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At least 505 records · Page 28

Cybersecurity concerns for the energy sector in the maritime domain

The world has seen a number of high-profile maritime disasters in recent months and years, and has felt the impact of them. At the same time, the world has also seen a number of high-profile cyberattacks. It has felt their impact, as well. And, likely no sector has been more affected by the maritime and cyber incidents than the energy sector, as fuel prices often spike or trough, and access to energy resources can become an instant source of concern, tension, or even conflict. As energy sectors—in all their forms—continue to rely on the maritime domain or even increase that reliance, they must be mindful that traditional maritime threats—like piracy, theft, and weather events—are not the only threats they face today. Maritime cybersecurity concerns are among the most potentially disruptive to energy-sector interests and, yet, are among the least understood and least addressed. This paper identifies nine areas in which the energy sector faces harmful cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime domain, to provide enough insight and examples to allow for action to be taken to reduce the risk of harm from these different vulnerabilities. The paper develops the example of offshore wind energy to model how to assess cyber considerations more fully. Ultimately, it concludes with a series of recommendations that offer policymakers, energy-sector actors, and security and law-enforcement professionals steps to minimize the exposure of the maritime energy sector to harmful cyberattacks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Implementation of wireless technologies in nuclear power plants' electromagnetic environment using cognitive radio system - 153

Wireless technologies have increased efficiency in many industrial settings across the world by enabling a mobile workforce and improving communications. Unfortunately, the nuclear power industry has been slow to adopt wireless technology as a result of safety, security, and reliability concerns expressed by regulators and others. A Research and Development (R and D) effort is currently being conducted to address two significant technical concerns for the introduction of wireless technology in nuclear power plants, which are electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and wireless coexistence. Most equipment in nuclear power plants has never been tested for vulnerability to wireless transmission. As such, the impact of modern wireless devices on nuclear safety and plant reliability is not understood. Existing guidance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) rely on the use of exclusion zones to protect plant equipment, which can result in exclusion zones of up to eight feet for some tablet devices rendering them ineffective for the mobile workforce. Another unknown is how different wireless devices will operate in close proximity to one another in the harsh electromagnetic environment of a nuclear power plant. These issues are being addressed through development of a cognitive radio system that has the ability to generate and output multiple wireless signals such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and cellular communications at varying power levels and frequencies. The cognitive radio system is a modular system that can test nuclear plant equipment located in training areas, simulators, and the actual plant environment. In addition to using the system for testing plant equipment to wireless signals and EMC standards, the system can also monitor the radio spectrum for usage in other plant focuses such as cyber security. The R and D work will provide the objective guidance for the nuclear industry in the two areas mentioned and will develop a cognitive radio system for in-plant EMC and coexistence testing. The system will assist in the seamless use of wireless technology in nuclear power plants while greatly reducing the risks wireless signals may introduce. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

CDP - Adaptive Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Technology for Infrastructure Protection (Final Report)

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems are a type of Industrial Control System characterized by the centralized (or hierarchical) monitoring and control of geographically dispersed assets. SCADA systems combine acquisition and network components to provide data gathering, transmission, and visualization for centralized monitoring and control. However these integrated capabilities, especially when built over legacy systems and protocols, generally result in vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers, with potentially disastrous consequences. Our research project proposal was to investigate new approaches for secure and survivable SCADA systems. In particular, we were interested in the resilience and adaptability of large-scale mission-critical monitoring and control infrastructures. Our research proposal was divided in two main tasks. The first task was centered on the design and investigation of algorithms for survivable SCADA systems and a prototype framework demonstration. The second task was centered on the characterization and demonstration of the proposed approach in illustrative scenarios (simulated or emulated).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Washington State Highway Seismic Screening Tool (HSST)

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) undertook the Washington State Transportation Systems RRAP project in 2017 to assess the seismic vulnerabilities of that state’s transportation system to a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) earthquake. The specific goal of that project was to assess the vulnerability of, and prioritize, transportation infrastructure for moving goods and supplies from Incident Support Bases to Federal Staging Areas within Washington State following a CSZ earthquake. As part of this analysis, Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), with input and support from the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) maintenance and pavements offices and state geotechnical engineer, developed the Highway Seismic Screening Tool (HSST) to inform a system-level analysis of highway recovery and reopening times. This report provides a full discussion of the HSST’s development, implementation, and results for the CSZ scenario earthquake. The primary outcome of the HSST is to determine the approximate reopening times of highway segments or bridges damaged by a CSZ magnitude 9.0 seismic event. This is done by calculating the permanent ground deformation (PGD) caused by soil liquefaction along state highways, which can cause significant damage or displacement of highway pavement structures. The term “reopening time” is different from “restoration time” and is intended to represent the approximate amount of time that would be needed to return highways to a minimum state of repair sufficient to support the limited movement of emergency and response vehicles. Additionally, the HSST is referred to as a “screening tool,” as it uses network- or system-level asset management information that WSDOT provided to assess seismic-related hazards and vulnerabilities of highways; it does not conduct an asset-level engineering analysis of seismic-related vulnerabilities. Accordingly, the results of the HSST analysis should only be used for system- or corridor-level planning and investment, and not for engineering or management decisions at the asset level. The HSST is also applied to assess the exposure of statewide rail systems to soil liquefaction and PGD hazards. However, little information is available about the sensitivity or vulnerability of railways and rail yards to such hazards, and therefore researchers were unable to determine approximate reopening times for the state’s rail system following a CSZ earthquake.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Data-driven cyber attack detection and mitigation for decentralized wide-area protection and control in smart grids

Modern power systems have already evolved into complicated cyber physical systems (CPS), often referred to as smart grids, due to the continuous expansion of the electrical infrastructure, the augmentation of the number of heterogeneous system components and players, and the consequential application of a diversity of information and telecommunication technologies to facilitate the Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) of the day-to-day power system operation. Because of the reliance on cyber technologies, WAMPAC, among other critical functions, is prone to various malicious cyber attacks. Successful cyber attacks, especially those sabotage the operation of Bulk Electric System (BES), can cause great financial losses and social panics. Application of conventional IT security solutions is indispensable, but it often turns out to be insufficient to mitigate sophisticated attacks that deploy zero-day vulnerabilities or social engineering tactics. To further improve the resilience of the operation of smart grids when facing cyber attacks, it is desirable to make the WAMPAC functions per se capable of detecting various anomalies automatically, carrying out adaptive activity adjustments in time and thus staying unimpaired even under attack. Most of the existing research efforts attempt to achieve this by adding novel functional modules, such as model-based anomaly detectors, to the legacy centralized WAMPAC functions. In contrast, this dissertation investigates the application of data-driven algorithms in cyber attack detection and mitigation within a decentralized architecture aiming at improving the situational awareness and self-adaptiveness of WAMPAC. First part of the research focuses on the decentralization of System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) with Multi-Agent System (MAS), within which the data-driven anomaly detection and optimal adaptive load shedding are further explored. An algorithm named as Support Vector Machine embedded Layered Decision Tree (SVMLDT) is proposed for the anomaly detection, which provides satisfactory detection accuracy as well as decision-making interpretability. The adaptive load shedding is carried out by every agent individually with dynamic programming. The load shedding relies on the load profile propagation among peer agents and the attack adaptiveness is accomplished by maintaining the historical mean of load shedding proportion. Load shedding only takes place after the consensus pertaining to the anomaly detection is achieved among all interconnected agents and it serves the purpose of mitigating certain cyber attacks. The attack resilience of the decentralized SIPS is evaluated using IEEE 39 bus model. It is shown that, unlike the traditional centralized SIPS, the proposed solution is able to carry out the remedial actions under most Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The second part investigates the clustering based anomalous behavior detection and peer-assisted mitigation for power system generation control. To reduce the dimensionality of the data, three metrics are designed to interpret the behavior conformity of generator within the same balancing area. Semi-supervised K-means clustering and a density sensitive clustering algorithm based on Hierarchical DBSCAN (HDBSCAN) are both applied in clustering in the 3D feature space. Aiming to mitigate the cyber attacks targeting the generation control commands, a peer-assisted strategy is proposed. When the control commands from control center is detected as anomalous, i.e. either missing or the payload of which have been manipulated, the generating unit utilizes the peer data to infer and estimate a new generation adjustment value as replacement. Linear regression is utilized to obtain the relation of control values received by different generating units, Moving Target Defense (MTD) is adopted during the peer selection and 1-dimensional clustering is performed with the inferred control values, which are followed by the final control value estimation. The mitigation strategy proposed requires that generating units can communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Evaluation results suggest the efficacy of the proposed solution in counteracting data availability and data integrity attacks targeting the generation controls. However, the strategy stays effective only if less than half of the generating units are compromised and it is not able to mitigate cyber attacks targeting the measurements involved in the generation control.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

CENTRAL STORAGE FACILITY PROJECT IN COLOMBIA TO PROVIDE THE SAFE STORAGE AND PROTECTION OF HIGH-ACTIVITY RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) reduces and protects vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide. Internationally, over 40 countries are cooperating with GTRI to enhance the security of these materials. The GTRI program has worked successfully with foreign countries to remove and protect nuclear and radioactive materials, including orphaned and disused high-activity sources. GTRI began cooperation with the Republic of Colombia in April 2004. This cooperation has been a resounding success by securing forty high-risk sites, consolidating disused/orphan sources at an interim secure national storage facility, and developing a comprehensive approach to security, training, and sustainability. In 2005 the Colombian Ministry of Mines and Energy requested the Department of Energy’s support in the construction of a new Central Storage Facility (CSF). In December 2005, the Ministry selected to construct this facility at the Institute of Geology and Mining (Ingeominas) site in Bogota. This site already served as Colombia’s national repository, where disused sources were housed in various buildings around the complex. The CSF project was placed under contract in May 2006, but environmental issues and public protests, which led to a class action lawsuit against the Colombian Government, forced the Ministry to quickly suspend activities, thereby placing the project in jeopardy. Despite these challenges, however, the Ministry of Mines and Energy worked closely with public and environmental authorities to resolve these issues, and continued to be a strong advocate of the GTRI program. In June 2008, the Ministry of Mines and Energy was granted the construction and environmental licenses. As a result, construction immediately resumed and the CSF was completed by December 2008. A commissioning ceremony was held for the new facility in January 2009, which was attended by representatives from the Department of Energy, U.S. Embassy, and the Ministry of Mines and Energy, including the Minister and Vice Minister.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Security Interface Considerations for Regaining Control of Discovered Nuclear and Radioactive Materials

Recognizing that regaining control of orphan radioactive and nuclear material is challenging, the international community has developed requirements and guidance to support countries in addressing the problem. However, limited guidance is available on the practical nuclear security related issues that arise when nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control (MORC) is encountered and efforts are undertaken to regain control. For example, the IAEA Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-19, “National Strategy for Regaining Control over Orphan Sources and Improving Control over Vulnerable Sources”, provides recommendations on a methodology for establishing a national strategy for regaining control of orphan sources. However, except for Pu239 in radioactive sources, nuclear material is outside the scope of this safety guide, and practical safety and security measures below the level of national strategy are not discussed adequately.This paper discusses the interfaces between the stakeholder groups and the responsibilities of each when encountering common scenarios that deal with MORC transitioning to regulatory control. The stakeholders include but are not limited to individuals who encounter MORC, and providers of formal and informal transport systems, and traditional and ad hoc storage solutions. This paper explores practical legal, financial, and institutional issues that hinder implementation of required safety and security practices. This paper also offers strategies that can be implemented on the individual, organizational, national, and international level to regain control of MORC.

Shannon, Michael↗

The IEC 61850 Sampled Measured Values Protocol: Analysis, Threat Identification, and Feasibility of Using NN Forecasters to Detect Spoofed Packets

The operation of the smart grid is anticipated to rely profoundly on distributed microprocessor-based control. Therefore, interoperability standards are needed to address the heterogeneous nature of the smart grid data. Since the IEC 61850 emerged as a wide-spread interoperability standard widely accepted by the industry, the Sampled Measured Values method has been used to communicate digitized voltage and current measurements. Realizing that current and voltage measurements (i.e., feedback measurements) are necessary for reliable and secure noperation of the power grid, firstly, this manuscript provides a detailed analysis of the Sampled Measured Values protocol emphasizing its advantages, then, it identifies vulnerabilities in this protocol and explains the cyber threats associated to these vulnerabilities. Secondly, current efforts to mitigate these vulnerabilities are outlined and the feasibility of using neural network forecasters to detect spoofed sampled values is investigated. It was shown that although such forecasters have high spoofed data detection accuracy, they are prone to the accumulation of forecasting error. Accordingly, this paper also proposes an algorithm to detect the accumulation of the forecasting error based on lightweight statistical indicators. The effectiveness of the proposed methods is experimentally verified in a laboratory-scale smart grid testbed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Application of Lightweight Formal Methods to Software Security

Formal specification and verification of security has proven a challenging task. There is no single method that has proven feasible. Instead, an integrated approach which combines several formal techniques can increase the confidence in the verification of software security properties. Such an approach which species security properties in a library that can be reused by 2 instruments and their methodologies developed for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) are described herein The Flexible Modeling Framework (FMF) is a model based verijkation instrument that uses Promela and the SPIN model checker. The Property Based Tester (PBT) uses TASPEC and a Text Execution Monitor (TEM). They are used to reduce vulnerabilities and unwanted exposures in software during the development and maintenance life cycles.

security↗

Exe-Guard Project

The exe-Guard Project is an alliance between Dominion Virginia Power (DVP), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Dartmouth University, and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL). SEL is primary recipient on this project. The exe-Guard project was selected for award under DE-FOA-0000359 with CFDA number 81.122 to address Topic Area of Interest 4: Hardened platforms and Systems. The exe-Guard project developed an antivirus solution for control system embedded devices to prevent the execution of unauthorized code and maintain settings and configuration integrity. This project created a white list antivirus solution for control systems capable of running on embedded Linux® operating systems. White list antivirus methods allow only credible programs to run through the use of digital signatures and hash functions. Once a system’s secure state is baselined, white list antivirus software denies deviations from that state because of the installation of malicious code as this changes hash results. Black list antivirus software has been effective in traditional IT environments but has negative implications for control systems. Black list antivirus uses pattern matching and behavioral analysis to identify system threats while relying on regular updates to the signature file and recurrent system scanning. Black list antivirus is vulnerable to zero day exploits which have not yet been incorporated into a signature file update. System scans hamper the performance of high availability applications, as revealed in NIST special publication 1058 which summarizes the impact of blacklist antivirus on control systems: Manual or “on-demand” scanning has a major effect on control processes in that they take CPU time needed by the control process (Sometimes close to 100% of CPU time). Minimizing the antivirus software throttle setting will reduce but not eliminate this effect. Signature updates can also take up to 100% of CPU time, but for a much shorter period than a typical manual scanning process. Control systems are vulnerable to performance losses if off-the-shelf blacklist antivirus solutions aren’t implemented with care. This investment in configuration in addition to constant decommissioning to perform manual signature file updates is unprecedented and impractical. Additionally, control systems are often disconnected or islanded from the network making the delivery of signature updates difficult. Exe-Guard project developed a white list antivirus solution that mitigated the above drawbacks and allows control systems to cost-effectively apply malware protection while maintaining high reliability. The application of security patches can also be minimized since white listing maintains constant defense against unauthorized code execution. Security patches can instead be applied in less frequent intervals where system decommissioning can be scheduled and planned for. Since control systems are less dynamic than IT environments, the feasibility of maintaining a secure baselined state is more practical. Because upgrades are performed in infrequent, calculated intervals, it allows a new security baseline to be established before the system is returned to service. Exe-Guard built on the efforts of SNL under the Code Seal project. SNL demonstrated prototype Trust Anchors on the project which are independent monitoring and control devices that can be integrated into untrustworthy components. The exe-Guard team started with the lessons learned under this project then designed commercial solution for white list malware protection. Malware is a real threat, even on islanded or un-networked installations, since operators can unintentionally install infected files, plug in infected mass storage devices, or infect a piece of equipment on the islanded local area network that can then spread to other connected equipment. Protection at the device level is one of the last layers of defense in a security-in-depth defense model before an asset becomes compromised. This project provided non-destructive intrusion, isolation and automated response solution, achieving a goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) Roadmap to Secure Control Systems. It also addressed CIP-007-R4 which requires asset owners to employ malicious software prevention tools on assets within the electronic security perimeter. In addition, the CIP-007-R3 requirement for security patch management is minimized because white listing narrows the impact of vulnerabilities and patch releases. The exe-Guard Project completed all tasks identified in the statement of project objective and identified additional tasks within scope that were performed and completed within the original budget. The cost share was met and all deliverables were successfully completed and submitted on time. Most importantly the technology developed and commercialized under this project has been adopted by the Energy sector and thousands of devices with exe-Guard technology integrated in them have now been deployed and are protecting our power systems today

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cybersecurity Assessment Methodology for International Safeguards

International nuclear safeguards are technical measures implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the correctness and completeness of declarations made by States about their nuclear activities. The systems used to verify such activities include electronic and digital hardware and software components capable of data collection, processing, analysis, storage and transmission. Despite increasing efforts to protect digital systems against unauthorized access or attack through cybersecurity measures, these systems are not immune to cyber exploitation that could compromise their integrity or reliability. Previous versions of these systems did not include capabilities that exist today, such as BluetoothTM and GPS. The inclusion of these new capabilities, as well as new data processing and storage mechanisms, adds new attack vectors and opportunities for adversaries to exploit the devices that did not previously exist. As mentioned in the above referenced Cybersecurity for Safeguards study, cyber-domain vulnerabilities present risks to the equipment used to perform the international nuclear safeguards mission. The IAEA has produced guidance on the protection of nuclear facilities and their computer systems against cyber threats, but these documents do not specifically address the risks to safeguards or safeguards equipment. In response, the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Safeguards/Safeguards Technology Development (NA-241) sponsored Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia, SNL) and the Idaho National Laboratory (Idaho, INL) to conduct a one-year study to evaluate cyber related vulnerabilities in safeguards equipment and develop recommendations for the mitigation of any identified risks.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids: A Semi-Supervised Deep Learning Approach

The dependence on advanced information and communication technology increases the vulnerability in smart grids under cyber-attacks. Recent research on unobservable false data injection attacks (FDIAs) reveals the high risk of secure system operation, since these attacks can bypass current bad data detection mechanisms. To mitigate this risk, this paper proposes a data-driven learning-based algorithm for detecting unobservable FDIAs in distribution systems. We use autoencoders for efficient dimension reduction and feature extraction of measurement datasets. Further, we integrate the autoencoders into an advanced generative adversarial network (GAN) framework, which successfully detects anomalies under FDIAs by capturing the unconformity between abnormal and secure measurements. Also, considering that the datasets collected from practical power systems are partially labeled due to expensive labeling costs and missing labels, the proposed method only requires a few labeled measurement data in addition to unlabeled data for training. Numerical simulations in three-phase unbalanced IEEE 13-bus and 123-bus distribution systems validate the detection accuracy and efficiency of this method.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Rosemount -- INL System Assessments

During this assessment, vulnerabilities were discovered, evaluated, and mitigation strategies developed. These results were reported to Rosemount Inc. to guide their efforts towards improved cyber security of their wireless SmartPackTM system.

Source record↗

High Voltage Modeling and Testing of Transformer, Line Interface Devices, and Bulk System Components Under Electromagnetic Pulse, Geomagnetic Disturbance, and other Abnormal Transients

This project aims at quantitatively analyzing possible knowledge gaps related to the risk of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) impact on high-voltage, power transformers (transmission-class), that represent the most critical power grid assets. In relation to the electric infrastructure, some past studies indicate that the grid is overall fairly robust and resilient against most EMP threats. This assessment stems, in part, from estimates of the peak voltage that can be induced on a transmission power line for a nominal EMP fast-transient, compared with the typically very high basic insulation level that is featured by the high-voltage infrastructure. The project provides additional insight toward a more comprehensive risk evaluation of the grid EMP and Geomagnetic Disturbances (GMD) vulnerabilities. This work is aligned with the U.S. Dept. of Energy current research thrust in support of the development of a highly secure and resilient power infrastructure. Project milestones have been devised to address the fundamental technical issues in support of protection of large power transformer against EMP threats. More specifically, this project included parallel research tasks focused on the following topics: analysis of EMP-induced, fast-transient, current and voltages on a variety of power line configurations and EMP impact scenarios, detailed characterization of EMP damage potential due to the voltage surge, from the impact on the power line, to the transformer windings, GMD and EMP slow transients and impact from harmonics generation and reactive power flow on a complex grid layout, and identification of risk mitigation paths, with emphasis on GIC damage prevention for large power transformers, and on impact protection options from a grid stability perspective.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Reverse Engineering of Medical Devices for Innovation and Advancement in Healthcare

• Medical technology is rapidly evolving and introducing new functionality and methodologies that suggest a higher risk for common vulnerability exposures (CVE) • Introduction of functionalities like Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and internet connectivity require devices to be rigorously evaluated for vulnerabilities • Subsequently like many other fields cell-phone interconnectivity suggests a significantly higher level of risk to critical infrastructure and data security

Baldwin, David [Savannah River National Laboratory↗

StructuredFuzzer: Fuzzing Structured Text-Based Control Logic Applications

Rigorous testing methods are essential for ensuring the security and reliability of industrial controller software. Fuzzing, a technique that automatically discovers software bugs, has also proven effective in finding software vulnerabilities. Unsurprisingly, fuzzing has been applied to a wide range of platforms, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs). However, current approaches, such as coverage-guided evolutionary fuzzing implemented in the popular fuzzer American Fuzzy Lop Plus Plus (AFL++), are often inadequate for finding logical errors and bugs in PLC control logic applications. They primarily target generic programming languages like C/C++, Java, and Python, and do not consider the unique characteristics and behaviors of PLCs, which are often programmed using specialized programming languages like Structured Text (ST). Furthermore, these fuzzers are ill suited to deal with complex input structures encapsulated in ST, as they are not specifically designed to generate appropriate input sequences. This renders the application of traditional fuzzing techniques less efficient on these platforms. To address this issue, this paper presents a fuzzing framework designed explicitly for PLC software to discover logic bugs in applications written in ST specified by the IEC 61131-3 standard. The proposed framework incorporates a custom-tailored PLC runtime and a fuzzer designed for the purpose. We demonstrate its effectiveness by fuzzing a collection of ST programs that were crafted for evaluation purposes. We compare the performance against a popular fuzzer, namely, AFL++. The proposed fuzzing framework demonstrated its capabilities in our experiments, successfully detecting logic bugs in the tested PLC control logic applications written in ST. On average, it was at least 83 times faster than AFL++, and in certain cases, for example, it was more than 23,000 times faster.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Disruption of Commercial Solar Inverter System by TLS Proxy Man-in-the-Middle Attack

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol that encrypts communication data, providing end-to-end communication encryption and authentication. Currently, TLS is widely adopted for securing communication between servers and end devices, including solar inverter systems. Therefore, users/operators can securely access the solar inverters through a web user interface (WebUI) application programmable interface (API) on a PC or server over TLS-enabled Wi-Fi or Ethernet. However, the security of the TLS-based network becomes compromised if it is breached by a TLS proxy man-in-the-middle (MITM) exploit. This report explores potential vulnerabilities in a commercial solar inverter system that leverages a TLS proxy MITM and discusses the impacts through assume-breached penetration testing. Furthermore, the paper explores recommended mitigation methods against the TLS proxy MITM exploit in solar inverters.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗