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At least 523 records · Page 29

Enhancing Safeguards Analysts’ Geospatial Usage

This report is the final summation of Sandia‘s Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project #151316, "Open Source Information Verification" (OSIV) which ran from FY11 through FY12. The aim of OSIV was to research, develop, and evaluate relevant geospatial analysis capabilities that address open-source information needs for international safeguards. OSIV generated a number of technical, programmatic, and cultural advances, detailed in this report. There were new methodological insights and research that resulted in ten publications and presentations; this report concludes with an abstract-annotated listing of all materials. OSIV generated a substantial prototype, GeoSafeguards, that not only achieved its intended goal of testing our hypothesis, but which also served as a vehicle for customer education and program development. OSIV, as intended, has catalyzed future work in this domain; by the end of two years, it has already brought considerable attention to this work both domestically and with our international partners. Finally, the OSIV project knit together previously disparate research staff and user expertise in a fashion that not only addressed our immediate research goals, which has created cross- understanding, in service of Sandia‘s national security responsibilities in safeguards and nonproliferation.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Technosocial Modeling for Determining the Status and Nature of a State’s Nuclear Activities

The International Atomic Energy Agency State Evaluation Process: The Role of Information Analysis in Reaching Safeguards Conclusions (Mathews et al. 2008), several examples of nonproliferation models using analytical software were developed that may assist the IAEA with collecting, visualizing, analyzing, and reporting information in support of the State Evaluation Process. This paper focuses on one of the examples a set of models developed in the Proactive Scenario Production, Evidence Collection, and Testing (ProSPECT) software that evaluates the status and nature of a state’s nuclear activities. The models use three distinct subject areas to perform this assessment: the presence of nuclear activities, the consistency of those nuclear activities with national nuclear energy goals, and the geopolitical context in which those nuclear activities are taking place. As a proof-of-concept for the models, a crude case study was performed. The study, which attempted to evaluate the nuclear activities taking place in Syria prior to September 2007, yielded illustrative, yet inconclusive, results. Due to the inconclusive nature of the case study results, changes that may improve the model’s efficiency and accuracy are proposed.

Gastelum, Zoe N.↗

The Use of Geomorphometrics for Geologic Site Characterization

The Problem: Developing an accurate geologic site characterization is difficult for denied-access sites. A good understanding of the geology (both in terms of the rock types and the fracture networks) is required for event evaluation (e.g., modulation of seismic signals from the source), planning of treaty monitoring sensors (fracture play a key role in the gas migration pathways), and evaluation of containment strategies. The Hypothesis: Quantitative analysis of terrain characteristics provides a way to relate the topography (easily obtained at high resolution) to surface geology. The Method: Integration of Terrain Complexity Index (TCI, derived from surface roughness) with drainage patterns and texture to produce a "predicted" geologic map. The viability of this method was evaluated by applying the algorithm to an area of know geology (Area 15 at the Nevada Test Site - NNSS). A 10-meter digital elevation model (DEM) was used for this evaluation. The Application: We have demonstrated the utility of this method by developing an improved surface geologic map for the North Korean Test Site using a 5-meter DEM. Why Now: Improved geologic characterization of potential nuclear test sites in a number of countries is needed for a number of Nonproliferation objectives. What's Needed Next: 1) A more robust and automated interpretation algorithm for the drainage analysis aspect; 2) improved data fusion of the TCI with drainage patterns; and 3) evaluation of the potential for fracture mapping in granite using a very high resolution DEM at the NNSS site (a 1-meter DEM in on order).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program 2012 Report

The Ecological Monitoring and Compliance Program (EMAC), funded through the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO, formerly Nevada Site Office), monitors the ecosystem of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and ensures compliance with laws and regulations pertaining to NNSS biota. This report summarizes the program’s activities conducted by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), during calendar year 2012. Program activities included (a) biological surveys at proposed construction sites, (b) desert tortoise compliance, (c) ecosystem monitoring, (d) sensitive plant species monitoring, (e) sensitive and protected/regulated animal monitoring, (f) habitat restoration monitoring, and (g) monitoring of the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex (NPTEC). During 2012, all applicable laws, regulations, and permit requirements were met, enabling EMAC to achieve its intended goals and objectives.

2012↗

Security by Design Handbook

This document is a draft Security-by-Design (SeBD) handbook produced to support the Work Plan of the Nuclear Security Summit to share best practices for nuclear security in new facility design. The Work Plan calls on States to “encourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities and provide technical assistance, upon request, to other States in doing so.” The materials for this document were generated primarily as part of a bilateral project to produce a SeBD handbook as a collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), which represented the US Department Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) under a Project Action Sheet PAS-PP04. Input was also derived based on tours of the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) Rokkasho Mixed Oxide Fuel fabrication facilities and associated project lessons-learned. For the purposes of the handbook, SeBD will be described as the system-level incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new nuclear power plant or nuclear facility resulting in a PPS design that minimizes the risk of malicious acts leading to nuclear material theft; nuclear material sabotage; and facility sabotage as much as possible through features inherent in (or intrinsic to) the design of the facility. A four-element strategy is presented to achieve a robust, durable, and responsive security system.

Snell, Mark Kamerer↗

Report on Project Action Sheet PP05 task 3 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEST)

This report documents the results of Task 3 of Project Action Sheet PP05 between the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology (MEST) for Support with Review of an ROK Risk Evaluation Process. This task was to have Sandia National Laboratories collaborate with the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) on several activities concerning how to determine the Probability of Neutralization, P N , and the Probability of System Effectiveness, P E , to include: providing descriptions on how combat simulations are used to determine P N and P E ; comparisons of the strengths and weaknesses of two neutralization models (the Neutralization.xls spreadsheet model versus the Brief Adversary Threat-Loss Estimator (BATLE) software); and demonstrating how computer simulations can be used to determine P N . Note that the computer simulation used for the demonstration was the Scenario Toolkit And Generation Environment (STAGE) simulation, which is a stand-alone synthetic tactical simulation sold by Presagis Canada Incorporated. The demonstration is provided in a separate Audio Video Interleave (.AVI) file.

Snell, Mark Kamerer↗

Challenges to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

The 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) was viewed as a success in largest part because it adopted a Final Document that included an unprecedented Action Plan that addressed all three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy – as well as a decision on the Middle East that outlined steps to be taken to convene a conference to begin to address calls for a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ). The 2015 NPT RevCon faces a number of challenges to attain a positive outcome that strengthens the NPT and advances its agenda. These challenges include unresolved issues of Treaty compliance and the role of NPT Parties and the review process in addressing them; the role in NPT diplomacy of the Non-Aligned Movement, now led by Iran, whose membership represents a majority of NPT parties; obstacles to convening the Middle East conference endorsed by the 2010 NPT RevCon; and the pressure the NPT Nuclear Weapon States will face to demonstrate further, tangible progress toward nuclear disarmament. This paper will address several challenges facing the 2015 RevCon, and will offer initial ideas for overcoming these barriers to success.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Reductions without Regret: Avoiding Wrong Turns, Roach Motels, and Box Canyons

This is the third of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. In this paper, we provide one example each of our judgments on what constitutes a box canyon, a roach motel, and a wrong turn: Wrong Turn: The Reliable Replacement Warhead: Roach Motel: SRAM T vs the B61: and A Possible Box Canyon: A Low-Yield Version of the W76 SLBM Warhead. Recognizing that new nuclear missions or weapons are not demanded by current circumstances ₋ a development path that yields future capabilities similar to those of today, which are adequate if not always ideal, and a broader national-security strategy that supports nonproliferation and arms control by reducing the role for, and numbers, of nuclear weapons ₋ we briefly consider alternate, less desirable futures, and their possible effect on the complex problem of regional deterrence. In this regard, we discuss the issues posed by, and possible responses to, three example regional deterrence challenges: in-country defensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary; reassurance of U.S. allies with limited strategic depth threatened by an emergent nuclear power; and extraterritorial, non-strategic offensive use of nuclear weapons by an adversary in support of limited military objectives against a U.S. ally.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Development of Database of SFL2a Signals for Neutron Generator Techniques Proposed for Integration

The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has sponsored a multi-laboratory, university, international partner collaboration to (1) quantify the plutonium (Pu) mass of a spent fuel assembly, (2) detect partial defects in assemblies, and (3) verify the initial enrichment (IE), burnup (BU) and cooling time (CT) of an assembly. A wide variety of nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques were researched to achieve these goals [Ref. 1 and 2]. A subset of 5 NDA techniques involving passive counting and/or a neutron generator were researched for integration potential with the focus on the first of the three goals, quantifying Pu mass.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Elpasolite scintillators.

This work was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nonproliferation Research to develop elpasolite materials, with an emphasis on high-atomic-number rare-earth elpasolites for gamma-ray spectrometer applications. Low-cost, high-performance gamma-ray spectrometers are needed for detection of nuclear proliferation. Cubic materials, such as some members of the elpasolite family (A2BLnX6; Ln-lanthanide and X-halogen), hold promise due to their high light output, proportionality, and potential for scale-up. Using both computational and experimental studies, a systematic investigation of the composition structure property relationships of these high-atomic-number elpasolite halides was performed. The results reduce the barrier to commercialization of large single crystals or transparent ceramics, and will facilitate economical scale-up of elpasolites for high-sensitivity gamma-ray spectroscopy.

Doty, F. Patrick↗

Semiconductor detectors with proximity signal readout

Semiconductor-based radiation detectors are routinely used for the detection, imaging, and spectroscopy of x-rays, gamma rays, and charged particles for applications in the areas of nuclear and medical physics, astrophysics, environmental remediation, nuclear nonproliferation, and homeland security. Detectors used for imaging and particle tracking are more complex in that they typically must also measure the location of the radiation interaction in addition to the deposited energy. In such detectors, the position measurement is often achieved by dividing or segmenting the electrodes into many strips or pixels and then reading out the signals from all of the electrode segments. Fine electrode segmentation is problematic for many of the standard semiconductor detector technologies. Clearly there is a need for a semiconductor-based radiation detector technology that can achieve fine position resolution while maintaining the excellent energy resolution intrinsic to semiconductor detectors, can be fabricated through simple processes, does not require complex electrical interconnections to the detector, and can reduce the number of required channels of readout electronics. Proximity electrode signal readout (PESR), in which the electrodes are not in physical contact with the detector surface, satisfies this need.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A primer for the statistical analysis of field test data obtained from screening instruments that detect contraband

A variety of federal agencies have continuing development programs whose mission is to advance the technology for monitoring the flow of commerce to detect the presence of contraband. The items of interest can be undeclared goods on which taxes or tariffs are due, or illegal substances such as recreational drugs, or banned weapons or weapon parts such as nuclear material, or nuclear weapons being moved in violation of a nonproliferation treaty. As these technologies continue in development they are assessed periodically in experimental testing either in the laboratory or in the field. The testing programs sometimes may resemble those employed by the pharmaceutical industry and their goal is to determine whether these technologies are efficacious and whether there are unanticipated negative consequences. The goal of the analysis is to determine the most probable value of P and estimate its uncertainty or the confidence that it falls within an acceptable range.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Verification of MCNP6.1 and MCNP6.1.1 for Criticality Safety Applications

MCNP6.1 is the new production version of MCNP [1] released in June 2013. An updated beta version, MCNP6.1.1, is targeted for release in summer 2014 to enable the use of several new features for homeland security and nonproliferation applications. The beta version does not include new capabilities for the criticality safety community, but does run significantly faster than the production version. From 2003 – 2013, the production version was MCNP5, with MCNP5-1.60 the final release in 2010.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Application of Active Seismic and Electrical Methods to Detect and Characterize Subsurface Effects of an Underground Explosion

During the period of underground nuclear testing in the U.S., now ended for over 20 years, the focus of work was to conduct the test and analyze the data as quickly as possible; there was little concern about application of technologies that could be used to detect and characterize the location and depth of the explosion. Thus, there is little experience with applying geophysical methods in places where an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) has taken place. On the other hand, application of geophysical methods to the detection of shallow artifacts and water table depth is commonly applied in the environmental remediation and site characterization realm of commercial geophysical surveys. For nuclear nonproliferation treaty applications which may incorporate both shallow and deep geophysical probing methods (such as on-site inspection (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty [CTBT]), there thus remains a need to better understand detection capabilities of the deeper targets: anomalies related to an explosion cavity or rubble zone that may be located several hundred meters below the ground surface. The purpose of this Coordinated Inspection Technologies (CIT) project was to gain experience in applying active seismic methods and electrical methods at a site in Nevada where an underground nuclear test (UNE) had been conducted in the past to get a better understanding of the capabilities of these methods for detection and characterization of deep subsurface effects of the explosion.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Next Gen Safeguards Professional Network (Final Report 2014)

This report summarizes the 2014 Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN) meeting held at Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories. The meeting comprised two days at each laboratory and included facility tours, technology demonstrations, presentations, and networking opportunities to strengthen expertise in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

New-Generation Thermal Neutron Detectors and Electronics for High-Count-Rate Applications

Neutron measurements are important in many nonproliferation and treaty verification applications. Helium-3 proportional counters and analog electronics are the backbone of neutron detection systems. Helium-3 tubes with a 1-in. diameter have been used with classical electronics for over three decades because of the almost ideal behavior of the 3 He tube as a neutron detector. However, some demanding applications of 3 He tubes (high gamma dose rate, high count rate) and the use of non-ideal detectors (such as 10 B-lined proportional counters) mean that the limitations of these conventional systems are being reached. For example, neutron multiplicity deadtime corrections can be large, and some applications have had trouble with multiple pulsing. Also, instrumentation designs for spent fuel applications often rely on large amounts of lead shielding to reduce the gamma dose at the detector location, making them heavy and expensive. This major challenge for a short dead time and operation in high gamma fields is difficult to address by simply changing the gas admixture and tweaking the shaper time constants. Those small gains are adequate for measurements of some lower-burn-up, low-enrichment-uranium spent fuel assemblies, but not for mixed oxide (MOX) fuel or advanced fast reactor fuel, where the neutron source term is greater.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Technology Assessment for Proof-of-Concept UF6 Cylinder Unique Identification Task 3.1.2 Report – Survey and Assessment of Technologies

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security’s (NA-24) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the nuclear industry have begun to develop approaches to identify and monitor uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders. The NA-24 interest in a global monitoring system for UF6 cylinders relates to its interest in supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in deterring and detecting diversion of UF6 (e.g., loss of cylinder in transit) and undeclared excess production at conversion and enrichment facilities. The industry interest in a global monitoring system for UF6 cylinders relates to the improvements in operational efficiencies that such a system would provide. This task is part of an effort to survey and assess technologies for a UF6 cylinder to identify candidate technologies for a proof-of-concept demonstration and evaluation for the Cylinder Identification System (CIS).

Cylinder↗

Analysis of the KUCA Type-A Experiments

The Kyoto University Critical Assembly (KUCA) experiments were launched in 2000 at the Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute (KURRI) with the main objective to establish measurement techniques of neutronic parameters in subcritical systems and to investigate the accuracy of the neutronic design of an Accelerator Driven Subcritical Reactor (ADSR). Due to the continuing interest in nonproliferation issues, new studies are being performed on these assemblies with the purpose to investigate the feasibility of converting the KUCA cores to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The KUCA facility consists of the solid-moderated and -reflected type-A and -B cores, and the water moderated and -reflected type-C core. The present document describes the analysis carried out at Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) on the KUCA type-A cores. In particular, calculated results of the KUCA ADSR benchmark assemblies and of the feasibility studies on the conversion of the KUCA dry cores from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to LEU are presented.

Aliberti, G.↗