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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2011

The Story Behind the Numbers: Lessons Learned from the Integration of Monitoring Resources in Addressing an ISS Water Quality Anomaly

Beginning in June of 2010 an environmental mystery was unfolding on the International Space Station (ISS). The U.S. Water Processor Assembly (WPA) began to produce water with increasing levels of total organic carbon (TOC). A surprisingly consistent upward TOC trend was observed through weekly in-flight total organic carbon analyzer (TOCA) monitoring. As TOC is a general organics indicator, return of water archive samples was needed to make better-informed crew health decisions and to aid in WPA troubleshooting. TOCA-measured TOC was more than halfway to its health-based screening limit before archive samples could be returned on Soyuz 22 and analyzed. Although TOC was confirmed to be elevated, somewhat surprisingly, none of the typical target compounds were the source. After some solid detective work, it was confirmed that the TOC was associated with a compound known as dimethylsilanediol (DMSD). DMSD is believed to be a breakdown product of silicon-containing compounds present on ISS. A toxicological limit was set for DMSD and a forward plan developed for operations given this new understanding of the source of the TOC. This required extensive coordination with ISS stakeholders and innovative use of available in-flight and archive monitoring resources. Behind the numbers and scientific detail surrounding this anomaly, there exists a compelling story of multi-disciplinary awareness, teamwork, and important environmental lessons learned.

McCoy, Torin↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Engine Hydrogen Flow Control Valve Poppet Breakage

The Main Propulsion System (MPS) uses three Flow Control Valves (FCV) to modulate the flow of pressurant hydrogen gas from the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) to the hydrogen External Tank (ET). This maintains pressure in the ullage volume as the liquid level drops, preserving ET structural integrity and assuring the engines receive a sufficient amount of head pressure. On Space Transportation System (STS)-126 (2009), with only a handful of International Space Station (ISS) assembly flights from the end of the Shuttle program, a portion of a single FCV?s poppet head broke off at about a minute and a half after liftoff. The risk of the poppet head failure is that the increased flow area through the FCV could result in excessive gaseous hydrogen flow back to the external tank, which could result in overboard venting of hydrogen ullage pressure. If the hydrogen venting were to occur in first stage (i.e., lower atmosphere), a flammability hazard exists that could lead to catastrophic loss of crew and vehicle. Other failure risks included particle impact damage to MPS downstream hardware. Although the FCV design had been plagued by contamination-related sluggish valve response problems prior to a redesign at STS-80 (1996), contamination was ruled out as the cause of the STS-126 failure. Employing a combination of enhanced hardware inspection and a better understanding of the consequences of a poppet failure, safe flight rationale for subsequent flights (STS-119 and later) was achieved. This paper deals with the technical lessons learned during the investigation and mitigation of this problem at a time when assembly flights were each in the critical path to Space Station success.

Martinez, Hugo E.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Constellation Program Lessons Learned in the Quantification and Use of Aerodynamic Uncertainty

The NASA Constellation Program has worked for the past five years to develop a re- placement for the current Space Transportation System. Of the elements that form the Constellation Program, only two require databases that define aerodynamic environments and their respective uncertainty: the Ares launch vehicles and the Orion crew and launch abort vehicles. Teams were established within the Ares and Orion projects to provide repre- sentative aerodynamic models including both baseline values and quantified uncertainties. A technical team was also formed within the Constellation Program to facilitate integra- tion among the project elements. This paper is a summary of the collective experience of the three teams working with the quantification and use of uncertainty in aerodynamic environments: the Ares and Orion project teams as well as the Constellation integration team. Not all of the lessons learned discussed in this paper could be applied during the course of the program, but they are included in the hope of benefiting future projects.

Walker, Eric L.↗
NASA NTRS2011

MLAS and LAS: Project Comparison of Lessons Learned

The development of new and safer manned space vehicles is a top priority at NASA. Recently two different approaches of how to accomplish this mission of keeping astronauts safe was successfully demonstrated. With work already underway on an Apollo-like launch abort system for the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), an alternative design concept named the Max Launch Abort System, or MLAS, was developed as a parallel effort. The Orion system, managed by the Constellation office, is based on the design of a single solid launch abort motor in a tower positioned above the capsule. The MLAS design takes a different approach placing the solid launch abort motor underneath the capsule. This effort was led by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). Both escape systems were designed with the Ares I Rocket as the launch vehicle and had the same primary requirement to safely propel a crew module away from any emergency event either on the launch pad or during accent. Beyond these two parameters, there was little else in common between the two projects, except that they both concluded in successful launches that will further promote the development of crew launch abort systems. This presentation will compare both projects from the standpoint of technical requirements; program management and flight test objectives and highlight the synergistic lessons learned by two engineers who worked on each program.

Dittemore, Gary↗
NASA NTRS2011

SRMS History, Evolution and Lessons Learned

Early in the development of the Space Shuttle, it became clear that NASA needed a method of deploying and retrieving payloads from the payload bay. The Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) was developed to fill this need. The 50 foot long robotic arm is an anthropomorphic design consisting of three electromechanical joints, six degrees of freedom, and two boom segments. Its composite boom construction provided a light weight solution needed for space operations. Additionally, a method of capturing payloads with the arm was required and a unique End Effector was developed using an electromechanical snare mechanism. The SRMS is operated using a Displays and Controls Panel and hand controllers located within the aft crew compartment of the shuttle. Although the SRMS was originally conceived to deploy and retrieve payloads, its generic capabilities allowed it to perform many other functions not originally conceived of. Over the years it has been used for deploying and retrieving constrained and free flying payloads, maneuvering and supporting EVA astronauts, satellite repair, International Space Station construction, and as a viewing aid for on-orbit International Space Station operations. After the Columbia accident, a robotically compatible Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) was developed and used in conjunction with the SRMS to scan the Thermal Protection System (TPS) of the shuttle. These scans ensure there is not a breach of the TPS prior to shuttle re-entry. Ground operations and pre mission simulation, analysis and planning played a major role in the success of the SRMS program. A Systems Engineering Simulator (SES) was developed to provide a utility complimentary to open loop engineering simulations. This system provided a closed-loop real-time pilot-driven simulation giving visual feedback, display and control panel interaction, and integration with other vehicle systems, such as GN&C. It has been useful for many more applications than traditional training. Evolution of the simulations, guided by the Math Model Working Group, showed the utility of input from multiple modeling groups with a structured forum for discussion.There were many unique development challenges in the areas of hardware, software, certification, modeling and simulation. Over the years, upgrades and enhancements were implemented to increase the capability, performance and safety of the SRMS. The history and evolution of the SRMS program provided many lessons learned that can be used for future space robotic systems.

Jorgensen, Glenn↗
NASA NTRS2004

Stray Light Lessons Learned from the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter's Optical Navigation Camera

The Optical Navigation Camera (ONC) is a technical demonstration slated to fly on NASA"s Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter in 2005. Conventional navigation methods have reduced accuracy in the days immediately preceding Mars orbit insertion. The resulting uncertainty in spacecraft location limits rover landing sites to relatively safe areas, away from interesting features that may harbor clues to past life on the planet. The ONC will provide accurate navigation on approach for future missions by measuring the locations of the satellites of Mars relative to background stars. Because Mars will be a bright extended object just outside the camera"s field of view, stray light control at small angles is essential. The ONC optomechanical design was analyzed by stray light experts and appropriate baffles were implemented. However, stray light testing revealed significantly higher levels of light than expected at the most critical angles. The primary error source proved to be the interface between ground glass surfaces (and the paint that had been applied to them) and the polished surfaces of the lenses. This paper will describe troubleshooting and correction of the problem, as well as other lessons learned that affected stray light performance.

stray lights↗
NASA NTRS2011

Reusable Solid Rocket Motor - Accomplishment, Lessons, and a Culture of Success

The Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) represents the largest solid rocket motor (SRM) ever flown and the only human-rated solid motor. High reliability of the RSRM has been the result of challenges addressed and lessons learned. Advancements have resulted by applying attention to process control, testing, and postflight through timely and thorough communication in dealing with all issues. A structured and disciplined approach was taken to identify and disposition all concerns. Careful consideration and application of alternate opinions was embraced. Focus was placed on process control, ground test programs, and postflight assessment. Process control is mandatory for an SRM, because an acceptance test of the delivered product is not feasible. The RSRM maintained both full-scale and subscale test articles, which enabled continuous improvement of design and evaluation of process control and material behavior. Additionally RSRM reliability was achieved through attention to detail in post flight assessment to observe any shift in performance. The postflight analysis and inspections provided invaluable reliability data as it enables observation of actual flight performance, most of which would not be available if the motors were not recovered. RSRM reusability offered unique opportunities to learn about the hardware. NASA is moving forward with the Space Launch System that incorporates propulsion systems that takes advantage of the heritage Shuttle and Ares solid motor programs. These unique challenges, features of the RSRM, materials and manufacturing issues, and design improvements will be discussed in the paper.

Moore, D. R.↗
NASA NTRS2011

EMU Lessons Learned Database

As manned space exploration takes on the task of traveling beyond low Earth orbit, many problems arise that must be solved in order to make the journey possible. One major task is protecting humans from the harsh space environment. The current method of protecting astronauts during Extravehicular Activity (EVA) is through use of the specially designed Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). As more rigorous EVA conditions need to be endured at new destinations, the suit will need to be tailored and improved in order to accommodate the astronaut. The Objective behind the EMU Lessons Learned Database(LLD) is to be able to create a tool which will assist in the development of next-generation EMUs, along with maintenance and improvement of the current EMU, by compiling data from Failure Investigation and Analysis Reports (FIARs) which have information on past suit failures. FIARs use a system of codes that give more information on the aspects of the failure, but if one is unfamiliar with the EMU they will be unable to decipher the information. A goal of the EMU LLD is to not only compile the information, but to present it in a user-friendly, organized, searchable database accessible to all familiarity levels with the EMU; both newcomers and veterans alike. The EMU LLD originally started as an Excel database, which allowed easy navigation and analysis of the data through pivot charts. Creating an entry requires access to the Problem Reporting And Corrective Action database (PRACA), which contains the original FIAR data for all hardware. FIAR data are then transferred to, defined, and formatted in the LLD. Work is being done to create a web-based version of the LLD in order to increase accessibility to all of Johnson Space Center (JSC), which includes converting entries from Excel to the HTML format. FIARs related to the EMU have been completed in the Excel version, and now focus has shifted to expanding FIAR data in the LLD to include EVA tools and support hardware such as the Pistol Grip Tool (PGT) and the Battery Charger Module (BCM), while adding any recently closed EMU-related FIARs.

Matthews, Kevin M., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Conducting Planetary Field Geology on EVA: Lessons from the 2010 DRATS Geologist Crewmembers

In order to prepare for the next phase of planetary surface exploration, the Desert Research and Technology Studies (DRATS) field program seeks to test the next generation of technology needed to explore other surfaces. The 2010 DRATS 14-day field campaign focused on the simultaneous operation of two habitatable rovers, or Space Exploration Vehicles (SEVs). Each rover was crewed by one astronaut/commander and one geologist, with a change in crews on day seven of the mission. This shift change allowed for eight crew members to test the DRATS technology and operational protocols [1,2]. The insights presented in this abstract represent the crew s thoughts on lessons learned from this field season, as well as potential future testing concepts.

Young, Kelsey E.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Lessons Learned during Thermal Hardware Integration on the Global Precipitation Measurement Satellite

The Global Precipitation Measurement mission is a joint NASA/JAXA mission scheduled for launch in late 2013. The integration of thermal hardware onto the satellite began in the Fall of 2010 and will continue through the Summer of 2012. The thermal hardware on the mission included several constant conductance heat pipes, heaters, thermostats, thermocouples radiator coatings and blankets. During integration several problems arose and insights were gained that would help future satellite integrations. Also lessons learned from previous missions were implemented with varying degrees of success. These insights can be arranged into three categories. 1) the specification of flight hardware using analysis results and the available mechanical resources. 2) The integration of thermal flight hardware onto the spacecraft, 3) The preparation and implementation of testing the thermal flight via touch tests, resistance measurements and thermal vacuum testing.

Cottingham, Christine↗
NASA NTRS2012

VIIRS On-Orbit Optical Anomaly - Investigation, Analysis, Root Cause Determination and Lessons Learned

A gradual, but persistent, decrease in the optical throughput was detected during the early commissioning phase for the Suomi National Polar-Orbiting Partnership (SNPP) Visible Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) Near Infrared (NIR) bands. Its initial rate and unknown cause were coincidently coupled with a decrease in sensitivity in the same spectral wavelength of the Solar Diffuser Stability Monitor (SDSM) raising concerns about contamination or the possibility of a system-level satellite problem. An anomaly team was formed to investigate and provide recommendations before commissioning could resume. With few hard facts in hand, there was much speculation about possible causes and consequences of the degradation. Two different causes were determined as will be explained in this paper. This paper will describe the build and test history of VIIRS, why there were no indicators, even with hindsight, of an on-orbit problem, the appearance of the on-orbit anomaly, the initial work attempting to understand and determine the cause, the discovery of the root cause and what Test-As-You-Fly (TAYF) activities, can be done in the future to greatly reduce the likelihood of similar optical anomalies. These TAYF activities are captured in the lessons learned section of this paper.

Iona, Glenn↗
NASA NTRS2012

CloudSat Anomaly Recovery and Operational Lessons Learned

In April 2011, NASA's pioneering cloud profiling radar satellite, CloudSat, experienced a battery anomaly that placed it into emergency mode and rendered it operations incapable. All initial attempts to recover the spacecraft failed as the resultant power limitations could not support even the lowest power mode. Originally part of a six-satellite constellation known as the "A-Train", CloudSat was unable to stay within its assigned control box, posing a threat to other A-Train satellites. CloudSat needed to exit the constellation, but with the tenuous power profile, conducting maneuvers was very risky. The team was able to execute a complex sequence of operations which recovered control, conducted an orbit lower maneuver, and returned the satellite to safe mode, within one 65 minute sunlit period. During the course of the anomaly recovery, the team developed several bold, innovative operational strategies. Details of the investigation into the root-cause and the multiple approaches to revive CloudSat are examined. Satellite communication and commanding during the anomaly are presented. A radical new system of "Daylight Only Operations" (DO-OP) was developed, which cycles the payload and subsystem components off in tune with earth eclipse entry and exit in order to maintain positive power and thermal profiles. The scientific methodology and operational results behind the graduated testing and ramp-up to DO-OP are analyzed. In November 2011, the CloudSat team successfully restored the vehicle to consistent operational collection of cloud radar data during sunlit portions of the orbit. Lessons learned throughout the six-month return-to-operations recovery effort are discussed and offered for application to other R&D satellites, in the context of on-orbit anomaly resolution efforts.

cloud profiling radar satellite↗
NASA NTRS2012

Antarctic Exploration Parallels for Future Human Planetary Exploration: Science Operations Lessons Learned, Planning, and Equipment Capabilities for Long Range, Long Duration Traverses

The purpose for this workshop can be summed up by the question: Are there relevant analogs to planetary (meaning the Moon and Mars) to be found in polar exploration on Earth? The answer in my opinion is yes or else there would be no reason for this workshop. However, I think some background information would be useful to provide a context for my opinion on this matter. As all of you are probably aware, NASA has been set on a path that, in its current form, will eventually lead to putting human crews on the surface of the Moon and Mars for extended (months to years) in duration. For the past 50 V 60 years, starting not long after the end of World War II, exploration of the Antarctic has accumulated a significant body of experience that is highly analogous to our anticipated activities on the Moon and Mars. This relevant experience base includes: h Long duration (1 year and 2 year) continuous deployments by single crews, h Established a substantial outpost with a single deployment event to support these crews, h Carried out long distance (100 to 1000 kilometer) traverses, with and without intermediate support h Equipment and processes evolved based on lessons learned h International cooperative missions This is not a new or original thought; many people within NASA, including the most recent two NASA Administrators, have commented on the recognizable parallels between exploration in the Antarctic and on the Moon or Mars. But given that level of recognition, relatively little has been done, that I am aware of, to encourage these two exploration communities to collaborate in a significant way. [Slide 4] I will return to NASA s plans and the parallels with Antarctic traverses in a moment, but I want to spend a moment to explain the objective of this workshop and the anticipated products. We have two full days set aside for this workshop. This first day will be taken up with a series of presentations prepared by individuals with experience that extends back as far as the late 1940s and includes contemporary experience. The people presenting bring a variety of points of view, including not only U.S. but international, although most, if not all, have collaborated on international teams. The second day will consist of a series of small focused group interactions centered on those elements likely to be needed for traverse missions, such as mobility, habitation, and extravehicular activity (EVA, aka space suits). Our invited participants will be talking with people that specialize in these elements so that we can foster more direct interaction and exchange of experiences between these two exploration communities. After the workshop we will be preparing a report documenting these presentations and the essence of the focused interactions.

Hoffman, Stephen J.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Lessons Learned in the Specification, Purchase, Validation and Final Installation Process of a Replacement PCM Bit Synchronizer

This paper intends to describe the lessons learned while specifying validating and installing a bit sync to replace the 30 year old Aydin Model 335a PCM bit sync used in the Space Shuttle Launch Control Center. The engineer had to analyze the original requirements and specifications and then create new requirements documentation that more correctly described our needs. One issue to consider was the removal of unnecessary requirements such as various data formats when only one format is used. The conversion to a system that no longer has an assortment of analog rotary switches required retraining of the operators. Finally, post-procurement corrections for undisclosed user requirements and missed design requirements required close contact with a manufacturer who was willing to accommodate the changes.

Price, Richard N.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Human-in-the-Loop Operations over Time Delay: NASA Analog Missions Lessons Learned

Teams at NASA have conducted studies of time-delayed communications as it effects human exploration. In October 2012, the Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Analog Missions project conducted a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) with the primary stakeholders to share information and experiences of studying time delay, to build a coherent picture of how studies are covering the problem domain, and to determine possible forward plans (including how to best communicate study results and lessons learned, how to inform future studies and mission plans, and how to drive potential development efforts). This initial meeting s participants included personnel from multiple NASA centers (HQ, JSC, KSC, ARC, and JPL), academia, and ESA. It included all of the known studies, analog missions, and tests of time delayed communications dating back to the Apollo missions including NASA Extreme Environment Mission Operations (NEEMO), Desert Research and Technology Studies (DRATS/RATS), International Space Station Test-bed for Analog Research (ISTAR), Pavilion Lake Research Project (PLRP), Mars 520, JPL Mars Orbiters/Rovers, Advanced Mission Operations (AMO), Devon Island analog missions, and Apollo experiences. Additionally, the meeting attempted to capture all of the various functional perspectives via presentations by disciplines including mission operations (flight director and mission planning), communications, crew, Capcom, Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA), Behavioral Health and Performance (BHP), Medical/Surgeon, Science, Education and Public Outreach (EPO), and data management. The paper summarizes the descriptions and results from each of the activities discussed at the TIM and includes several recommendations captured in the meeting for dealing with time delay in human exploration along with recommendations for future development and studies to address this issue.

Rader, Steven N.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Direct Imaging of Extra-Solar Planets in Star Forming Regions: Lessons Learned from a False Positive Around IM Lup

Context. Most exoplanet imagers consist of ground-based adaptive optics coronagraphic cameras which are currently limited in contrast, sensitivity and astrometric precision, but advantageously observe in the near-infrared window (1 5 m). Because of these practical limitations, our current observational aim at detecting and characterizing planets puts heavy constraints on target selection, observing strategies, data reduction, and follow-up. Most surveys so far have thus targeted young systems (1 100 Myr) to catch the putative remnant thermal radiation of giant planets, which peaks in the near-infrared. They also favor systems in the solar neighborhood (d less than 80 pc), which eases angular resolution requirements but also ensures a good knowledge of the distance and proper motion, which are critical to secure the planet status, and enable subsequent characterization. Aims. Because of their youth, it is very tempting to target the nearby star forming regions, which are typically twice as far as the bulk of objects usually combed for planets by direct imaging. Probing these interesting reservoirs sets additional constraints that we review in this paper by presenting the planet search that we initiated in 2008 around the disk-bearing T Tauri star IM Lup, which is part of the Lupus star forming region (140-190 pc). Methods. We show and discuss why age determination, the choice of evolutionary model for both the central star and the planet, precise knowledge of the host star proper motion, relative or absolute (between different instruments) astrometric accuracy (including plate scale calibration), and patience are the key ingredients for exoplanet searches around more distant young stars. Results. Unfortunately, most of the time, precision and perseverance are not paying off: we discovered a candidate companion around IM Lup in 2008, which we report here to be an unbound background object. We nevertheless review in details the lessons learned from our endeavor, and additionally present the best detection limits ever calculated for IM Lup. We also accessorily report on the successful use of innovative data reduction techniques, such as the damped-LOCI and iterative roll subtraction.

D Mawet↗