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At least 505 records · Page 28

Coordination Between Sectors in Shared Airspace Operations

Recent studies have shown that a more efficient use of airspace may involve shared airspace operations, i.e., temporal as well as spatial separation of arrival and departure flows [1][2]. Temporal separation would permit a departure aircraft to fly through an arrival flow, depending on an available gap. This would necessitate careful and precise coordination between controllers in different sectors. Three methods of coordination which permit the penetration of a controller's airspace by another controller's aircraft are described: point out, look-and-go, and prearranged coordination procedure. Requirements of each method are given, along with associated problems that have surfaced in the field as described by Aviation Safety and Reporting System (ASRS) and other reports. A Human-in-the-Loop simulation was designed to compare two of the methods: point out and prearranged coordination procedures. In prearranged coordination procedures (P-ACP), the controllers control an aircraft in another controller's airspace according to specified prearranged procedures, without coordinating each individual aircraft with another controller, as is done with point outs. In the simulation, three experienced controllers rotated through two arrival sectors and a non-involved arrival sector of a Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) airspace. Results of eighteen one-hour simulation runs (nine in each of the two conditions) showed no impact of the coordination method on separation violations nor on arrival times for 208 departing aircraft crossing an arrival stream. Participant assessment indicated that although both coordination conditions were acceptable, the prearranged coordination procedure condition was slightly safer, more efficient, timely, and overall, worked better operationally. Problems arose in the point out condition regarding controllers noticing acceptance of point outs. Also, in about half of the point-out runs, time pressure was felt to have had an impact on when and if the departures could cross an arrival stream. An additional problem with point outs may be confusion in the field about which controller has responsibility for separating point-out aircraft from other aircraft.

Parke, Bonny↗

Analysis of Seed Sanitization, Rapid Freezer Proficiency, and Veg-03 Water Verification

In order to ensure the well-being of astronauts and experiments on the ISS (International Space Station), seeds need to be free of microbes, the rapid freezer needs to be freezing biological samples evenly and proficiently, and the astronauts need to have accurate watering procedures for Veg-03 (the latest Phytotron for the Veggie (Vegetable Production System) project). Seed flight candidates were sanitized with varying levels of HCL in order to determine the right amount to use for future flight experiments, too much HCL and the seeds will not germinate and too little and they will be contaminated with microorganisms. The rapid freezer was assessed using temperature probes to determine if there is a homogeneous change in temperature in order to ensure the safe freezing of biological organisms. The plant watering procedures given to the astronauts were assessed in order to make sure that Veg-03 experiments are receiving the correct amount of water.

Hollingsworth, Savannah↗

2023 Annual Report of Available Drawdowns for Each Oil Storage Cavern in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve

DOE maintains an up-to-date documentation of the number of available full drawdowns of each of the caverns at the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This information is important for assessing the SPR’s ability to deliver oil to domestic oil companies expeditiously if national or world events dictate a rapid sale and deployment of the oil reserves. Sandia was directed to develop and implement a process to continuously assess and report the evolution of drawdown capacity, the subject of this report. This report covers impacts on drawdown availability due to SPR operations during Calendar Year 2022. A cavern has an available drawdown if, after that drawdown, the long-term stability of the cavern, the cavern field, or the oil quality are not compromised. Thus, determining the number of available drawdowns requires the consideration of several factors regarding cavern and wellbore integrity and stability, including stress states caused by cavern geometry and operations, salt damage caused by dilatant and tensile stresses, the effect of enhanced creep on wellbore integrity, and the sympathetic stress effect of operations on neighboring caverns. Finite-element geomechanical models have been used to determine the stress states in the pillars following successive drawdowns. By computing the tensile and dilatant stresses in the salt, areas of potential structural instability can be identified that may represent red flags for additional drawdowns. These analyses have found that many caverns will maintain structural integrity even when grown via drawdowns to dimensions resulting in a pillar-to-diameter ratio of less than 1.0. The analyses have also confirmed that certain caverns should only be completely drawn down one time. As the SPR caverns are utilized and partial drawdowns are performed to remove oil from the caverns (e.g., for oil sales, purchases, or exchanges authorized by the Congress or the President), the changes to the cavern caused by these procedures must be tracked and accounted for so that an ongoing assessment of the cavern’s drawdown capacity may be continued. A methodology for assessing and tracking the available drawdowns for each cavern is reiterated. This report is the latest in a series of annual reports, and it includes the baseline available drawdowns for each cavern, and the most recent assessment of the evolution of drawdown expenditures. A total of 222 million barrels of oil were released in calendar-year 2022. A nearly-equal amount of raw water was injected, resulting in an estimated 34 million barrels of cavern leaching. Twenty caverns have now expended a full drawdown. Cavern BC 18 has expended all its baseline available drawdowns, and has no drawdowns remaining. Cavern BM 103 has expended one of its two baseline drawdowns, and is now a single-drawdown cavern. All other caverns with an expenditure went from at-least-5 to at-least-4 remaining drawdowns.

02 PETROLEUM↗

2020 Annual Report of Available Drawdowns for Each Oil Storage Cavern in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve

The Department of Energy maintains an up-to-date documentation of the number of available full drawdowns of each of the caverns owned by the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This information is important for assessing the SPR's ability to deliver oil to domestic oil companies expeditiously if national or world events dictate a rapid sale and deployment of the oil reserves. Sandia was directed to develop and implement a process to continuously assess and report the evolution of drawdown capacity, the subject of this report. A cavern has an available drawdown if after that drawdown, the long-term stability of the cavern, the cavern field, or the oil quality are not compromised. Thus, determining the number of available drawdowns requires the consideration of several factors regarding cavern and wellbore integrity and stability, including stress states caused by cavern geometry and operations, salt damage caused by dilatant and tensile stresses, the effect of enhanced creep on wellbore integrity, and the sympathetic stress effect of operations on neighboring caverns. A consensus has now been built regarding the assessment of drawdown capabilities and risks for the SPR caverns. The process involves an initial assessment of the pillar-to-diameter (P/D) ratio for each cavern with respect to neighboring caverns. A large pillar thickness between adjacent caverns should be strong enough to withstand the stresses induced by closure of the caverns due to salt creep. The first evaluation of P/D includes a calculation of the evolution of P/D after a number of full cavern drawdowns. The most common storage industry standard is to keep this value greater than 1.0, which should ensure a pillar thick enough to prevent loss of fluids to the surrounding rock mass. However, many of the SPR caverns currently have a P/D less than 1.0 or will likely have a low P/D after one or two full drawdowns. For these caverns, it is important to examine the structural integrity with more detail using geomechanical models. Finite-element geomechanical models have been used to determine the stress states in the pillars following successive drawdowns. By computing the tensile and dilatant stresses in the salt, areas of potential structural instability can be identified that may represent "red flags" for additional drawdowns. These analyses have found that many caverns will maintain structural integrity even when grown via drawdowns to dimensions resulting in a P/D of less than 1.0. The analyses have also confirmed that certain caverns should only be completely drawn down one time. As the SPR caverns are utilized and partial drawdowns are performed to remove oil from the caverns (e.g., for occasional oil sales authorized by the Congress or the President), the changes to the cavern caused by these procedures must be tracked and accounted for so that an ongoing assessment of the cavern's drawdown capacity may be continued. A proposed methodology for assessing and tracking the available drawdowns for each cavern was presented in Sobolik et al. (2018). This report includes an update to the baseline drawdowns for each cavern, and provides an initial assessment of the evolution of drawdown expenditure for several caverns

02 PETROLEUM↗

Available Drawdowns for Each Oil Storage Cavern in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (2021 Annual Report)

The Department of Energy maintains an up-to-date documentation of the number of available full drawdowns of each of the caverns owned by the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This information is important for assessing the SPRs ability to deliver oil to domestic oil companies expeditiously if national or world events dictate a rapid sale and deployment of the oil reserves. Sandia was directed to develop and implement a process to continuously assess and report the evolution of drawdown capacity, the subject of this report. A cavern has an available drawdown if after that drawdown, the long-term stability of the cavern, the cavern field, or the oil quality are not compromised. Thus, determining the number of available drawdowns requires the consideration of several factors regarding cavern and wellbore integrity and stability, including stress states caused by cavern geometry and operations, salt damage caused by dilatant and tensile stresses, the effect of enhanced creep on wellbore integrity, and the sympathetic stress effect of operations on neighboring caverns. A consensus has now been built regarding the assessment of drawdown capabilities and risks for the SPR caverns (Sobolik et al., 2014; Sobolik 2016). The process involves an initial assessment of the pillar - to - diameter (P/D) ratio for each cavern with respect to neighboring caverns. A large pillar thickness between adjacent caverns should be strong enough to withstand the stresses induced by closure of the caverns due to salt creep. The first evaluation of P/D includes a calculation of the evolution of P/D after a number of full cavern drawdowns. The most common storage industry standard is to keep this value greater than 1.0, which should ensure a pillar thick enough to prevent loss of fluids to the surrounding rock mass. However, many of the SPR caverns currently have a P/D less than 1.0 or will likely have a low P/D after one or two full drawdowns. For these caverns, it is important to examine the structural integrity with more detail using geomechanical models. Finite-element geomechanical models have been used to determine the stress states in the pillars following successive drawdowns. By computing the tensile and dilatant stresses in the salt, areas of potential structural instability can be identified that may represent red flags for additional drawdowns. These analyses have found that many caverns will maintain structural integrity even when grown via drawdowns to dimensions resulting in a P/D of less than 1.0. The analyses have also confirmed that certain caverns should only be completely drawn down one time. As the SPR caverns are utilized and partial drawdowns are performed to remove oil from the caverns (e.g., for occasional oil sales , purchases, or exchanges authorized by the Congress or the President), the changes to the cavern caused by these procedures must be tracked and accounted for so that an ongoing assessment of the caverns drawdown capacity may be continued. A proposed methodology for assessing and tracking the available drawdowns for each cavern was presented in Sobolik et al. (2018). This report is the latest in a series of annual reports, and it includes the baseline available drawdowns for each cavern, and the most recent assessment of the evolution of drawdown expenditure for several caverns .

02 PETROLEUM↗

Available Drawdowns for Each Oil Storage Cavern in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (2022 Annual Report)

The Department of Energy maintains an up-to-date documentation of the number of available full drawdowns of each of the caverns owned by the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This information is important for assessing the SPR's ability to deliver oil to domestic oil companies expeditiously if national or world events dictate a rapid sale and deployment of the oil reserves. Sandia was directed to develop and implement a process to continuously assess and report the evolution of drawdown capacity, the subject of this report. A cavern has an available drawdown if after that drawdown, the long-term stability of the cavern, the cavern field, or the oil quality are not compromised. Thus, determining the number of a vailable drawdowns requires the consideration of several factors regarding cavern and wellbore integrity and stability, including stress states caused by cavern geometry and operations, salt damage caused by dilatant and tensile stresses, the effect of enhanced creep on wellbore integrity, and the sympathetic stress effect of operations on neighboring caverns. A consensus has now been built regarding the assessment of drawdown capabilities and risks for the SPR caverns (Sobolik et al., 2014; Sobolik 2016). The process involves an initial assessment of the pillar-to-diameter (P/D) ratio for each cavern with respect to neighboring caverns. A large pillar thickness between adjacent caverns should be strong enough to withstand the stresses induced by closure of the caverns due to salt creep. The first evaluation of P/D includes a calculation of the evolution of P/D after a number of full cavern drawdowns. The most common storage industry standard is to keep this value greater than 1.0, which should ensure a pillar thick enough to prevent loss of fluids to the surrounding rock mass. However, many of the SPR caverns currently have a P/D less than 1.0 or will likely have a low P/D after one or two full drawdowns. For these caverns, it is important to examine the s tructural integrity with more detail using geomechanical models. Finite - element geomechanical models have been used to determine the stress states in the pillars following successive drawdowns. By computing the tensile and dilatant stresses in the salt, areas of potential structural instability can be identified that may represent "red flags" for additional drawdowns. These analyses have found that many caverns will maintain structural integrity even when grown via drawdowns to dimensions resulting in a P/D of less than 1.0. The analyses have also confirmed that certain caverns should only be completely drawn down one time. As the SPR caverns are utilized and partial drawdowns are performed to remove oil from the caverns (e.g., for occasional oil sales , purchases, or exchanges authorized by the Congress or the President), the changes to the cavern caused by these procedures must be tracked and accounted for so that an ongoing assessment of the cavern's drawdown capacity may be continued. A proposed methodology for assessing and tracking the available drawdowns for each cavern was presented in Sobolik et al. (2018). This report is the latest in a series of annual reports, and it includes the baseline available drawdowns for each cavern, and the most recent assessment of the evolution of drawdown expenditure for several caverns.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Spatial adaptation procedures on tetrahedral meshes for unsteady aerodynamic flow calculations

Spatial adaptation procedures for the accurate and efficient solution of steady and unsteady inviscid flow problems are described. The adaptation procedures were developed and implemented within a three-dimensional, unstructured-grid, upwind-type Euler code. These procedures involve mesh enrichment and mesh coarsening to either add points in high gradient regions of the flow or remove points where they are not needed, respectively, to produce solutions of high spatial accuracy at minimal computational cost. A detailed description of the enrichment and coarsening procedures are presented and comparisons with experimental data for an ONERA M6 wing and an exact solution for a shock-tube problem are presented to provide an assessment of the accuracy and efficiency of the capability. Steady and unsteady results, obtained using spatial adaptation procedures, are shown to be of high spatial accuracy, primarily in that discontinuities such as shock waves are captured very sharply.

Rausch, Russ D.↗

FRET-based dynamic structural biology: Challenges, perspectives and an appeal for open-science practices

Single-molecule FRET (smFRET) has become a mainstream technique for studying biomolecular structural dynamics. The rapid and wide adoption of smFRET experiments by an ever-increasing number of groups has generated significant progress in sample preparation, measurement procedures, data analysis, algorithms and documentation. Several labs that employ smFRET approaches have joined forces to inform the smFRET community about streamlining how to perform experiments and analyze results for obtaining quantitative information on biomolecular structure and dynamics. The recent efforts include blind tests to assess the accuracy and the precision of smFRET experiments among different labs using various procedures. These multi-lab studies have led to the development of smFRET procedures and documentation, which are important when submitting entries into the archiving system for integrative structure models, PDB-Dev. This position paper describes the current ‘state of the art’ from different perspectives, points to unresolved methodological issues for quantitative structural studies, provides a set of ‘soft recommendations’ about which an emerging consensus exists, and lists openly available resources for newcomers and seasoned practitioners. To make further progress, we strongly encourage ‘open science’ practices.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Validation of WIND for a Series of Inlet Flows

Validation assessments compare WIND CFD simulations to experimental data for a series of inlet flows ranging in Mach number from low subsonic to hypersonic. The validation procedures follow the guidelines of the AIAA. The WIND code performs well in matching the available experimental data. The assessments demonstrate the use of WIND and provide confidence in its use for the analysis of aircraft inlets.

Slater, John W.↗

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA CARA Prelaunch Analysis and Process

NASA implemented an official Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8079.1 in June 2023, establishing the minimum collision avoidance requirements and associated operational protocols for NASA space flight programs, projects, and spacecraft to protect the space environment by reducing the risk of collision to an acceptable level. Part of the requirement employs a two-fold approach to analyze the satellite design process with conjunction assessment and risk mitigation in mind, during the pre-launch process, led by the Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis (CARA) Program for non-Human Space Flight (HSF) Missions. This presentation outlines CARA coordination with missions, informed by the NPR, that spans early mission development to operations. CARA is an Agency-level resource that provides support to all NASA non-HSF missions. CARA protects the orbital environment from collision between NASA non-HSF missions and other tracked on-orbit objects. During the pre-formulation and formulation phases, NASA missions undergo a series of conjunction assessment analyses captured in the Orbital Collision Avoidance Plan (OCAP) prior to transitioning to the implementation phase (typically at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) or equivalent). The OCAP analyses consist of a thorough review of the spacecraft(s) orbit selection and placement, deployment, cataloguing performance, trackability, ephemeris generation, conjunction mitigation options, autonomous maneuvering, and risk assessment parameters which are performed by a dedicated CARA Analysis Team. The results of these analyses, CARA’s formal recommendations, and the mission’s methods for implementing them, are documented in the OCAP. The intent of engaging in this process so early in the mission design phase, is to ensure that conjunction assessment is considered from the outset, thus mitigating costly design changes and operational risks down the road. NASA missions are also required to coordinate their operational processes and conjunction mitigation procedures with CARA in a Conjunction Assessment Operations Implementation Agreement (CAOIA). The aim of this process is to document the conjunction assessment screening process, conjunction risk assessment parameters, conjunction mitigation steps, flight dynamics operations concepts and maneuvers, and the communication and coordination process between the mission’s project manager and CARA. The intent of the CAOIA document is for it to be completed iteratively, and as missions update these elements, corresponding changes are made in the CAOIA. With this process in place, the engagement and coordination between the missions and CARA from early in the design process into mission operations, helps to ensure that missions not only have a robust conjunction assessment concept of operations to reduce conjunction risk for space sustainability, but are also able to achieve their science goals and have a successful mission.

conjunction assessment↗

Quantitative Assessment and Measurement of X-ray Detector Performance and Solid Angle in the Analytical Electron Microscope

A wide range of X-ray detectors and geometries are available today on transmission/scanning transmission analytical electron microscopes. While there have been numerous reports of their individual performance, no single experimentally reproducible metric has been proposed as a basis of comparison between the systems. In this paper, we detail modeling, experimental procedures, measurements, and specimens which can be used to provide a manufacturer-independent assessment of the performance of an analytical system. Using these protocols, the geometrical collection efficiency, system peaks, and minimum detection limits can be independently assessed and can be used to determine the best conditions to conduct modern hyperspectral and/or spectrally resolved tomographic analyses for an individual instrument. Here, a simple analytical formula and specimen is presented which after suitable system calibrations can be used to experimentally determine the X-ray detector solid angle.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Weld Residual Stress and Distortion Analysis of the ARES I-X Upper Stage Simulator (USS)

An independent assessment was conducted to determine the critical initial flaw size (CIFS) for the flange-to-skin weld in the Ares I-X Upper Stage Simulator (USS). The Ares system of space launch vehicles is the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration s plan for replacement of the aging space shuttle. The new Ares space launch system is somewhat of a combination of the space shuttle system and the Saturn launch vehicles used prior to the shuttle. Here, a series of weld analyses are performed to determine the residual stresses in a critical region of the USS. Weld residual stresses both increase constraint and mean stress thereby having an important effect on fatigue and fracture life. While the main focus of this paper is a discussion of the weld modeling procedures and results for the USS, a short summary of the CIFS assessment is provided.

Raju, Ivatury↗

MARSAME Release Report for TA-03 Building 16

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has determined that materials associated with technical area 3, Buildings 16 and 18 (collectively known as TA-3-16) (Figure 1) do not meet the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020) and are to be treated as Low Level Waste (LLW). These conclusions are based on the known history of the building combined with radiation survey data collected in 2020 and 2021, and findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC-ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL 2020a). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (MARSAME 2000) and LANL procedures (LANL 2020b). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

MARSAME Radiological Release Report TA-50, TRU Liquid Waste Construction Soil

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has determined that the soil associated with Technical Area 50 (TA-50), Transuranic (TRU) Liquid Waste construction project (TLW) meets the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020, NNSA 2021). This conclusion is based on the known history of the area combined with soil sample data collected in 2021; the findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL 2020a). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (MARSAME 2000) and LANL procedures (LANL 2020b). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program. The scope of this final release report includes the TLW construction site soil located south of TA-50, Building 001.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Diamond Drive Widening and Roundabout Construction Projects

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has determined that only a portion of the soil associated with the Diamond Drive Widening/Roundabout Projects (Figure 1) meets the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE, 2020). The remaining soil did not meet the criteria for unrestricted release and must be managed appropriately. These conclusions are based on the known history of the area combined with soil sample data collected in 2022; the findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC-ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL, 2021). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives (MQOs) under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (NUREG, 2009) and LANL procedures (LANL, 2020). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Replacement Water Lines from TA-48 to TA-55

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has determined that only a portion of the soil associated with Replacement Water Lines from Technical Area (TA)-48 to TA55 (Figure 1) meets the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE, 2020). The remaining soil did not meet the criteria for unrestricted release and must be managed appropriately. These conclusions are based on the known history of the area combined with soil sample data collected in 2022; the findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC-ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL, 2021). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives (MQOs) under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (NUREG, 2009) and LANL procedures (LANL, 2020). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗