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DOE OSTI2023

Performance Evaluation of the Starfire nGen-350 DD Neutron Generator for use with the Fast Neutron Coincidence Collar

The Starfire Industries nGen-350 DD neutron generator has been developed for use with the Fast Neutron Coincidence Collar (FNCL). The generator was adapted from the nGen-310 model generator by Starfire to accommodate an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) request to incorporate a neutron yield stabilization mechanism. An nGen-350 generator was obtained by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for evaluation as a potential neutron interrogation source replacement for Am(Li) in the FNCL. This report provides a summary of the performance of the nGen-350.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Increasing the Fissile Mass Loading of High-Level Waste Glass Canisters to Greater Than 2,500 g/m 3 at the Savannah River Site

To eliminate future fissile mass loading constraints for the Savannah River Site H-Canyon Facility and Liquid Waste system, the Savannah River National Laboratory recommends a repository evaluation of a uranium fissile mass loading in glass at 7,144 g/m 3 in addition to the existing International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and security limit of 2,500 g/m 3 total plutonium. This recommended increase above the authorized 2,500 g/m 3 fissile mass loading limit is based on concentrations of uranium and plutonium shown to produce an acceptable glass waste form rather than projections of the maximum fissile mass loading in future sludge batches. An authorized fissile mass loading limit greater than 2,500 g/m 3 will increase facility flexibility, reduce the number of high-level waste canisters produced, and potentially avoid an increase in the Department of Energy Environmental Management mission life without compromising safety or glass product quality.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Advanced Algorithms for Scrutiny of Mandatory State Reports Declarations to the IAEA (Final Project Report)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) has an interest in applying machine learning to safeguards problems. However, the lack of machine training data for outside researchers is a significant impediment for progress in including advanced algorithms in safeguards practices. Information about a State’s inventory and movements of nuclear material is highly sensitive, both from a commercial perspective and from a security perspective. States (and commercial entities) do not freely divulge this information, and the IAEA–which receives detailed information from States as accounting reports–considers all information concerning nuclear materials location and composition to be Safeguards Confidential. Even within the Agency, information marked as safeguards confidential can be accessed only on a direct need-to-know basis by those who analyze and summarize the information for that particular State.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

An Autonomous Critical Data Extrapolator for the AGN-201m

Nuclear nonproliferation serves as a key goal, being undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To recognize proliferation there are two pathways that states, who intend to use nuclear material for malicious purposes can take, diversion can misuse. Diversion is when fissile nuclear material is declared to the IAEA for non-weapon purposes, but then covertly removed. If the source of nuclear material, that is not declared and not fissionable, is placed inside the reactor core to create fissile material used to create weapons then the state is using the second pathway of proliferation, misuse. With the emerging development in areas of simulation and machine learning the creation of virtual models of reactor systems, digital twins, serve as a potential method to identify proliferation through detecting anomalous behavior in the reactor. A digital twin for a physical nuclear reactor has never been developed, as digital twins serve as an emerging technology. To investigate the process for development and use of a digital twin for a nuclear reactor Idaho State University’s AGN-201m serves as the nuclear reactor used for development of this digital twin. A data acquisition system has been installed to the reactor system allowing for the transfer of collected data from a reactor operation to Idaho National Laboratory’s Deeplynx data warehouse. When utilizing data to train reactor physics and machine learning models, a significant challenge encountered is the initial state of the data. Nuclear proliferation will have the capacity to be detected when the reactor immediately starts up, nor will it occur after the reactor shuts down. Generally, it will be detected when the reactor is operating at some desired power over a sufficient period for that specific reactor design. For the AGN-201m this will be when the reactor is critical (generally 1 mW or above) for a timespan that is within or less than the range of a regular business day. Datasets sent to Deeplynx have had to be manually cut to when the reactor is critical based on plots of power levels. This method is inefficient and laborious, especially when using multiple datasets at once to train a model. To provide a more streamlined approach an automated critical data extrapolator is developed, with capabilities of recognizing when the reactor operation first reaches criticality, and when the reactor undergoes a SCRAM and is shutdown.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Operation of the Fast Neutron Coincidence Collar (FNCL) with a DD-Neutron Generator

For more than 30 years, the quantitative assay of the 235 U content of light water reactor fresh fuel assemblies relied on measuring coincidence neutrons from fissions induced by an Am(Li) neutron source using 3 He based detectors. The Fast Neutron Collar (FNCL) developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), replaces traditional 3 He proportional counters with an array of liquid scintillator detectors arranged about the fuel assembly to provide improved measurement precision and reduced sensitivity to gadolinium poison rods. The FNCL relies on Am(Li) neutron sources that are no longer commercially available. This work examines the replacement of Am(Li) sources with a commercial off the-shelf deuterium–deuterium (DD) neutron generator. In addition to mitigating supply concerns, the neutron generator offers advantages in measurement precision and potential automation of sequential passive/active neutron measurements. This report presents the initial performance results for both the integrated DD/FNCL and Am(Li)/FNCL assays of compact depleted uranium, low-enriched uranium, and highly enriched uranium standards along with an estimate of the expected performance for fresh fuel assemblies. A discussion of the design and operation of the “FNCL Analysis and Simulation Software” is also provided.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

AIACHNE's contribution for Nuclear Energy Agency Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Co-operation Subgroup 50

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2024

AIACHNE's contribution for Nuclear Energy Agency Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Co-operation Subgroup 50

The AIACHNE (AI/ML Informed cAlifornium CHi Nuclear data Experiment) project aims at designing an experiment for the 252 Cf Prompt Fission Neutron Spectrum (PFNS) that explores systematic biases in an experimental database retrieved from the EXFOR databases. To that end, machine learning (ML) methods were applied to pint-point measurement features likely related to bia. From that information, we selected a feature that should be explored by the AIACHNE experiment. Measurement features are metadata encapsulating all pertinent information about the physical measurement and analysis techniques. Examples are, for instance, what neutron and fission detectors were used for the physical metadata, and what background reduction techniques were employed for analysis techniques. Such metadata were retrieved both from EXFOR entries as well as the literature of data sets described in detail in Ref. [2]. The prerequisite for applying machine learning techniques is casting the metadata into a format that can be parsed by the algorithm. This step might seem trivial but requires to find a unique language where metadata that carry the same physics meaning across several experiments must have the same identifier. One example is, for instance, the neutron detector. As seen in Figure 1, the machine learning code identified the use of 6 Li detectors as being related to bias in some datasets of the AIACHNE 252 Cf PFNS experimental database. In fact, here are several experiments that used neutron detectors containing 6Li in the database, for instance for the example below. EXFOR format has a unique keywords describing detectors such as “SCIN” or “GLASD”. One may think that these keywords are already sufficient descriptors for ML to uniquely find an issue. However, “SCIN” (used for [3, 4]) and “GLASD” (used for [5]) fail to inform the algorithm what is the active material in the detector. And, the key common issue leading to bias in 252 Cf related to neutron detectors is not whether it is a glass detector or a scintillator. No, the issue is that 6 Li was within both detector types and that even small mistakes in the detector response functions around approximately 200 keV are amplified by the 6 Li(n,α) resonance there leading to bias in data as highlighted in Fig. 1 and Ref. [1]. Hence, the features describing the neutron detector must call out the active material in the detector, rather than the existing EXFOR detector keyword, that the ML algorithm can find physically meaningful features related to bias. The AIACHNE team used a precursor of the WPEC (Working Party on International Nuclear Data Evaluation Co-operation) SG(Subgroup)-50 format to store the metadata for the ML analysis.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2024

IDB Database Tables

The International Database of Reference Gamma-Ray Spectra of Various Nuclear Matter is designed to hold curated gamma spectral data is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency on its public facing web site. The database used to hold the spectral data was designed by Sandia National Labs under the auspices of the State Department’s Support Program. This document describes the tables and entity relationships that make up the database.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2024

TEX-HEU: Integral Experiment Execution with Polyethylene at Very Low Temperatures

The low-temperature variant of the TEX HEU (called Low-Temperature TEX or sometimes LT TEX) campaign is a highly anticipated and necessary experimental series by the greater nuclear science community. Fundamentally, the need for low-temperature integral experiments is required to perform validation of cross sections below room temperature. There has been substantial international interest in low-temperature benchmarks to validate below room temperature cross sections, namely talks given at the 2019 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality (ICNC): UK (Watson, 2019), France (Milin, 2019), and UK (Gan & Wilson, 2019). Additionally, NCSP funded thermal scattering laws (TSLs) were produced by North Carolina State University and require low-temperature benchmarks to validate them. Validation of low-temperature cross sections is also necessary for criticality safety applications. One particularly important application is to ensure that during transportation, fissile materials must remain subcritical under normal ambient conditions which is defined as temperatures down to -40°C/°F by the United States 10 CRF 71 as well as a regulation put forward by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Assessment of Evaluations for 239 Pu Photonuclear Cross Sections

We have performed an initial assessment of available data libraries for photonuclear reactions on 239 Pu. Specifically, we considered the following five evaluated data libraries: the ENDF/B-VIII.0 and the recently deployed ENDF/B.VIII.1 Evaluated Nuclear Data Files, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Photonuclear Data Library 2019 (IAEA-2019), the Japanese evaluated nuclear data library version 5 (JENDL-5), and the 2023 version of the TALYS Evaluated Nuclear Data Library (TENDL-2023). Each of these libraries were translated form ENDF to GNDS format using FUDGE. For each of the Pu isotopes, we provide a comparison with available experimental data in the EXFOR experimental nuclear reaction database, as well as a rapid quantitative assessment of the quality of the evaluation.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Krash-ESL-Final report

During the period of the current Grant, the effort of the UCSD researchers was focused on: i) The application of the gyrokinetic code COGENT code to study the kinetic drift wave instability and its impact on blob dynamics, and ii) The modeling of edge plasma transport in collisional and semi-collisional regimes, and iii) Impurity transport in edge plasma and the incorporation of plasma-impurity collision operator (hereafter unlike particle collision operator) into COGENT. Over the years four UCSD graduate students (J. Angus, W. Lee, Y. Zhang, and A. Knyazev), funded under this Grant, contributed to the COGENT development/utilization and defended their PhD theses, which are based, partly, on their research related to the COGENT. Three of them (J. Angus, W. Lee, and Y. Zhang) have received “The Best MAE Graduate Student of the Year” awards. Whereas W. Lee after defending his PhD thesis returned back to his home country (South Korea), J. Angus, and Y. Zhang are continuing their research in plasma physics in the LLNL and LANL, whereas A. Knyazev currently is a postdoctoral fellow at Columbia University working on the theoretical aspects of advanced stellarators. The results obtained in our studies were disseminated in many papers published in first-class refereed scientific journals and presented on prestigious scientific meetings including the Annual APS DPP Meeting, Sherwood Fusion Theory Conference, IAEA Fusion Energy Conferences, International Conferences on Plasma-Surface Interactions in Controlled Fusion Devices, International Workshops on Edge Plasma Theory in Fusion Devices, etc. In what follows we highlight the major accomplishments of the UCSD Team in the main areas of our research.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Net Zero World 2024 Achievements

Net Zero World, launched at COP26, aims to expedite the transition to clean energy systems worldwide. This report details Net Zero World's achievements in 2024. Leveraging expertise from ten U.S. Department of Energy national laboratories and nine federal agencies, Net Zero World has provided specialized technical support and energy modeling to eight partner countries: Argentina, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Singapore, Thailand, and Ukraine.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2024

Inspecta Technical Report

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is in the process of creating Inspecta (International Nuclear Safeguards Personal Examination and Containment Tracking Assistant), an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-powered smart digital assistant (SDA) with robotic capabilities, aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, and safety of international nuclear safeguards inspections. This innovative tool is designed to assist inspectors on-site by supporting or automating tasks that are typically mundane, hazardous, or susceptible to errors. In 2021, the development team established the specifications for Inspecta by analyzing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents and consulting with former IAEA inspectors and subject matter experts. This process involved aligning in-field inspection tasks with existing commercial or open-source technologies to outline a roadmap for the initial prototype of Inspecta, while also identifying areas needing further research and development. From 2022 – 2024, the focus has shifted to integrating a critical inspection activity, the examination of seals, into an early version of Inspecta. This has involved developing both the software and hardware capabilities necessary for this task. This report outlines the ongoing advancements in Inspecta's functionalities, specifically those supporting the seal examination process.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Puck Loop Seal (Final Project Technical Report)

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is advancing technical capabilities used in passive loop seals. The “Puck” seal used a set of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements for new passive loop seals published in 2020 as a design guide. The seal is based on an oxygen-sensitive inner mixture encased in an oxygen-impermeable shell, is monolithic rather than two-part, incorporates self-capturing wire features, contains colored water beads and bubbles formed during processing as unique identifiers (UIDs), and visually indicates tamper (whether from seal body penetration or from seal wire removal) by irreversibly changing the seal body from multi-colored to black. This paper will provide details on the design, development, and testing of Puck seal prototypes.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

Safeguards Considerations for Salt Fuel Fabrication

Molten salt reactors (MSR) with liquid fuel present a unique safeguards challenge whereby the current verification techniques have not been evaluated for effectiveness and applicability. While MSR operations have been the subject of prior studies, the front-end liquid fuel preparation activities have not been extensively evaluated. Reviewing the existing resources on fuel fabrication and evaluating the range of fuel fabrication process options available will allow safeguards analysts to identify the applicability of existing safeguards practices, identify gaps in capability, and identify opportunities where safeguards may be applied. There is no existing supplier of fuel salt for MSRs. In an extensive review of MSR technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA's) Nuclear Power Technology Development Section acknowledges the gap in existing capabilities for fuel salt fabrication, noting, simply, “if demand exists, supply will appear.” Salt reactor fuel has not been previously produced on an industrial scale in a non-nuclear weapon state. These characteristics of MSR fuel fabrication present high levels of uncertainty, but they also represent an opportunity to mature safeguards techniques alongside liquid fuel preparation technologies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Direct Air Capture (DAC) Deployment Assessment in Deep Mitigation Pathways Toward 2075 in the U.S.: MARKAL-NETL Modeling Results

Presentation made at the 2024 Annual International Pittsburgh Energy and Carbon Management Conference (PECMC) OCTOBER 7 - 9, 2024 (virtual). The presentation summarized the methodology and results from energy market scenario analyses of the deployment of Direct Air Capture technologies under net-zero CO2 requirements by 2050. The results showed strong deployment of DAC under all scenarios, with increased value of the technology when other CO2 reduction pathways were unavailable or minimized.

Victor, Nadejda↗

DOE OSTI2025

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2024

Identify and Assess Technical Challenges in Safeguards Measurements of Spent Advanced Reactor Fuels

Advanced reactor (AR) designs use various nuclear fuel types that can be significantly different than conventional light-water reactor (LWR) fuels, including differences in sizes, compositions, and chemical forms (e.g., oxide, carbide, metal). Nearly all the proposed AR fuels use high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), which will have higher enrichments (5–20 wt% 235 U) than LWR fuels (currently limited to <5 wt% 235 U). In advance of the wide use of these new fuel types around the world, international safeguards organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA]) are working with some of the AR vendors to formulate safeguards approaches for these AR fuel cycles. As part of the overall safeguards approach, it is important to identify the potential technical challenges in performing safeguards verification measurements of these AR fuels (both fresh and spent fuels) in advance of the widespread adoption of these new fuel types, because new safeguards technologies can take several years to develop, test, and approve for use. This report documents work performed in fiscal year 2024 based on modeling and simulation to assess the performance of the existing safeguards measurement technologies for irradiated or spent AR fuel elements or items. This work is a continuation of the work performed in fiscal year 2023 that focused on fresh AR fuels. Spent AR fuels have a distinct difference from their LWR counterparts: unlike the spent LWR fuels typically stored in a water-filled pool, some spent AR fuels—such as tristructural-isotropic (TRISO)-based fuels—will most likely be stored in air-filled hot cells. Because most safeguards measurements on spent fuel performed to date have been conducted under water, the air-filled hot cell environment could present unique challenges to safeguards measurements. Fork detector (FDET) and Cerenkov viewing device (CVD) systems have been the two primary instruments used by the IAEA for several decades to measure spent LWR fuel assemblies stored in pools for safeguards verification purposes. Because the lower refractive index of air causes Cerenkov light to be of lower intensity in air than in water, existing CVDs are likely unable to perform safeguards verification measurements for spent fuel stored in an air-filled hot cell, as is the case for the TRISO-based spent fuel elements (e.g., pebbles, graphite fuel blocks). Unlike FDET measurements, CVD measurements do not require fuel be moved, so they are a simpler and faster to take than FDET measurements. The inability to perform CVD measurements on the TRISO-based AR fuel types presents a major technical challenge in the effort to use existing technology to perform safeguards measurements on spent AR fuels. This study was mainly conducted through the modeling and simulation of an FDET or an FDET-like system on five spent AR fuel types, including one metallic fuel type and four TRISO-based fuel types in both pebble and graphite block forms in their respective storage configurations and environments. Because the various AR fuel types have significantly different dimensions, FDET systems must be adapted to accommodate them. Partial defect tests were also simulated in this study to assess the FDET’s ability to detect potential fuel diversions. The FDET measures the fuel’s total passive neutron and gamma emissions. The simulated FDET results from spent AR fuel items are compared against results from a typical spent pressurized water reactor (PWR) assembly. High-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma detector measurements were also simulated for the spent AR fuel types and the PWR assembly because the signature photopeaks have been used in LWR safeguards verifications, although HPGe is usually not used to detect diversions because of the fuel’s self-attenuation effects on those photopeaks. The results indicate that these detectors have significant challenges in performing safeguards measurements of the spent AR fuel items, including incompatibilities between AR fuel items and existing FDETs, lower neutron count rates, lower sensitivities to fuel diversions in certain AR fuel items, and significantly higher interference from a neighboring fuel item when the measurement is performed in air. These results suggest that an alternative technology or significant and timely technology development is needed to perform adequate safeguards measurements of some of these AR fuel items.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗