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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2008

Sea State and Weather Capability for NASA's Constellation Program

Marine weather and related parameters such as wind, ocean wave height and period, air temperature, sea surface temperature, visibility, and potential for icing are critical to the design, operation, and safety of crewed space vehicles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Constellation Program requires detailed assessment of marine weather related parameters that may be encountered during launch, abort, landing, and crew rescue operations for the crewed Axes/Orion space vehicles. This information is required for both space vehicle design and operational purposes. The space vehicles must be designed such that they cam withstand the environment they are likely to encounter. The crewed Axes/Orion space vehicles will launch from NASA's Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida for both International Space Station (ISS) missions with 51.6deg inclination orbits and lunar missions with approximately 280 inclination orbits. Since both missions will fly ever the Atlantic Ocean on ascent to orbit and will fly over the Pacific Ocean on descent from orbit, an unlikely but possible emergency abort could require parachuting the Orion capsule and crew into the ocean. This situation could potentially put the crew in an isolated and hazardous environment for severn hours while they await rescue. Therefore, abort, landing, and crew rescue elements of the Constellation Program must address weather related parameters on a global scale. This paper describes buoy measurement data, sea surface temperature satellite data, and sea state computer model data that are being utilized by the Constellation Program to address these design and operational issues.

Barbre, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Sea State and Weather Assessment Capability for NASA's Constellation Program

Marine weather and related parameters such as wind, ocean wave height and period, air temperature, sea surface temperature, visibility, and potential for icing are critical to the design, operation, and safety of crewed space vehicles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Constellation Program requires detailed assessment of marine weather related parameters that may be encountered during launch, abort, landing, and crew rescue operations for the crewed Ares/Orion space vehicles. This information is required for both space vehicle design and operational purposes. The space vehicles must be designed such that they can withstand the environment they are likely to encounter. The crewed Ares/Orion space vehicles will launch from NASA's Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida for both International Space Station (ISS) missions with 51.6 o inclination orbits and lunar missions with approximately 28 inclination orbits. Since both missions will fly over the Atlantic Ocean on ascent to orbit and will fly over the Pacific Ocean on descent from orbit, an unlikely but possible emergency abort could require parachuting the Orion capsule and crew into the ocean. This situation could potentially put the crew in an isolated and hazardous environment for several hours while they await rescue. Therefore, abort, landing, and crew rescue elements of the Constellation Program must address weather related parameters on a global scale. This paper describes buoy measurement data, sea surface temperature satellite data, and sea state computer model data that are being utilized by the Constellation Program to address these design and operational issues.

Barbre, B. J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Fission Systems for Mars Exploration

Fission systems are used extensively on earth, and 34 such systems have flown in space. The energy density of fission is over 10 million times that of chemical reactions, giving fission the potential to eliminate energy density constraints for many space missions. Potential safety and operational concerns with fission systems are well understood, and strategies exist for affordably developing such systems. By enabling a power-rich environment and highly efficient propulsion, fission systems could enable affordable, sustainable exploration of Mars.

Houts, Michael G.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Damage Tolerance Assessment Branch

The Damage Tolerance Assessment Branch evaluates the ability of a structure to perform reliably throughout its service life in the presence of a defect, crack, or other form of damage. Such assessment is fundamental to the use of structural materials and requires an integral blend of materials engineering, fracture testing and analysis, and nondestructive evaluation. The vision of the Branch is to increase the safety of manned space flight by improving the fracture control and the associated nondestructive evaluation processes through development and application of standards, guidelines, advanced test and analytical methods. The Branch also strives to assist and solve non-aerospace related NDE and damage tolerance problems, providing consultation, prototyping and inspection services.

Walker, James L.↗
NASA NTRS2009

The Application of a Residual Risk Evaluation Technique Used for Expendable Launch Vehicles

This presentation provides a Residual Risk Evaluation Technique (RRET) developed by Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Launch Services Division. This technique is one of many procedures used by S&MA at KSC to evaluate residual risks for each Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) mission. RRET is a straight forward technique that incorporates the proven methodology of risk management, fault tree analysis, and reliability prediction. RRET derives a system reliability impact indicator from the system baseline reliability and the system residual risk reliability values. The system reliability impact indicator provides a quantitative measure of the reduction in the system baseline reliability due to the identified residual risks associated with the designated ELV mission. An example is discussed to provide insight into the application of RRET.

Latimer, John A.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Cognitive Systems Engineering: The Next 30 Years

This presentation is part of panel discussion on Cognitive Systems Engineering. The purpose of this panel is to discuss the challenges and future directions of Cognitive Systems Engineering for the next 30 years. I intended to present the work we have been doing with the Aviation Safety program and Space Human Factors Engineering project on Work Domain Analysis and some areas of Research Focus. Specifically, I intend to focus on the shift on the need to understand and model attention in mixed-initiative systems, the need for methods which can generate results to be used in trade-off decisions, and the need to account for a range of human behavior in the design.

Feary, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2016

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana↗
NASA NTRS2017

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana L.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Fast, Safe, Propellant-Efficient Spacecraft Motion Planning Under Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill Dynamics

This paper presents a sampling-based motion planning algorithm for real-time and propellant-optimized autonomous spacecraft trajectory generation in near-circular orbits. Specifically, this paper leverages recent algorithmic advances in the field of robot motion planning to the problem of impulsively actuated, propellant- optimized rendezvous and proximity operations under the Clohessy-Wiltshire-Hill dynamics model. The approach calls upon a modified version of the FMT* algorithm to grow a set of feasible trajectories over a deterministic, low-dispersion set of sample points covering the free state space. To enforce safety, the tree is only grown over the subset of actively safe samples, from which there exists a feasible one-burn collision-avoidance maneuver that can safely circularize the spacecraft orbit along its coasting arc under a given set of potential thruster failures. Key features of the proposed algorithm include 1) theoretical guarantees in terms of trajectory safety and performance, 2) amenability to real-time implementation, and 3) generality, in the sense that a large class of constraints can be handled directly. As a result, the proposed algorithm offers the potential for widespread application, ranging from on-orbit satellite servicing to orbital debris removal and autonomous inspection missions.

spacecraft relative motio↗
NASA NTRS2019

International Space Station Spacecraft Charging Hazards: Hazard Identification, Management, and Control Methodologies, with Possible Applications to Human Spaceflight Beyond LEO

In this paper, we present an overview of how the International Space Station (ISS) safety engineering methodology directed to controlling extravehicular activity (EVA) crew electrical shock hazards, caused by ISS spacecraft charging, has evolved over the past 25+ years. Long-term measurements of ISS charging severity and frequency-of-occurrence, combined with detailed probabilistic analysis of EVA electric shock- circuit completion, led to a change in hazard control methodology. The requirement for two-fault tolerant EVA shock hazard control during all EVAs was replaced with a less operationally burdensome and risky EVA shock hazard detection and warning process. The applicability of event probability-based detection-and- warning processes to human spaceflight charging hazard control beyond low-earth orbit (LEO) is also considered.

Koontz, Steve↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Use of Preliminary PRA to Inform Decisions During Initial NASA Gateway Development

How do you use Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to support a program in development before designs are even known? Traditional PRAs require detailed design information and early in a program life cycle such information is not available. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) developed a preliminary PRA for the Gateway Program based upon NASA reference designs utilizing data and models from pervious PRA studies as surrogates for the Gateway systems. Gateway will be a lunar outpost that supports missions to the moon and includes several elements/modules developed by NASA and International Partners. NASA SMA began supporting Gateway in fall 2017 during initial formulation and continues to support the Gateway Program today. This paper will explore how the NASA SMA developed preliminary PRA was used to inform Gateway Program decisions with specific examples provided.

PRA↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Use of Preliminary PRA to Inform Decisions During Initial NASA Gateway Development

How do you use Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to support a program in development before designs are even known? Traditional PRAs require detailed design information and early in a program life cycle such information is not available. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) developed a preliminary PRA for the Gateway Program based upon NASA reference designs utilizing data and models from previous PRA studies as surrogates for the Gateway systems. Gateway will be a lunar outpost that supports missions to the moon and includes several elements/modules developed by NASA and International Partners. NASA SMA began supporting Gateway in fall 2017 during initial formulation and continues to support the Gateway Program today. This paper will explore how the NASA SMA developed preliminary PRA was used to inform Gateway Program decisions with specific examples provided.

PRA↗
NASA NTRS2024

Susceptibility of extremophiles to far-UVC light for bioburden reduction in spacecraft assembly facilities

The prevention and reduction of microbial species entering and leaving Earth's biosphere is a critical aspect of planetary protection research. While various decontamination methods exist and are currently utilized for planetary protection purposes, the use of far-UVC light (200–230 nm) as a means for microbial reduction remains underexplored. Unlike conventional germicidal ultraviolet at 254 nm, which can pose a health risk to humans even with small exposure doses, far-UVC light poses minimal health hazard making it a suitable candidate for implementation in occupied areas of spacecraft assembly facilities. This study investigates the efficacy of far-UVC 222-nm light to inactivate bacteria using microbial species which are relevant to planetary protection either in vegetative cell or spore form. All the tested vegetative cells demonstrated susceptibility to 222-nm exposure, although susceptibility varied among the tested species. Notably, Deinococcus radiodurans, a species highly tolerant to extreme environmental conditions, exhibited the most resistance to far-UVC exposure with a dose of 112 mJ/cm 2 required for a 1-log reduction in survival. While spore susceptibility was similar across the species tested, Bacillus pumilus spores were the most resistant of the tested spores when analyzed with a bi-exponential cell killing model (D 90 of 6.8 mJ/cm 2 ). Overall, these results demonstrate the efficacy of far-UVC light for reducing microbial bioburden to help ensure the success and safety of future space exploration missions.

Ultraviolet light↗
NASA NTRS1988

Post-Challenger evaluation of space shuttle risk assessment and management

As the shock of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident began to subside, NASA initiated a wide range of actions designed to ensure greater safety in various aspects of the Shuttle system and an improved focus on safety throughout the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Program. Certain specific features of the NASA safety process are examined: the Critical Items List (CIL) and the NASA review of the Shuttle primary and backup units whose failure might result in the loss of life, the Shuttle vehicle, or the mission; the failure modes and effects analyses (FMEA); and the hazard analysis and their review. The conception of modern risk management, including the essential element of objective risk assessment is described and it is contrasted with NASA's safety process in general terms. The discussion, findings, and recommendations regarding particular aspects of the NASA STS safety assurance process are reported. The 11 subsections each deal with a different aspect of the process. The main lessons learned by SCRHAAC in the course of the audit are summarized.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2024

Envisioning an Optimal Network of Space-Based Lasers for Orbital Debris Remediation

The rapid increase in resident space objects, including satellites and orbital debris, poses a significant threat to the safety and sustainability of space missions. This paper explores orbital debris remediation using a network of collaborative space-based lasers, leveraging laser ablation for momentum transfer on debris. A novel delta-v vector analysis framework quantifies the e↵ects of multiple simultaneous laser-to-debris (L2D) engagements by using vector composition of the imparted delta-v vectors. The paper introduces the Concurrent LocationScheduling Problem (CLSP), which optimizes the placement of laser platforms and the scheduling of L2D engagements to maximize debris remediation capacity. Due to the computational complexity of the CLSP, it is decomposed into two sequential subproblems: (1) optimal laser platform locations are determined using the Maximal Covering Location Problem, and (2) a novel integer linear programming-based approach schedules L2D engagements within the network configuration to maximize remediation capacity. Computational experiments are conducted to evaluate the proposed framework’s e↵ectiveness under various mission scenarios, demonstrating key network functions such as collaborative nudging, deorbiting, and just-in-time collision avoidance. A sensitivity analysis further examines how varying the number and distribution of laser platforms a↵ects debris remediation capacity, providing insights into optimizing the performance of space-based laser networks.

David O Williams Rogers↗
NASA NTRS2019

Reliability, Safety, and Performance for Two Aerospace Revolutions - UAS/ODM and Commercial Deep Space

Aerospace is in the midst of a renaissance, expanding on both the air and space side into major new commercial areas including unmanned air systems (UAS), on demand mobility (ODM), personal air vehicles (PAV), and commercial deep space. These new areas require, in the initial planning, consideration of new safety, reliability, and in some cases, enabling performance approaches for viability. For example, due to their huge numbers, if current accident rates prevail, UAS/ODM/PAV aircraft could crash at an unacceptable rate, causing life and property damage. Also, if humans in commercial space activities have serious health issues and/or there are unacceptable rocket viability issues/crash rates, these new, major markets (order of 1 trillion dollars per year) could be rapidly curtailed until agreeable and effective changes are instituted, producing additional expense, delay, and reduced revenue. This report addresses such safety and reliability issues and includes: performance enhancement possibilities such as an enabling Air Traffic Control System (ATC), crash proof vehicles, increased range for aero, space debris removal, and human health for space.

Crash Proof↗
NASA NTRS2010

Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission Four (HST SM4) EVA Challenges for Safe Execution of STS-125

In May of 2009, the world-renowned Hubble Space Telescope (HST) received a suite of new instruments and a refurbished bus to enable science for many years to come. The restoration was conducted on-orbit by four space-walkers on five carefully scripted Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA) days. Assuring the safety of the space-walkers and their crew-mates required careful attention to tool development, detailed procedures for every activity and many rehearsals with engineers and crew to ensure that everything worked together. Additionally, evolution of EVA requirements since the last servicing mission in 2002, and the broad scope of the mission demanded a much higher degree of safety participation in hardware design and risk acceptance than for previous servicing missions.

Dedalis, Robert P.↗