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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 487 records · Page 27
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2013

Destructive Single-Event Failures in Diodes

In this summary, we have shown that diodes are susceptible to destructive single-event effects, and that these failures occur along the guard ring. By determining the last passing voltages, a safe operating area can be derived. By derating off of those values, rather than by the rated voltage, like what is currently done with power MOSFETs, we can work to ensure the safety of future missions. However, there are still open questions about these failures. Are they limited to a single manufacturer, a small number, or all of them? Is there a threshold rated voltage that must be exceeded to see these failures? With future work, we hope to answer these questions. In the full paper, laser results will also be presented to verify that failures only occur along the guard ring.

Casey, Megan C.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Space Shuttle Stiffener Ring Foam Failure, a Non-Conventional Approach

The Space Shuttle makes use of the excellent properties of rigid polyurethane foam for cryogenic tank insulation and as structural protection on the solid rocket boosters. When foam applications debond, classical methods of analysis do not always provide root cause of the failure of the foam. Realizing that foam is the ideal media to document and preserve its own mode of failure, thin sectioning was seen as a logical approach for foam failure analysis. Thin sectioning in two directions, both horizontal and vertical to the application, was chosen to observe the three dimensional morphology of the foam cells. The cell foam morphology provided a much greater understanding of the failure modes than previously achieved.

Howard, Philip M.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Comparison of Failure Modes in 2-D and 3-D Woven Carbon Phenolic Systems

NASA Ames Research Center is developing Woven Thermal Protection System (WTPS) materials as a new class of heatshields for entry vehicles (Stackpoole). Currently, there are few options for ablative entry heatshield materials, none of which is ideally suited to the planetary probe missions currently of interest to NASA. While carbon phenolic was successfully used for the missions Pioneer Venus and Galileo (to Jupiter), the heritage constituents are no longer available. An alternate carbon phenolic would need to be qualified for probe missions, which is most efficient at heat fluxes greater than those currently of interest. Additional TPS materials such as Avcoat and PICA are not sufficiently robust for the heat fluxes required. As a result, there is a large TPS gap between the materials efficient at very high conditions (carbon phenolic) and those that are effective at low-moderate conditions (all others). Development of 3D Woven TPS is intended to fill this gap, targeting mid-density weaves that could with withstand mid-range heat fluxes between 1100 W/sq cm and 8000 W/sq cm (Venkatapathy (2012). Preliminary experimental studies have been performed to show the feasibility of WTPS as a future mid-range TPS material. One study performed in the mARC Jet Facility at NASA Ames Research Center characterized the performance of a 3D Woven TPS sample and compared it to 2D carbon phenolic samples at ply angles of 0deg, 23.5deg, and 90deg. Each sample contained similar compositions of phenolic and carbon fiber volume fractions for experimental consistency. The goal of this study was to compare the performance of the TPS materials by evaluating resulting recession and failure modes. After exposing both samples to similar heat flux and pressure conditions, the 2D carbon phenolic laminate was shown to experience significant delamination between layers and further pocketing underneath separated layers. The 3D Woven TPS sample did not experience the delamination or pocketing failure modes because z-fibers in the through-thickness direction provided extra reinforcement to hold material layers together. Therefore, the benefit of using a 3D weave architecture was shown to alleviate failure modes experienced by a 2D laminate sample of similar material composition. In summary this poster reviews the thermal response performance comparisons drawn between a 3D Woven TPS sample and 2D Carbon Phenolic samples after performing rigorous heating experiments in the mARC facility at NASA Ames. Although the mARC Facility is still in its developmental stages, researchers expect similar trends in failure modes observed from large scale arc jet facilities. This work helps demonstrate the viability of 3D Woven TPSs as a new TPS option for future atmospheric entry missions.

Rossman, Grant A.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Modeling Common Cause Failures of Thrusters on ISS Visiting Vehicles

This paper discusses the methodology used to model common cause failures of thrusters on the International Space Station (ISS) Visiting Vehicles. The ISS Visiting Vehicles each have as many as 32 thrusters, whose redundancy and similar design make them susceptible to common cause failures. The Global Alpha Model (as described in NUREG/CR-5485) can be used to represent the system common cause contribution, but NUREG/CR-5496 supplies global alpha parameters for groups only up to size six. Because of the large number of redundant thrusters on each vehicle, regression is used to determine parameter values for groups of size larger than six. An additional challenge is that Visiting Vehicle thruster failures must occur in specific combinations in order to fail the propulsion system; not all failure groups of a certain size are critical.

Haught, Megan↗
NASA NTRS2014

Using Generic Data to Establish Dormancy Failure Rates

Many hardware items are dormant prior to being operated. The dormant period might be especially long, for example during missions to the moon or Mars. In missions with long dormant periods the risk incurred during dormancy can exceed the active risk contribution. Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) need to account for the dormant risk contribution as well as the active contribution. A typical method for calculating a dormant failure rate is to multiply the active failure rate by a constant, the dormancy factor. For example, some practitioners use a heuristic and divide the active failure rate by 30 to obtain an estimate of the dormant failure rate. To obtain a more empirical estimate of the dormancy factor, this paper uses the recently updated database NPRD-2011 [1] to arrive at a set of distributions for the dormancy factor. The resulting dormancy factor distributions are significantly different depending on whether the item is electrical, mechanical, or electro-mechanical. Additionally, this paper will show that using a heuristic constant fails to capture the uncertainty of the possible dormancy factors.

Reistle, Bruce↗
NASA NTRS2013

Numerical Predictions of Damage and Failure in Carbon Fiber Reinforced Laminates Using a Thermodynamically-Based Work Potential Theory

A thermodynamically-based work potential theory for modeling progressive damage and failure in fiber-reinforced laminates is presented. The current, multiple-internal state variable (ISV) formulation, referred to as enhanced Schapery theory (EST), utilizes separate ISVs for modeling the effects of damage and failure. Consistent characteristic lengths are introduced into the formulation to govern the evolution of the failure ISVs. Using the stationarity of the total work potential with respect to each ISV, a set of thermodynamically consistent evolution equations for the ISVs are derived. The theory is implemented into a commercial finite element code. The model is verified against experimental results from two laminated, T800/3900-2 panels containing a central notch and different fiber-orientation stacking sequences. Global load versus displacement, global load versus local strain gage data, and macroscopic failure paths obtained from the models are compared against the experimental results.

composite materials↗
NASA NTRS2014

Modeling Common Cause Failures of Thrusters on ISS Visiting Vehicles

This paper discusses the methodology used to model common cause failures of thrusters on the International Space Station (ISS) Visiting Vehicles. The ISS Visiting Vehicles each have as many as 32 thrusters, whose redundancy makes them susceptible to common cause failures. The Global Alpha Model (as described in NUREG/CR‐5485) can be used to represent the system common cause contribution, but NUREG/CR‐5496 supplies global alpha parameters for groups only up to size six. Because of the large number of redundant thrusters on each vehicle, regression is used to determine parameter values for groups of size larger than six. An additional challenge is that Visiting Vehicle thruster failures must occur in specific combinations in order to fail the propulsion system; not all failure groups of a certain size are critical.

Haught, Megan↗
NASA NTRS2015

Shuttle/ISS EMU Failure History and the Impact on Advanced EMU PLSS Design

As the Shuttle/ISS EMU Program exceeds 30 years in duration and is still supporting the needs of the International Space Station (ISS), a critical benefit of such a long running program with thorough documentation of system and component failures is the ability to study and learn from those failures when considering the design of the next generation space suit. Study of the subject failure history leads to changes in the Advanced EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS) schematic, selected component technologies, as well as the planned manner of ground testing. This paper reviews the Shuttle/ISS EMU failure history and discusses the implications to the AEMU PLSS.

Campbell, Colin↗
NASA NTRS2015

Shuttle/ISS EMU Failure History and the Impact on Advanced EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS) Design

As the Shuttle/ISS EMU Program exceeds 35 years in duration and is still supporting the needs of the International Space Station (ISS), a critical benefit of such a long running program with thorough documentation of system and component failures is the ability to study and learn from those failures when considering the design of the next generation space suit. Study of the subject failure history leads to changes in the Advanced EMU Portable Life Support System (PLSS) schematic, selected component technologies, as well as the planned manner of ground testing. This paper reviews the Shuttle/ISS EMU failure history and discusses the implications to the AEMU PLSS.

Campbell, Colin↗
NASA NTRS2016

Pitfalls and Precautions When Using Predicted Failure Data for Quantitative Analysis of Safety Risk for Human Rated Launch Vehicles

Launch vehicle reliability analysis is largely dependent upon using predicted failure rates from data sources such as MIL-HDBK-217F. Reliability prediction methodologies based on component data do not take into account risks attributable to manufacturing, assembly, and process controls. These sources often dominate component level reliability or risk of failure probability. While consequences of failure is often understood in assessing risk, using predicted values in a risk model to estimate the probability of occurrence will likely underestimate the risk. Managers and decision makers often use the probability of occurrence in determining whether to accept the risk or require a design modification. Due to the absence of system level test and operational data inherent in aerospace applications, the actual risk threshold for acceptance may not be appropriately characterized for decision making purposes. This paper will establish a method and approach to identify the pitfalls and precautions of accepting risk based solely upon predicted failure data. This approach will provide a set of guidelines that may be useful to arrive at a more realistic quantification of risk prior to acceptance by a program.

Hatfield, Glen S.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling in Space Launch Vehicles

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2016

Radiation Failures in Intel 14nm Microprocessors

In this study the 14 nm Intel Broadwell 5th generation core series 5005U-i3 and 5200U-i5 was mounted on Dell Inspiron laptops, MSI Cubi and Gigabyte Brix barebones and tested with Windows 8 and CentOS7 at idle. Heavy-ion-induced hard- and catastrophic failures do not appear to be related to the Intel 14nm Tri-Gate FinFET process. They originate from a small (9 m 140 m) area on the 32nm planar PCH die (not the CPU) as initially speculated. The hard failures seem to be due to a SEE but the exact physical mechanism has yet to be identified. Some possibilities include latch-ups, charge ion trapping or implantation, ion channels, or a combination of those (in biased conditions). The mechanism of the catastrophic failures seems related to the presence of electric power (1.05V core voltage). The 1064 nm laser mimics ionization radiation and induces soft- and hard failures as a direct result of electron-hole pair production, not heat. The 14nm FinFET processes continue to look promising for space radiation environments.

Microprocessors↗
NASA NTRS2016

Failure Simulation Testing of the Z-1 Spacesuit Titanium Bearing Assemblies

The Z-2 is a candidate for NASA's next generation spacesuit, designed for a range of possible missions with enhanced mobility for spacewalks both on planetary surfaces and in microgravity. Increased mobility was accomplished through innovations in shoulder and hip joints, using a number of new bearings to allow spacesuit wearers to dip, walk, and bend with ease; all important tasks for a planetary explorer collecting samples or traveling over rough terrain. The Advanced Spacesuit Development Team of NASA Johnson Space Center requested that the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) perform a series failure simulation tests on three titanium bearing assemblies, an elemental part of the joint construction used in new spacesuit designs. This testing simulated two undetected failures within the bearings and as a result the objective of this test program was to evaluate whether a failed or failing bearing could result in ignition of the titanium race material due to friction. The first failure was an inner seal leak sufficient to pressurize the race with +99 percent oxygen. The second failure was an improperly installed or mismatched ball port that created a protrusion in the ball bearing race, partially obstructing the nominal rolling path of each ball bearing. When the spacesuit bearings are assembled, bearing balls are loaded into the assembly via a ball port. The ball port is specific and unique to each bearing assembly (matched pair). The simulated mismatched ball port is a significant source of friction, which would be caused by an assembly error. To evaluate this risk, the bearings were cycled in a simulated worst-case scenario environment, with operational loads, and potential flaw conditions. During test the amount of actuation torque required and heat generated through continuous operation were measured and the bearings were observed for sparks or burning events. This paper provides detailed descriptions of the test hardware, methodology, and results.

de Baca, Richard C.↗
NASA NTRS2018

FPGA Reliability and Failure Rate Analysis for Launch and Space Vehicles Environments

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) integrated circuits (IC) are one of the key electronic components in today's sophisticated launch and space vehicle complex avionic systems, largely due to their superb reprogrammable and reconfigurable capabilities combined with relatively low non-recurring engineering costs (NRE) and short design cycle. Consequently, FPGAs are prevalent ICs in communication protocols and control signal commands. This paper will demonstrate guidelines to estimate FPGA failure rates for ascent and in space operations. The guidelines will account for hardware and radiation-induced failures, as well as Bayesian updates to failure rates. The hardware contribution of the approach accounts for physical failures of the FPGA IC. The radiation portion will expand on FPGA susceptibility to different space radiation environments.

Al Hassan, Mohammad↗
NASA NTRS2018

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure probabilities in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Work on a new methodology originally started with ARES I-X and the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) for range safety applications. CSWG consists of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Air Force, and NASA. Historical launch vehicle data was viewed as the best predictor of success/failure for launches of new vehicles. A launch vehicle database was developed that includes all launches from 1980-2017 (both US and foreign). Entries to the database include: Vehicle by model type; Launch dates; Failure description; Failure Result (Loss Of Vehicle (LOV)/Loss Of Mission (LOM); Failure cause (when available); Vehicle designs (stages/engines/etc.)

Early flight risk↗
NASA NTRS2019

The Role of Alerting System Failures in Loss of Control Accidents CAST SE-210 Output 2

This report is part of a series of reports that address flight deck design and evaluation, written as a response to loss of control accidents. In particular, this activity is directed at failures in airplane state awareness in which the pilot loses awareness of the airplane's energy state or attitude and enters an upset condition. In a report by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, an analysis of accidents and incidents related to loss of airplane state awareness determined that hazard alerting was not effective in producing the appropriate pilot response to a hazard (CAST, 2014). In the current report, we take a detailed look at 28 airplane state awareness accidents and incidents to determine how well the hazard alerting worked. We describe a five-step integrated alerting-to-recovery sequence that prescribes how hazard alerting should lead to effective flight crew actions for managing the hazard. Then, for each hazard in each of the 28 events, we determine if that sequence failed and, if so, how it failed. The results show that there was an alerting failure in every one of the 28 safety events, and that the most frequent failure (20/28) was tied to the flight crew not orienting to (not being aware of) the hazard. The discussion section summarizes findings and identifies alerting issues that are being addressed and issues that are not currently being addressed. We identify a few recent upgrades that have addressed certain alerting failures. Two of these upgrades address alerting design, but one response to the safety events is to upgrade training for approach to stall and stall recovery. We also describe issues that are not being addressed adequately: better alert integration for flight path management types of hazards, airplanes in the fleet that do not meet the current alerting regulations, a lack of innovation for addressing cases of channelized attention, and existing vulnerabilities in managing data validity.

aviation safety↗
NASA NTRS2019

Failure of Nd:YVO4 Amplifier Crystals

Brittle single crystals are used in NASA applications ranging from lenses to centrally heated laser slabs. Despite standard procedures to design such components, unexpected failures occasionally occur. The ICEsat-2 (Ices,Cloud, and Elevation satellite-2) employs Yttrium orthovanadate single crystals in laser amplifiers and oscillators. Although the systems are currently flying and successfully operating, some unexpected crystal fractures occurred just prior to flight. The failures were traced to poor crystal quality along with time-dependent chemical reaction within the system assembly that increased stress beyond expectations and promoted both fast fracture and stress corrosion. This presentation will discuss failure analysis of the crystals and the chemical reactions that promoted failures, along with corrective actions taken to reduce likelihood of fracture over the three-year mission. Re-designed lasers were stored for 12 months and operated for a total of 1,000 hours without signs of degradation.

Design↗
NASA NTRS2019

Failure of Nd:YVO4 Amplifier Crystals

Brittle single crystals are used in NASA applications ranging from lenses to centrally heated laser slabs. Despite standard procedures to design such components, unexpected failures occasionally occur. The ICEsat-2 (Ices, cloud, and elevation satellite) employs Yttrium orthovanadate single crystals in laser amplifiers and oscillators. Although the systems are currently flying and successfully operating, some unexpected crystal fractures occurred just prior to flight. The failures were traced to poor crystal quality along with time depend chemical reaction within the system assembly that increased stress beyond expectations and promoted both fast fracture and stress corrosion. This presentation will discuss failure analysis of the crystals and the chemical reactions that promoted failures, along with corrective actions taken to reduce likelihood of fracture over the three year mission. Re-designed lasers were stored for 12 months and operated for a total of 1,000 hours without signs of degradation.

Salem, Jon↗