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Strain gauge for testing microreactor hexagonal core blocks in the Single Primary Heat Extraction and Removal Emulator

To support the development and deployment of microreactor technologies, experiments that help verify and validate reactor systems and components are performed at non-nuclear test facilities. The Single Primary Heat Extraction Removal Emulator at Idaho National Laboratory is one of these test facilities and was used to monitor a test article that has a prototypic geometry of a heat-pipe cooled microreactor core block. To collect crucial temperature and strain data during testing, temperature and strain sensing fiber optics were embedded to the surface of the test article using an ultrasonic additive manufacturing technique. To support and provide benchmark strain data for the embedded sensors, a commercial resistive strain gauge was attached. This report will discuss the results from the deployment of the commercial strain gauge which includes the setup/attachment strategies, data acquisition, and analysis of the strain data.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Summary of the Atmospheric Test Data (Film Scanning and Re-Analysis) Project at LLNL

The goal of the Atmospheric Test Data (ATD) Project is to preserve and make better use of scientific-quality films that were taken during the era of above ground nuclear testing. The project is being done in collaboration with Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is the custodian of the films. Our primary points of contact at LANL have been Alan Carr, Carla Breiner, and Randy Drake.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Pahute Mesa Well Development and Testing Analyses for Wells ER-20-8 and ER-20-4, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

Wells ER-20-4 and ER-20-8 were drilled during fiscal year (FY) 2009 and FY 2010 (NNSA/NSO, 2011a and b). The closest underground nuclear test detonations to the area of investigation are TYBO (U-20y), BELMONT (U-20as), MOLBO (U-20ag), BENHAM (U-20c), and HOYA (U-20 be) (Figure 1-1). The TYBO, MOLBO, and BENHAM detonations had working points located below the regional water table. The BELMONT and HOYA detonation working points were located just above the water table, and the cavity for these detonations are calculated to extend below the water table (Pawloski et al., 2002). The broad purpose of Wells ER-20-4 and ER-20-8 is to determine the extent of radionuclide-contaminated groundwater, the geologic formations, groundwater geochemistry as an indicator of age and origin, and the water-bearing properties and hydraulic conditions that influence radionuclide migration. Well development and testing is performed to determine the hydraulic properties at the well and between other wells, and to obtain groundwater samples at the well that are representative of the formation at the well. The area location, wells, underground nuclear detonations, and other features are shown in Figure 1-1. Hydrostratigraphic cross sections A-A’, B-B’, C-C’, and D-D’ are shown in Figures 1-2 through 1-5, respectively.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Calendar Year 2016 (January 2016–December 2016), Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are evaluated to determine whether the UR boundaries remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Additionally, monitoring data are used to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries (CBs) calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. In summary, the monitoring results from 2016 indicate the regulatory controls on the closure of CAU 98 remain effective in protection of human health and the environment. Recommendations resulting from this first year of monitoring activities include formally incorporating wells UE-5 PW-1, UE-5 PW-2, and UE-5 PW-3 into the groundwater-level monitoring network given their strategic location in the basin; and early development of a basis for trigger levels for the groundwater-level monitoring given the observed trends. Additionally, it is recommended to improve the Real Estate/Operations Permit process for capturing information important for evaluating the impact of activities on groundwater resources, and to shift the reporting requirement for this annual report from the second quarter of the federal fiscal year (end of March) to the second quarter of the calendar year (end of June).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Final Design for Additional Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) with Sodium Chloride Absorbers to Provide Validation Benchmarks for TerraPower

The first set of Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) with chlorine absorbers (TEX-Cl) were executed in Q4FY24 and are in the process of being benchmarked for the ICSBEP. TEX-Cl builds upon the TEX-HEU baseline cases that were published in the 2022 International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook. TEX-HEU, like TEX-Pu, was designed to be modular to allow for the incorporation of various absorbers and reflectors to test nuclear data and application case needs. For example, TEX-HEU with hafnium (TEX-Hf) utilizes hafnium plates as both absorbers and reflectors, depending on the tested configuration. A second set of chlorine experiments, dubbed More TEX-Cl, are laid out in this report to meet the needs of TerraPower for chlorine validation for their Molten Chloride Fast Reactor (MCFR) systems. TerraPower’s Molten Chloride Reactor Experiment (MCRE) and MCFR are fast molten salt reactors that utilize sodium chloride (NaCl) salt eutectics as the fuel and coolant. The MCRE eutectic is a mixture of NaCl and uranium trichloride (UCl 3 ). An abundant need for chlorine absorption validation has been expressed by multiple members of the community, including Y-12 (whose needs were addressed with the first set of experiments), LANL (whose needs were addressed with the Chlorine Worth Study (CWS)), TerraPower, institute de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire (IRSN), Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SNRS), and others. Of the members who have expressed interest in this validation, most are interested in the fast neutron energy region, where the 35 Cl(n,p) reaction is most prominent. New 35 Cl(n,p) differential cross section measurements performed by LANL at LANCSE show substantial changes to the cross sections (Figure 1) and may be validated through these experiments as some configurations are optimally sensitive to this cross section.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Evaluation of Building 23-702, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory H-8 Foil Handling Building, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-702, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) H-8 Foil Handling Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15278) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. As part of the modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement Between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-702 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-702 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-702 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DPF Test Conditions: FY 2016

A Neutron Diagnosed Subcritical Experiment (NDSE) is designed to quantitatively measure the reactivity of a subcritical (k eff <1.0) plutonium experiment and thereby improve our understanding of primary performance in the absence of underground nuclear testing. Successful implementation of this diagnostic requires a short, intense burst of neutrons be delivered to the fissile assembly at a precise time during a plutonium implosion. Monte Carlo particle transport simulations of representative subcritical experiments have been performed to establish the pulse shape, flux, and timing requirements for the NDSE neutron source. Additional requirements have also been established for detector sensitivity, acceptable background levels, and total diagnostic reliability.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Xenon International Overview

The Xenon International system is a fully automated unattended system designed to collect, separate, purify, quantify, and perform nuclear counting on radioxenon isotopes as well as transmit data using two-way communications (Figure 1). Xenon International is designed to stringent requirements that make it an high performance next-generation-system for use in nuclear explosion monitoring networks such as the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Application for a Permit to Operate a Class III Solid Waste Disposal Site at the Nevada Test Site Area 5 Asbestiform Low-Level Solid Waste Disposal Site

The NTS solid waste disposal sites must be permitted by the state of Nevada Solid Waste Management Authority (SWMA). The SWMA for the NTS is the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Federal Facilities (NDEP/BFF). The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) as land manager (owner), and National Security Technologies (NSTec), as operator, will store, collect, process, and dispose all solid waste by means that do not create a health hazard, a public nuisance, or cause impairment of the environment. NTS disposal sites will not be included in the Nye County Solid Waste Management Plan. The NTS is located approximately 105 kilometers (km) (65 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is the federal lands management authority for the NTS, and NSTec is the Management and Operations contractor. Access on and off the NTS is tightly controlled, restricted, and guarded on a 24-hour basis. The NTS has signs posted along its entire perimeter. NSTec is the operator of all solid waste disposal sites on the NTS. The Area 5 RWMS is the location of the permitted facility for the Solid Waste Disposal Site (SWDS). The Area 5 RWMS is located near the eastern edge of the NTS (Figure 2), approximately 26 km (16 mi) north of Mercury, Nevada. The Area 5 RWMS is used for the disposal of low-level waste (LLW) and mixed low-level waste. Many areas surrounding the RWMS have been used in conducting nuclear tests. A Notice of Intent to operate the disposal site as a Class III site was submitted to the state of Nevada on January 28, 1994, and was acknowledged as being received in a letter to the NNSA/NSO on August 30, 1994. Interim approval to operate a Class III SWDS for regulated asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) was authorized on August 12, 1996 (in letter from Paul Liebendorfer to Runore Wycoff), with operations to be conducted in accordance with the ''Management Plan for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste with Regulated Asbestos Waste.'' A requirement of the authorization was that on or before October 9, 1999, a permit was required to be issued. Because of NDEP and NNSA/NSO review cycles, the final permit was issued on April 5, 2000, for the operation of the Area 5 Low-Level Waste Disposal Site, utilizing Pit 7 (P07) as the designated disposal cell. The original permit applied only to Pit 7, with a total design capacity of 5,831 cubic yards (yd{sup 3}) (157,437 cubic feet [ft{sup 3}]). NNSA/NSO is expanding the SWDS to include the adjacent Upper Cell of Pit 6 (P06), with an additional capacity of 28,037 yd{sup 3} (756,999 ft{sup 3}) (Figure 3). The proposed total capacity of ALLW in Pit 7 and P06 will be approximately 33,870 yd{sup 3} (0.9 million ft{sup 3}). The site will be used for the disposal of regulated ALLW, small quantities of low-level radioactive hydrocarbon-burdened (LLHB) media and debris, LLW, LLW that contains PCB Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water, and small quantities of LLHB demolition and construction waste (hereafter called permissible waste). Waste containing free liquids, or waste that is regulated as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) or state-of-generation hazardous waste regulations, will not be accepted for disposal at the site. The only waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that will be accepted at the disposal site is regulated asbestos-containing materials (RACM). The term asbestiform is used throughout this document to describe this waste. Other TSCA waste (i.e., polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]) will not be accepted for disposal at the SWDS. The disposal site will be used as a depository of permissible waste generated both on site and off site. All generators designated by NNSA/NSO will be eligible to dispose regulated ALLW at the Asbestiform Low-Level Waste Disposal Site in accordance with the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) 325, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC, current revision). Approval will be given by NNSA/NSO to generators that have successfully demonstrated through process knowledge (PK) and/or sampling and analysis that the waste is low-level, contains asbestiform material, and does not contain prohibited waste materials. Each waste stream will be approved through the Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program (RWAP), which ensures that the waste meets acceptance requirements outlined in the NTS Class III Permit and the NTSWAC.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Underground Test Area Annual Sampling Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Revision 1, Calendar Year 2018)

The Sampling Plans (Rev. 0 and Rev. 1) ensure routine sampling that is critical to understanding contaminant transport near and downgradient of the underground nuclear testing areas, and is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Activity Quality Assurance Plan and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. This report presents the analytical data for the 2018 calendar year (CY) (January 1 through December 31, 2018) to ensure that the Sampling Plans’ objectives are achieved. Appendix D presents data from samples collected in 2016 and 2017. These results were not reported in previous reports because they were not available from the specialized laboratories at the time of the publication of the reports.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Phase II testing of Xenon International on Mount Schauinsland, Germany

Station RN33 on Mount Schauinsland near Freiburg, Germany, is part of the International Monitoring System monitoring radioxenon in air ( 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe) for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Here, we present data from phase II testing of a new system, Xenon International at RN33, July 14th, 2021 to Jan 22nd, 2022, together with SPALAX data from the same time period. Radioxenon could be detected in 473 of 719 samples, among them many multiple isotope detections. Activity concentrations of spiked and selected environmental samples were verified by laboratory reanalysis. Finally, the sensitivity of Xenon International for radioxenons is up to one order of magnitude better for the metastable isotopes than that of the SPALAX, with a shorter sampling duration of 6 h.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A stilbene - CdZnTe based radioxenon detection system

Atmospheric monitoring of radioxenon is one of the most widely used methods by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to detect elevated levels of 131m Xe, 133/133m Xe, and 135 Xe. The ratios of these radionuclides help discriminate between peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear weapon explosions. Radioxenon detection systems often use plastic scintillators in the capacity of an electron detector and a gas cell, plastic gas cells are responsible for introducing high memory effect in these systems. This work presents the design of a new detection system for radioxenon monitoring that utilizes silicon photomultipliers, a stilbene gas cell, and a CdZnTe detector. This detector was evaluated using xenon radioisotope samples produced in the TRIGA reactor at Oregon State University. Here, a 48-h background was collected and calculations of the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) were carried out using the Region of Interest (ROI) approach. An MDC of less than 1 mBq/m 3 was obtained for 131m Xe, 133 Xe, and 133m Xe in accordance with the sensitivity limits set by the CTBTO and performs respectably when compared to state-of-the-art radioxenon detection systems. Using 131m Xe, this study indicates that the stilbene gas cell exhibits a memory effect of 0.045 ±0.017%, this is almost a two-order magnitude improvement compared to plastic scintillators. The main purpose of this work is to explore the use of new stilbene detection media for radioxenon application and addressing the problem of memory effect.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Comparison of Radionuclide Ratios in Atmospheric Nuclear Explosions and Nuclear Releases from Chernobyl and Fukushima seen in Gamma Ray Spectormetry

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has remote radionuclide monitoring followed by an On Site Inspection (OSI) to clarify the nature of a suspect event. An important aspect of radionuclide measurements on site is the discrimination of other potential sources of similar radionuclides such as reactor accidents or medical isotope production. The Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear reactor disasters offer two different reactor source term environmental inputs that can be compared against historical measurements of nuclear explosions. The comparison of whole-sample gamma spectrometry measurements from these three events and the analysis of similarities and differences are presented. This analysis is a step toward confirming what is needed for measurements during an OSI under the auspices of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

IDC Re-Engineering Phase 2 System Specification Document Version 1.5

This document contains the system specifications derived to satisfy the system requirements found in the IDC System Requirements Document for the IDC Re-Engineering Phase 2 project. This System Specification Document (SSD) defines waveform data processing requirements for the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The routine processing includes characterization of events with the objective of screening out events considered to be consistent with natural phenomena or non-nuclear, man-made phenomena. This document does not address requirements concerning acquisition, processing and analysis of radionuclide data but does include requirements for the dissemination of radionuclide data and products.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance Plan for the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) prepared this Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance Plan (LTSMP) for the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site (the Gnome site). The Gnome site is approximately 25 miles east of Carlsbad in Eddy County, New Mexico (Figure 1). The site was the location of a 3-kiloton-yield underground nuclear test and radioisotope groundwater tracer test. The tests resulted in residual contamination and post-detonation features that require long-term oversight. Long-term responsibility for the site was transferred from the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office to LM on October 1, 2006. Responsibilities include surveillance, monitoring, and maintenance of institutional controls (ICs) as part of the long-term stewardship of the site. Long-term stewardship is designed to ensure protection of human health and the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Closure Report)

This CR describes the selected corrective action to be implemented during closure to protect human health and the environment from groundwater impacted by the underground nuclear testing within the YF/CM CAU. The purpose of the CR is to describe the selected corrective action. Summarize previous activities and conclusions that support CAU closure. Present final contaminant boundaries, use restriction (UR) boundaries, and regulatory boundaries. Provide an implementation plan for long-term monitoring and well network maintenance and identify the approaches and policies for institutional controls.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Discussion of Procedures and Equipment for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection Environmental Sampling and Analysis

This paper is intended to serve as a scientific basis to start discussions of the available environmental sampling techniques and equipment that have been used in the past that could be considered for use within the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspections (OSI). This work contains information on the techniques, equipment, costs, and some operational procedures associated with environmental sampling that have actually been used in the past by the United States for the detection of nuclear explosions. This paper also includes a discussion of issues, recommendations, and questions needing further study within the context of the sampling and analysis of aquatic materials, atmospheric gases, atmospheric particulates, vegetation, sediments and soils, fauna, and drill-back materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ViBRANT Applied as a Closed Loop Flux and Thermal Surrogate

Surrogate testing platforms provide a means to develop a target aspect of a larger system. Some systems target single aspects while others are more wholistic. ViBRANT (Visual Benign Reactor as Analog for Nuclear Testing) aims to be a wholistic system by representing the primary reactor behaviors through an accessible LED driven reactor core, photodiodes, thermocouples, and high-performance software interfaces being developed to the standards required for actual microreactor deployment such as MARVEL. With the ability to drive control drums enabled with full reactor capability (e.g. speed/angle/torque capability/limits for operation and clutch/spring scram capability), drive ViBRANT’s high fidelity 36 pin hexagon core to represent phenomena via LEDs, and capture the analog response of distributed photodiodes/thermocouples, this paper will show the system’s ability to operate in a closed-loop fashion and do well at matching reactor power/temperature distribution in an accessible reactor surrogate environment.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗