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At least 487 records · Page 27

2020 Postclosure Groundwater Monitoring and Inspection Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 443

This report presents the groundwater monitoring data collected by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) from the Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA), Nevada, Site, Subsurface Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 443 in Nye County, Nevada (Figure 1). The CNTA is the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968 that resulted in residual contamination near the detonation depth of 3200 feet (ft); the contamination requires long-term monitoring. Responsibility for the environmental restoration and long-term monitoring was transferred from DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Field Office, to LM on October 1, 2006. The environmental restoration and site closure process were completed in 2015 in accordance with the amended 1996 Nevada Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (State of Nevada et al. 1996, as amended) and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The Closure Report, Central Nevada Test Area, Subsurface Corrective Action, Unit 443 (DOE 2018), also called the Closure Report, originally was completed in January 2016 and revised in October 2018; it describes LM’s plan for long-term postclosure monitoring. This includes monitoring of the radioisotopes of interest and water elevations, inspecting the site and maintaining the institutional controls (ICs), evaluating and reporting data, and documenting the site’s records and data management processes (DOE 2018).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Global Nuclear Explosion Discrimination Using a Convolutional Neural Network

Using P-wave seismograms, we trained a seismic source classifier using a Convolutional Neural Network. We trained for three classes: earthquake P-wave, underground nuclear explosion (UNE) P-wave, and noise. With the current absence of nuclear testing by countries that have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, high quality seismic data from UNEs is limited. Even with limited training data, our model can accurately characterize most events recorded at regional and teleseismic distances, finding over 95% signals in the validation set. We applied the model on holdout datasets of the North Korean test explosions to evaluate the performance on unique region and station-source pairs, with promising results. Additionally, we tested on the Source Physics Experiment events to investigate the potential for chemical explosions to act as a surrogate for nuclear explosions. We anticipate that machine-learning models like our classifier system can have broad application for other seismic signals including volcanic and non-volcanic tremor, anomalous earthquakes, ice-quakes or landslide-quakes.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Extraction of Xenon using Enriching Reflux Pressure Swing Adsorption

Measuring radioactive xenon isotopes in the atmosphere is an important technique used for monitoring within the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Several process steps are needed to capture and prepare a xenon sample suitable for transfer to a nuclear detector. These processes include air drying, xenon collection, concentration and purification. The ideal xenon sampling system would be small, have low power consumption, not use consumables (such as helium gas or liquid nitrogen) and be fully automated, robust and dependable. Due to the low concentration of xenon in the air, the most energy intensive part of the gas processing is the first stage collection and concentration. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has developed a batch mode enriching-reflux pressure-swing-adsorption (ER-PSA) process that shows promise as a xenon collection and concentration technique. The development of this process was guided by finite element models of the process chemistry. The modeling showed minimizing the xenon dispersion in the adsorption columns is critical to achieving a good separation. Prior to hardware construction, models were used to determine appropriate trap dimensions, adsorbent particle size and optimum process variables such as cycle steps, step times, and flow rates. A bench top ER-PSA unit was constructed and testing under various operating conditions has begun. The results obtained in these initial parametric experiments have provided insight into the physics of the process and have refined the mathematical models. The combination of modeling and experiment provides a better understanding of process physics than either experiment or models alone. The bench top system has demonstrated room temperature collection of xenon with a xenon enrichment of 1000 (starting from air) with a modest pressure ratio of 7-10 resulting in an energy efficient separation technique. The technique does not use exotic adsorbents, cryogenic temperatures or high pressure compressors, enabling a small, low power and robust system. This ER-PSA process is an enabling technology for small energy efficient xenon collectors, desirable qualities for next generation international xenon systems.

Williams, Richard M.↗

Execution of an Alternative Modeling Strategy for Closure of the Rainier Mesa Corrective Action Unit at the Nevada National Security Site - 19099

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project of the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) is investigating radionuclide contaminant movements in groundwater derived from a decades-long period of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to support regulatory corrective action and closure requirements. The project is built around an integrated campaign of drilling and sampling, data interpretation, computer modeling, and broader monitoring activities conducted under a joint Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (1996 as amended) (FFACO) between the State of Nevada, the DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense. The FFACO strategy is applied to individual Corrective Action Units (CAUs) that roughly envelop disparate geographic testing areas at the NNSS. The Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RMSM) CAU is a geologically and hydrologically complex system lying in a remote up-gradient section of the NNSS. It was the site of 67 underground tests conducted between 1957 and 1992, 61 at Rainier Mesa proper, and 6 at Shoshone Mountain, isolated to its south. The original strategy to close the RMSM CAU required a simulation-based investigation to define the evolution of contaminated volumes of groundwater (in 3D) under uncertainty as a means to define a surface-projected contaminant boundary and to serve as a basis for longer term monitoring activities. Early models developed under this strategy proved to be quite complex and difficult to calibrate. Additional costs required to better characterize the system were judged to be out of balance with the low risks associated with this particular CAU. As a result, an Alternative Modeling Strategy (AMS) was adopted. The AMS removes the requirement for developing ensembles of 3D simulations and replaces it with a simpler one requiring the generation of multiple 1D streamline models. These are meant to encompass a range of alternative, yet plausible release and transport scenarios as a means to bound the overall lateral extent of contaminant transport. This paper will review the modeling approach developed under the AMS and its application to the Rainier Mesa portion of the CAU. Preliminary model results made under different parametric assumptions and boundary condition scenarios will be presented. Additional refinements of the model and its further application will be discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Analysis of Transient Groundwater Flow Near the Cheshire Test at Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

This report focuses on analysis and determination of the causes of transient water levels measured between 1964 and 2017 near the Cheshire underground nuclear test, which was detonated on February 14, 1976 in Area 20 (USDOE, 2015) of the Pahute Mesa (PM) testing areas of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) located in southern Nevada (Figure 1). Transient water levels near Cheshire indicate influences of a water-production well and yet-unexplained water level rise attributed to testing effects (Jackson and Fenelon, 2018; Jackson et al. 2021). Transient groundwater flow is relevant to the implementation of the hydrologic source term (HST), which prescribes the quantity and release rates of radionuclide source terms to be applied at individual test locations in assessment of regional-scale radionuclide transport (Carle and Tompson, 2021; Carle et al., 2021), as previously investigated for NNSS testing areas at PM (Pawloski et al., 2001), Frenchman Flat (Carle et al, 2007), Yucca Flat (Mcnab, 2009; Tompson, 2009), and Rainier Mesa (Carle, 2011; Tompson et al., 2011).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Analysis of Transient Groundwater Flow Near the Cheshire Test at Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site

This report focuses on analysis and determination of the causes of transient water levels measured between 1964 and 2017 near the Cheshire underground nuclear test, which was detonated on February 14, 1976 in Area 20 (USDOE, 2015b) of the Pahute Mesa (PM) testing areas of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) located in southern Nevada (Figure 1). Transient water levels near Cheshire indicate influences of a water-production well and yet-unexplained water level rise attributed to testing effects (Jackson and Fenelon, 2018; Jackson et al. 2021). Transient groundwater flow is relevant to the implementation of the hydrologic source term (HST), which prescribes the quantity and release rates of radionuclide source terms to be applied at individual test locations in assessment of regional-scale radionuclide transport (Carle and Tompson, 2021; Carle et al., 2021), as previously investigated for NNSS testing areas at PM (Pawloski et al., 2001), Frenchman Flat (Carle et al, 2007), Yucca Flat (Carle et al., 2009; Mcnab, 2009; Tompson et al., 2009), and Rainier Mesa (Carle, 2011; Tompson et al., 2011).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Iridium an Important Neutron Flux Monitor

Iridium has been used for decades at Los Alamos as a fluence monitor in underground nuclear testing. Iridium can be used to monitor three neutron spectral groups at once, thermal/epithermal, 14 MeV, and fission spectrum (>2 MeV). The nuclear reaction Ir-193(n,n')Ir- 193m has not had a model independent cross section, until recently. The first measurement of the cross section was made last fall at the Berkeley HFNG.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 2

This revision was prepared to document changes to the data-collection activities. Specifically, the drilling and completion of the wells have been revised, and enhancements to the surface geophysics measurements have been included. Corrective action is needed because underground radioactive contamination exists in these areas resulting from historic underground nuclear testing. The PM CAUs are located in the northwestern portion of the Nevada National Security Site and comprise 82 corrective action sites. A total of 85 underground nuclear detonations took place within the area covered by the PM CAUs between 1965 and 1992 and resulted in the release of radionuclides in the subsurface in the vicinity of the test cavities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev. 1)

This corrective action decision document (CADD)/corrective action plan (CAP) has been prepared for the Central and Western Pahute Mesa (PM) Corrective Action Units (CAUs) 101 and 102. Corrective action is needed because underground radioactive contamination exists in these areas resulting from historic underground nuclear testing. The PM CAUs are located in the northwestern portion of the Nevada National Security Site and comprise 82 corrective action sites. A total of 85 underground nuclear detonations took place within the area covered by the PM CAUs between 1965 and 1992 and resulted in the release of radionuclides (RNs) in the subsurface in the vicinity of the test cavities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

CY2018 Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (January 2018–December 2018, Revision 1)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the URs remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2018. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. Tritium concentrations in both of these wells, RNM-2S and UE-5n, remain above the Safe Drinking Water Act maximum contaminant level of 20,000 picocuries per liter but declined in 2018 as compared to measurements in 2017. All other contaminants of concern are below the minimum detection level plus analytical error. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2018 is generally consistent with recent measurements for all wells. Many wells continue to exhibit a long-term downward trend in water level, despite small increases in measured water levels in 2018. The sharp 2016 decline in water level in Well ER-5-3-2 remains unexplained, with the lower level persisting through 2018. Rising water-level trends continue to be observed in two relatively deep wells (ER-5-3 deep piezometer and ER-5-4-2), and also in former supply Well WW-5A. The current supply wells exhibit relatively erratic water levels associated with pumping activities. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Software enhancements to the IVSEM model of the CTBTO IMS.

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) developed the Integrated Verification System Evaluation Model (IVSEM) to estimate the performance of the International Monitoring System (IMS) operated by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). IVSEM was developed in several phases between 1995 and 2000. The model was developed in FORTRAN with an IDL-based user interface and was compiled for Windows and UNIX operating systems. Continuing interest in this analysis capability, coupled with numerous advances in desktop computer hardware and software since IVSEM was written, enabled significant improvements to IVSEM run-time performance and data analysis capabilities. These improvements were implemented externally without modifying the FORTRAN executables, which had been previously verified. This paper describes the parallelization approach developed to significantly reduce IVSEM run-times and the new test setup and analysis tools developed to facilitate better IVSEM operation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: (CY2017 January 2017–December 2017, Rev. 0)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the URs remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2017. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. The 86,000-picocuries-per-liter (pCi/L) tritium concentration in one of the wells is about 12 percent higher than measured in 2016 but is over an order of magnitude less than the peak value measured in the well in 1980. The concentration in the other source/plume well is lower than measured in 2016. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2017 is generally consistent with recent measurements for most wells. Water-level declines differing from long-term trends were observed in four wells. Three of these (WW-4, WW-4A, and WW-5B) are water-supply wells that experienced increases in pumping during the year. No definitive cause for the sharp decline in the fourth well (ER-5-3-2) in 2016 is known as yet. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Case Study Analyses of Radionuclide Transport in Variably Saturated Media at Rainier Mesa

This document presents a series of six case study analyses of groundwater flow and contaminant transport in the subsurface formations underlying the Rainier Mesa (RM) testing area at the NNSS. The analyses are designed to assess the potential over a 1,000-year period for radionuclide contamination derived from underground nuclear tests at RM to enter and migrate in saturated groundwater underlying the testing areas. The radionuclide source zones at RM consist of individual test centers corresponding to 62 unique detonations conducted in 2 shafts and 11 tunnel complexes; the E-, N-, and T-Tunnel pond systems that captured contaminated water discharged from these tunnel complexes (and continue to do so in the case of E-Tunnel); and the contaminated N- and T-Tunnel “reservoirs” that formed behind plugs installed between 1992 and 1994 to block subsequent contaminant losses into the N- and T-Tunnel ponds.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Area 6 Control Point: An Architectural Survey of the Area 6 Control Point, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) proposes to demolish five buildings and five accessory resources in the Area 6 Control Point at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The demolition and removal of the buildings and accessories constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. The buildings and accessories were recorded in Identification and Evaluation of 14 Architectural Resources Scheduled for Demolition, Area 6 Control Point and Vicinity, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2020). The report found that the five buildings were not individually eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) but were potentially eligible as contributing elements to an unrecorded Area 6 Control Point district. The report also found that the five accessory resources were not individually eligible for the NRHP but they contributed to other historic properties, including the contributing elements to the unrecorded district. Finally, the report found that the undertaking would result in an adverse effect to historic properties. The State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings regarding the eligibility of the buildings and structures in the Area of Potential Effect (APE) and that the undertaking would result in an adverse effect (Reed 2020). The NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, then developed the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-21NA25543 Between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Demolition of Fourteen Buildings and Structures in Area 6 of the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, hereafter referred to as the MOA. The MOA stipulates that a district boundary be delineated with an accompanying boundary report and supporting photographs (Stipulation III.A) followed by an architectural survey of the potential historic district (Stipulation III.B). The SHPO reviewed and concurred with the proposed district boundary and accompanying boundary report and photographs (O’Neill et al. 2021) on August 23, 2021, in fulfillment of Stipulation III.A (Reed 2021). This architectural survey report has been prepared in accordance with Stipulation III.B. It includes an NRHP evaluation of the district, identifies contributing and non-contributing elements, and is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms. The NRHP evaluation concludes that the Area 6 Control Point is recommended eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s Significance Criterion A at the national level as the location of the command center and various support facilities directly related to timing and firing operations for nuclear testing on the NNSS from 1951 to 1992. It is also recommended eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characteristics of a nuclear command center in the context of the Cold War and as a significant and distinguishable entity. There are a total of 29 primary resources within the district boundary. Of these, 28 are recommended as contributing elements to the Area 6 Control Point Historic District and one is recommended as non-contributing.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

MARVEL Reactor Fuel Performance Report (Rev.2)

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and EvaLuation (MARVEL) project is producing a high temperature liquid metal-cooled nuclear test bed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to ultimately improve the integration of microreactors to end-user applications. This ambitious effort seeks to design, authorize, construct, test, and operate the reactor within five years. In order to construct and operate the MARVEL reactor in a timely manner, the system will utilize materials and component designs which have already been used, qualified, or licensed from previous reactors. The MARVEL reactor will be located at the INL Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) facility in the north high-bay equipment pit and will use the existing 304 stainless steel-clad U-ZrH1.6 pin-type fuel system developed by General Atomics and purchased from TRIGA International. This fuel has been previously qualified under the United States Department of Energy’s (US DOE) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program. Even though the regulator of the MARVEL reactor is the US DOE, the standards and overall approach recommended by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is well-defined and utilized here. Following NUREG-1537 regulatory guidance, this report documents the authorization case for the MARVEL fuel system’s application to MARVEL and establishes stable and predictable fuel performance during the most thermophysically unfavorable conditions achievable in the MARVEL reactor. To that end, this report provides a comprehensive survey of the known thermophysical properties, performance, and quantitative relationships associated with the MARVEL reactor fuel element and uses this information to determine its mechanical integrity and risk of reaching unacceptable conditions during the most extreme accident scenarios predicted for the reactor using the most conservative assumptions available. The information contained herein is compiled from a combination of historical reports and peer reviewed scientific publication manuscripts. Known mechanisms under which the fuel is susceptible to failure are highlighted and compared to conditions that could exist in the MARVEL reactor during an unanticipated transient or accident scenario. The two scenarios considered for analysis in this report are (1) an unprotected loss of flow accident and (2) a hypothetical unprotected loss of coolant accident during the loss of flow accident. Preliminary 2D steady-state analyses herein indicate that both fuel-cladding chemical interactions and fuel-cladding mechanical interactions are negligible throughout the fuel’s operational cycle under both normal and high temperature accident scenario conditions. Although higher fidelity 3D time-dependent modeling and simulations are planned, the following may be concluded presently. The MARVEL fuel element maintains its geometric stability and structural integrity during the most extreme accident scenarios predicted for the MARVEL reactor. The hoop stress during the unprotected loss of flow accident reaches about -1.27 MPa; this negative stress indicates that it is compressive rather than tensile. The compressive stress is a result of the NaK pressure on the outside of the fuel element, caused by the restricted thermal expansion of the NaK coolant, exceeding the internal pressures generated inside of the fuel element. The hoop stress generated in the cladding during the unprotected loss of coolant accident reaches a maximum of about approximately 10 MPa, which is nearly an order of magnitude less than the predicted yield strength of the cladding under high-temperature accident scenario conditions. Calculations were compared with results from high performance computational simulations using BISON and are in very close agreement. A conservative MARVEL fuel meat peak temperature limit of 900 °C is recommended presently, which is about 180 °C higher than the peak fuel temperature predicted to occur during the most extreme accident. Based on the known properties and behavior of the MARVEL fuel element, the fuel successfully meets its design and safety requirements under normal and most extreme accident conditions with a large safety margin.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MARVEL Reactor Fuel Performance Report

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and EvaLuation (MARVEL) project is producing a high temperature liquid metal-cooled nuclear test bed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to ultimately improve the integration of microreactors to end-user applications. This ambitious effort seeks to design, authorize, construct, test, and operate the reactor within five years. In order to construct and operate the MARVEL reactor in a timely manner, the system will utilize materials and component designs which have already been used, qualified, or licensed from previous reactors. The MARVEL reactor will be located at the INL Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) facility in the north high-bay equipment pit and will use the existing 304 stainless steel-clad U-ZrH1.6 pin-type fuel system developed by General Atomics and purchased from TRIGA International. This fuel has been previously qualified under the United States Department of Energy’s (US DOE) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program. Even though the regulator of the MARVEL reactor is the US DOE, the standards and overall approach recommended by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is well-defined and utilized here. Following NUREG-1537 regulatory guidance, this report documents the authorization case for the MARVEL fuel system’s application to MARVEL and establishes stable and predictable fuel performance during the most thermophysically unfavorable conditions achievable in the MARVEL reactor. To that end, this report provides a comprehensive survey of the known thermophysical properties, performance, and quantitative relationships associated with the MARVEL reactor fuel element and uses this information to determine its mechanical integrity and risk of reaching unacceptable conditions during the most extreme accident scenarios predicted for the reactor using the most conservative assumptions available. The information contained herein is compiled from a combination of historical reports and peer reviewed scientific publication manuscripts. Known mechanisms under which the fuel is susceptible to failure are highlighted and compared to conditions that could exist in the MARVEL reactor during an unanticipated transient or accident scenario. The two scenarios considered for analysis in this report are (1) an unprotected loss of flow accident and (2) a hypothetical unprotected loss of coolant accident during the loss of flow accident. Preliminary 2D steady-state analyses herein indicate that both fuel-cladding chemical interactions and fuel-cladding mechanical interactions are negligible throughout the fuel’s operational cycle under both normal and high temperature accident scenario conditions. Although higher fidelity 3D time-dependent modeling and simulations are planned, the following may be concluded presently. The MARVEL fuel element maintains its geometric stability and structural integrity during the most extreme accident scenarios predicted for the MARVEL reactor. The hoop stress during the unprotected loss of flow accident reaches about -1.27 MPa; this negative stress indicates that it is compressive rather than tensile. The compressive stress is a result of the NaK pressure on the outside of the fuel element, caused by the restricted thermal expansion of the NaK coolant, exceeding the internal pressures generated inside of the fuel element. The hoop stress generated in the cladding during the unprotected loss of coolant accident reaches a maximum of about approximately 10 MPa, which is nearly an order of magnitude less than the predicted yield strength of the cladding under high-temperature accident scenario conditions. Calculations were compared with results from high performance computational simulations using BISON and are in very close agreement. A conservative MARVEL fuel meat peak temperature limit of 900 °C is recommended presently, which is about 180 °C higher than the peak fuel temperature predicted to occur during the most extreme accident. Based on the known properties and behavior of the MARVEL fuel element, the fuel successfully meets its design and safety requirements under normal and most extreme accident conditions with a large safety margin.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Calendar Year 2016 (January 2016–December 2016), Revision 1

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the UR boundaries remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2016. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. The tritium concentration in both wells is slowly decreasing. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2016 in all wells is consistent with recent measurements. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗