. Today in the Liquid Waste System (LWS), approximately 125 million liters of salt waste remain to be processed. The Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) receives the decontaminated salt waste, which is mixed with dry feeds consisting of cement, fly ash and slag to produce the saltstone. The mixed slurry is pumped to the Saltstone Disposal Units (SDUs) for safe disposal in the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). To support continuous Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) operations at annual processing volumes many times higher than present, significant modifications are required to ensure that the SPF has the capacity to support the throughput of salt waste. These changes include several infrastructure upgrades that are being worked through the Enhanced Low Activity Waste Disposal (ELAWD) project. In addition to infrastructure upgrades, Savannah River Remediation (SRR), the Savannah River Site's Liquid Waste Contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy, has identified a flowsheet improvement opportunity of implementing a cement-free saltstone formulation to eliminate cement from the current three component formulation. This two-component formulation would simplify the procurement, transport, off-loading, and storage of the premix materials, and increase the storage capacity for the individual components. This flowsheet, when implemented, will reduce operational risk and improve throughput necessary to achieve disposal rates necessary for SWPF operations. Research has been completed to confirm the feasibility of this formulation, with the new cement-free flowsheet expected to be implemented in the next few years. Improvements have also been identified downstream of the SPF to increase SDU utilization. Specifically, a concentrated effort has taken place to raise the fill height in SDU 6 to the full disposal height, 13 meters, to maximize the usage of each SDU in support of the liquid waste disposal mission. This improvement has been made through additional thermal modeling and improved process understanding to create a SDU flammability model and control strategy more representative of facility operations. This work will allow for the completion of construction and operational readiness for SDU 7 while filling SDU 6 to ensure there is no lapse in available space once SWPF starts up. A summary of these improvements as they relate to increased throughput will be provided along with associated status. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2023

Metallographic examinations and hydrogen measurements of high-burnup spent nuclear fuel cladding

In the US, commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is transferred to interim dry storage casks where it will be stored for decades awaiting transport to a consolidated interim storage facility or a geologic repository. Because the fuel rod cladding is the first barrier against any radioactive material release, understanding the behavior of SNF cladding, particularly at high burnup (HBU), in dry storage conditions is crucial to safely store and transport the spent fuel. In this study, a series of metallographic examinations and cladding hydrogen measurements were conducted on HBU SNF cladding at Oak Ridge National Laboratory as a part of the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, which is sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE). Here, t o investigate the effect of simulated drying conditions on the cladding, three as-received fuel rods with different cladding materials—M5, ZIRLO, and Zircaloy-4—were heated to 400°C and then slow-cooled to room temperature. The pellet and cladding were then qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed and compared in terms of pellet crack morphology, HBU rim, waterside oxide, cladding H, and cladding hydride morphologies. This paper presents and discusses the results of these analyses in detail.

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