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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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Curifactory: A research experiment manager

Curifactory is a command line tool and framework for organizing Python experiment code, configuration parameters, and results. It is an opinionated and lightweight approach to workflow management infrastructure and is primarily intended to support researchers conducting experiments on one machine. This software was developed to support the reproducibility of results for several data science projects in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Curifactory is intended to be a general framework and is not specific to machine learning or data science. It can aid in any field in which experiments are primarily computation-based studies and can be implemented in Python (e.g., high-energy physics, astronomy, computational chemistry). Here, the design emphasizes the automated caching of intermediate data analysis artifacts to speed up development involving computationally intensive tasks. It also allows for data provenance and experiment reproduction. Individual experiment runs are tracked through logs and their output reports, and entire copies of a run with all cached data and metadata can be exported for others to run using Curifactory on another machine. Curifactory experiments can either be integrated into a project from the beginning or can be written on top of an existing codebase without needing significant modification. A few important views of the Curifactory library can be seen in Figure 1.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

CREATION OF THE MODEL ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

In 1991, the international nuclear nonproliferation community was dismayed to discover that the implementation of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under its NPT INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement with Iraq had failed to detect Iraq's nuclear weapon program. It was now clear that ensuring that states were fulfilling their obligations under the NPT would require not just detecting diversion but also the ability to detect undeclared materials and activities. To achieve this, the IAEA initiated what would turn out to be a five-year effort to reappraise the NPT safeguards system. The effort engaged the IAEA and its Member States and led to agreement in 1997 on a new safeguards agreement, the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. The Model Protocol makes explicit that one IAEA goal is to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Model Protocol requires an expanded declaration that identifies a State's nuclear potential, empowers the IAEA to raise questions about the correctness and completeness of the State's declaration, and, if needed, allows IAEA access to locations. The information required and the locations available for access are much broader than those provided for under INFCIRC/153. The negotiation was completed in quite a short time because it started with a relatively complete draft of an agreement prepared by the IAEA Secretariat. This paper describes how the Model Protocol was constructed and reviews key decisions that were made both during the five-year period and in the actual negotiation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

AQUEOUS HOMOGENEOUS REACTORTECHNICAL PANEL REPORT

Considerable interest has been expressed for developing a stable U.S. production capacity for medical isotopes and particularly for molybdenum- 99 (99Mo). This is motivated by recent re-ductions in production and supply worldwide. Consistent with U.S. nonproliferation objectives, any new production capability should not use highly enriched uranium fuel or targets. Conse-quently, Aqueous Homogeneous Reactors (AHRs) are under consideration for potential 99Mo production using low-enriched uranium. Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has guidance to facilitate the licensing process for non-power reactors, that guidance is focused on reactors with fixed, solid fuel and hence, not applicable to an AHR. A panel was convened to study the technical issues associated with normal operation and potential transients and accidents of an AHR that might be designed for isotope production. The panel has produced the requisite AHR licensing guidance for three chapters that exist now for non-power reactor licensing: Reac-tor Description, Reactor Coolant Systems, and Accident Analysis. The guidance is in two parts for each chapter: 1) standard format and content a licensee would use and 2) the standard review plan the NRC staff would use. This guidance takes into account the unique features of an AHR such as the fuel being in solution; the fission product barriers being the vessel and attached systems; the production and release of radiolytic and fission product gases and their impact on operations and their control by a gas management system; and the movement of fuel into and out of the reactor vessel.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Development of an Ontology-Directed Signal Processing Toolbox

This project was focused on the development of tools for the automatic configuration of signal processing systems. The goal is to develop tools that will be useful in a variety of Government and commercial areas and useable by people who are not signal processing experts. In order to get the most benefit from signal processing techniques, deep technical expertise is often required in order to select appropriate algorithms, combine them into a processing chain, and tune algorithm parameters for best performance on a specific problem. Therefore a significant benefit would result from the assembly of a toolbox of processing algorithms that has been selected for their effectiveness in a group of related problem areas, along with the means to allow people who are not signal processing experts to reliably select, combine, and tune these algorithms to solve specific problems. Defining a vocabulary for problem domain experts that is sufficiently expressive to drive the configuration of signal processing functions will allow the expertise of signal processing experts to be captured in rules for automated configuration. In order to test the feasibility of this approach, we addressed a lightning classification problem, which was proposed by DOE as a surrogate for problems encountered in nuclear nonproliferation data processing. We coded a toolbox of low-level signal processing algorithms for extracting features of RF waveforms, and demonstrated a prototype tool for screening data. We showed examples of using the tool for expediting the generation of ground-truth metadata, for training a signal recognizer, and for searching for signals with particular characteristics. The public benefits of this approach, if successful, will accrue to Government and commercial activities that face the same general problem - the development of sensor systems for complex environments. It will enable problem domain experts (e.g. analysts) to construct signal and image processing chains without the aid of signal processing experts. Thus enabled, problem domain experts will be able to work more quickly and produce better quality work.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Graphical User Interface for Simplified Neutron Transport Calculations

A number of codes perform simple photon physics calculations. The nuclear industry is lacking in similar tools to perform simplified neutron physics shielding calculations. With the increased importance of performing neutron calculations for homeland security applications and defense nuclear nonproliferation tasks, having an efficient method for performing simple neutron transport calculations becomes increasingly important. Codes such as Monte Carlo N-particle (MCNP) can perform the transport calculations; however, the technical details in setting up, running, and interpreting the required simulations are quite complex and typically go beyond the abilities of most users who need a simple answer to a neutron transport calculation. The work documented in this report resulted in the development of the NucWiz program, which can create an MCNP input file for a set of simple geometries, source, and detector configurations. The user selects source, shield, and tally configurations from a set of pre-defined lists, and the software creates a complete MCNP input file that can be optionally run and the results viewed inside NucWiz.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Reactor Fuel

Global appetite for fission power is projected to grow dramatically this century, and for good reason. Despite considerable research to identify new sources of energy, fission remains the most plentiful and practical alternative to fossil fuels. The environmental challenges of fossil fuel have made the fission power option increasingly attractive, particularly as we are forced to rely on reserves in ecologically fragile or politically unstable corners of the globe. Caught between a globally eroding fossil fuel reserve as well as the uncertainty and considerable costs in the development of fusion power, most of the world will most likely come to rely on fission power for at least the remainder of the 21st century. Despite inevitable growth, fission power faces enduring challenges in sustainability and security. One of fission power's greatest hurdles to universal acceptance is the risk of potential misuse for nefarious purposes of fissionable byproducts in spent fuel, such as plutonium. With this issue in mind, we have discussed intrinsic concepts in this report that are motivated by the premise that the utility, desirability, and applicability of nuclear materials can be reduced. In a general sense, the intrinsic solutions aim to reduce or eliminate the quantity of existing weapons usable material; avoid production of new weapons-usable material through enrichment, breeding, extraction; or employ engineering solutions to make the fuel cycle less useful or more difficult for producing weapons-usable material. By their nature, these schemes require modifications to existing fuel cycles. As such, the concomitants of these modifications require engagement from the nuclear reactor and fuel-design community to fully assess their effects. Unfortunately, active pursuit of any scheme that could further complicate the spread of domestic nuclear power will probably be understandably unpopular. Nevertheless, the nonproliferation and counterterrorism issues are paramount, and we posit that the exploration, development, and implementation of intrinsic mechanisms such as discussed here are part of a balanced approach aimed at preventing the misuse of nuclear material for nuclear-energy applications.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

2011 U.S. Department of Energy Strategic Plan

The mission of the Department of Energy is to ensure America's security and prosperity by addressing its energy, environmental, and nuclear challenges through transformative science and technology solutions. Goal 1 is to catalyze the timely, material, and efficient transformation of the nation's energy system and secure U.S. leadership in clean energy technologies. Goal 2 is to maintain a vibrant U.S. effort in science and engineering as a cornerstone of our economic prosperity with clear leadership in strategic areas. Goal 3 is to enhance nuclear security through defense, nonproliferation, and environmental efforts. Goal 4 is to establish an operational and adaptable framework that combines the best wisdom of all Department stakeholders to maximize mission success.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Utility of Social Modeling in Assessment of a State’s Propensity for Nuclear Proliferation

This report is the third and final report out of a set of three reports documenting research for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Security Administration (NASA) Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development NA-22 Simulations, Algorithms, and Modeling program that investigates how social modeling can be used to improve proliferation assessment for informing nuclear security, policy, safeguards, design of nuclear systems and research decisions. Social modeling has not to have been used to any significant extent in a proliferation studies. This report focuses on the utility of social modeling as applied to the assessment of a State's propensity to develop a nuclear weapons program.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together with several DOE laboratories such as Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). In particular, ORNL's participation encompasses student internships, postdoctoral appointments, collaboration with universities in safeguards curriculum development, workshops, and outreach to professional societies through career fairs.

Kirk, Bernadette Lugue↗

Introduction to Neutron Coincidence Counter Design Based on Boron-10

The Department of Energy Office of Nonproliferation Policy (NA-241) is supporting the project 'Coincidence Counting With Boron-Based Alternative Neutron Detection Technology' at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for development of an alternative neutron coincidence counter. The goal of this project is ultimately to design, build and demonstrate a boron-lined proportional tube based alternative system in the configuration of a coincidence counter. This report, providing background information for this project, is the deliverable under Task 1 of the project.

10B↗

Nevada National Security Site: Site-Directed Research and Development (Fiscal Year 2011 Annual Report)

This fiscal year 2011 annual report of the Site-Directed Research and Development program, the 10th anniversary edition, recognizes a full decade of innovative R&D accomplishments in support of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Last year the NNSS itself was renamed to reflect a diversifying mission, and our R&D program has contributed significantly to shape emerging missions that will continue to evolve. New initiatives in stockpile stewardship science, nonproliferation, and treaty verification and monitoring have had substantial successes in FY 2011, and many more accomplishments are expected. SDRD is the cornerstone on which many of these initiatives rest. Historically supporting our main focus areas, SDRD is also building a solid foundation for new, and non-traditional, emerging national security missions. The program continues its charter to advance science and technology for a broad base of agencies including the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and many others.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program 2011 Report

The Ecological Monitoring and Compliance (EMAC) Program, funded through the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, monitors the ecosystem of the Nevada National Security Site and ensures compliance with laws and regulations pertaining to NNSS biota. This report summarizes the program's activities conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC, during calendar year 2011. Program activities included (a) biological surveys at proposed construction sites, (b) desert tortoise compliance, (c) ecosystem monitoring, (d) sensitive plant species monitoring, (e) sensitive and protected/regulated animal monitoring, (f) habitat restoration monitoring, and (g) monitoring of the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex. During 2011, all applicable laws, regulations, and permit requirements were met, enabling EMAC to achieve its intended goals and objectives.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Internship at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is located in Los Alamos, New Mexico. It provides support for our country's nuclear weapon stockpile as well as many other scientific research projects. I am an Undergraduate Student Intern in the Systems Design and Analysis group within the Nuclear Nonproliferation division of the Global Security directorate at LANL. I have been tasked with data analysis and modeling of particles in a fluidized bed system for the capture of carbon dioxide from power plant flue gas.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

LANL Analytical and Radiochemistry Capabilities

The overview of this presentation is: (1) Introduction to nonproliferation efforts; (2) Scope of activities Los Alamos National Laboratory; (3) Facilities for radioanalytical work at LANL; (4) Radiochemical characterization capabilities; and (5) Bulk chemical and materials analysis capabilities.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Improved capture gamma-ray libraries for nuclear applications

The neutron-capture reaction is of fundamental use in identifying and analyzing the γ-ray spectrum from an unknown object as it gives unambiguous information on exactly what isotopes are absorbing the neutrons. There are many applications where this can be used passively (nonproliferation), or actively where an external neutron source is used to probe an unknown assembly (planetary studies).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Multiscale models of nuclear waste reprocessing: from the mesoscale to the plant-scale

Nuclear waste reprocessing and nonproliferation models are needed to support the renaissance in nuclear energy. This report summarizes an LDRD project to develop predictive capabilities to aid the next-generation nuclear fuel reprocessing, in SIERRA Mechanics, Sandia’s high performance computing multiphysics code suite and Cantera, an open source software product for thermodynamics and kinetic modeling.

Rao, Rekha Ranjana↗

BAZAAR DIPLOMACY: Examining Iran's Nuclear Bargaining Tactics

Since undeclared elements of Iran’s nuclear program were revealed in 2002, Tehran has engaged in a decade of efforts to justify and advance its nuclear program. Unlike North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has maximized advantage and minimized backlash by maneuvering near the borders of the NPT system. Iran has embraced a three-pronged approach to bargain with the international community: (1) divide international opposition, (2) delay international monitoring, negotiations, and sanctions, (3) and defy international monitoring, commitments, and pressure. Iran’s nuclear bargaining can be divided into several time periods, and Iran used divide, delay, and defy tactics in each period. During the first phase from 2003 to 2005, Iranian reformist leader Mohammad Khatami was more willing to negotiate with the international community, but his ability to negotiate was constrained domestically and particularly during his last year of leadership. Tehran mainly negotiated with the France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – the European 3 (EU-3) – to drive a wedge between European and U.S. pressures on Iran and to delay outside monitoring and prevent international sanctions. It is in this early period that Iran developed its range of divide, delay, and defy tactics. For divide, Iran negotiated with the EU-3 because Europe had a close and influential relationship with the United States, whereas other international actors such as Russia and China were powerful but could not form an united bloc against the U.S. Iran began to delay international monitoring of its nuclear program by creating hurdles for international inspectors, stalling requests for information, and not volunteering information but providing updates only when Iranian nuclear developments were exposed by other parties. Iranian diplomats also delayed negotiations and sanctions by framing talks, negotiating and responding slowly to offers, providing false hopes and the appearance of concessions before key international events and resolutions, and adopting temporary and shifting negotiating positions. To defy, Iran modified and razed nuclear sites to prevent detection, used legalistic and minimal interpretations to subvert commitments, argued for an international right to enrich uranium, and proclaimed a fatwa against nuclear weapons. After President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, Iran took a tougher stance internationally. Ahmadinejad and his cabinet did not provide major concessions to facilitate international negotiations, were less willing to seriously consider proposals to curb Iran’s nuclear program, and linked Iran’s nuclear program to sovereignty and national pride. Realizing that Europe was less optimistic about negotiations, Ahmadinejad leveraged Russia and China to Iran’s advantage. Both countries helped delay and dilute United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Ahmadinejad employed more tactics to defy international monitoring and pressure. These tactics involved demonstrating Iran’s nuclear progress even as Tehran engaged in negotiations over its program. Iran also increased the cost of failed negotiations by sustaining and escalating regional and global tensions to coincide with international events and resolutions that criticized or condemned Iran’s nuclear program. The third and present phase of Iranian nuclear bargaining began during Ahmadinejad’s second term as president (2009-2012). During this period, Ahmadinejad’s power significant weakened and domestic turf wars made Iranian nuclear negotiations unpredictable and at times contradictory. Due to the domestic situation and the exhausting of successful divide and delay tactics, Iran began using more defy tactics. Iran, for example, considered enriching uranium to a higher percentage for naval reactors, warned of closing the Straits of Hormuz, and engaged in terrorist acts against the West and its allies. Currently, Iran’s range of bargaining options has narrowed, with many divide and delay tactics less useful since the international community has become more aware of Iranian efforts to stall and buy time. While Iran leaders have employed more acts of defiance, Iran’s ability to sustain its defy tactics are waning and it is still possible to prevent greater confrontation between Iran and the West.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗