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Nevada National Security Site Groundwater Program

From 1951 to 1992, the Unites States government conducted 828 underground nuclear tests at the Nevada National Security Site. About one-third of these tests occurred near, below or within the water table - the very top portion of the groundwater layer where rock and soil are completely saturated with water. As a result, some groundwater was contaminated. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) began exploring the effects of groundwater contamination in the 1970s. Though contamination from underground testing has never been detected on public land, the DOE was committed to developing an advanced, reliable monitoring network that ensures the long-term protection of the public. An intensive groundwater investigation program was launched in 1989.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluation of Building 23-702, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory H-8 Foil Handling Building, Mercury, Area 23, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) plans to demolish Building 23-702, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) H-8 Foil Handling Building (Nevada State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource No. B15278) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in Nye County, Nevada. The NNSA/NFO is implementing a long-term project to modernize the town of Mercury for future mission needs. The project is considered an undertaking subject to review under Title 54 of United States Code (USC) § 306108, commonly known as Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, Title 54 USC § 300101, et seq., and its implementing regulations, Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations (36 CFR) Part 800. In 2018, Desert Research Institute (DRI) completed an architectural survey of the town of Mercury. This effort resulted in the identification, recordation, and evaluation of the Mercury Historic District (MHD, SHPO Resource No. D230), including the identification of its contributing elements (Reno et al. 2018). The MHD was recommended eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP, National Register) under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criteria A and C, as defined in 36 CFR Part 60.4, as a significant concentration of buildings and structures with a direct and important association with Cold War-era nuclear testing from 1951 through 1992. As part of the modernization program for Mercury, the NNSA/NFO and the SHPO executed the 2018 Programmatic Agreement Between the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Modernization and Operational Maintenance of the Nevada National Security Site, at Mercury in Nye County, Nevada (Mercury PA). The Mercury PA includes streamlined Section 106 procedures for undertakings in the MHD based on contributing element categories. Building 23-702 is identified in Appendix C of the Mercury PA as a Category I contributing element, indicating that it might be individually eligible for the NRHP. It is a historic property for the purposes of Section 106 compliance and subject to the stipulations of the Mercury PA. Per Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA, when the Area of Potential Effect (APE) for an undertaking includes Category I elements, the NNSA/NFO must evaluate the Category I elements for individual NRHP eligibility under all of the SOI Significance Criteria prior to initiating any activity that may affect the elements. The purpose of this report is to evaluate Building 23-702 as a potential individually eligible historic property in fulfillment of Stipulation VI of the Mercury PA. The evaluation detailed herein concludes that Building 23-702 is not individually eligible for listing in the NRHP. Although it retains aspects of integrity and continues to contribute to the MHD, it is not individually significant under any of the SOI Significance Criteria.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DPF Test Conditions: FY 2016

A Neutron Diagnosed Subcritical Experiment (NDSE) is designed to quantitatively measure the reactivity of a subcritical (k eff <1.0) plutonium experiment and thereby improve our understanding of primary performance in the absence of underground nuclear testing. Successful implementation of this diagnostic requires a short, intense burst of neutrons be delivered to the fissile assembly at a precise time during a plutonium implosion. Monte Carlo particle transport simulations of representative subcritical experiments have been performed to establish the pulse shape, flux, and timing requirements for the NDSE neutron source. Additional requirements have also been established for detector sensitivity, acceptable background levels, and total diagnostic reliability.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Xenon International Overview

The Xenon International system is a fully automated unattended system designed to collect, separate, purify, quantify, and perform nuclear counting on radioxenon isotopes as well as transmit data using two-way communications (Figure 1). Xenon International is designed to stringent requirements that make it an high performance next-generation-system for use in nuclear explosion monitoring networks such as the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Application for a Permit to Operate a Class III Solid Waste Disposal Site at the Nevada Test Site Area 5 Asbestiform Low-Level Solid Waste Disposal Site

The NTS solid waste disposal sites must be permitted by the state of Nevada Solid Waste Management Authority (SWMA). The SWMA for the NTS is the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Federal Facilities (NDEP/BFF). The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) as land manager (owner), and National Security Technologies (NSTec), as operator, will store, collect, process, and dispose all solid waste by means that do not create a health hazard, a public nuisance, or cause impairment of the environment. NTS disposal sites will not be included in the Nye County Solid Waste Management Plan. The NTS is located approximately 105 kilometers (km) (65 miles [mi]) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1). The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is the federal lands management authority for the NTS, and NSTec is the Management and Operations contractor. Access on and off the NTS is tightly controlled, restricted, and guarded on a 24-hour basis. The NTS has signs posted along its entire perimeter. NSTec is the operator of all solid waste disposal sites on the NTS. The Area 5 RWMS is the location of the permitted facility for the Solid Waste Disposal Site (SWDS). The Area 5 RWMS is located near the eastern edge of the NTS (Figure 2), approximately 26 km (16 mi) north of Mercury, Nevada. The Area 5 RWMS is used for the disposal of low-level waste (LLW) and mixed low-level waste. Many areas surrounding the RWMS have been used in conducting nuclear tests. A Notice of Intent to operate the disposal site as a Class III site was submitted to the state of Nevada on January 28, 1994, and was acknowledged as being received in a letter to the NNSA/NSO on August 30, 1994. Interim approval to operate a Class III SWDS for regulated asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) was authorized on August 12, 1996 (in letter from Paul Liebendorfer to Runore Wycoff), with operations to be conducted in accordance with the ''Management Plan for the Disposal of Low-Level Waste with Regulated Asbestos Waste.'' A requirement of the authorization was that on or before October 9, 1999, a permit was required to be issued. Because of NDEP and NNSA/NSO review cycles, the final permit was issued on April 5, 2000, for the operation of the Area 5 Low-Level Waste Disposal Site, utilizing Pit 7 (P07) as the designated disposal cell. The original permit applied only to Pit 7, with a total design capacity of 5,831 cubic yards (yd{sup 3}) (157,437 cubic feet [ft{sup 3}]). NNSA/NSO is expanding the SWDS to include the adjacent Upper Cell of Pit 6 (P06), with an additional capacity of 28,037 yd{sup 3} (756,999 ft{sup 3}) (Figure 3). The proposed total capacity of ALLW in Pit 7 and P06 will be approximately 33,870 yd{sup 3} (0.9 million ft{sup 3}). The site will be used for the disposal of regulated ALLW, small quantities of low-level radioactive hydrocarbon-burdened (LLHB) media and debris, LLW, LLW that contains PCB Bulk Product Waste greater than 50 ppm that leaches at a rate of less than 10 micrograms of PCB per liter of water, and small quantities of LLHB demolition and construction waste (hereafter called permissible waste). Waste containing free liquids, or waste that is regulated as hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) or state-of-generation hazardous waste regulations, will not be accepted for disposal at the site. The only waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that will be accepted at the disposal site is regulated asbestos-containing materials (RACM). The term asbestiform is used throughout this document to describe this waste. Other TSCA waste (i.e., polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]) will not be accepted for disposal at the SWDS. The disposal site will be used as a depository of permissible waste generated both on site and off site. All generators designated by NNSA/NSO will be eligible to dispose regulated ALLW at the Asbestiform Low-Level Waste Disposal Site in accordance with the U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office (DOE/NV) 325, Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC, current revision). Approval will be given by NNSA/NSO to generators that have successfully demonstrated through process knowledge (PK) and/or sampling and analysis that the waste is low-level, contains asbestiform material, and does not contain prohibited waste materials. Each waste stream will be approved through the Radioactive Waste Acceptance Program (RWAP), which ensures that the waste meets acceptance requirements outlined in the NTS Class III Permit and the NTSWAC.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Underground Test Area Annual Sampling Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Revision 1, Calendar Year 2018)

The Sampling Plans (Rev. 0 and Rev. 1) ensure routine sampling that is critical to understanding contaminant transport near and downgradient of the underground nuclear testing areas, and is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Activity Quality Assurance Plan and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. This report presents the analytical data for the 2018 calendar year (CY) (January 1 through December 31, 2018) to ensure that the Sampling Plans’ objectives are achieved. Appendix D presents data from samples collected in 2016 and 2017. These results were not reported in previous reports because they were not available from the specialized laboratories at the time of the publication of the reports.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Phase II testing of Xenon International on Mount Schauinsland, Germany

Station RN33 on Mount Schauinsland near Freiburg, Germany, is part of the International Monitoring System monitoring radioxenon in air ( 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe) for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Here, we present data from phase II testing of a new system, Xenon International at RN33, July 14th, 2021 to Jan 22nd, 2022, together with SPALAX data from the same time period. Radioxenon could be detected in 473 of 719 samples, among them many multiple isotope detections. Activity concentrations of spiked and selected environmental samples were verified by laboratory reanalysis. Finally, the sensitivity of Xenon International for radioxenons is up to one order of magnitude better for the metastable isotopes than that of the SPALAX, with a shorter sampling duration of 6 h.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A stilbene - CdZnTe based radioxenon detection system

Atmospheric monitoring of radioxenon is one of the most widely used methods by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to detect elevated levels of 131m Xe, 133/133m Xe, and 135 Xe. The ratios of these radionuclides help discriminate between peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear weapon explosions. Radioxenon detection systems often use plastic scintillators in the capacity of an electron detector and a gas cell, plastic gas cells are responsible for introducing high memory effect in these systems. This work presents the design of a new detection system for radioxenon monitoring that utilizes silicon photomultipliers, a stilbene gas cell, and a CdZnTe detector. This detector was evaluated using xenon radioisotope samples produced in the TRIGA reactor at Oregon State University. Here, a 48-h background was collected and calculations of the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC) were carried out using the Region of Interest (ROI) approach. An MDC of less than 1 mBq/m 3 was obtained for 131m Xe, 133 Xe, and 133m Xe in accordance with the sensitivity limits set by the CTBTO and performs respectably when compared to state-of-the-art radioxenon detection systems. Using 131m Xe, this study indicates that the stilbene gas cell exhibits a memory effect of 0.045 ±0.017%, this is almost a two-order magnitude improvement compared to plastic scintillators. The main purpose of this work is to explore the use of new stilbene detection media for radioxenon application and addressing the problem of memory effect.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Comparison of Radionuclide Ratios in Atmospheric Nuclear Explosions and Nuclear Releases from Chernobyl and Fukushima seen in Gamma Ray Spectormetry

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has remote radionuclide monitoring followed by an On Site Inspection (OSI) to clarify the nature of a suspect event. An important aspect of radionuclide measurements on site is the discrimination of other potential sources of similar radionuclides such as reactor accidents or medical isotope production. The Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear reactor disasters offer two different reactor source term environmental inputs that can be compared against historical measurements of nuclear explosions. The comparison of whole-sample gamma spectrometry measurements from these three events and the analysis of similarities and differences are presented. This analysis is a step toward confirming what is needed for measurements during an OSI under the auspices of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

IDC Re-Engineering Phase 2 System Specification Document Version 1.5

This document contains the system specifications derived to satisfy the system requirements found in the IDC System Requirements Document for the IDC Re-Engineering Phase 2 project. This System Specification Document (SSD) defines waveform data processing requirements for the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The routine processing includes characterization of events with the objective of screening out events considered to be consistent with natural phenomena or non-nuclear, man-made phenomena. This document does not address requirements concerning acquisition, processing and analysis of radionuclide data but does include requirements for the dissemination of radionuclide data and products.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance Plan for the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management (LM) prepared this Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance Plan (LTSMP) for the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site (the Gnome site). The Gnome site is approximately 25 miles east of Carlsbad in Eddy County, New Mexico (Figure 1). The site was the location of a 3-kiloton-yield underground nuclear test and radioisotope groundwater tracer test. The tests resulted in residual contamination and post-detonation features that require long-term oversight. Long-term responsibility for the site was transferred from the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office to LM on October 1, 2006. Responsibilities include surveillance, monitoring, and maintenance of institutional controls (ICs) as part of the long-term stewardship of the site. Long-term stewardship is designed to ensure protection of human health and the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Closure Report)

This CR describes the selected corrective action to be implemented during closure to protect human health and the environment from groundwater impacted by the underground nuclear testing within the YF/CM CAU. The purpose of the CR is to describe the selected corrective action. Summarize previous activities and conclusions that support CAU closure. Present final contaminant boundaries, use restriction (UR) boundaries, and regulatory boundaries. Provide an implementation plan for long-term monitoring and well network maintenance and identify the approaches and policies for institutional controls.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Discussion of Procedures and Equipment for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection Environmental Sampling and Analysis

This paper is intended to serve as a scientific basis to start discussions of the available environmental sampling techniques and equipment that have been used in the past that could be considered for use within the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspections (OSI). This work contains information on the techniques, equipment, costs, and some operational procedures associated with environmental sampling that have actually been used in the past by the United States for the detection of nuclear explosions. This paper also includes a discussion of issues, recommendations, and questions needing further study within the context of the sampling and analysis of aquatic materials, atmospheric gases, atmospheric particulates, vegetation, sediments and soils, fauna, and drill-back materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ViBRANT Applied as a Closed Loop Flux and Thermal Surrogate

Surrogate testing platforms provide a means to develop a target aspect of a larger system. Some systems target single aspects while others are more wholistic. ViBRANT (Visual Benign Reactor as Analog for Nuclear Testing) aims to be a wholistic system by representing the primary reactor behaviors through an accessible LED driven reactor core, photodiodes, thermocouples, and high-performance software interfaces being developed to the standards required for actual microreactor deployment such as MARVEL. With the ability to drive control drums enabled with full reactor capability (e.g. speed/angle/torque capability/limits for operation and clutch/spring scram capability), drive ViBRANT’s high fidelity 36 pin hexagon core to represent phenomena via LEDs, and capture the analog response of distributed photodiodes/thermocouples, this paper will show the system’s ability to operate in a closed-loop fashion and do well at matching reactor power/temperature distribution in an accessible reactor surrogate environment.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Livermore Lab's giant laser system will bring star power to Earth

In the 50 years since the laser was first demonstrated in Malibu, California, on May 16, 1960, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has been a world leader in laser technology and the home for many of the world's most advanced laser systems. That tradition continues today at LLNL's National Ignition Facility (NIF), the world's most energetic laser system. NIF's completion in March 2009 not only marked the dawn of a new era of scientific research - it could also prove to be the next big step in the quest for a sustainable, carbon-free energy source for the world. NIF consists of 192 laser beams that will focus up to 1.8 million joules of energy on a bb-sized target filled with isotopes of hydrogen - forcing the hydrogen nuclei to collide and fuse in a controlled thermonuclear reaction similar to what happens in the sun and the stars. More energy will be produced by this 'ignition' reaction than the amount of laser energy required to start it. This is the long-sought goal of 'energy gain' that has eluded fusion researchers for more than half a century. Success will be a scientific breakthrough - the first demonstration of fusion ignition in a laboratory setting, duplicating on Earth the processes that power the stars. This impending success could not be achieved without the valuable partnerships forged with other national and international laboratories, private industry and universities. One of the most crucial has been between LLNL and the community in which it resides. Over 155 businesses in the local Tri-Valley area have contributed to the NIF, from industrial technology and engineering firms to tool manufacturing, electrical, storage and supply companies. More than $2.3B has been spent locally between contracts with nearby merchants and employee salaries. The Tri-Valley community has enabled the Laboratory to complete a complex and far-reaching project that will have national and global impact in the future. The first experiments were conducted on NIF last summer and fall, successfully delivering a world-record level of ultraviolet laser energy - more than 1.2 million joules - to a target. The experiments also demonstrated the target drive and target capsule conditions required to achieve fusion ignition. When ignition experiments begin later this year, NIF's lasers will create temperatures and pressures in the hydrogen target that exist only in the cores of stars and giant planets and inside thermonuclear weapons. As a key component of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Stockpile Stewardship Program, NIF will offer the means for sustaining a safe, secure and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing. NIF is uniquely capable of providing the experimental data needed to develop and validate computer models that will enable scientists to assess the continuing viability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. Along with this vital national security mission, success at NIF also offers the possibility of groundbreaking scientific discoveries in a wide variety of disciplines ranging from hydrodynamics to astrophysics. As a unique facility in the world that can create the conditions that exist in supernovas and in the cores of giant planets, NIF will help unlock the secrets of the cosmos and inspire the next generation of scientists. It is NIF's third mission, energy security that has been generating the most excitement in the news media and the international scientific community. The reasons are obvious: global energy demand, driven by population growth and the aspirations of the developing world, already is straining the planet's existing energy resources. Global need for electricity is expected to double from its current level of about two trillion watts (TW) to four TW by 2030 and could reach eight to ten TW by the end of the century. As many as 10,000 new billion-watt power plants will have to be built to keep up with this demand. Meeting this pressing need will require a sustainable carbon-free energy technology that can supply base load electricity to the world. Successful ignition experiments at NIF can be a springboard for a revolutionary, long-term solution to our energy security - laser inertial fusion energy, or LIFE. An advanced energy concept now under development at LLNL, LIFE will build on the physics and technology developed for NIF to help meet future worldwide energy needs in a safe, sustainable manner without carbon dioxide emissions. LIFE power plants would be inherently safe, use the limitless supply of hydrogen fuel found in the world's oceans, and be capable of supplying base load electricity to the world. By harnessing the universe's quintessential power source, fusion energy, the United States can continue its leadership in game-changing technologies that drive economic competitiveness. Successful demonstration of ignition and energy gain at NIF will be a transforming event that will solidify fusion's potential as an important energy source.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Signal Processing of Multiplexed Optical PWM Signals for Sensor Arrays in Nuclear Environments

Safe and effective generation of terrestrial nuclear power greatly benefits from the actionable data provided by the array of sensors located throughout a plant to provide a holistic online indication of reactor operation. This array includes sensors for monitoring coolant flow and pressure, temperature and heat transfer, radiation levels, structure health monitoring, and other critical parameters for reactor operation. While sensors capable of measuring these parameters have been developed, the electronics used in the pre-amplification and analog-to-digital conversion of the small signals they produce are extremely sensitive and susceptible to damage by high-temperatures and radiation environments nuclear reactors encounter while generating power. The small signals from sensors in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are transmitted over long cable runs which introduce dispersion artifacts into the signals of interest as well as electromagnetic interference (EMI) from lighting fixtures, pumps, mains electricity, and other equipment. To overcome these challenges, a front-end digitization (FREND) platform has been developed to use radiation-tolerant electronics to multiplex, amplify, and optically encode signals from an array of sensors for transmission over an optical fiber to mitigate dispersion and EMI artifacts from long runs of electrical cabling. To recover the optically transmitted data, a signal processing scheme based on 1-dimensional template matching to an indexing channel is described herein and demonstrated to have an effective bit-depth of 9.2 bits (1%). This scheme has been validated in proof-of-concept, non-nuclear testing and preliminary experimental results show good agreement between the measured optical output and and sensor input signals. The FREND system represents a low-loss data link between sensors in nuclear environments and data acquisition hardware which is aimed at improving the signal-to-noise ratio of the data acquired from these sensors to provide better information to operators and researchers.

Sweeney, Dan↗

A groundwater flow and transport model of long-term radionuclide migration in central Frenchman flat, Nevada test site

A set of groundwater flow and transport models were created for the Central Testing Area of Frenchman Flat at the former Nevada Test Site to investigate the long-term consequences of a radionuclide migration experiment that was done between 1975 and 1990. In this experiment, radionuclide migration was induced from a small nuclear test conducted below the water table by pumping a well 91 m away. After radionuclides arrived at the pumping well, the contaminated effluent was discharged to an unlined ditch leading to a playa where it was expected to evaporate. However, recent data from a well near the ditch and results from detailed models of the experiment by LLNL personnel have convincingly demonstrated that radionuclides from the ditch eventually reached the water table some 220 m below land surface. The models presented in this paper combine aspects of these detailed models with concepts of basin-scale flow to estimate the likely extent of contamination resulting from this experiment over the next 1,000 years. The models demonstrate that because regulatory limits for radionuclide concentrations are exceeded only by tritium and the half-life of tritium is relatively short (12.3 years), the maximum extent of contaminated groundwater has or will soon be reached, after which time the contaminated plume will begin to shrink because of radioactive decay. The models also show that past and future groundwater pumping from water supply wells within Frenchman Flat basin will have negligible effects on the extent of the plume.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗