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Enterprise SRS: Leveraging Ongoing Operations to Advance Nuclear Fuel Cycle Programs - 12579

The international leadership in nuclear technology development and deployment long held by the United States has eroded due to the lack of clear national strategies for advanced reactor fuel cycle concepts and for nuclear materials management, as well as to the recent policy decision that halts work on the nuclear fuel repository at Yucca Mountain. Although no national consensus on strategy has yet been reached, a number of recent high-profile reviews and workshops have clearly highlighted a national need for robust research, development and deployment (RD and D) programs in key areas of nuclear technology, especially nuclear separations science and engineering. Collectively, these reviews and workshops provide a picture of the nuclear separations mission needs for three major program offices: Department of Energy Office of-Environmental Management), DOE Office of Nuclear Energy), and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). While the individual program needs differ significantly in detail and timing, they share common needs in two critical areas of RD and D: - The need for access to and use of multi-purpose engineering-scale demonstration test facilities that can support testing with radioactive material, and - The need for collaborative research enterprises that encompass government research organizations (i.e., national laboratories), commercial industry and the academic community. Such collaborative enterprises effectively integrate theory and modeling with the actual experimental work at all scales, as well as strengthen the technical foundation for research in critical areas. The arguments for engineering-scale collaborative research facilities are compelling. Processing history has shown that test programs and demonstrations conducted with actual nuclear materials are essential to program success. It is widely recognized, however, that such facilities are expensive to build and maintain; creating an imposing, if not prohibitive, financial burden on an individual sponsoring office. Given that reality, success for the current and future nuclear separations missions is dependent on a concerted effort to develop new, creative, approaches that leverage existing facilities in a manner that supports both near- and long-term needs of national programs. As a result of this situation, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) organized the 'Nuclear Separations User Facility Strategy Session' in Washington, D.C. on July 29, 2011. This workshop brought together key stakeholders from DOE and the private sector to develop a strategy for using engineering-scale nuclear materials processing facilities to advance our nation's nuclear separations research needs. In particular, the meeting focused on recommending how these engineering-scale demonstration facilities, like the Savannah River Site H-Canyon, can be connected with smaller 'bench-scale' research activities to form a seamless approach that integrates across the continuum of RD and D of advanced separations technologies. Coming out of this workshop, a new vision has been developed for a collaborative research facility model that centers on H-Canyon. Unique to this approach is the fact that H-Canyon will continue to accomplish DOE's critical nuclear material processing missions, while simultaneously serving as an RD and D resource for the scientific and technical portions of the nuclear separations community. This paper describes the planned operations for H-Canyon in FY2012 and beyond and discusses how these operations fit within the context of a collaborative research facility model and support the ongoing fuel cycle research and development programs of the DOE. (authors)

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OSRP Source Repatriations-Case Studies: Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) began recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources (sources) in 1999. As of February 2012, the project had recovered over 30,000 sources totaling over 820,000 Ci. OSRP grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover disused excess Plutonium- 239 (Pu-239) sources that were distributed in the 1960's and 1970's under the Atoms for Peace Program. Source recovery was initially considered a waste management activity. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the interagency community began to recognize that excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources pose a national security threat, particularly those that lack a disposition path. After OSRP's transfer to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, its mission was expanded to include all disused sealed sources that might require national security consideration. Recognizing the transnational threat posed by porous borders and the ubiquitous nature of sources, GTRI/OSRP repatriates U.S. origin sources based on threat reduction prioritization criteria. For example, several recent challenging source repatriation missions have been conducted by GTRI/OSRP in South America. These include the repatriation of a significant amount of Cs-137 and other isotopes from Brazil; re-packaging of conditioned Ra-226 sources in Ecuador for future repatriation; and, multilateral cooperation in the consolidation and export of Canadian, US, and Indian Co-60/Cs-137 sources from Uruguay. In addition, cooperation with regulators and private source owners in other countries presents opportunities for GTRI/OSRP to exchange best practices for managing disused sources. These positive experiences often result in long-term cooperation and information sharing with key foreign counterparts. International source recovery operations are essential to the preservation of U.S. national security interests. They are also mutually beneficial for fostering positive relationships with other governments and private industry, and demonstrate that responsible end-of-life options are given to legacy U.S.-origin sources in other countries. GTRI/OSRP does not take back sources that have a viable path for commercial disposal. Most US origin sources were sold commercially and were not provided by the US government. Below is a synopsis of cooperative efforts with Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay. Bilateral and multilateral efforts have been successful in removing hundreds of U.S.origin sealed radioactive sources from Latin American countries to the U.S. As many disused sources remain in the region, and since repatriation is not always an option, GTRI will continue to work with those countries to ensure that these sources are stored securely for the long-term. Successful Latin America operations should serve as a model for other regional cooperation in the repatriation of sealed sources, encouraging other source exporting countries to implement similar programs. Securing and removing sources, both domestically and internationally, is crucial to strengthening the life-cycle management of radioactive sources worldwide. Such efforts not only prevent these materials from being used maliciously, but also address public health and safety concerns, and under-gird the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (authors)

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One System Integrated Project Team Progress in Coordinating Hanford Tank Farms and the Waste Treatment Plant

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed at the Hanford Site in late 2011 as a way to improve coordination and itegration between the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC) on interfaces between the two projects, and to eliminate duplication and exploit opportunities for synergy. The IPT is composed of jointly staffed groups that work on technical issues of mutal interest, front-end design and project definition, nuclear safety, plant engineering system integration, commissioning, planning and scheduling, and environmental, safety, health and quality (ESH&Q) areas. In the past year important progress has been made in a number of areas as the organization has matured and additional opportunities have been identified. Areas covered in this paper include: Support for development of the Office of Envirnmental Management (EM) framework document to progress the Office of River Protection's (ORP) River Protection Project (RPP) mission; Stewardship of the RPP flowsheet; Collaboration with Savannah River Site (SRS), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL); Operations programs integration; and, Further development of the waste acceptance criteria.

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 32, No. 1, January-March 1991]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 The Safety Review and Approval Process for Space Nuclear Power Sources, G. L. Bennett; 19 Report on the American Nuclear Society International Topical Meeting: "The Safety, Status, and Future of Non-Commercial Reactors and Irradiation Facilities", E. G. Silver; 35 Book Review: Fission Product Transport Processes in Reactor Accidents, Proceedings to the International Centre tor Heat and Mass Processes T. S. Kress; 38 Fast Reactor Technology in the 1990s: A Summary of the 1990 International Fast Reactor Safety Meeting, A. E. Levin; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 56 Effects of Chemical Phenomena on LWR Severe Accident Fission Product Behavior, A. P. Malinauskas and T. S. Kress; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 65 Technical Note: Safety Parameter Display Systems—10 Years Later, R. J. Eckenrode; 68 Potential Application of Neural Networks to the Operation of Nuclear Power Plants, R. E. Uhrig; DESIGN FEATURES: 80 Twenty-First DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning Conference, R. R. Bellamy, D. W. Moeller, and M. W. First; 91 Impact of an Apparent Radiation Embrittlement Rate on the Life Expectancy of PWR Vessel Supports, R. D. Cheverton, G. C. Robinson, W. E. Pennell, and R. K. Nanstad; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 103 Technical Note: The Impact of Offsite Factors on the Safety Performance of Small Nuclear Power Plants, Yu. D. Baranaev and A. N. Viktorov; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 109 Activities Related to Waste Management, Compiled by E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 118 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 121 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 123 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 140 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by E. G. Silver; 150 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 155 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities, Compiled by E. G. Silver; 157 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1990; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 79 MIT Offers Summer Program on Nuclear Power Reactor Safety; 108 Harvard School of Public Health Offers Several Short Courses; 139 Short Course and Workshop on Nuclear Criticality Safety at University of New Mexico; 160 SCK/CEN Announces Training Course on Emergency Planning and Response; 161 The Authors; 164 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 31

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A Second Opinion is Worth the Cost - 12479

This paper, 'A Second Opinion is Worth the Cost', shows how a second opinion for a Department of Energy (DOE) Project helped prepare and pass a DOE Order 413.3A 'Program and Project Management for the acquisition of Capital Assets' Office of Engineering and Construction Management (OECM) required External Independent Review (EIR) in support of the approved baseline for Critical Decision (CD) 2. The DOE project personnel were informed that the project's Total Project Cost (TPC) was going to increase from $815 million to $1.1 billion due to unforeseen problems and unexplained reasons. The DOE Project Team determined that a second opinion was needed to review and validate the TPC. Project Time and Cost, Inc. (PT and C) was requested to evaluate the cost estimate, schedule, basis of estimate (BOE), and risk management plan of the Project and to give an independent assessment of the TPC that was presented to DOE. This paper will demonstrate how breaking down a project to the work breakdown structure (WBS) level allows a project to be analyzed for potential cost increases and/or decreases, thus providing a more accurate TPC. The review Team's cost analyses of Projects identified eight primary drivers resulting in cost increases. They included: - Overstatement of the effort required to develop drawings and specifications. - Cost allocation to 'Miscellaneous' without sufficient detail or documentation. - Cost for duplicated efforts. - Vendor estimates or quotations without sufficient detail. - The practice of using the highest price quoted then adding an additional 10% mark-up. - Application of Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) highest level quality requirements when not required. - Allocation of operational costs to the Project Costs instead of to the Operating Expenses (OPEX). OPEX costs come from a different funding source. - DOE had not approved the activities. By using a Team approach with professionals from cost, civil, mechanical, electrical, structural and nuclear disciplines and by performing a Line by Line, WBS element by WBS element review of the Projects' CD-2 baseline package helped the DOE Project Team experience success. The second opinion that PT and C provide by conducting a Pre-EIR review of the Project baseline package and the cost review of the TPC helped the DOE Team pass the CD-2 EIR and reduced the TPC. The Line-by-Line review of the DOE Project identified opportunities to reduce the TPC from $1.1 billion to $740.8 million, thus realizing a saving of approximately $359.2 million, or roughly 32% of the original TPC. This significant cost savings underscores the cost in obtaining the second opinion. This same Line by Line review can be applied to any DOE project in the Energy Management or Weapons complex. In the case of this DOE Project a second opinion was worth the cost. (authors)

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Fifty-Five Gallon Drum Standard Study

Fifty-five gallon drums are routinely used within the U.S. for the storage and eventual disposal of fissionable materials as Transuranic or low-level waste. To support these operations, criticality safety evaluations are required. A questionnaire was developed and sent to selected Endusers at Hanford, Idaho National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Oak Ridge and the Savannah River Site to solicit current practices. This questionnaire was used to gather information on the kinds of fissionable materials packaged into drums, the models used in performing criticality safety evaluations in support of operations involving these drums, and the limits and controls established for the handling and storage of these drums. The completed questionnaires were reviewed and clarifications solicited through individual communications with each Enduser to obtain more complete and consistent responses. All five sites have similar drum operations involving thousands to tens of thousands of fissionable material waste drums. The primary sources for these drums are legacy (prior operations) and decontamination and decommissioning wastes at all sites except Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The results from this survey and our review are discussed in this paper.

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Underground Test Area Activity Waste Management Plan; and Attachment 1 Fluid Management Plan for the Underground Test Area Activity

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office initiated the Underground Test Area Activity to characterize the risk posed to human health and the environment as a result of underground nuclear testing activities at the Nevada National Security Site. The UGTA Activity is now administered by the DOE Environmental Management Nevada Program. This document is a revision to NNSA/NSO (2009). The new document and revision number reflect EM Nevada Program as the current UGTA Activity administrator.

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Life-Cycle Baseline Customization for the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program - 20304

One of the responsibilities of the federal government is to estimate sound and defensible life-cycle baseline costs for use in federal budget estimates and to meet federal financial reporting requirements. To accomplish this, the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) have partnered together to ensure that the liabilities documented in each Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) site's life-cycle baseline are specifically tailored. FUSRAP was created in the mid-1970's to clean up radiological contamination resulting from the early development of nuclear weapons. DOE was responsible for FUSRAP until October 1997, when Congress transferred the administration and execution of FUSRAP site cleanups to USACE. By 1997, DOE had completed the cleanup of 25 of the 46 sites that were active within the program and had begun cleanup at 13 additional sites. USACE was assigned responsibility for the cleanup of the 21 remaining FUSRAP sites, and at 8 additional sites that had since been referred for cleanup. The LM mission for the FUSRAP sites is to perform long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). Currently, LM provides long-term stewardship for 34 completed FUSRAP sites. Another 20 sites are under active remediation by USACE. Within the last 5 years, USACE has completed the cleanup at five FUSRAP sites and the LTS and M responsibility has been transferred to LM. By 2029, USACE will compete remediation at eight additional sites and LTS and M for those sites will transfer to LM. Because responsibilities for the FUSRAP sites transfer between USACE and LM upon completion of remedial actions, both agencies maintain life-cycle baselines for different stages of the project and both must have a strong understanding of the needs and requirements for each site. This understanding ensures that the life-cycle baselines form a complete and accurate picture of what is required for the site and for the FUSRAP program. LM focuses on several things when customizing the life-cycle baseline estimates for the FUSRAP sites, including (1) Understanding the unique requirements for each site. By reviewing site-specific documents prepared by USACE, such as Feasibility Studies and Records of Decision, and partnering with USACE to gain additional insight about site conditions and requirements for stewardship, as well as potential risks, LM can better develop the life-cycle baselines. (2) Developing site-specific labor breakdowns. This ensures the required labor mix is baselined for specific activities by comparing the labor mix required to perform activities at (a) other LM-managed FUSRAP sites and (b) non-FUSRAP LM sites and (c) by USACE at active FUSRAP sites. (3) Taking a tiered approach to life-cycle baseline planning. Estimates for sites transferring to LM in the near term (5 years) are more definitive than for sites transferring in the out-year period. Remedial actions at the near-term sites are at or near completion, providing LM a strong understanding of the LTS and M requirements and remaining liabilities. This in turn allows for site-specific customization of the baseline. (4) Using a robust risk management approach to ensure that liabilities specific to each site are identified, evaluated by probability and severity, and documented in relation to the impact to cost or schedule. To ensure the most accuracy within all the baselines, the FUSRAP life-cycle baselines are updated as needed to support program, project, and contract management needs. (authors)

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Use of InSpector{sup TM} 1 1000 Instrument with LaBr{sub 3} for Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Applications at the Westinghouse Hematite Decommissioning Project (HDP) - 13132

The Westinghouse Hematite Decommissioning Project (HDP) is a former nuclear fuel cycle facility that is currently undergoing decommissioning. One aspect of the decommissioning scope is remediation of buried nuclear waste in unlined burial pits. The current Nuclear Criticality Safety program relies on application of criticality controls based on radiological setpoints from a 2 x 2 Sodium Iodide (NaI) detector. Because of the nature of the material buried (Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), depleted uranium, thorium, and radium) and the stringent threshold for application of criticality controls based on waste management (0.1 g {sup 235}U/L), a better method for {sup 235}U identification and quantification has been developed. This paper outlines the early stages of a quick, in-field nuclear material assay and {sup 235}U mass estimation process currently being deployed at HDP. Nuclear material initially classified such that NCS controls are necessary can be demonstrated not to require such controls and dispositioned as desired by project operations. Using Monte Carlo techniques and a high resolution Lanthanum Bromide (LaBr) detector with portable Multi-Channel Analyzer (MCA), a bounding {sup 235}U mass is assigned to basic geometries of nuclear material as it is excavated. The deployment of these methods and techniques has saved large amounts of time and money in the nuclear material remediation process. (authors)

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Producing Desired Properties From a Broader Spectrum of Compositions - 18167

The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River Protection has an extensive research program to develop low-activity waste and high-level waste glass compositions for the balance of mission of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The fundamental data stemming from this program will support development of advanced glass formulations, key process control models, and processing strategies to ensure safe and successful operations for both the Low-Activity Waste and High-Level Waste facilities with an appreciation toward reducing overall mission life. (author)

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Safety Design Strategy for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3A, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3A and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project.

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Safety Design Strategy for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3A, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3A and DOE Order 420.1B, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project.

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Safety Design Strategy for the Remote Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project

In accordance with the requirements of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 413.3A, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” safety must be integrated into the design process for new or major modifications to DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities. The intended purpose of this requirement involves the handling of hazardous materials, both radiological and chemical, in a way that provides adequate protection to the public, workers, and the environment. Requirements provided in DOE Order 413.3A and DOE Order 420.1C, “Facility Safety,” and the expectations of DOE-STD-1189-2008, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” provide for identification of hazards early in the project and use of an integrated team approach to design safety into the facility. This safety design strategy provides the basic safety-in-design principles and concepts that will be used for the Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Project.

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West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2018

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2018. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2018 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) Calendar Year (2016)

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2016. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2016. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2016 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report Calendar Year 2013

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2013. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2013. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2013 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2014

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2014. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2014. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2014 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2015

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2015. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2015. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2015 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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