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At least 505 records · Page 28

The establisment of an achievement test for determination of primary teachers’ knowledge level of earthquake

In this study it was aimed to improve an academic achievement test to establish the students’ knowledge about the earthquake and the ways of protection from earthquakes. In the method of this study, the steps that Webb (1994) was created to improve an academic achievement test for a unit were followed. In the developmental process of multiple choice test having 25 questions, was prepared to measure the pre-service teachers’ knowledge levels about the earthquake and the ways of protection from earthquakes. The multiple choice test was presented to view of six academics (one of them was from geographic field and five of them were science educator) and two expert teachers in science Prepared test was applied to 93 pre-service teachers studying in elementary education department in 2014-2015 academic years. As a result of validity and reliability of the study, the test was composed of 20 items. As a result of these applications, Pearson Moments Multiplication half-reliability coefficient was found to be 0.94. When this value is adjusted according to Spearman Brown reliability coefficient the reliability coefficient was set at 0.97.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Parametric Thermal Models of the Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT)

This work supports the restart of transient testing in the United States using the Department of Energy’s Transient Reactor Test Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory. It also supports the Global Threat Reduction Initiative by reducing proliferation risk of high enriched uranium fuel. The work involves the creation of a nuclear fuel assembly model using the fuel performance code known as BISON. The model simulates the thermal behavior of a nuclear fuel assembly during steady state and transient operational modes. Additional models of the same geometry but differing material properties are created to perform parametric studies. The results show that fuel and cladding thermal conductivity have the greatest effect on fuel temperature under the steady state operational mode. Fuel density and fuel specific heat have the greatest effect for transient operational model. When considering a new fuel type it is recommended to use materials that decrease the specific heat of the fuel and the thermal conductivity of the fuel’s cladding in order to deal with higher density fuels that accompany the LEU conversion process. Data on the latest operating conditions of TREAT need to be attained in order to validate BISON’s results. BISON’s models for TREAT (material models, boundary convection models) are modest and need additional work to ensure accuracy and confidence in results.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Gearbox Reliability Collaborative Gearbox 3 Planet Bearing Calibration

The Gearbox Reliability Collaborative gearbox was redesigned to improve its load-sharing characteristics and predicted fatigue life. The most important aspect of the redesign was to replace the cylindrical roller bearings with preloaded tapered roller bearings in the planetary section. Similar to previous work, the strain gages installed on the planet tapered roller bearings were calibrated in a load frame. This report describes the calibration tests and provides the factors necessary to convert the measured units from dynamometer testing to bearing loads, suitable for comparison to engineering models.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Comparison of Subdivided Versus Full-Length Fuel Pin Burnup in the ATF-2 Safety Analysis

The Accident Tolerant Fuels (ATF) campaign, under the Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) Advanced Fuels program, was developed after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster in 2011. Under ATF, fuel and cladding concepts are to be developed and tested that may more readily withstand an accident similar to the one that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi. ATF is a combination of industry, universities, and national laboratories in an effort to develop advanced accident tolerant cladding and fuel concepts. The end goal of the ATF program is to insert a lead test rod (LTR) or lead test assembly (LTA) into an operating commercial power light water reactor by 2022. In order to meet this 2022 insertion goal, ATF is split into three separate phases: ATF-1, ATF-2, and ATF-3. The first phase of the ATF program, ATF-1, is the concept feasibility study and early irradiation testing. Feasibility, fabrication, and out-of-pile testing are happening at universities and laboratories all over the United States. Irradiation testing of these concepts is happening at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Early irradiation testing involves testing clad and/or fuel in drop-in capsules in the ATR. Currently, these capsules are in the relatively low-flux positions in the ATR, but some newer concepts and concepts that require higher burnup will be moved to the higher-flux positions later on during irradiation. Currently, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Westinghouse Electric Company, Areva, and General Electric (GE) have inserted capsules for ATF-1, although more concepts are planned. The second phase of ATF, ATF-2, is the focus of this paper. ATF-2 is the loop testing of fuel pins with new cladding and fuel concepts to simulate pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) environments. ATF-2 will concurrently be happening at the ATR and at the Halden Reactor in Norway. The ATF-2 irradiation at the ATR will only simulate a PWR environment. ATF-2 will be inserted into the ATR pressurized water loop, Loop 2A, in the Center Flux Trap (CFT), where chemistry, temperature, and pressure can all be controlled separately from the primary coolant system and other loops in ATR. Loop 2A will be borated, pressurized to 2200 psi nominal, and have an average water temperature of 300 deg. C. A borated loop with fueled rodlets is extremely rare for Nuclear Energy experiments in the ATR, so ATF-2 will demonstrate new and unique capabilities for INL. ATF-3 is the testing of fresh and irradiated ATF concepts at the Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility. The TREAT Reactor is planned for restart, re-establishing U.S. transient testing capabilities after nearly 20 years of non-operations. TREAT will test ATF concepts under transient conditions, such as a reactivity insertion accident. In addition to fresh fuel pins, TREAT will use from ATF2 and do transient testing on those irradiated pins. The information TREAT will provide to the vendors to support fuel licensing will be valuable, showing that these concepts do enhance the accident tolerance of the fuel in commercial reactors. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 398: Area 25 Spill Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the April 2003, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 398: Area 25 Spill Sites as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 25-25-17, Subsurface Hydraulic Oil Spill. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove the UR because contamination is not present at the site above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 214: Bunkers and Storage Areas Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 2006, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 214: Bunkers and Storage Areas as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 25-23-01, Contaminated Materials • CAS 25-23-19, Radioactive Material Storage These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 355: Area 2 Cellars/Mud Pits Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the November 2003, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 355: Area 2 Cellars/Mud Pits as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS 02-37-01, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-03, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-04, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-05, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-06, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-07, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-10, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-11, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-12, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-13, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-14, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-15, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-16, Cellar & Mud Pit • CAS 02-37-17, Cellar • CAS 02-37-18, Cellar & Tanks These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Plowshare Program - American Atomic Bomb Tests For Industrial Applications

The United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) established the Plowshare Program as a research and development activity to explore the technical and economic feasibility of using nuclear explosives for industrial applications. The reasoning was that the relatively inexpensive energy available from nuclear explosions could prove useful for a wide variety of peaceful purposes. The Plowshare Program began in 1958 and continued through 1975. Between December 1961 and May 1973, the United States conducted 27 Plowshare nuclear explosive tests comprising 35 individual detonations. Conceptually, industrial applications resulting from the use of nuclear explosives could be divided into two broad categories: 1) large-scale excavation and quarrying, where the energy from the explosion was used to break up and/or move rock; and 2) underground engineering, where the energy released from deeply buried nuclear explosives increased the permeability and porosity of the rock by massive breaking and fracturing. Possible excavation applications included: canals, harbors, highway and railroad cuts through mountains, open pit mining, construction of dams, and other quarry and construction-related projects. Underground nuclear explosion applications included: stimulation of natural gas production, preparation of leachable ore bodies for in situ leaching, creation of underground zones of fractured oil shale for in situ retorting, and formation of underground natural gas and petroleum storage reservoirs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 357: Mud Pits and Waste Dump, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Rev. 0)

This document constitutes an addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 357: Mud Pits and Waste Dump, Nevada Test Site, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications To Remove Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order dated September 2013. The Use Restriction Removal document was approved by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection on October 16, 2013. The approval of the UR Removal document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with the UR Removal document, this addendum consists of: This page that refers the reader to the UR Removal document for additional information The cover, title, and signature pages of the UR Removal document; The NDEP approval letter; The corresponding section of the UR Removal document; This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 04-26-03, Lead Bricks. This UR was established as part of FFACO corrective actions and was based on the presence of lead contamination at concentrations greater than the action level established at the time of the initial investigation.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Pilot Plant Test of Removal of Co-60 and Cs-137 from the Evaporator Concentrates of Forsmark unit 3 - 17158

A pilot plant test has been conducted to treat evaporator concentrates at Forsmark BWR NPP unit 3 in Sweden using Fortum's selective ion exchanger technology. The concentrate contains an array of radionuclides of which C-60 and Cs-137 are radiologically the most important ones. Concentrate also contained a high salt content ∼ 20 g/l and high organic carbon loading ∼ 1 g/l The pilot system consisted of pre-treatment (mechanical filters, activated carbon, UV oxidation) and Cs and Co selective ion exchangers. CsTreat ion exchanger was very effective in removing Cs from the evaporator concentrate: {sup 137}Cs activity was lowered from the initial value 280 MBq/m{sup 3} to below detection limit 550 Bq/m{sup 3}. Removing Co was more complicated: results suggest that Co is bound to organic chelating compounds, thus fairly compete oxidation of organic carbon was required in order to achieve good ion exchange results. Finally, after total organic carbon (TOC) was treated to below 50 ppm, {sup 60}Co activity was lowered from the initial value of 57 MBq/m{sup 3} to 2.7 kBq/m{sup 3}. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

CO 2 Capture by Cold Membrane Operation with Actual Power Plant Flue Gas

The main objective of the project was to develop a post-combustion CO 2 capture process based on the hybrid cold temperature membrane operation. The CO 2 in the flue gas from coal fired power plant is pre-concentrated to >60% CO 2 in the first stage membrane operation followed by further liquefaction of permeate stream to achieve >99% CO 2 purity. The aim of the project was based on DOE program goal of 90% CO 2 capture with >95% CO 2 purity from Pulverized Coal (PC) fired power plants with $40/tonne of carbon capture cost by 2025. The project moves the technology from TRL 4 to TRL 5. The project involved optimization of Air Liquide commercial 12” PI-1 bundle to improve the bundle productivity by >30% compared to the previous baseline (DE-FE0004278) using computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling and bundle testing with synthetic flue gas at 0.1 MWe bench scale skid located at Delaware Research and Technology Center (DRTC). In parallel, the next generation polyimide based novel PI-2 membrane was developed with 10 times CO 2 permeance compared to the commercial PI-1 membrane. The novel PI-2 membrane was scaled from mini-permeator to 1” permeator and 1” bundle for testing. Bundle development was conducted with a Development Spin Unit (DSU) installed at MEDAL. Air Liquide’s cold membrane technology was demonstrated with real coal fired flue gas at the National Carbon Capture Center (NCCC) with a 0.3 MWe field-test unit (FTU). The FTU was designed to incorporate testing of two PI-1 commercial membrane bundles (12” or 6” diameter) in parallel or series. A slip stream was sent to the next generation PI-2 membrane for testing with real flue gas. The system exceeded performance targets with stable PI-1 membrane operation for over 500 hours of single bundle, steady state testing. The 12” PI-1 bundle exceeded the productivity target by achieving ~600 Nm3/hr, where the target was set at ~455 Nm3/hr at 90% capture rate. The cost of 90% CO 2 capture from a 550 MWe net coal power plant was estimated between 40 and $45/tonne. A 6” PI-1 bundle exhibited superior bundle performance compared to the 12” PI-1 bundle. However, the carbon capture cost was not lower with the 6” PI-1 bundle due to the higher bundle installed cost. A 1” PI-1 bundle was tested to compare bundles with different length / diameter ratios. This bundle exhibited the lowest performance due to the different fiber winding pattern and increased bundle non-ideality. Several long-term and parametric tests were conducted with 3,200 hours of total run-time at NCCC. Finally, the new PI-2 membrane fiber was tested at a small scale (1” modules) in real flue gas and exhibited up to 10 times the CO 2 permeance and slightly lower CO 2 /N 2 selectivity as the commercial PI-1 fiber. This corresponded to a projected 4 - 5 times increase in the productivity per bundle and a potential cost reduction of $3/tonne for CO2 capture, as compared with PI-1. An analytical campaign was conducted to trace different impurities such as NOx, mercury, Arsenic, Selenium in gas and liquid samples through the carbon capture system. An Environmental, Health and Safety (EH&S) analysis was completed to estimate emissions from a 550 MWe net power plant with carbon capture using cold membrane. A preliminary design and cost analysis was completed for 550 tpd (~25 MWe) plant to assess the capital investment and carbon capture cost for PI-1 and PI-2 membrane solutions from coal fired flue gas. A comparison was made with an amine based solution with significant cost advantage for the membrane at this scale. Additional preliminary design and cost analysis was completed between coal, natural gas and SMR flue gas for carbon capture at 550 tpd (~25 MWe) plant.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Addendum 2 to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 358: Areas 18, 19, 20 Cellars/Mud Pits, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revison 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 358: Areas 18, 19, 20 Cellars/Mud Pits, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, January 2004 as described in the document Supplemental Investigation Report for FFACO Use Restrictions, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (SIR) dated November 2008. The SIR document was approved by NDEP on December 5, 2008. The approval of the SIR document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with the SIR document, this addendum consists of: • This page that refers the reader to the SIR document for additional information • The cover, title, and signature pages of the SIR document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the SIR document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 19-09-05, Mud Pit. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was reevaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove the UR because contamination is not present at the site above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 326: Areas 6 and 27 Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 1

This document constitutes an addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 326: Areas 6 and 27 Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (Revision 1), December 2002 as described in the document Supplemental Investigation Report for FFACO Use Restrictions, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (SIR) dated November 2008. The SIR document was approved by NDEP on December 5, 2008. The approval of the SIR document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with the SIR document, this addendum consists of: • This page that refers the reader to the SIR document for additional information • The cover, title, and signature pages of the SIR document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the SIR document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the UR for CAS 06-25-01, CP-1 Heating Oil Release. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was reevaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove the UR because contamination is not present at the site above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 504: 16a-Tunnel Muckpile, Nevada Test Site

This Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Closure Report (CR) was prepared by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 504, 16a-Tunnel Muckpile. This CADD/CR is consistent with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. Corrective Action Unit 504 is comprised of four Corrective Action Sites (CASs).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 1998, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS TA-03-001-TARC Roller Coaster Lagoons • CAS TA-21-001-TARC Roller Coaster N. Disposal Trench These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify these URs to administrative URs. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). These Administrative URs were based on a “Remote Work Sites” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 336 hours per year). Any proposed activity within these use restricted areas that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Corrective Action Plan for Corrective Action Unit 168: Area 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, REV 1

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 168 is identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order of 1996 as Area 25 and 26 Contaminated Materials and Waste Dumps. CAU 168 consists of twelve Corrective Action Sites (CASs) in Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada Test Site, which is approximately 105 kilometers (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. The CASs contain surface and subsurface debris, impacted soil, and contaminated materials. Site characterization activities were conducted in 2002, and the results are presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD) for CAU 168 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2006). Site characterization results indicated that soil at several sites exceeded the clean-up criteria for total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and radionuclides. The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection approved the proposed corrective actions specified in the CADD (NNSA/NSO, 2006). The approved corrective actions include no further action, clean closure, and closure in place with administrative controls.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Diagnostic experiments at a 3 MeV test stand at Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (United Kingdom)

A front end is currently under construction consisting of a H{sup -} Penning ion source (65 keV, 60 mA), low energy beam transport (LEBT), and radio frequency quadrupole (3 MeV output energy) with a medium energy beam transport suitable for high power proton applications. Diagnostics can be divided either in destructive techniques such as beam profile monitor, pepperpot, slit-slit emittance scanner (preferably used during commissioning) or nondestructive, permanently installed devices such as photodetachment-based techniques. Another way to determine beam distributions is a scintillator with charge-coupled device camera. First experiments have been performed to control the beam injection into the LEBT. The influence of beam parameters such as particle energy and space-charge compensation on the two-dimensional distribution and profiles will be presented.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗