Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “security vulnerabilities”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 487 records · Page 27

A Surety Engineering Framework and Process to Address Ethical Legal and Social Issues for Artificial Intelligence

The ethical, legal, and social issues (ELSI) surrounding Artificial Intelligence (AI) can have as great of an impact on the technologies’ success as technical issues such as safety, reliability, and security. Addressing these risks can counter potential program failures, legal and ethical battles, constraints to scientific research, and product vulnerabilities. This paper presents a surety engineering framework and process that can be applied to AI to identify and address technical, ethical, legal and societal risks. Extending sound engineering practices to incorporate a method to “engineer” ELSI can offer the scientific rigor required to significantly reduce the risk of AI vulnerabilities. Modeling the specification, design, evaluation and quality/risk indicators for AI provides a foundation for a risk-informed decision process that can benefit researchers and stakeholders alike as they use it to critically examine both substantial and intangible risks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Leveraging Technology Services for Public Good

As the technological world expands, vulnerabilities of our critical infrastructure are becoming clear. Fortunately, emerging services provide an opportunity to improve the efficiency and security of current practices. In particular, serverless computing (such as Amazon Web Services and REDFISHs Acequia) provide opportunities to improve current practices. However, the critical infrastructure needs to evolve and that will require due diligence to ensure that transferring aspects of its practices onto the internet is done in a secure manner.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Comprehensive Study of the Potential of Extracting and Processing Critical Minerals from Coal-Based Resources - Phase I

The Phase I report prepared for the Department of Energy addresses U.S. Executive Order 13817 titled A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals, issued on December 20, 2017, that lists 35 critical minerals that are vulnerable to supply disruption. A comprehensive review of each of the minerals was conducted to determine the criticality based primarily on extractability from coal-based resources. Several other factors were also considered such as gaps in supply and demand, use in current technology, and the existence of viable substitutes. It was determined that the critical minerals that show highest potential for extraction from coal-based resources are lithium, rare earth elements (REEs), cobalt, and manganese. All four of the critical minerals listed serve an important role in the technology industry, have few substitutes, and have a heavy import reliance. Most notably are lithium, which is widely used in the electric vehicle industry, and the REEs which can be found in virtually all electronic devices. The research of critical mineral extraction from coal-based resources was completed using a combination of literature review from public sources as well as cooperation from coal mines and power plants across the United States. Samples collected from six different geographical locations across the U.S. were subjected to sample preparation (i.e., pH measurement, moisture content, particle size analysis) and characterization studies using Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectroscopy (ICP-MS) and Scanning Electron Microscopy, Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (SEM-EDX) instruments. 27 samples of coal waste materials such as refuse, sludge, and fly ash were tested to characterize the rare earth element concentration by total rare earth elements (TREEs), heavy rare earth elements (HREEs), and light rare earth elements (LREEs). Of the 27 samples tested, 22 contained a TREE concentration higher than the threshold of 300 ppm, which is considered a viable feedstock material. 3 samples contained less than 300 ppm of TREEs; however, they were within 20 ppm of the threshold, and could potentially be considered viable sources in the future pending the advancement of more efficient extraction technologies. 2 of the 27 samples had significantly low TREE concentrations, which does not imply any potential for being a source for REEs. For the minerals identified as most critical in the literature review, a conceptual process flow diagram (PFD) was developed for their extraction from different coal-based feedstocks. The process targets selective recovery of one commodity (i.e., rare earths, lithium, cobalt, and manganese) via several hydrometallurgical separation methods. By identifying potentially extractable coal-based critical mineral resources, a study of the current and future market environments for each critical mineral, and a review of current processing methodologies for critical mineral extraction from coal-based resources, the foundation has been laid to further characterize and explore new resources and extraction techniques. As reliance on technologies in industries such as the production of electronic devices, batteries, and alloys containing critical minerals utilizing critical minerals continues to increase, a sound understanding of our nation’s dependence on and even the global criticality of certain critical minerals, will serve as a catalyst for innovation in virtually all fields of science.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Strengthening the Security of Operational Technology: Understanding Contemporary Bill of Materials

The evolution of cyber-physical infrastructure has made its security more challenging. The last few years have witnessed a convergence of hardware and software segments in various domains, including operational technology (OT) which is responsible for carrying out critical tasks such as monitoring and controlling power grids, nuclear plants, transportation, and emergency services. Both hardware and software encapsulate numerous open source and proprietary subcomponents, making it crucial for end-users to understand the composition of the products they are using. For example, wind turbines incorporate thousands of lines of code (software) used for the turbine's design, planning, operation, and analytics in addition to the numerous hardware subcomponents that construct it. Due to the highly complex nature of software and hardware, knowledge of the components and subcomponents is required to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities and defend against cyberattacks. There has also been a transformation from a traditional linear supply chain into a global, dynamic, diverse, and interconnected system. The digitization of the supply chain makes it easier to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Critical infrastructures (e.g., power grids, oil, natural gas, water, and wastewater) rely on OT to function, and if the OT is compromised, equipment damage and potential interruption of services could result. A significant security measure to protect OT systems from disruption is to develop a supply chain bill of materials (BoM) corresponding to the software and hardware used in OT, along with attestations amongst vendors and asset owners. A supply chain BoM is a proactive way to understand the inherent vulnerabilities in the system and mitigate them in advance of being exploited. BoMs bolster the trust placed in the digital infrastructure and enhance software supply chain security by sustaining the management of component obsolescence and compliance, along with the seclusion of unsafe segments of a specific product. Adopting BoM tools is becoming increasingly important across various government sectors, as evidenced by the recent U.S. executive order on cybersecurity (NIST 2021). This paper aims to classify BoMs based on structure, functionality, component type, and architecture. The work also discusses case studies to further highlight the benefits of BoMs. In addition, it identifies missing pieces in existing BoM implementations so that future research may identify bounds on where it could expect to make improvements and directly enable researchers to identify promising areas for exploration. Further, the authors provide valuable recommendations to tool developers, researchers, and standardizing organizations (policymakers), additionally benefitting critical infrastructure owners and government executives. This aids in paving a path for future work, thereby, providing suggestions to determine a tool for consumers that best suit their needs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Final Report for FY15 Spent Fuel Project Task 12: Data Authentication

The data authentication task is concerned with the ability of a user to trust the output from an unattended measurement of spent nuclear fuel intended for disposal. Five high-level requirements that are driven from a data authentication perspective need to be considered for instrument development: The instrument must be secured. All data emerging from the instrument must be signed. Instrument inputs may also need to be signed and authenticated. The instrument environment needs to be controlled. A vulnerability assessment will be necessary for the full system before deployment. Additional requirements may be necessary, especially if operational scenarios include arrangements for joint use. None of the prototype instruments currently under development yet satisfies any of these requirements. From a data authentication perspective, the selection of a preferred instrument from among the candidates under development should consider the relative ability to secure the instrument, its relative needs for ancillary instrumentation, and ability of the instrument to self-interrogate its state of health. Further work is recommended to develop advanced technologies, methods and approaches for tamper indication. Beyond the development of any particular instrument for the nondestructive assay of spent fuel, efforts should be devoted to developing the system for spent fuel verification prior to long term disposal, including likely operational scenarios for routine use of the verification system.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Redundancy of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Market: Are Fabrication Services Assured?

For several years, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has been assessing the reliability of nuclear fuel supply in support of the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. Three international low enriched uranium reserves, which are intended back up the existing and well-functioning nuclear fuel market, are currently moving toward implementation. These backup reserves are intended to provide countries credible assurance that of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel to operate their nuclear power reactors in the event that their primary fuel supply is disrupted, whether for political or other reasons. The efficacy of these backup reserves, however, may be constrained without redundant fabrication services. This report presents the findings of a recent PNNL study that simulated outages of varying durations at specific nuclear fuel fabrication plants. The modeling specifically enabled prediction and visualization of the reactors affected and the degree of fuel delivery delay. The results thus provide insight on the extent of vulnerability to nuclear fuel supply disruption at the level of individual fabrication plants, reactors, and countries. The simulation studies demonstrate that, when a reasonable set of qualification criteria are applied, existing fabrication plants are technically qualified to provide backup fabrication services to the majority of the world's power reactors. The report concludes with an assessment of the redundancy of fuel supply in the nuclear fuel market, and a description of potential extra-market mechanisms to enhance the security of fuel supply in cases where it may be warranted. This report is an assessment of the ability of the existing market to respond to supply disruptions that occur for technical reasons. A forthcoming report will address political disruption scenarios.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Cyber Security Testing and Training Programs for Industrial Control Systems

Service providers rely on industrial control systems (ICS) to manage the flow of water at dams, open breakers on power grids, control ventilation and cooling in nuclear power plants, and more. In today's interconnected environment, this can present a serious cyber security challenge. To combat this growing challenge, government, private industry, and academia are working together to reduce cyber risks. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a key contributor to the Department of Energy National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), both of which focus on improving the overall security posture of ICS in the national critical infrastructure. In support of the NSTB, INL hosts a dedicated SCADA testing facility which consists of multiple control systems supplied by leading national and international manufacturers. Within the test bed, INL researchers systematically examine control system components and work to identify vulnerabilities. In support of the CSSP, INL develops and conducts training courses which are designed to increase awareness and defensive capabilities for IT/Control System professionals. These trainings vary from web-based cyber security trainings for control systems engineers to more advanced hands-on training that culminates with a Red Team/ Blue Team exercise that is conducted within an actual control systems environment. INL also provides staffing and operational support to the DHS Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) Security Operations Center which responds to and analyzes control systems cyber incidents across the 18 US critical infrastructure sectors.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Security constrained optimal power shutoff for wildfire risk mitigation

Abstract Electric grid faults are increasingly the source of ignition for major wildfires. To reduce the likelihood of such ignitions in high risk situations, utilities use preemptive de‐energization of power lines, commonly referred to as Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS). Besides raising challenging trade‐offs between power outages and wildfire safety, PSPS removes redundancy from the network at a time when component faults are likely to happen. This may leave the network particularly vulnerable to unexpected line faults that may occur while the PSPS is in place. Previous works have not explicitly considered the impacts of these outages. To address this gap, the Security Constrained Optimal Power Shutoff problem is proposed which uses post‐contingency security constraints to model the impact of unexpected line faults when planning a PSPS. This model enables, for the first time, the exploration of a wide range of trade‐offs between both wildfire risk and pre‐ and post‐contingency load shedding when designing PSPS plans, providing useful insights for utilities and policy makers considering different approaches to PSPS. The efficacy of the model is demonstrated using the EPRI 39‐bus system as a case study. The results highlight the potential risks of not considering security constraints when planning PSPS and show that incorporating security constraints into the PSPS design process improves the resilience of current PSPS plans.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Evolution and Trends of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents since 2017

The industrial control systems (ICSs) that manage our critical infrastructure are increasingly converging with corporate networks and the Internet as technology and businesses prioritize digital connectivity. These connections make them more vulnerable and available to malicious cyber actors who traditionally targeted the companies’ more public-facing information technology (IT) networks. This paper will review select publicly reported cyber incidents to highlight the continued and growing threat to ICS devices and operational technology (OT) environments. It will summarize the incident and when available, will provide information on the cyber actors, the vulnerabilities they exploited, and any publications the U.S. Government (USG) provided in response. Data belonging to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will be used to highlight quantitative trends concerning ICS incidents. This paper builds on “History of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents” (Hemsley & Fisher 2018), a paper that highlighted select noteworthy threats and incidents to ICS systems up to 2017. This paper will similarly review select incidents occurring after the last previously reviewed incident, Triton/HatMan, December 2017, and will note ICS incident trends including IT/OT convergence and advances in cyber-threat actors’ capabilities in observed in the examined incidents.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Seaborne Delivery Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Over the next 10-20 years, the probability of a terrorist attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) on the United States is projected to increase. At some point over the next few decades, it may be inevitable that a terrorist group will have access to a WMD. The economic and social impact of an attack using a WMD anywhere in the world would be catastrophic. For weapons developed overseas, the routes of entry are air and sea with the maritime vector as the most porous. Providing a system to track, perform a risk assessment and inspect all inbound marine traffic before it reaches US coastal cities thereby mitigating the threat has long been a goal for our government. The challenge is to do so effectively without crippling the US economy. The Portunus Project addresses only the maritime threat and builds on a robust maritime domain awareness capability. It is a process to develop the technologies, policies and practices that will enable the US to establish a waypoint for the inspection of international marine traffic, screen 100% of containerized and bulk cargo prior to entry into the US if deemed necessary, provide a palatable economic model for transshipping, grow the US economy, and improve US environmental quality. The implementation strategy is based on security risk, and the political and economic constraints of implementation. This article is meant to provide a basic understanding of how and why this may be accomplished.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Where Big Data and Prediction Meet

Our ability to assemble and analyze massive data sets, often referred to under the title of “big data”, is an increasingly important tool for shaping national policy. This in turn has introduced issues from privacy concerns to cyber security. But as IBM’s John Kelly emphasized in the last Innovation, making sense of the vast arrays of data will require radically new computing tools. In the past, technologies and tools for analysis of big data were viewed as quite different from the traditional realm of high performance computing (HPC) with its huge models of phenomena such as global climate or supporting the nuclear test moratorium. Looking ahead, this will change with very positive benefits for both worlds. Societal issues such as global security, economic planning and genetic analysis demand increased understanding that goes beyond existing data analysis and reduction. The modeling world often produces simulations that are complex compositions of mathematical models and experimental data. This has resulted in outstanding successes such as the annual assessment of the state of the US nuclear weapons stockpile without underground nuclear testing. Ironically, while there were historically many test conducted, this body of data provides only modest insight into the underlying physics of the system. A great deal of emphasis was thus placed on the level of confidence we can develop for the predictions. As data analytics and simulation come together, there is a growing need to assess the confidence levels in both data being gathered and the complex models used to make predictions. An example of this is assuring the security or optimizing the performance of critical infrastructure systems such as the power grid. If one wants to understand the vulnerabilities of the system or impacts of predicted threats, full scales tests of the grid against threat scenarios are unlikely. Preventive measures would need to be predicated on well-defined margins of confidence in order to take mitigating actions that could have wide ranging impacts. There is a rich opportunity for interaction and exchange between the HPC simulation and data analytics communities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - runZero Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator™ (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator: Cohort 2 - Asimily Public Report

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) sponsors the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (TM) (CECA) to expedite the deployment of emerging security technologies that address the most urgent security concerns facing modern and future electric grids. CECA Cohort 2 assessed solutions focused on hidden risks due to incomplete system visibility and device security and configuration. Improving visibility can be achieved through operational technology (OT) asset identification solutions, including capabilities like automatic discovery, vulnerability reporting, and configuration monitoring. Solutions that monitor and identify assets in information technology (IT) networks in other domains are widely used; however, there is far less adoption of monitoring solutions for operational technology environments. Wider adoption may increase with increased confidence in the ability for these solutions to understand and respond to the specific requirements of OT environments. CECA Cohort 2 evaluated the active and passive asset discovery capabilities of market-ready solutions, documented and analyzed results, and identified gaps in functionality or capabilities. This report and describes how these results can help advance the adoption of these and similar solutions in the electric sector.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Plant Disease Detection: Exploring Applications in Hyperspectral Imaging and Machine Learning for Agriculture

The threat of crop disease on food security and agriculture is projected to escalate, leading to reduced crop yields, global economic loss, and endangered food availability to vulnerable populations. Early identification of plant disease is crucial to combatting the crisis but traditional manual methods for disease detection are laborious and may miss early signs of infection. The proposed solution suggests equipping a drone with a hyperspectral camera to collect images and analyzing the data with neural networks trained to flag and classify infected plants. This approach offers a faster, more accurate, and potentially more cost-effective alternative to current practices. While the expensive and complex nature of hyperspectral imaging (HSI) may be an obstacle to the adoption of the drone, rapidly advancing technologies compounded with rental-based usage may make these tools simpler, cheaper, and more accessible to a wider audience. The research further discusses the potential for automated flight paths and the expansion of disease detection to a broader range of crops.

plant disease detection↗

Finite Energy and Bounded Attacks on Control System Sensor Signals

Control system networks are increasingly being connected to enterprise level networks. These connections leave critical industrial controls systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Most of the effort in protecting these cyber-physical systems (CPS) has been in securing the networks using information security techniques and protection and reliability concerns at the control system level against random hardware and software failures. However, besides these failures the inability of information security techniques to protect against all intrusions means that the control system must be resilient to various signal attacks for which new analysis and detection methods need to be developed. In this paper, sensor signal attacks are analyzed for observer-based controlled systems. The threat surface for sensor signal attacks is subdivided into denial of service, finite energy, and bounded attacks. In particular, the error signals between states of attack free systems and systems subject to these attacks are quantified. Optimal sensor and actuator signal attacks for the finite and infinite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the corresponding cost functions are computed. The closed-loop system under optimal signal attacks are provided. Illustrative numerical examples are provided together with an application to a power network with distributed LQ controllers.

Cyber-physical↗

Engineering Trade-off Considerations Regarding Design-for-Security, Design-for-Verification, and Design-for-Test

The United States government has identified that application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware are at risk from a variety of adversary attacks. This finding affects system security and trust. Consequently, processes are being developed for system mitigation and countermeasure application. The scope of this tutorial pertains to potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures within the ASIC/FPGA design cycle. The presentation demonstrates how design practices can affect the risk for the adversary to: change circuitry, steal intellectual property, and listen to data operations. An important portion of the design cycle is assuring the design is working as specified or as expected. This is accomplished by exhaustive testing of the target design. Alternatively, it has been shown that well established schemes for test coverage enhancement (design-for-verification (DFV) and design-for-test (DFT)) can create conduits for adversary accessibility. As a result, it is essential to perform a trade between robust test coverage versus reliable design implementation. The goal of this tutorial is to explain the evolution of design practices; review adversary accessibility points due to DFV and DFT circuitry insertion (back door circuitry); and to describe common engineering trade-off considerations for test versus adversary threats.

Design for reliability (DFR)↗

A holistic cyber-physical security protocol for authenticating the provenance and integrity of structural health monitoring imagery data

Modern infrastructure systems, such as bridges, dams, power generation stations, and buildings increasingly have an intrinsic cyber-physical nature to them. Infrastructure now commonly, includes actuators, network connections, sensors, control systems, and computational resources. It is of increasing concern that modern infrastructure is vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can damage both the cyber and physical nature of the infrastructure. To date, the physical and cyber health of infrastructure has been considered separately. However, the increasing concerns associated with the cyber-physical security of infrastructure coupled with the emergence of 5G networks made using components that are not universally considered trustworthy, and the emergence of techniques for creating deepfakes and adversarial examples suggests the time has come to begin considering cyber health and structural health with a more holistic approach. In this work, a protocol is developed for ensuring the imagery data captured by a structural health monitoring system can be unambiguously attributed to legitimate sensors associated with the structural health monitoring system. A computer vision approach based on the idea of mutual information is then presented to detect damage in an image. This work presents the protocol for authenticating the provenance of imager data and demonstrates that this protocol does not have overly adverse effects when used with the mutual information-based technique for detecting damage in the resulting imagery data.

Jung, HweeKwon↗

Using Discrete Event Simulation to Model Attacker Interactions with Cyber and Physical Security Systems

The number of connections between physical and cyber security systems is rapidly increasing due to centralized control from automated and remotely connected means. As the number of interfaces between systems continues to grow, the interactions and interdependencies between them cannot be ignored. Historically, physical and cyber vulnerability assessments have been performed independently. This independent evaluation omits important aspects of the integrated system, where the impacts resulting from malicious or opportunistic attacks are not easily known or understood. Here, we describe a discrete event simulation model that uses information about integrated physical and cyber security systems, attacker characteristics and simple response rules to identify key safeguards that limit an attacker's likelihood of success. Key features of the proposed model include comprehensive data generation to support a variety of sophisticated analyses, and full parameterization of safeguard performance characteristics and attacker behaviours to evaluate a range of scenarios. Lastly, we also describe the core data requirements and the network of networks that serves as the underlying simulation structure.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗