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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 487 records · Page 27
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Examining Thermolytic Production of Hydrogen from Lubrication Oil

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested by Savannah River Remediation (SRR) to conduct testing via Technical Task Request (HR) to determine the thermolytic HGR of Mobil SHC™ 630, a lubrication oil. Currently, 35 gallons of contaminated Mobil SHC 630 is proposed for release into the recycle stream from the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) to Tank 22 and then to the 242-16H (2H) Evaporator system. Inhibited recycle waste in the Recycle Collection Tank (RCT) is transferred to Recycle Pump Tank (RPT) in the Low Point Pump Pit (LPPP) and then to the Concentration, Storage and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) H-area. The lubrication oil would be added directly to the RPT, bypassing the RCT. The current DWPF waste compliance plan for liquid transfers from the RCT to the CSTF limits the concentration of Mobil SHC 630 to <1,100 ppm which is equal to <9.3 gallons of Mobil SHC 630 when considering a 7,500 gal RCT batch with an initial Mobil SHC 630 concentration of 42 mg/L. Mobil SHC 630 is expected to be largely immiscible in the caustic aqueous waste stream. It is a blend of base oils including polyalphaolefin (PAO) base oil and additives such as triphenylphosphate and cresyl diphenyl phosphate at various concentrations (<0.25 wt%). While the base oils are expected to be largely unreactive in CSTF waste, the triarylphosphates additives would be expected to hydrolyze in the caustic waste, forming diarylphosphates and phenol. The tests described herein were governed by a single Run Plan and will determine thermolytic HGR from the caustic aqueous solution, as well as from any organic phases present.

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DOE OSTI2025

Literature Review Investigating Historical Plutonium Solubility in SRS Tank Waste

The Savannah River Site (SRS) has designed the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program to accelerate the de-inventory of L-Basin and accelerate the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) disposition mission. Similarly, the H-Canyon facility at SRS is reestablishing the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver for dissolving unirradiated stainless-steel (SS) clad Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel. In both discard types (ABD and FCA), plutonium is present and its complex solubility when composited to Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF) sludge is being investigated as it may have downstream impacts to the liquid waste (LW) organization. This literature review aims to highlight and compile the existing literature on plutonium solubility in waste streams relevant to ABD and FCA discards, as well as discuss some considerations in analyzing solubility data of plutonium. This review serves to help define the analysis methods for future experiments involving plutonium (and other actinides) and in designing appropriate testing conditions surrounding these studies. This review is broken up into five parts and will discuss: (i) The possible effects of testing hold time and temperature on plutonium solubility, (ii) the influence of neutralization rate and particle size of freshly precipitated discards, (iii) the coprecipitation of plutonium with iron and uranium, (iv) predictive solubility modeling and the influence of supernate anions on solubility, and (v) the speciation of plutonium in solutionas a result of supernate anions.

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DOE OSTI2020

Overview of 2016 through 2018 Testing of Air-Purifying Respirator (APR) Cartridge Performance on Multiple Hanford Tank Headspaces and Exhausters

Between 2016 and 2018, 28 air purifying respirator (APR) cartridge tests were performed on headspace vapors from seven Hanford waste storage tanks (SY-102, A-101, BY-108, AX-101, BY-110, SX-101, and SX-104) and seven waste tank exhausters (AP in 2016, AP in 2018, 702-AZ, AN and AW in 2016, and AX and 702-AZ in 2017). All but two tests were conducted under static conditions absent waste-disturbing activities in the subject tanks or tank farms. The two exceptions were cartridges tested with vapors from 702-AZ in 2017 when samples were taken during waste-disturbing activities. Multipurpose APR cartridges, SCOTT 7422-SD1 and 7422-SC1, were tested on samples from each of the 14 tanks or exhausters. Out of 612 Chemicals of Potential Concern (COPCs), only ammonia, mercury, N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), 2,5-dimethylfuran, 2,5-dihydrofuran, furan, and 1,3-butadiene exhibited breakthroughs with outlet concentrations that were >10% of their Occupational Exposure Limits (OEL).

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DOE OSTI2024

Regulatory Spike Testing of RPP-WTP LAW and HLW Glasses for Compliance with Land Disposal Restrictions, VSL-03R3760-1, Rev. 1

The United States Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Hanford site is the current location of storage of about 50 million gallons of mixed waste. This waste is stored in underground tanks at the Hanford site and is both a listed and characteristic waste, as defined in 40 CFR Part 261, and a dangerous waste according to Chapter 173-303 of the Washington Administrative Code (WAC). The waste is also subject to the Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) (40 CFR Part 268 and WAC 173-303-140). The River Protection Project - Waste Treatment Plant (RPP-WTP) will provide DOE with a means for treating this waste by vitrification (for subsequent disposal). The tank waste will be partitioned into low and high activity fractions, which will then be vitrified respectively into Immobilized Low Activity Waste (ILAW) and Immobilized High Level Waste (IHLW) products. The ILAW product will be disposed of in an engineered facility on the Hanford site while the IHLW product will be directed to the national deep geological disposal facility for high level nuclear waste. The ILAW and IHLW products must meet a variety of requirements with respect to protection of the environment.

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DOE OSTI2024

Sampling and Analysis Plan for LSL2 Underground Storage Tank Evaluation of PFAS in Soil: Protection of Groundwater

This SAP gathers all pertinent information relevant to the sampling and analysis of soil at the removal site for a former 10,000-gallon UST and reference sites in the vicinity of the excavation site. Data Quality Objectives establishes the process and steps for the acquisition of data. Data Flow Diagram establishes the decisions and next steps. Quality Assurance Project Plan establishes the quality requirements for data collection, including planning, implementation, and assessment of sampling, field measurements, and laboratory analysis. The work is being completed for DOE-SC Pacific Northwest Site Office.

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DOE OSTI2021

Characterization of Infrequent Samples from the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility: F-Area Pump Pit 3 (FPP-3) Sump Sample: December 2021 Sample

In December 2021, SRR-E sent an ~185 mL sample identified as FPP-3 from a F-Area pump pit sump to SRNL for analysis. The sample was pale yellow in color and contained a small amount of suspended solids visually estimated to be less than 1% by volume. SRNL analysis indicated that the sample contained 4.4 E+05 dpm/mL Cs-137, 6.2 E+05 dpm/mL total beta activity, 9.3 E+02 dpm/mL beta activity following cesium removal, and below detectable levels of alpha activity following cesium removal. In addition, the sample contained 0.015 M free OH- and 947 μg total organic carbon/mL.

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DOE OSTI2020

NA-22 Write for Consortium Efforts

We are asked to look into the improvements for the measurement of Pu of a variety of material types (MT): MT41 (Pu-242, 20 – 60% enriched), MT42 (Pu-242 > 60% enrichment), and MT-82 (Np-237). Many of these are legacy items that were packaged years ago (Fig 1&2), and when the items are re-packaged for long-term storage, they must be re-measured using either NDA (nondestructive analysis methods or radiochemical methods. It is of interest to improve the NDA and radiochemistry to reduce the un-certainty in the measurements, as in the case of larger items (250 g to 2 kg items) the uncertainty in measurements makes it difficult to certify the mass of the material down to the 0.5 g accountability requirement per DOE orders by only doing NDA measurement. It would be of interest to look into methods to improve the detection of these materials, which would not only benefit the weapon manufacturing community, but also has the ability to significantly improve the non-proliferation community.

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DOE OSTI2021

Report on Field Test at INL Cask Farm of Single Detector Fast Neutron Spent Fuel Cask Verification System

Detecting diversion of spent fuel elements in dry storage casks is challenging due to the thick shielding used in cask construction. Measurements on top of the cask to map the underlying arrangement of the fuel elements and looking for anomalous changes over time has proven difficult to achieve using gamma rays due to the high scattering and attenuation from the thick steel structure, weakening information on the present or absence of fuel bundles. Simulations and laboratory experiments suggest that the high-energy neutron flux (>200 keV) measured directly above each fuel bundle is sufficient to produce a position map that enables detection of the present or absence of fuel bundles, and therefore diversion of a spent fuel bundle. A single-detector spent-fuel monitoring technique based on this principle was development at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The INL Cask Farm in the INTEC technical area at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) offers the capability to test this technique on an MC-10 storage cask which has a distribution of full and empty fuel positions. An experimental test plan for the single-detector verification system was developed in consultation with INL personnel to be completed in FY2021. Due to travel advisories related to COVID-19, the experimental test plan was adapted to enable INL personnel to carry out the measurements in consultation with LLNL personnel following shipment of the LLNL system to INL. Field test measurements of the single detector verification system were successfully carried out at the INL cask farm on September 7-9, 2021. This document summarizes results of the field test.

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DOE OSTI2021

Plan for Development and Application of Risk Assessment Approach for Transportation Package Approval of an MNPP for Domestic Highway Shipment

For nuclear reactors, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has been conducted since the 1970s [e.g., see WASH-1400 (NRC 1975), NUREG-1150 (NRC 1990), and NUREG-1935 (Chang et al. 2012)]. PRA has also been used to assess a dry cask storage system at a nuclear power plant [see NUREG-1864 (NRC 2007)]. PRA techniques have also been applied to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, most notably in NUREG/CR-4829 (Fischer et al. 1987), NUREG/CR-6672 (Sprung et al. 2000), and NUREG-2125 (NRC 2014). Additional guidance is provided in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) IAEA-TECDOC-1346 (2003). Transportation PRA was also used in the evaluations of transportation impacts in reports such as the Repository Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2002) and the Repository Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2008).

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DOE OSTI2025

Caustic Neutralization and Precipitation of Acidic Dissolved Simulated Stainless Steel–Clad Plutonium and Plutonium/Uranium Nuclear Fuel

Simulated dissolved stainless steel (SS) clad Pu and Pu/U nuclear fuel in HNO 3 was neutralized to a free hydroxide (OH - ) concentration of 0.6 M. A thermal neutron poison, Gd, was added to the simulants at concentrations of either ~3 - 6 g/L or ~37 - 38 g/L. The supernate Pu concentration the day of neutralization ranged from 0.48 to 8.75 mg/L. The supernate Pu concentration of a simplified simulant neutralized to 0.6 M OH - above precipitated solids containing Pu was demonstrated to decrease over 18 days. A significant portion of precipitated Pu was found to be insoluble in 8 M HNO 3 at ambient temperature, but essentially quantitative Pu dissolution was achieved in 11.5 M HNO 3 /0.1 M KF at 100 °C. The difficulty in dissolving the Pu precipitate is believed to be due to the formation of refractory PuO 2 •xH 2 O during the neutralization process. Initial Gd concentrations of ~37 – 38 g/L were found to result in a greater Al precipitation when neutralized to 0.6 M OH - than initial Gd concentrations of ~3 – 6 g/L. Physical properties of the resultant slurries were measured and used to calculate limiting flowrates and slurry velocities by gravity only in transfer piping between the Savannah River Site’s H-Canyon Facility and the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF). These results were compared to calculated deposition velocities to predict if solids would settle during the transfer. The Newtonian model was found to be reasonable for each diluted slurry evaluated. Deposition velocities of Pu containing slurries are lower than nuclear fuel slurries primarily composed of U due to the high density of Pu solids. In conclusion, dilution of slurries reduces the margin between the slurry and deposition velocities due to the reduction in viscosity because higher viscous forces on the particles promote maintained suspension.

Actinide Neutralization↗
DOE OSTI2022

Analysis of Dust Samples Collected from a Near-Marine East Coast ISFSI Site ("Site C")

In June of 2022, dust samples were collected from the surface of an in-service spent nuclear fuel dry storage canister during an inspection at an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. The site is anonymous but is a near-marine or brackish water east coast location referred to here as "Site C". The purpose of the sampling was to assess the composition and abundance of the soluble salts present on the canister surface, information that provides a metric for potential corrosion risks. Following collection, the samples were delivered to Sandia National Laboratories for analysis. At Sandia, the soluble salts were leached from the dust and quantified by ion chromatography. In addition, subsamples of the dust were taken for scanning electron microscopy to determine the particle sizes, morphology, and mineralogy of the dust and salts. The results of those analyses are presented in this report.

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DOE OSTI2021

Increased Fissile Loading Flowsheet Review

A request was made by H-Canyon Process Engineering to assess the impact of blending dissolved, neutralized Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) with future sludge batches and their impact on downstream processing facilities including the Concentration, Storage and Transfer Facilities (CSTF), the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), Saltstone, and the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). The purpose of this change is to accelerate the deinventory of SNF which is currently stored in the L-Area Disassembly Basin. The addition of SNF increases the mass of fissiles in each future sludge batch, due to their high enrichment. This high enrichment has the potential to complicate the programs to eliminate criticality events in the downstream processing facilities and will increase the number of canisters produced by DWPF because of the SNF mass increase. A separate report addressed the impacts to glass. The review and subsequent calculations were based on average predicted compositions of Accelerated Basin Deinventory (ABD) slurry, average compositions for predicted future sludge batches, average past salt batches and average past recycle batches to predict the feeds that will be processed in SWPF, DWPF, Saltstone, the 2H evaporator and ETF. Each of the processes was evaluated for potential issues.

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DOE OSTI2022

A Framework to Assess Advanced Reactor Spent Fuel Management Facility Deployment

Previous planning and prioritization for LWR SNF management investigated the risks and uncertainties of deploying facilities such as consolidated interim storage [1, 2, 3, 4]. As part of that work, activities and milestones were collected into success precedence diagrams that charted a path to achieving facility deployment [1]. In that framework, activities are any research, development, design, or decision required to achieve an intermediate goal; milestones are activity endpoints and mark the completion of deliverables. Milestones can be thought of as achievements required to reach the final goal of facility deployment; activities are the means by which milestones are accomplished. In planning, activities and milestones are compiled into comprehensive flow charts that visualize the steps necessary for deployment. This framework has been used to quantify risks, timelines, and costs of deploying SNF management facilities.

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DOE OSTI2020

Structural, Criticality, and Radiation Dose Calculations to support SNF Loading into a DOE Standard Canister

The DOE Standard Canister Demonstration Project includes the development of an internal support structure (ISS) for the 4.6-m long and 45.7-cm diameter canister. This study presents structural evaluations, criticality safety assessments, and dose rate calculations conducted within the scope of the ISS design process to support smooth canister loading operations and to ensure safe storage, transportation, and disposal of Peach Bottom 1 Core II (PB2) and Fort St. Vrain (FSV) SNF, currently stored at the CPP-603 facility of the INL. The ISS includes a 316L stainless steel basket that holds twelve PB2 SNF rods. Further, six individual, 78.7-cm long, 316L stainless steel columns are equally spaced and welded to the inner canister wall at the lower end of the shell. These columns represent the FSV basket and can hold one FSV SNF element. An A92014 T6 aluminum spacer disc is bolted to the bottom plate of the PB2 basket to vertically restrain the FSV SNF element after the PB2 basket is placed inside the canister on top of the FSV basket. The structural evaluations of the ISS followed applicable ASME BPVC.III.3 guidelines and included finite element (FE) analyses of the PB2 basket structure; analyses of welds and bolds; buckling analyses of selected components, and acceptability assessments of the expected basket deformations under loading operations. The criticality safety assessments used the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) software architecture version 6.2 including ENDF/B-V continuous energy cross-section libraries, considering intact SNF in a single storage overpack or two multi-storage overpack configurations, and intact or failed SNF configured for disposal. The dose rate computations are based on source terms taken from the DOE Spent Fuel Database. The isotopic composition was decay corrected for the year 2022 using the ORIGEN module in the SCALE suite. A 19-group photon spectrum and 27-group neutron-source spectra were generated and used in MCNP to calculate estimated dose-equivalent rates, both on DOE Standard Canister contact and at a radial distance of from the canister surface. The results of this study indicate a structurally sound system that can uphold its criticality safety functions throughout its intended operational phases. Further, they increase confidence that sufficient radiological protection is technically achievable.

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DOE OSTI2022

Remote Monitoring Systems/Remote Data Transmission for International Nuclear Safeguards.

The use of remotely transmitted data from a nuclear facility under international nuclear safeguards to an inspectorate headquarters has been rapidly growing since inception as its value in reducing inspection effort and cost is demonstrated. There are opportunities for further growth moving forward including (1) the number of spent fuel casks in dry interim storage are increasing, leading to strain on inspection resources and potentially increased radiation exposure to inspectors, (2) the frequency of encapsulating spent nuclear fuel for final disposal in geological repositories occurs at a rate that may lead to the need for on-site inspectors unless systems can be developed to remotely transmit data, and (3) new facility types such as small modular reactors may rely heavily on remotely transmitted data due in part to remote locations of operation and mobility. Challenges need to be addressed too and include (1) hesitancy to implement remote data transmission by states, (2) data collection, transmission, security, and analysis, and (3) reliable power and communications. This report examines the evolution, equipment deployed, status, and opportunities/challenges of remote data transmission moving forward.

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DOE OSTI2020

Management of Fissionable Equivalent Mass Materials at ORNL - 20146

The US DOE manages an inventory of materials that contains a range of long-lived radioactive isotopes that were produced from the 1960's through the 1980's by irradiating targets in production reactors to produce special heavy isotopes for US DOE programmatic use, scientific research, and industrial and medical applications. Since the production reactors and enrichment facilities that produced many of these materials have been shut down, they are considered unique materials that are not likely to be produced again. ORNL uses these materials in US DoE's center for production, storage, and distribution of TRU isotopes (plutonium through californium) and other related nuclear research programs. ORNL also operates the High Flux Isotope Reactor, which provides a high neutron source for production of isotopes for medical, industrial, and nuclear research programs. As a result, ORNL has an inventory of radioisotopes that are being managed for ongoing research programs and being held for reuse because they have potential intrinsic value to US DOE. An initiative is underway at ORNL to better manage these materials, particularly focusing on those with high fissionable equivalent mass that could impact the ability to perform ongoing or new research projects. This paper describes the actions ORNL is taking to manage these inventories, many of which consist of TRU materials, through reuse and disposal. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Air-Purifying Respirator (APR) and Powered Air-Purifying Respirator (PAPR) Cartridge Performance Testing on Hanford Tanks BY-108 and BY-110 Volume 1

Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) tested four types of chemical cartridges for use in air-purifying respirators (APR) and powered air-purifying respirators (PAPR). These tests were undertaken to determine the period of time that the cartridges would provide adequate performance for APRs and PAPRs used to protect workers when exposed to a mixture of Chemicals of Potential Concern (COPC) from vapors exiting the headspaces of Hanford BY-108 and BY-110 waste storage tanks. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) considers cartridge testing to be a valid approach for establishing cartridge change schedules. Testing commonly is applied in situations where mixtures of COPCs exist, and where other approaches, such as manufacturer recommendations and modeling, are less reliable. The tests were designed and conducted to assure measurement and/or control of the key variables OSHA identified as important to estimate the cartridge service life, including temperature, humidity, COPC concentration, breathing rate, and cartridge adsorption capacity. Cartridge tests were conducted over two days from February 23-25, 2018, using headspace vapors from Hanford tanks BY-108 and BY-110. Headspace vapors from the BY-108 tank were fed to the PAPR respirator cartridge test stand, while vapors from the BY-110 headspace were fed to the APR respirator cartridge test stand. Both the APR and PAPR test stands were developed by WRPS in collaboration with HiLine Engineering (Richland, Washington). Two different cartridges were assessed on each tank. Multipurpose APR cartridges—SCOTT 7422-SD1 and SCOTT 7422-SC1 (SCOTT Safety, Monroe, North Carolina)—were assessed for vapors from BY-110 using the APR cartridge test stand. Multipurpose PAPR cartridges—MSA OptiFilter TL (MSA Safety Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) and 3M FR-57 (3M Company, Maplewood, Minnesota)—also were assessed for vapors from BY-108 over the same two days using the PAPR cartridge test stand. Sample media (i.e., sorbent tubes) were used to collect samples of the vapor stream entering and exiting the respirator cartridges, and the samples then were analyzed for COPC concentrations. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was tasked with conducting an independent analysis of the analytical results and making recommendations based on the results for respiratory cartridge performance and service life. The key conclusions from the analysis are described below.

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DOE OSTI2020

DOE Standard Canister Loading Methodology Poster

Over 250 different types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) are managed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The current configuration of SNF at INL is not transportable off-site. In the Yucca Mountain Repository License Application, the SNF was to be loaded into DOE Standard Canisters which are capable of storage, transportation, and eventual disposal using the proper overpacks. The DOE Standard Canister will allow INL to place the SNF in a Road-Ready configuration in preparation for transportation off-site. The focus of this work is development of a general loading methodology for the DOE Standard Canister. This methodology is to be general enough that it will apply to all SNF to be loaded into the DOE Standard Canister. The main sections of the methodology to be outlined are prerequisites before loading (including any issues with materials such as inserts or baskets), loading of SNF, and canister closure and quality assurance (including welding and inspection). Each subsection will analyze and provide the bases for each step.

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