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At least 487 records · Page 27

Calculation of the Phenix end-of-life test in natural circulation with the CATHARE code

The Inst. of Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) acts as technical support to French public authorities. As such, IRSN is in charge of safety assessment of operating and under construction reactors, as well as future projects. In this framework, one current objective of IRSN is to evaluate the ability and accuracy of numerical tools to foresee consequences of accidents. One of the advantages pointed up for fast reactors cooled by heavy liquid metal is the possibility of decay heat removal based on natural convection. The promotion of this passive cooling mode in future safety demonstrations will involve the use of adapted and validated numerical codes. After the final shutdown of the Phenix sodium cooled fast reactor in 2009, a set of tests covering different areas was conducted for code validation, including a natural circulation test in the primary circuit. Experimental data were issued by CEA to organize a benchmark exercise in the frame of an IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP), with the objective to assess the system-codes capability in simulating the thermal-hydraulics behavior of sodium cooled fast reactors in such accidental conditions. IRSN participated to this benchmark with the CATHARE code. This code, co-developed by CEA, EDF, AREVA and IRSN and widely used for PWR safety studies, was recently extended for sodium applications. This paper presents the CATHARE modeling of the Phenix primary circuit and the results obtained. A relatively good agreement was found with available measurements considering the experimental uncertainties. This work stressed the local aspects of phenomena occurring during the natural convection establishment and the limits of a 0D/1D approach. (authors)

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Analysis of Phenix natural convection test with the TRACE code

Experimental data from the Natural Convection (NC) test performed in the Phenix reactor prior to its final shutdown have been used to further validate the single-phase sodium flow modeling in TRACE. The experimental data for the benchmark have been shared by the CEA in the frame of a Coordinated Research Project (CRP), initiated by the IAEA Technical Working Group on Fast Reactors (TWG-FR). This paper presents a complete TRACE model of the Phenix primary circuit developed for the analysis. Steady-state calculations at nominal (350 MWth) and reduced (120 MWth) power are compared to the experimental data for the validation of the model. We presents results from the 'blind' comparison, i.e. the comparison of the test results with those computed prior to the communication of the experimental data, so-called 'pre-test' results. 'Post-test' results, calculated from a model improved on the basis of the discrepancies identified from the blind comparison, are also presented. The analysis highlights the need to accurately simulate the reactor structures, since these define the thermal inertia of the system during the first phase of the transient. Furthermore, it shows the limitations of computed 1D-results when applied to the simulation of highly-stratified temperature fields. Nevertheless, the simulated reactor behavior and temperatures are found to match very well with the experimental data after the first two hours and, in general, the TRACE blind predictions may be considered as having been quite satisfactory. (authors)

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Major results from safety-related integral effect tests with VISTA-ITL for the SMART design

A series of integral effect tests (IETs) was performed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Inst. (KAERI) using the VISTA integral test loop (VISTA-ITL) as a small-scale IET program. Among them this paper presents major results acquired from the safety-related IETs with the VISTA-ITL facility for the SMART design. Three small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) tests of safety injection system (SIS) line break, shutdown cooling system (SCS) line break and pressurizer safety valve (PSV) line break were successfully performed and the transient characteristics of a complete loss of flowrate (CLOF) was simulated properly with the VISTA-ITL facility. (authors)

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Mixed-oxide fuel decay heat analysis for BWR LOCA safety evaluation

The mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel decay heat behavior is analyzed for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) safety evaluation. The physical reasoning on why the decay heat power fractions of MOX fuel fission product (FP) are significantly lower than the corresponding decay heat power fractions of uranium-oxide (UOX) fuel FP is illustrated. This is primarily due to the following physical phenomena. -The recoverable energies per fission of plutonium (Pu)-239 and Pu-241 are significantly higher than those of uranium (U)-235 and U-238. Consequently, the fission rate required to produce the same amount of power in MOX fuel is significantly lower than that in UOX fuel, which leads to lower subsequent FP generation rate and associated decay heat power in MOX fuel than those in UOX fuel. - The effective FP decay energy per fission of Pu-239 is significantly lower than the corresponding effective FP decay energy per fission of U-235, e.g., Pu-239's 10.63 Mega-electron-Volt (MeV) vs. U-235's 12.81 MeV at the cooling time 0.2 second. This also leads to lower decay heat power in MOX fuel than that in UOX fuel. The FP decay heat is shown to account for more than 90% of the total decay heat immediately after shutdown. The FP decay heat results based on the American National Standard Institute (ANSI)/American Nuclear Society (ANS)-5.1-1979 standard method are shown very close to the corresponding FP decay heat results based on the ANSI/ANS-5.1-2005 standard method. The FP decay heat results based on the ANSI/ANS-5.1-1979 simplified method are shown very close to but mostly slightly lower than the corresponding FP decay heat results based on the ANSI/ANS-5.1-1971 method. The FP decay heat results based on the ANSI/ANS-5.1-1979 simplified method or the ANSI/ANS-5.1-1971 method are shown significantly larger than the corresponding FP decay heat results based on the ANSI/ANS-5.1-1979 standard method or the ANSI/ANS-5.1-2005 standard method. (authors)

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New Remote Method for Estimation of Contamination Levels of Reactor Equipment - 13175

Projects for decommissioning of shutdown reactors and reactor facilities carried out in several countries, including Russia. In the National Research Centre 'Kurchatov Institute' decontamination and decommissioning of the research reactor MR (Material Testing Reactor) has been initiated. The research reactor MR has a long history and consists of nine loop facilities for experiments with different kinds of fuel. During the operation of main and auxiliary equipment of reactors it was subjected to strong radioactive contamination. The character of this contamination requires individual strategies for the decontamination work. This requires information about the character of the distribution of radioactive contamination of equipment in the premises. A detailed radiation survey of these premises using standard dosimetric equipment is almost impossible because of high levels of radiation and high-density of the equipment that does not allow identifying the most active fragments using standard tools of measurement. The problem can be solved using the method of remote measurements of distribution of radioactivity with help of the collimated gamma-ray detectors. For radiation surveys of the premises of loop installations remotely operated spectrometric collimated system was used [1, 2, 3]. As a result of the work, maps of the distribution of activity and dose rate for surveyed premises were plotted and superimposed on its photo. The new results of measurements in different areas of the reactor and at its loop installations, with emphasis on the radioactive survey of highly-contaminated samples, are presented. (authors)

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Overview of the Government of Canada Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program - 13551

Nuclear legacy liabilities have resulted from more than 60 years of nuclear research and development carried out on behalf of Canada. The liabilities are located at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) Chalk River Laboratories in Ontario and Whiteshell Laboratories in Manitoba, as well as three shutdown prototype reactors in Ontario and Quebec that are being maintained in a safe storage state. Estimated at about $7.4 billion (current day dollars), these liabilities consist of disused nuclear facilities and associated infrastructure, a wide variety of buried and stored waste, and contaminated lands. In 2006, the Government of Canada adopted a long-term strategy to deal with the nuclear legacy liabilities and initiated a five-year, $520 million start-up phase, thereby creating the Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (NLLP). The Government of Canada renewed the NLLP in 2011 with a $439-million three-year second phase that ends March 31, 2014. The projects and activities carried out under the Program focus on infrastructure decommissioning, environmental restoration, improving the management of legacy radioactive waste, and advancing the long-term strategy. The NLLP is being implemented through a Memorandum of Understanding between Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and AECL whereby NRCan is responsible for policy direction and oversight, including control of funding, and AECL is responsible for implementing the program of work and holding and administering all licences, facilities and lands. (authors)

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MA transmutation performance in the optimized MYRRHA

MYRRHA (multi-purpose hybrid research reactor for high-tech applications) is a multipurpose research facility currently being developed at SCK-CEN. It will be able to work in both critical and subcritical modes and, cooled by lead-bismuth eutectic. In this paper the minor actinides (MA) transmutation capabilities of MYRRHA are investigated. (Pu + Am, U) MOX fuel and (Np + Am + Cm, Pu) Inert Matrix Fuel test samples have been loaded in the central channel of the MYRRHA critical core and have been irradiated during five cycles, each one consisting of 90 days of operation at 100 MWth and 30 days of shutdown. The reactivity worth of the test fuel assembly was about 1.1 dollar. A wide range of burn-up level has been achieved, extending from 42 to 110 MWd/kg HM, the samples with lower MA-to-Pu ratios reaching the highest burn-up. This study has highlighted the importance of the initial MA content, expressed in terms of MA/Pu ratio, on the transmutation rate of MA elements. For (Pu + Am, U) MOX fuel samples, a net build-up of MA is observed when the initial content of MA is very low (here, 1.77 wt% MA/Pu) while a net decrease in MA is observed in the sample with an initial content of 5 wt%. This suggests the existence of some 'equilibrium' initial MA content value beyond which a net transmutation is achievable.

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The Accident at Fukushima: What Happened?

At 2:46 PM, on the coast of the Pacific Ocean in eastern Japan, people were spending an ordinary afternoon. The earthquake had a magnitude of 9.0, the fourth largest ever recorded in the world. Avery large number of aftershocks were felt after the initial earthquake. More than 100 of them had a magnitude of over 6.0. There were very few injured or dead at this point. The large earthquake caused by this enormous crustal deformation spawned a rare and enormous tsunami that crashed down 30-40 minutes later. It easily cleared the high levees, washing away cars and houses and swallowing buildings of up to three stories in height. The largest tsunami reading taken from all regions was 40 meters in height. This tsunami reached the West Coast of the United States and the Pacific coast of South America, with wave heights of over two meters. It was due to this tsunami that the disaster became one of a not imaginable scale, which saw the number of dead or missing reach about 20,000 persons. The enormous tsunami headed for 15 nuclear power plants on the Pacific coast, but 11 power plants withstood the tsunami and attained cold shutdown. The flood height of the tsunami that struck each power station ranged to a maximum of 15 meters. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Units experienced the largest and the cores of three reactors suffered meltdown. As a result, more than 160,000 residents were forced to evacuate, and are still living in temporary accommodation. The main focus of this presentation is on what happened at the Fukushima Daiichi, and how station personnel responded to the accident, with considerable international support. A year after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, Japan is in the process of leveraging the lessons learned from the accident to further improve the safety of nuclear power facilities and regain the trust of society. In this connection, not only international organizations, including IAEA, and WANO, but also governmental organizations and nuclear industry representatives from various countries, have been evaluating what happened at Fukushima Daiichi. Support from many countries has contributed to successfully stabilizing the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. International cooperation is required as Japan started along the long road to decommissioning the reactors. Such cooperation with the international community would achieve the decommissioning of the damaged reactors. Finally, recovery plans by the Japanese government to decontaminate surrounding regions have been started in order to get residents back to their homes as early as possible. Looking at the world's nuclear power industry, there are currently approximately 440 reactors in operation and 60 under construction. Despite the dramatic consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi catastrophe it is expected that the importance of nuclear power generation will not change in the years to come. Newly accumulated knowledge and capabilities must be passed on to the next generation. This is the duty put upon us and which is one that we must embrace.

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Decommissioning, Dismantling and Disarming: a Unique Information Showroom Inside the G2 Reactor at Marcoule Centre (France) - 12068

The paper aims at presenting the new information showroom called 'Escom G2' (for 'Espace Communication') inaugurated by the French Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies Commission (CEA) in spring 2011. This showroom is settled directly inside the main building of the G2 nuclear reactor: a facility formerly dedicated to weapon-grade plutonium production since the late 1950's at the Marcoule nuclear centre, in south of France. After its shutdown, and reprocessing of the last spent fuels, a first dismantling step was successfully completed from 1986 to 1996. Unique in France and in Europe, Escom G2 is focused on France dismantling expertise and its action for disarmament. This showroom comprises of a 300-square meters permanent exhibition, organized around four themes: France strategy for disarmament, decommissioning and dismantling technical aspects, uranium and plutonium production cycles. Each of these topics is illustrated with posters, photos, models and technical pieces from the dismantled plants. It is now used to present France's action in disarmament to highly ranked audiences such as: state representatives, diplomats, journalists... The paper explains the background story of this original project. As a matter of fact, in 1996 France was the first nuclear state to decide to shut down and dismantle its fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons. First, the paper presents the history of the G2 reactor in the early ages of Marcoule site, its operating highlights as well as its main dismantling operations, are presented. In Marcoule, where the three industrial-scale reactors G1, G2 and G3 used to be operated for plutonium production (to be then reprocessed in the nearby UP1 plant), the initial dismantling phase has now been completed (in 1980's for G1 and in 1996 for G2 and G3). The second phase, aimed at completely dismantling these three reactors, will restart in 2020, and is directly linked to the opening of a future national storage facility for irradiated graphite waste. Then, the paper recalls communication events and official visits hosted in Pierrelatte and Marcoule, following a formal invitation from the French President Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy. These visits, which were organized in order to illustrate the irreversibility of these dismantling operations, allowed visitors to discovers places that used to be former highly classified areas. Three official visits were organized in 2008 and 2009 for representatives of the Conference on Disarmament Member States, non-governmental experts and journalists. All participants visited the dismantled uranium enrichment plant in Pierrelatte, the G2 reactor and the UP1 plant in Marcoule. The visits were successful and visitors were especially impressed by the G2 reactor and its massive industrial architecture, symbolic of the early ages of nuclear history. In late 2010, this feedback convinced CEA Military Application Directorate (CEA DAM) that a permanent showroom could be installed inside the reactor, making it possible to preserve the cultural value of this historical landmark, and to continue its ongoing effort of communication and outreach. The paper explains the design of this concept: the museography project with a professional designer, the communication material conception and the features of such an original place. (authors)

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Plant Decontamination as a Precondition of the Remote Dismantling Concept of the Karlsruhe Vitrification Plant VEK - 12206

Vitrification of the high-active liquid waste concentrates (HAWC) was a major milestone in the WAK decommissioning project (StiWAK). From September 2009 to June 2010, about 56 m{sup 3} of HAWC were vitrified at the Karlsruhe vitrification facility (VEK) and filled into 123 canisters. HAWC vitrification was followed by an extensive rinsing and shutdown program, in the course of which both the VEK process installations and the facilities for the storage and evaporation of high-active fission product solutions (LAVA) are prepared specifically for dismantling. Finally the rinsing programme leads to an overall reduction of the remaining contamination in the installations by a factor of approx. 5 - 10. The amount of liquids arisen from this program has been vitrified and another 17 canisters have been filled. In total, 140 canisters were packed into 5 CASTOR casks that were already transported to the Zwischenlager Nord (interim store North) of EWN GmbH (ZLN) in the mid of February 2011. The melter of the VEK was already shut down in the late November 2010. (authors)

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Development of accident tolerant control rod for light water reactors

For an accident tolerant control rod (ATCR) designed to improve LWR (light water cooled reactor)core safety, the following inherent characteristics are required: sufficient neutron absorption, high-temperature stability and high miscibility with fuel materials to avoid uncontrollable recriticality. In the present work an ATCR is being developed to improve the safety of light water reactors under all conditions including severe accidents. Promising neutron-absorbing materials for the ATCR include rare-earth sesquioxides (RE{sub 2}O{sub 3}), hafnium dioxide (HfO{sub 2}) and mixtures of these materials. A reactivity worth analysis of these materials in representative light water reactors revealed that a conventional control rod can be replaced by an ATCR without significant impact on the reactor operation conditions. A high-temperature compatibility of the candidate ATCR materials and iron, which is a main component of control rod cladding, was examined experimentally, and no significant reaction occurred upon heating to 1600 Celsius degrees for 1 hour. That is, the ATCR is expected to have no significant damage prior to extensive fuel pin failure in severe accidents, thus avoiding uncontrollable recriticality after reactor shutdown even in case of injection of non-borated or insufficiently borated water for emergency cooling of the reactor.

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French Atomic and alternative energies commission decommissioning policy and strategies: What is at stake lessons learned and feedback experience - 15013

Since its creation in 1945, the French Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies Commission has carried out research programmes on civil use of nuclear, and its application. CEA has set up and run various types of installations from research (accelerators, pond reactors, fast reactors, laboratories) to industry (power reactor, processing facilities). There are currently more than several tens of facilities which are presently closed down pending dismantling or in the process of being dismantled by CEA, the governmental body for research and development in nuclear and renewable energies. When operating, all these installations have generated radioactive waste. When they are shutdown, either as a result of the programmes for which they were set up, or due to equipment wearing out or being obsolete, these installations must be cleaned up, dismantled and decommissioned, taking into account their nuclear nature and requirements related to safety and environment. During the decommissioning process, the implementer has to deal with safety and site remediation issues. Dealing with these installations is a long-term programme which must be carefully planned and financed in order to optimise its management. The paper will describe the CEA's decommissioning policy, strategies adopted, and draw up lessons learned and feedback experience, showing that: - Safety is guaranteed, - Dismantling is a technically controllable operation, but R and D actions are to be developed for specific problems as characterization or operation in hostile environment. Moreover all the methods and techniques improve as a result of feedback experience, - The amount of material and waste produced by the dismantling are manageable. The very low, low and intermediate level waste can be stored on existing shallow land burial centres, some new repositories have to be created for specific waste (graphite, radium,...) and for high and intermediate level long live waste, which are stored in interim storage , - The dismantling must be optimized, especially by appliance of a good strategy based on rational industrial choices. - Communication and transparency with stakeholders is essential for global process acceptance, - The lessons learned and how feedback experience could benefit for future decommissioning projects. (authors)

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The february 2014 accidents at WIPP - 15024 (What Happened and What We Know About Why)

With almost 15 years of successful and safe operations, the WIPP facility was suddenly shutdown in February 2014 due to two unrelated accidents underground. A fire burned the front tires and engine of a salt haul truck, creating significant soot and forced evacuation of the mine. A second unrelated incident occurred 9 days later when at least one drum of non-compliant waste from Los Alamos National Laboratory burst, introducing airborne radioactivity into the underground ventilation air. Some radioactivity was released to the atmosphere at the surface. Bioassay showed that 22 workers received low internal doses, with no long-term adverse health effects expected for these employees. Independent environmental monitoring indicated very low levels off-site and dose reconstruction modeling indicated no members of the public were exposed. Comprehensive accident investigations resulted in significant planned changes to enhance safety management programs at WIPP, and a recovery plan was developed. In addition to safety management program augmentation, recovery involves new and enhanced underground ventilation systems and decontamination of affected areas underground. Resumption of initial waste disposal operations is scheduled for early in FY16, with a return to normal operations (17 shipments per week) within about three years. (authors)

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Considerations for recovery of large areas of a nuclear facility for re-use - 15147

This paper highlights a number of factors an organization might consider for recovery of a facility, using a successful example from the UK. In 2013 a power failure led to the shutdown of the ventilation system that caused loose contamination to be deposited over large sections of man-accessible areas of plant after the evacuation of personnel. The successful initiation of emergency Command and Control arrangements during the Response phase, saw several key responders brought together to offer technical direction across many disciplines. The actions of the Command and Control unit prevented any further spread contamination to other areas of the facility and any external release. This enabled the return of the plant to an operational status which forms an important mission enabler for the site hazard reduction programme. Intervention at an early stage during the Response phase of the incident saw the cessation of traditional dilute chemical wet decontamination approach that would otherwise leave a legacy of slow leaching contamination; to that of containment and ultimate removal of loose contamination using strippable coatings. Doing so established a more rapid and reliably 'clean' access or pathway into the plant to establish the full extent of the situation. The scale and scope of the decontamination requirement was steadily revealed through a number of controlled re-entries to the plant. A number of other techniques were considered and employed to address the different areas making use of available plant resources to deliver the successful 'self-help' recovery of the plant using multi-disciplinary teams. As Response switched to Recovery, it was important to set out and agree which strategic option should be adopted to return the facility to normal operation. Equally, it was necessary to verify which equipment had been affected by the power outage and repair as required. Furthermore, equipment with designated safety functions had to be maintained alongside the Recovery activities. A careful balance of priorities demanded an unparalleled depth of plant knowledge to address this, whilst still keeping site and external stakeholders informed. The engagement by the plant workforce to take on the decontamination challenge to enable recovery of their plant supported by other teams formed a critical step in the speed of recovery. (authors)

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Guidance for decommissioning plants entering safe storage - 15280

Although a number of plants worldwide have been placed into safe storage after permanent shutdown, there is no generic guidance for establishment of safe storage conditions. To address this need, EPRI is conducting a project to document the best practices to reduce risk, maintenance and monitoring requirements during safe storage, as well as practices that optimize decommissioning following the safe storage period. This project additionally evaluates potential options for establishment of safe storage conditions, such as performance of chemical decontamination, completion of environmental remediation activities, early removal of highly activated components, dismantlement of non-power block structures and partial site release in advance of completion of decommissioning of the nuclear island. (authors)

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Solutions for management of defective fuel assemblies - 15318

Defective fuel management is a major challenge for nuclear operators when the time comes for finding a long-term solution for their used (or spent) fuel assemblies. This question of defective fuel management can be raised in several cases: - For optimizing the remaining operating costs of shutdown reactors, the spent fuel pools must be emptied as soon as possible; a solution needs therefore to be found for evacuating all the spent fuel assemblies, defective fuel assemblies and in particular defective fuel rods included; - Some utilities are today facing a saturation of their reactor spent fuel pool; evacuating the defective fuel assemblies and extracted defective fuel rods allows optimizing the space in the pool. Whereas the solutions for managing intact used fuel assemblies are well-known, a specific technical solution must be implemented for managing the defective spent fuel assemblies as well. The purpose of this paper is to describe the existing solutions for the management of all types of defective fuel assemblies. Interim Dry Storage Solution Interim dry storage of defective spent fuel assemblies is being implemented for decades in the USA. Specific operations are performed for preparing the defective fuel assemblies for interim dry storage and they are then stored with intact used fuel assemblies in the dry storage cask. The advantage of such a solution is its short-term cost effectiveness. The paper presents the existing dry interim storage solutions for defective used fuel rods, the way they are implemented, the associated operational experience. Long-term Dry Storage Solution A long-term dry storage solution for defective fuel assemblies is being developed, compliant with direct disposal requirements. The solution is based on the encapsulation of each defective fuel rod into a fuel rod capsule and an associated specific dry storage licensing approach: this is the best available technology regarding long term storage safety requirements. The paper presents this unique capsule technology, the transport and storage casks that can be used for transportation of defective fuel rods to the storage facility, and the associated transport licensing approach currently used in Europe. Treatment Solution. The most definitive way to get rid of defective fuel assemblies is their treatment (or reprocessing) in a treatment plant. There is then no need to assess the behaviour of these specific used fuel assemblies as for an interim storage facility or a final repository. The advantage of such a solution is its sustainable approach. The paper presents the existing transport and treatment solutions, the way they are implemented, the associated operational experience. (authors)

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Performance improvement and human resources transition management in D and D projects - 15440

Power generation and other nuclear facilities production is mainly characterized by stable working environment, with continuous efforts for improvement based on previous achievements, constant workload, foreseeable and established organizational hierarchy; and generation of cash. In contrary to normal production - when phasing down the facility for final shutdown, decommissioning and dismantling - one has to manage a new, highly dynamic working environment, with decreasing workload, new skills required; and consumption of cash. The key to successful transition is to recognize the need for establishing an explicit performance improvement program with an effective change management process in order to address this profound evolution as early as possible in the project. AREVA owns and operates large nuclear material processing facilities. This includes the responsibility for their end of life up to final Decommissioning and Dismantling (D and D). Faced with this transitional challenge, AREVA took example from well-known management methods (Lean Management, 6 Sigma, TPM...) successfully applied by the non-nuclear production industry with the corresponding philosophy of Operational Excellence. These methods were adapted to the specifics of nuclear decommissioning projects. Furthermore, specific computerized tools were developed to assist managers in implementing measures for re-deploying, re-training and re-qualifying personnel as well as re-organizing the work structure while maintaining safety and social consensus. Significant improvements in the dismantling works as well as in the management of generated waste were achieved early after start of the implementation of the performance improvement programs. (authors)

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Overview of the DOE nuclear fuels storage and transportation planning project - 15444

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy is conducting planning activities within the Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project (NFST) to lay the groundwork for implementing interim storage, including associated transportation, per the Administration's Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, and to develop a foundation for a new nuclear waste management organization. The purpose of the NFST is to make progress on this important national issue within existing legislative and budgetary authorizations. The objective of the NFST is to develop and begin implementation of an integrated plan to (1) implement interim storage; (2) improve the overall integration of storage as a planned part of the waste management system; (3) prepare for the large-scale transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, with an initial focus on removing SNF from the shutdown reactor sites; and (4) develop foundational information, resources, and capabilities needed to support the aforementioned objectives and future implementation decisions and actions. An over-arching goal is to develop options for decision-makers on the design of an integrated waste management system. The planning activities are divided into four major topical areas: (1) Consent-Based Siting, (2) Storage, (3) Transportation, and (4) Strategic Crosscuts. This paper provides an overview of the NFST and its activities. (authors)

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