Results for “failure modes” — Page 28

DOE OSTI2021

Design for Remanufacturing

The objective of this project was to develop relationships between published scholarship, industry experience, and remanufacturing design rules and identify a clear path for integrating remanufacturing design rules into CAD tools and design practices. To accomplish this, remanufacturing knowledge was compiled, and then the relationships between this knowledge and a prioritized set of product design guidelines was developed. Next, a process to create rules out of guidelines was developed by first defining life extension as a primary function, and remanufacturing as effective tasks to control the failure modes that would restrict the product life. The reliability centered maintenance (RCM) process was used to identify proactive tasks and default actions to mitigate the effects of failure modes. These tasks were developed into expert system rules. The impact of design on remanufacturing was then validated through implementing a prioritized set of design rules for a Heavy Duty Off-Road (HDOR) techno-economic case study. Finally, detailed steps on how to define, develop, and integrate these rules into CAD were created.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the displays and controls subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items Llist (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Displays and Control hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison for the Orbiter D and C hardware are documented.

Trahan, W. H.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the communication and tracking subsystem, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets.

Long, W. C.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the communication and tracking subsystem, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed and analysis of the Communication and Tracking hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter Communication and Tracking hardware. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and contains the potential critical items list, detailed analysis, and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Long, W. C.↗

NASA NTRS1997

Ion Engine Service Life Validation by Analysis and Testing

Assessment of the NSTAR ion engine service life is being accomplished through a combination of long duration testing and probabilistic analyses of the credible failure modes. A literature review that examined 65 ion engine endurance tests perfromed over the past 35 years was conducted to compile a list of possible ion engine failure modes.

Ion Engine↗

NASA NTRS1996

Ion Engine Service Life Validation by Analysis and Testing

Assessment of the NSTAR ion engine service life is being accomplished through a combination of long duration testing and probabilistic analyses of the credible failure modes. A literature review that examined 65 ion engine endurance tests perfromed over the past 35 years was conducted to compile a list of possible ion engine failure modes.

Ion Engine↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Examining the Role of IMU Health Characterization and Monitoring in UAS Safety

Inertial measurement units (IMUs) can be vital for vehicle attitude and position estimation in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Degradation in these units could result in incorrect position estimates that are utilized in vehicle control, trajectory prediction, and other critical systems; however, the modes and effects of degradation in these IMUs are not well understood. In order to quantify the risk posed by degradation in these sensors, a study was conducted on the types of IMUs prevalent in the commercial market, their known failure modes, and the applicability to health monitoring methods for risk reduction and increased safety in an increasingly autonomous airspace. First, use cases and failure modes of the various types and reliability of commercially available IMUs were reviewed, and knowledge gaps and issues in the field were identified. Noting that inexpensive and lightweight MEMS (Microelectromechanical Systems) IMUs are some of the most commonly used but least reliable sensors in sUAS (small Unmanned Aerial Systems), five inexpensive MEMS IMUs were chosen for a performance evaluation study, selected from the Pixhawk autopilot systems, hobby sUAS, and prior NASA experimental studies. For each of these IMUs, a 10-minute bias test and a 12-hour drift test were performed for the accelerometers in a benchtop setting, using a BeagleBone Black for data collection. Using these results, the sensors’ performance is compared to their reported specifications, and the utility of implementing diagnostic methods for MEMS IMUs for research and commercial applications is evaluated. The paper concludes with a planned study for the evaluation of vibration-induced degradation for the selected sensors.

IMUs↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the data processing system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Data Processing System (DPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. The results of that comparison is documented for the Orbiter DPS hardware.

Lowery, H. J.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the nose wheel steering subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter NWS hardware.

Mediavilla, Anthony Scott↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the orbiter main propulsion system FMEA/CIL, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. The Orbiter MPS is composed of the Propellant Management Subsystem (PMS) consisting of the liquid oxygen (LO2) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) subsystems and the helium subsystem. The PMS is a system of manifolds, distribution lines, and valves by which the liquid propellants pass from the External Tank to the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The helium subsystem consists of a series of helium supply tanks and their associated regulators, control valves, and distribution lines. Volume 1 contains the MPS description, assessment results, ground rules and assumptions, and some of the IOA worksheets.

Slaughter, B. C.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets for MPS hardware items.

Holden, K. A.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA worksheets and includes the potential critical items list.

Holden, K. A.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the main propulsion subsystem FMEA/CIL, volume 4

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to available data from the Rockwell Downey/NASA JSC FMEA/CIL review. Volume 4 contains the IOA analysis worksheets and the NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross reference and recommendations.

Slaughter, B. C.↗

DOE OSTI2020

Dispenser Reliability: Materials R&D. A Hydrogen Fueling Infrastructure Research and Station Technology (H2FIRST) Report

Dispensers are the top cause of maintenance events and down-time at hydrogen fueling stations. In an effort to help characterize and enable improvements in dispenser reliability, an extensive accelerated lifetime testing set-up was designed and built at NREL involving components typically part of dispensing operations at fueling stations. Device Under Test (DUTs) included different components such as normally open valves, normally closed valves, fueling nozzles, breakaways devices and filters. Conditions of testing included pressures, and flow rates similar to light duty fuel cell electric vehicles fueling at -40°C, and -20°C for thousands of cycles in hydrogen. Tested components (failed and non-failed) were disassembled at SNL and polymeric O-rings were carefully retrieved and cataloged for chemical and physical characterization. Data collected was compared to similar O-rings from unexposed or non-tested components for hydrogen effects, and failure modes. Degradation analyses, based on select polymer chemistries common across all component types, their location within components, visual assessment of damage coupled with strong hydrogen effects from chemical characterization, was completed and presented to NREL and DOE. Overall, the failure rate amongst the components was not as high as expected for the test conditions. Among the component types tested, breakaways were the most susceptible to damage under these test conditions, with fueling nozzles a close second. The proper combination of selection of the right polymer and optimum component design was found to make a strong difference in component reliability under severe dispenser operating conditions. Physical degradation of polymers, rather than chemical changes due to low temperature hydrogen exposure, is more prevalent as failure mode for these test conditions. The nature and the extent of the degradation was much less at -20°C as compared to -40°C. The damage and failure rates were higher at lower temperatures than at higher test temperatures. As expected, increasing the number of cycles at the lowest test temperature (-40°C) increased damage. This indicates that cycling at the low temperature of -40°C required by SAE J2601 can reduce component life in fuel dispensing operations

08 HYDROGEN↗

NASA NTRS2000

The Effect of Boron on the Low Cycle Fatigue Behavior of Disk Alloy KM4

The durability of powder metallurgy nickel base superalloys employed as compressor and turbine disks is often limited by low cycle fatigue (LCF) crack initiation and crack growth from highly stressed surface locations (corners, holes, etc.). Crack growth induced by dwells at high stresses during aerospace engine operation can be particularly severe. Supersolvus solution heat treatments can be used to produce coarse grain sizes approaching ASTM 6 for improved resistance to dwell fatigue crack growth. However, the coarse grain sizes reduce yield strength, which can lower LCF initiation life. These high temperature heat treatments also can encourage pores to form. In the advanced General Electric disk superalloy KM4, such pores can initiate fatigue cracks that limit LCF initiation life. Hot isostatic pressing (HIP) during the supersolvus solution heat treatment has been shown to improve LCF initiation life in KM4, as the HIP pressure minimizes formation of the pores. Reduction of boron levels in KM4 has also been shown to increase LCF initiation life after a conventional supersolvus heat treatment, again possibly due to effects on the formation tendencies of these pores. However, the effects of reduced boron levels on microstructure, pore characteristics, and LCF failure modes in KM4 still need to be fully quantified. The objective of this study was to determine the effect of boron level on the microstructure, porosity, LCF behavior, and failure modes of supersolvus heat treated KM4.

Gabb, Timothy↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem FMEA/CIL

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Fuel Cell Powerplant (EPG/FCP) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPG/FCP hardware.

Brown, K. L.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were than compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the extravehicular mobility unit, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort performed an independent analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) hardware and system, generating draft failure modes criticalities and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the most recent proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EMU hardware. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list and NASA FMEA to IOA worksheet cross references and recommendations.

Raffaelli, Gary G.↗