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LONG-TERM STEWARDSHIP AT DOE HANFORD SITE - 12575

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site is located in southeast Washington and consists of 1,518 square kilometers (586 square miles) of land. Established in 1943 as part of the Manhattan Project, Hanford workers produced plutonium for our nation's nuclear defense program until the mid 1980's. Since then, the site has been in cleanup mode that is being accomplished in phases. As we achieve remedial objectives and complete active cleanup, DOE will manage Hanford land under the Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program until completion of cleanup and the site becomes ready for transfer to the post cleanup landlord - currently planned for DOE's Office of Legacy Management (LM). We define Hanford's LTS Program in the ''Hanford Long-Term Stewardship Program Plan,'' (DOE/RL-201 0-35)[1], which describes the scope including the relationship between the cleanup projects and the LTS Program. DOE designed the LTS Program to manage and provide surveillance and maintenance (S&M) of institutional controls and associated monitoring of closed waste sites to ensure the protection of human health and the environment. DOE's Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) and Hanford cleanup and operations contractors collaboratively developed this program over several years. The program's scope also includes 15 key activities that are identified in the DOE Program Plan (DOE/RL-2010-35). The LTS Program will transition 14 land segments through 2016. The combined land mass is approximately 570 square kilometers (220 square miles), with over 1,300 active and inactive waste sites and 3,363 wells. Land segments vary from buffer zone property with no known contamination to cocooned reactor buildings, demolished support facilities, and remediated cribs and trenches. DOE-RL will transition land management responsibilities from cleanup contractors to the Mission Support Contract (MSC), who will then administer the LTS Program for DOE-RL. This process requires an environment of cooperation between the contractors and DOE-RL. Information Management (IM) is a key part of the LTS program. The IM Program identifies, locates, stores, protects and makes accessible Hanford LTS records and data to support the transfer of property ultimately to LM. As such, DOE-RL manages the Hanford LTS Program in a manner consistent with LM's goals, policies, and procedures.

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Opportunities and challenges for structural health monitoring of radioactive waste systems and structures

Radioactive waste systems and structures (RWSS) are safety-critical facilities in need of monitoring over prolonged periods of time. Structural health monitoring (SHM) is an emerging technology that aims at monitoring the state of a structure through the use of networks of permanently mounted sensors. SHM technologies have been developed primarily within the aerospace and civil engineering communities. This paper addresses the issue of transitioning the SHM concept to the monitoring of RWSS and evaluates the opportunities and challenges associated with this process. Guided wave SHM technologies utilizing structurally-mounted piezoelectric wafer active sensors (PWAS) have a wide range of applications based on both propagating-wave and standing-wave methodologies. Hence, opportunities exist for transitioning these SHM technologies into RWSS monitoring. However, there exist certain special operational conditions specific to RWSS such as: radiation field, caustic environments, marine environments, and chemical, mechanical and thermal stressors. In order to address the high discharge of used nuclear fuel (UNF) and the limited space in the storage pools the U.S. the Department of Energy (DOE) has adopted a 'Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste' (January 2013). This strategy endorses the key principles that underpin the Blue Ribbon Commission's on America's Nuclear Future recommendations to develop a sustainable program for deploying an integrated system capable of transporting, storing, and disposing of UNF and high-level radioactive waste from civilian nuclear power generation, defense, national security, and other activities. This will require research to develop monitoring, diagnosis, and prognosis tools that can aid to establish a strong technical basis for extended storage and transportation of UNF. Monitoring of such structures is critical for assuring the safety and security of the nation's spent nuclear fuel until a national policy for closure of the nuclear fuel cycle is defined and implemented. In addition, such tools can provide invaluable and timely information for verification of the predicted mechanical performance of RWSS (e.g. concrete or steel barriers) during off-normal occurrence and accident events such as the tsunami and earthquake event that affected Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The ability to verify the conditions, health, and degradation behavior of RWSS over time by applying nondestructive testing (NDT) as well as development of nondestructive evaluation (NDE) tools for new degradation processes will become challenging. The paper discusses some of the challenges associated to verification and diagnosis for RWSS and identifies SHM technologies which are more readily available for transitioning into RWSS applications. Fundamental research objectives that should be considered for the transition of SHM technologies (e.g., radiation hardened piezoelectric materials) for RWSS applications are discussed. The paper ends with summary, conclusions, and suggestions for further work. (authors)

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International Low Level Waste Disposal Practices and Facilities

The safe management of nuclear waste arising from nuclear activities is an issue of great importance for the protection of human health and the environment now and in the future. The primary goal of this report is to identify the current situation and practices being utilized across the globe to manage and store low and intermediate level radioactive waste. The countries included in this report were selected based on their nuclear power capabilities and involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle. This report highlights the nuclear waste management laws and regulations, current disposal practices, and future plans for facilities of the selected international nuclear countries. For each country presented, background information and the history of nuclear facilities are also summarized to frame the country's nuclear activities and set stage for the management practices employed. The production of nuclear energy, including all the steps in the nuclear fuel cycle, results in the generation of radioactive waste. However, radioactive waste may also be generated by other activities such as medical, laboratory, research institution, or industrial use of radioisotopes and sealed radiation sources, defense and weapons programs, and processing (mostly large scale) of mineral ores or other materials containing naturally occurring radionuclides. Radioactive waste also arises from intervention activities, which are necessary after accidents or to remediate areas affected by past practices. The radioactive waste generated arises in a wide range of physical, chemical, and radiological forms. It may be solid, liquid, or gaseous. Levels of activity concentration can vary from extremely high, such as levels associated with spent fuel and residues from fuel reprocessing, to very low, for instance those associated with radioisotope applications. Equally broad is the spectrum of half-lives of the radionuclides contained in the waste. These differences result in an equally wide variety of options for the management of radioactive waste. There is a variety of alternatives for processing waste and for short term or long term storage prior to disposal. Likewise, there are various alternatives currently in use across the globe for the safe disposal of waste, ranging from near surface to geological disposal, depending on the specific classification of the waste. At present, there appears to be a clear and unequivocal understanding that each country is ethically and legally responsible for its own wastes, in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Therefore the default position is that all nuclear wastes will be disposed of in each of the 40 or so countries concerned with nuclear power generation or part of the fuel cycle. To illustrate the global distribution of radioactive waste now and in the near future, Table 1 provides the regional breakdown, based on the UN classification of the world in regions illustrated in Figure 1, of nuclear power reactors in operation and under construction worldwide. In summary, 31 countries operate 433 plants, with a total capacity of more than 365 gigawatts of electrical energy (GW[e]). A further 65 units, totaling nearly 63 GW(e), are under construction across 15 of these nations. In addition, 65 countries are expressing new interest in, considering, or actively planning for nuclear power to help address growing energy demands to fuel economic growth and development, climate change concerns, and volatile fossil fuel prices. Of these 65 new countries, 21 are in Asia and the Pacific region, 21 are from the Africa region, 12 are in Europe (mostly Eastern Europe), and 11 in Central and South America. However, 31 of these 65 are not currently planning to build reactors, and 17 of those 31 have grids of less than 5 GW, which is said to be too small to accommodate most of the reactor designs available. For the remaining 34 countries actively planning reactors, as of September 2010: 14 indicate a strong intention to precede with introduction of nuclear power; 7 are preparing but haven't made a final decision, 10 have made a decision and are preparing infrastructure, 2 have ordered a new nuclear power plant, and 1 has a plant under construction. In all countries interested in pursuing nuclear power, it is necessary for the governments to create an environment for investment and advancement of nuclear power, including development of a professional and independent regulatory framework and regime, knowledge and refinement of skills in nuclear safety and control, definition of policies on nuclear waste management and decommissioning, and participation in international non-proliferation measures. Specifically related to radioactive waste management, nuclear facilities and industries that utilize radioactive material work to well-established safety standards for the management of their waste.

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Stakeholder Transportation Scorecard: Reviewing Nevada's Recommendations for Enhancing the Safety and Security of Nuclear Waste Shipments - 13518

As a primary stakeholder in the Yucca Mountain program, the state of Nevada has spent three decades examining and considering national policy regarding spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transportation. During this time, Nevada has identified 10 issues it believes are critical to ensuring the safety and security of any spent nuclear fuel transportation program, and achieving public acceptance. These recommendations are: 1) Ship the oldest fuel first; 2) Ship mostly by rail; 3) Use dual-purpose (transportable storage) casks; 4) Use dedicated trains for rail shipments; 5) Implement a full-scale cask testing program; 6) Utilize a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process for the selection of a new rail spur to the proposed repository site; 7) Implement the Western Interstate Energy Board (WIEB) 'straw man' process for route selection; 8) Implement Section 180C assistance to affected States, Tribes and localities through rulemaking; 9) Adopt safety and security regulatory enhancements proposed states; and 10) Address stakeholder concerns about terrorism and sabotage. This paper describes Nevada's proposals in detail and examines their current status. The paper describes the various forums and methods by which Nevada has presented its arguments and sought to influence national policy. As of 2012, most of Nevada's recommendations have been adopted in one form or another, although not yet implemented. If implemented in a future nuclear waste program, the State of Nevada believes these recommendations would form the basis for a successful national transportation plan for shipments to a geologic repository and/or centralized interim storage facility. (authors)

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Approaches for Communicating Technical Information - 16012

Projects within the nuclear industry are generally complex and associated with high hazards. To achieve success there is often a necessity to apply innovation or adopt longer term strategies and solutions. Because of these long timescales and the fact that some approaches revolve around allowing natural radioactive decay to take place prior to visible action, the industry is sometimes perceived to be technically unable to make progress with its environmental and waste management obligations. Work within the industry additionally takes on a high profile and invariably creates greater levels of anxiety and mistrust in the eyes of stakeholders than comparable projects from non-nuclear related industries. Many aspects of the industry are still seen as secretive, environmentally detrimental and 'risky' and all components of the nuclear life-cycle are therefore open to external scrutiny. Although communication and engagement has increased greatly over the years, especially in developed countries, there is still room for improvement in this field. Such improvement might relate to the frequency and level of engagement, the subject matter or the actual process itself. Communication with stakeholders is required throughout the various phases of the nuclear lifecycle whether the activity relates to mining/milling of uranium, fuel production, operational plant activities, decommissioning, remediation or waste management. The concerns and aspirations of stakeholders during these different activities will vary but need to be adequately addressed. Some organisations now have a basic engagement program and convince themselves that they are carrying out true engagement. But just ticking a box to say that an engagement program is in place does not provide evidence of its appropriateness or success as on many occasions' organisations might still not understand how to adequately engage and communicate technical information. It is not always the information we choose to communicate but that which might be withheld that is often perceived to be most relevant to the stakeholder community. Communicating technical information isn't as straightforward as it sounds, but still has to be undertaken, otherwise trust, understanding and acceptance of chosen options will not be achieved. I utilise what I call the 'ten principles of engagement' which I believe can help when communicating technical Information in relation to nuclear and radiological matters. These are; 1. Develop Trust. 2. Educating people and providing information in a transparent manner. 3. Develop an engagement process that is truly a two way process. 4. Openly discuss risk perception and risk communication. 5. Never try to trivialise risk. 6. Where possible, simplify the language you use. 7. Put background and naturally occurring radioactivity into context. 8. Explain how radioactive materials are often used in everyday life. 9. Try to demonstrate that you too are a member of the public. 10.Walk the talk - Try to undertake what you wish others to undertake. Further research is being undertaken to determine if Mental Models might assist with the communication of nuclear and radiological information. A mental model is an explanation of someone's thought process about how something works in the real world. The mental model approach aims to investigate the judgment and decision-making processes of both expert and lay groups, thus allowing a comparison and visualisation of the different views to be made. It is undoubtedly worthwhile keeping a watching brief on the outcome of such research as we strive to improve our communication with the general public. The aim of this paper is to highlight some simple principles and approaches that can assist with the communication of technical information. (authors)

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Management of Metals from Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities - 18411

The EDF group companies within the Cyclife platform have for decades performed treatment and recycling of metals. With different approaches but all considered international Good Practice, as valuable materials are recovered for safe recycling and volumes in the repositories for radioactive waste are saved. For an efficient decommissioning project, a well-defined waste management process is one of the critical paths, not least when it comes to routes for clearance and recycling of materials. It is easy to underestimate the complexity and bottlenecks caused by shortage of logistic space. In order to mitigate these risks, activities such as strengthening categorization, quantification and adopting different routes based on the material properties should be implemented. By categorization of the of waste and materials considered/classified as contaminated or potentially contaminated it is obvious that the management of the metals is a key parameter in nuclear decommissioning. Analyses performed by the EDF companies shows that a majority of the materials, classified as contaminated, from a BWR/PWR plant are metals. Experience gives that a high percentage of these metals from decommissioning can be subject to recycling either directly upon completion of the clearance process or after certain treatment. Non-technical key parameters like the regulatory requirements on applying the waste hierarchy, the impact on repository programs as well as, not at least, the regulatory and public acceptance of recycling of materials from the nuclear industry are, together with costs essential factors when forming the routing of metals and other waste materials from a decommissioning project. Today the EDF group companies are positioned to provide a wide range of services for management of the contaminated metals from decommissioning projects, spanning from industrial management of metals which directly will be subject general clearance after verification measurements up to decontamination and melting of selected reactor internals for recycling to public domain or within the nuclear industry. In this paper the typical waste material composition for BWR and PWR plants, the different ways to treat/manage the radioactive and potentially radioactive metals including a comparison of the different approach commonly used in a technical, logistical and economical perspectives. A few success stories will be resented as well as lessons learned. (authors)

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Relationship between recycling rate and air pollution: Waste management in the state of Massachusetts

Highlights: • This study examines the relationship between recycling rate of solid waste and air pollution. • Fixed effects Stochastic Frontier Analysis model with panel data are employed. • The case study is a waste municipality survey in the state of Massachusetts during 2009–2012. • The findings support that a negative relationship between air pollution and recycling. - Abstract: This study examines the relationship between recycling rate of solid waste and air pollution using data from a waste municipality survey in the state of Massachusetts during the period 2009–2012. Two econometric approaches are applied. The first approach is a fixed effects model, while the second is a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) with fixed effects model. The advantage of the first approach is the ability of controlling for stable time invariant characteristics of the municipalities, thereby eliminating potentially large sources of bias. The second approach is applied in order to estimate the technical efficiency and rank of each municipality accordingly. The regressions control for various demographic, economic and recycling services, such as income per capita, population density, unemployment, trash services, Pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) program and meteorological data. The findings support that a negative relationship between particulate particles in the air 2.5 μm or less in size (PM{sub 2.5}) and recycling rate is presented. In addition, the pollution is increased with increases on income per capita up to $23,000–$26,000, while after this point income contributes positively on air quality. Finally, based on the efficiency derived by the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) model, the municipalities which provide both drop off and curbside services for trash, food and yard waste and the PAYT program present better performance regarding the air quality.

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Hanford Waste Transfer Planning and Control - 13465

Hanford tank waste cleanup requires efficient use of double-shell tank space to support single-shell tank retrievals and future waste feed delivery to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Every waste transfer, including single-shell tank retrievals and evaporator campaign, is evaluated via the Waste Transfer Compatibility Program for compliance with safety basis, environmental compliance, operational limits and controls to enhance future waste treatment. Mixed radioactive and hazardous wastes are stored at the Hanford Site on an interim basis until they can be treated, as necessary, for final disposal. Implementation of the Tank Farms Waste Transfer Compatibility Program helps to ensure continued safe and prudent storage and handling of these wastes within the Tank Farms Facility. The Tank Farms Waste Transfer Compatibility Program is a Safety Management Program that is a formal process for evaluating waste transfers and chemical additions through the preparation of documented Waste Compatibility Assessments (WCA). The primary purpose of the program is to ensure that sufficient controls are in place to prevent the formation of incompatible mixtures as the result of waste transfer operations. The program defines a consistent means of evaluating compliance with certain administrative controls, safety, operational, regulatory, and programmatic criteria and specifies considerations necessary to assess waste transfers and chemical additions. Current operations are most limited by staying within compliance with the safety basis controls to prevent flammable gas build up in the tank headspace. The depth of solids, the depth of supernatant, the total waste depth and the waste temperature are monitored and controlled to stay within the Compatibility Program rules. Also, transfer planning includes a preliminary evaluation against the Compatibility Program to assure that operating plans will comply with the Waste Transfer Compatibility Program. (authors)

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Considerations and Lessons Learned from the Use of Gamma Spectroscopy Systems at FUSRAP Project Sites - 17459

This paper will discuss the application of gamma spectroscopy systems for analysis of environmental media samples for parents and daughter progeny of the Natural Uranium and Thorium Decay Series radionuclides. The concentrations and relative ratios of naturally occurring isotopes are used to confirm the presence of FUSRAP-related wastes and for understanding the associated potential dose and health risks. Focus will be given to lessons learned from the set-up and operation of onsite gamma spectroscopy laboratories used to provide stakeholders with defensible and timely results to support FUSRAP site investigations and remediation including adaptive survey design implementation, physical remediation and waste transport, and confirmatory final status survey activities. This paper focuses on the potential impacts to gamma spectroscopy measurement accuracy from the following: - Bias caused by sample matrix effects as well as use of different library reference values between performance evaluation study providers and testing laboratories; - Use of calibration sources with limited energy ranges, and; - Selection of available alternative isotopic decay reference data for the input of line energies and their intensities. These lessons learned include discussing how inter-laboratory measurement differences from blind performance evaluation samples are affected by the manufacturer's measurement method, including equilibrium assumptions; the isotope decay information source library used by the study provider and participating laboratories; and calibration source geometry/density variances from actual sample conditions. Any of these factors can significantly impact the accuracy of reported results data. Deepening the reader's understanding of the various factors that impact the accuracy, interpretation, and overall usability of gamma spectroscopy results data from laboratories will help ensure defensible decision-making and cost-effective mission implementation within FUSRAP and similar remediation programs. (authors)

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Value of Integrated Risk and Issue Management - 17589

Risk management is a tool that has been used by project managers for several decades to help manage scope, cost, and schedule baselines and to improve the likelihood of project success. More recently, the risk management process has been applied to the management of companies and corporations under the designation of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) where it is used to help ensure success in meeting strategic objectives. All of this focus on risk (related to events or conditions that may occur) is normally done without considering how issues (related to events or conditions that will or has occurred) may impact the allocation of resources required to address risks, and perhaps more importantly, how resources required to support normal work scope may be impacted. This paper suggests the use of an integrated risk and issue management process, where risks and issues are managed concurrently using similar but separate and distinct processes. The benefit of using an integrated process is the organization and centralization of data related to risks and issues that becomes available for decision makers to use in prioritizing and allocating limited resources between performing normal work, addressing risks, or resolving issues. Applying integrated risk and issue management to any activity will lead to better decisions, whether the activity is personal, project, program, or enterprise. (authors)

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Computational and Experimental Examination of Simulated Core Damage and Relocation Dynamics of a BWR Fuel Assembly - 16013

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) plans a large-scale test to evaluate damage and relocation behavior of Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) core materials consisting of fuel rods (zirconia as fuel simulant), channel boxes, control blade assemblies as well as lower core-support structures. Its purpose is to contribute to the understanding of the core material relocation behavior in the event of severe accidents with the BWR design conditions for which existing experimental database is quite limited. Prior to large-scale testing anticipated at JAEA in the future, JAEA desires preliminary investigations to examine melting test pieces, being composed of a mixture of zirconia and metals by a non-transferred thermal plasma heating system. The purpose of such tests is to verify the materials and test piece will be heated by plasma as a primary heat source to the target temperature of ca. 2900 K and to collect data about the relocation behavior of the high-temperature materials. This paper describes the first in a series of tests demonstrating the effective use of thermal plasma technology to recreate the dynamics of a typical fuel core bundle channel assembly section. Results from preliminary computational simulations of simplified fuel bundle assemblies are presented illustrating the effectiveness of a 150 kW, non transferred (NTR) configuration of a thermal plasma argon jet to heat the assembly within a highly-insulated containment vessel. An experimental test program using the computational analyses as a basis and a Phoenix Solutions Co (PSC) commercial model PT150, 150 kW plasma torch is described and the test results are presented illustrating the time versus temperature history of the fuel bundle assembly melting dynamics. Details on plasma operation are discussed including: power requirements, current flow, voltage levels achieved, argon gas flow rates, processing times and standoff distances of the torch discharge from the top of the fuel bundle assembly (achieved with remote control of the axial (vertical) translation of the torch within the containment processing chamber). Photos taken from the top of the processing chamber are presented illustrating the various phases of melting characteristics of the zircaloy-clad, zirconium oxide filled fuel tubes, all within a stainless steel tube bundle channel centered within an insulated zirconia crucible. Based on lessons learned from this initial test campaign, a brief discussion of the requirements and features of a follow-on Phase II test program is provided. (authors)

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Hanford Single-Shell Tank and Double-Shell Tank Integrity Programs - 16390

Waste at Hanford is stored in 149 single-shell tanks and 28 double-shell tanks. Concerns related to aging radioactive waste storage facilities throughout the DOE complex led to Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) developing guidelines for structural integrity programs for tank systems. The committee of experts who developed these guidelines is commonly known as the Tank Structural Integrity Panel (TSIP). The DOE has subsequently adopted these guidelines, and requires site operators to have a program consistent with them. The Double-Shell Tank (DST) integrity is maintained with a variety of activities such as ultrasonic and visual inspections, chemistry controls, corrosion monitoring and structural analyses methods. In October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) determined that the primary tank of 241-AY-102 was leaking. WRPS contracted a panel of experts from industry and academia to provide advice and recommendations for the DST Integrity Program. The panel focused on three concerns: - No Early warning - Determine why the existing DST Integrity Program did not predict a primary tank failure or provide early warning of the pending failure. - Program improvements - Recommend activities to either predict a primary tank failure or increase the probability of early warning. - Forensic recommendations - The panel provided additional recommendations regarding forensic assessment of Tank 241-AY-102 (AY-102) to facilitate a conclusion on why the leak occurred. WRPS has prepared a response to the concerns of the panel coupled with recommendations for project action to strengthen the DST Integrity Program [4]. The purpose of this DST Integrity Improvement Plan is to translate the recommendations to specific project activities that are technically and practically responsive. To improve the understanding of the Single-Shell Tank (SST) integrity, WRPS, the Department of Energy-Office of River Protection tank operations contractor, developed an enhanced Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project (SSTIP) in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity, consisting of various subject matter experts in industry and academia, was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. This panel developed 33 recommendations in four main areas of interest: structural integrity, liner degradation, leak integrity and prevention, and mitigation of contamination migration. In late 2010, seventeen of these recommendations were used to develop the basis for the M-45-10-1 Change Package for the Hanford Federal Agreement and Compliance Order, also known as the Tri-Party Agreement. The change package identified two phases of work for SST integrity. The initial phase, which was completed in 2015, was focused on efforts to envelope the integrity of the tanks. It was divided into two primary areas of investigation: structural integrity and leak integrity. If necessary, based on the outcome from the initial work, a second phase would be focused on further definition of the integrity of the tanks and liners. The two combined phases are designed to support the formal integrity assessment of the Hanford SSTs in 2018 by an Independent Qualified Registered Professional Engineer. This paper will summarize the current status of the DST and SST Integrity Programs and discuss the ongoing efforts to improve these programs. (authors)

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West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2018

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2018. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2018 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) Calendar Year (2016)

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2016. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2016. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2016 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report Calendar Year 2013

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2013. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2013. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2013 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2014

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2014. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2014. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2014 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

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