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At least 523 records · Page 29

Safety Culture And Best Practices At Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Safety Culture and Best Practices at Japan's Fusion Research Facilities

The Safety Monitor Joint Working Group (JWG) is one of the magnetic fusion research collaborations between the US Department of Energy and the government of Japan. Visits by occupational safety personnel are made to participating institutions on a biennial basis. In the 2013 JWG visit of US representatives to Japan, the JWG members noted a number of good safety practices in the safety walkthroughs. These good practices and safety culture topics are discussed in this paper. The JWG hopes that these practices for worker safety can be adopted at other facilities. It is a well-known, but unquantified, safety principle that well run, safe facilities are more productive and efficient than other facilities (Rule, 2009). Worker safety, worker productivity, and high quality in facility operation all complement each other (Mottel, 1995).

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Baseline Risk Assessment Supporting Closure at Waste Management Area C at the Hanford Site Washington

The Office of River Protection under the U.S. Department of Energy is pursuing closure of the Single-Shell Tank (SST) Waste Management Area (WMA) C under the requirements of the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (HFFACO). A baseline risk assessment (BRA) of current conditions is based on available characterization data and information collected at WMA C. The baseline risk assessment is being developed as a part of a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI)/Corrective Measures Study (CMS) at WMA C that is mandatory under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and RCRA corrective action. The RFI/CMS is needed to identify and evaluate the hazardous chemical and radiological contamination in the vadose zone from past releases of waste from WMA C. WMA C will be under Federal ownership and control for the foreseeable future, and managed as an industrial area with restricted access and various institutional controls. The exposure scenarios evaluated under these conditions include Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA) Method C, industrial worker, maintenance and surveillance worker, construction worker, and trespasser scenarios. The BRA evaluates several unrestricted land use scenarios (residential all-pathway, MTCA Method B, and Tribal) to provide additional information for risk management. Analytical results from 13 shallow zone (0 to 15 ft. below ground surface) sampling locations were collected to evaluate human health impacts at WMA C. In addition, soil analytical data were screened against background concentrations and ecological soil screening levels to determine if soil concentrations have the potential to adversely affect ecological receptors. Analytical data from 12 groundwater monitoring wells were evaluated between 2004 and 2013. A screening of groundwater monitoring data against background concentrations and Federal maximum concentration levels was used to determine vadose zone contamination impacts on groundwater. Waste Management Area C is the first of the Hanford tank farms to begin the closure planning process. The current baseline risk assessment will provide valuable information for making corrective actions and closure decisions for WMA C, and will also support the planning for future tank farm soil investigation and baseline risk assessments.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Implementation of a System of Gamma Imagers for Measuring Plutonium Holdup

The Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is an effort to dilute and dispose of many tonsof weapons grade plutonium. This work will take place in a shielded glovebox to protect workers fromradiological dose. Accurate measurements of the holdup, or material left behind, in the gloveboxes is im-portant for Nuclear Material Control and Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, andprocess monitoring. Shielding around the gloveboxes presents an obstacle for the traditional GeneralizedGamma Holdup (GGH) method. The uncertainties associated with that method, at around 28%, arealso detrimental since the amount of holdup must be kept below an established limit with a high level ofconfidence.Passive gamma-ray imaging provides a more complete depiction of the distribution of radioactivematerials. Recent refinement of the method has demonstrated that quantitative information can beextracted from the images with a well-characterized system. A permanently installed system of gamma-ray imagers is currently being developed to measure plutonium holdup in the SPD gloveboxes. Thispaper will report on progress with the development of this system.This application requires that the features of current commercially available instruments from H3Dand PHDS, optimized for measurement performance in a mobile application, be translated into theconstraints of the operational environment with fixed installations. The interaction between facilityconstraints and measurement capabilities will be addressed.A series of measurements with plutonium sources in a mocked-up glovebox geometry with imagersmounted above the ceiling of the glovebox have been taken. Imager performance with respect to angularresolution, minimum measurement time for quantification, and signal-to-noise ratio with a multitudeof sources will be evaluated for those measurements. A series of prototypes of user interfaces will bepresented for display of the data to its various consumers for the purposes of Nuclear Material Controland Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, and process monitoring.

Schmitt, Kyle↗

K-25 Structural Separation and Demolition

The K-25 building is a former gaseous diffusion plant, built in 1944-1945 as part of the United States Manhattan Project. The structure was the largest structure under one roof, surpassed only by the Pentagon. Together the three wings represent about 17.8 hectare (44 acres) under roof and are generally about 18.3 meters (60 ft.) high on the outside face and approximately 12.2 meters (40 ft.) high on the inside face. The entire structure was built in the shape of a 'U', with a lateral distance of approximately one mile. It was constructed in individual building units with each unit connected using expansion joint-type connection. A single unit is approximately 24.4 meters (80 ft.) across and 122 meters (400 ft.) deep. The northern structure is connected to the eastern and western structures at the upper level floors. The four-level, U-shaped building is a steel-frame structure with corrugated cement-asbestos siding. The cell level is an elevated concrete structure supported by reinforced concrete columns located in the basement, or vault area. The vault area can be accessed at grade level from the outside perimeter. Inside the courtyard, the grade level has been raised to provide entry to the second or cell floor level. An engineering evaluation of the structure was performed to determine the condition of the structure and possibility of unplanned collapse of any portion of the structure. The evaluation included physical inspections, calculations for wind, pre-demolition loads, and evaluation of failure modes. The results of the evaluation have provided guidance for the demolition plan and the development of criteria for protection of personnel performing pre-demolition activities. Challenges include degradation of the structure that necessitated repair, dealing with changes in the code revisions from both the American Concrete Institute (ACI) and the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), access to areas of the structure that were not necessarily designed for access, and acceleration of the building degradation due to the pre-demolition activities. When a full building is evaluated, 50 percent of wind and applied forces are dissipated in 3 units and 80 percent is dissipated in 12 units. The forces are basically linear for the first 6 units once the building is opened at the start of demolition. Some column buckling, based on current codes, was noted in the analysis that would have to be mitigated to ensure a controlled demolition. Loading for the removal of the equipment required structural engineering evaluation of the certainty of the load and the application of the load. Corbels are being evaluated through an inspection program and criteria for repair based on current loading and anticipated additional live loads. Access issues continue to be a challenge and have created the need for a significant fall protection program. Other areas of access require different approaches and engineering solutions, sometime considering ultimate strength design versus standard yield stress design. An evaluation of separating a wing into two sections to allow for worker re-entry to perform pre-demolition activities during the demolition off shift was conducted. The evaluation has shown that because of both design and history of the K-25 and K-27 Buildings, significant care and attention is needed to demolish these structures from a structural perspective. When the project schedule issues are overlaid, that may demand workers in other parts of the structure after demolition has begun, the structural issues become severe, demanding exacting analysis and significant controls to ensure the safety of the workers both in and outside the building performing the demolition work.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Opening Doors of Opportunity to Develop the Future Nuclear Workforce - 13325

The United States' long-term demand for highly skilled nuclear industry workers is well-documented by the Nuclear Energy Institute. In addition, a study commissioned by the SRS Community Reuse Organization concludes that 10,000 new nuclear workers are needed in the two-state region of Georgia and South Carolina alone. Young adults interested in preparing for these nuclear careers must develop specialized skills and knowledge, including a clear understanding of the nuclear workforce culture. Successful students are able to enter well-paying career fields. However, the national focus on nuclear career opportunities and associated training and education programs has been minimal in recent decades. Developing the future nuclear workforce is a challenge, particularly in the midst of competition for similar workers from various industries. In response to regional nuclear workforce development needs, the SRS Community Reuse Organization established the Nuclear Workforce Initiative (NWI{sup R}) to promote and expand nuclear workforce development capabilities by facilitating integrated partnerships. NWI{sup R} achievements include a unique program concept called NWI{sup R} Academies developed to link students with nuclear career options through firsthand experiences. The academies are developed and conducted at Aiken Technical College and Augusta Technical College with support from workforce development organizations and nuclear employers. Programs successfully engage citizens in nuclear workforce development and can be adapted to other communities focused on building the future nuclear workforce. (authors)

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In Situ Decommissioning (ISD) Concepts and Approaches for Excess Nuclear Facilities Decommissioning End State - 13367

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) currently has numerous radiologically contaminated excess nuclear facilities waiting decommissioning throughout the Complex. The traditional decommissioning end state is complete removal. This commonly involves demolishing the facility, often segregating various components and building materials and disposing of the highly contaminated, massive structures containing tons of highly contaminated equipment and piping in a (controlled and approved) landfill, at times hundreds of miles from the facility location. Traditional demolition is costly, and results in significant risks to workers, as well as risks and costs associated with transporting the materials to a disposal site. In situ decommissioning (ISD or entombment) is a viable alternative to demolition, offering comparable and potentially more protective protection of human health and the environment, but at a significantly reduced cost and worker risk. The Savannah River Site (SRS) has completed the initial ISD deployment for radiologically contaminated facilities. Two reactor (P and R Reactors) facilities were decommissioned in 2011 using the ISD approach through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The SRS ISD approach resolved programmatic, regulatory and technical/engineering issues associated with avoiding the potential hazards and cost associated with generating and disposing of an estimated 124,300 metric tons (153,000 m{sup 3}) of contaminated debris per reactor. The DOE Environmental Management Office of Deactivation and Decommissioning and Facility Engineering, through the Savannah River National Laboratory, is currently investigating potential monitoring techniques and strategies to assess ISD effectiveness. As part of SRS's strategic planning, the site is seeking to leverage in situ decommissioning concepts, approaches and facilities to conduct research, design end states, and assist in regulatory interactions in broad national and international government and private industry decommissioning applications. SRS offers critical services based upon the SRS experience in decommissioning and reactor entombment technology (e.g., grout formulations for varying conditions, structural and material sciences). The SRS ISD approach follows a systems engineering framework to achieve a regulatory acceptable end state based on established protocols, attains the final end state with minimal long stewardship requirements, protects industrial workers, and protects groundwater and the environment. The ISD systems engineering framework addresses key areas of the remedial process planning, technology development and deployment, and assessment to attain the ultimate goal of natural resource stewardship and protecting the public. The development and deployment of the SRS ISD approach has established a path for ISD of other large nuclear facilities in the United States and around the globe as an acceptable remedial alternative for decommissioning nuclear facilities. (authors)

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Radiation Field of Packages Carrying Spent Co-60 Radioactive Sources - 12437

Among the diverse radioactive sources commonly exploited in medical and industrial applications, Co- 60 is increasingly used as strong gamma emitter. Over time, source manufacturers favored Co-60 as opposed to other gamma emitters because its relatively short half-life (5.27 year) that minimizes issues related to the management of disused sources. Disused Co-60 sources can retain a significant amount of radioactivity (from hundreds of MBq to several GBq) that still poses safety concerns on their handling and transportation. In this context a detailed knowledge of their radiation field would provide the necessary information for taking actions in preventing unnecessary doses to the workers and the population by optimizing transportation procedures and handling operations. We modeled the geometry and the materials constituting a transportation packaging of a spent Co-60 source which had an original maximum activity of a few GBq and was enclosed in a small lead irradiator. Then we applied a Monte Carlo transport code (MCNP5) for tracking down the gamma photons emitted by the source, including the secondary photons resulting by the interaction of the source photons with the surrounding materials. This allowed for the evaluation of the radiation field inside and outside the packaging, and the corresponding equivalent dose useful for checking the compliance with the regulations and the health risk of possible radiation exposure. We found that a typical 60-liters drum carrying a spent Co-60 source, enclosed in its original irradiator, with a residual activity of 300 MBq could already overcome an equivalent dose of 0.2 mSv/h on the drum external surface, which is the maximum equivalent dose at any point of the surface for this packaging as prescribed by local regulations. This condition is even more apparent when the source is slightly displaced with respect to the rotation axis of the drum, an easily occurring condition for sources not properly packaged, generating non-compliant hot-spots on the drum surface. As an example, a displacement of 5 cm translates in an increase of 80% in the dose level on the nearest side of the drum. We also found that the equivalent dose is significantly influenced by the scattered source photons and the secondary photons, whose contribution to the radiation field is mainly determined by the package geometry. The developed model resulted in an important tool for exploring the detail of the radiation field of a spent Co-60 source packaged for transportation allowing to check for compliance with the regulations and to evaluate risks to the workers and the population. It is worth to point out that this modeling approach is completely general and can be applied to a variety of different problems not limited to the transportation of radioactive material. In the example illustrated in this work, a small Co-60 source inside its irradiator and properly packaged in a drum for transport, presents a hot-spot on the drum surface if the irradiator is displaced of just few centimeters with respect to the rotation axis of the drum. A Monte Carlo simulation provided a complete description of the radiation field in the volume surrounding the packaging as a function of photon energy showing that a significant contribution comes from source photons scattered by the package itself. As an example, the Transport Index (TI) of this packaging was calculated, resulting in a value of 0.5. This value is low when compared to the regulations, however suggests that an individual just 1 meter afar from the packaging receives, in a few hours, a dose comparable to that received with a radiograph. This might be the case of the driver of a truck transporting the packaging, in particular when a number of packages are transported at the same time. It is important to notice that the results presented in this work are general, and can be appropriately scaled to represent the radiation field of similar geometries with gamma sources of different activity. However, this quick application of a Monte Carlo simulation provides useful insights in the process of preparing a packaging for transport. This simple model suggests that this approach can be efficient for screening a number of packaging configurations and flagging those potentially not compliant with regulations, that will require a more thorough care in the packaging process. Furthermore the knowledge of the details of the radiation field can be useful for optimizing the geometry of the transport cargo, and becomes essential when a variety of packaging are transported or stored, in order to prevent hazardous situations during their handling, and hence preventing unnecessary doses to the workers and the populations. It is worth to point out that this modeling approach is completely general and can be applied to a variety of different problems not limited to the transportation of radioactive material. (authors)

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Application of Robotics in Decommissioning and Decontamination - 12536

Decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities is a significant challenge worldwide and one which is growing in size as more plants reach the end of their operational lives. The strategy chosen for individual projects varies from the hands-on approach with significant manual intervention using traditional demolition equipment at one extreme to bespoke highly engineered robotic solutions at the other. The degree of manual intervention is limited by the hazards and risks involved, and in some plants are unacceptable. Robotic remote engineering is often viewed as more expensive and less reliable than manual approaches, with significant lead times and capital expenditure. However, advances in robotics and automation in other industries offer potential benefits for future decommissioning activities, with the high probability of reducing worker exposure and other safety risks as well as reducing the schedule and costs required to complete these activities. Some nuclear decommissioning tasks and facility environments are so hazardous that they can only be accomplished by exclusive use of robotic and remote intervention. Less hazardous tasks can be accomplished by manual intervention and the use of PPE. However, PPE greatly decreases worker productivity and still exposes the worker to both risk and dose making remote operation preferable to achieve ALARP. Before remote operations can be widely accepted and deployed, there are some economic and technological challenges that must be addressed. These challenges will require long term investment commitments in order for technology to be: - Specifically developed for nuclear applications; - At a sufficient TRL for practical deployment; - Readily available as a COTS. Tremendous opportunities exist to reduce cost and schedule and improve safety in D and D activities through the use of robotic and/or tele-operated systems. - Increasing the level of remote intervention reduces the risk and dose to an operator. Better environmental information identifies hazards, which can be assessed, managed and mitigated. - Tele-autonomous control in a congested unstructured environment is more reliable compared to a human operator. Advances in Human Machine Interfaces contribute to reliability and task optimization. Use of standardized dexterous manipulators and COTS, including standardized communication protocols reduces project time scales. - The technologies identified, if developed to a sufficient TRL would all contribute to cost reductions. Additionally, optimizing a project's position on a Remote Intervention Scale, a Bespoke Equipment Scale and a Tele-autonomy Scale would provide cost reductions from the start of a project. Of the technologies identified, tele-autonomy is arguably the most significant, because this would provide a fundamental positive change for robotic control in the nuclear industry. The challenge for technology developers is to develop versatile robotic technology that can be economically deployed to a wide range of future D and D projects and industrial sectors. The challenge for facility owners and project managers is to partner with the developers to provide accurate systems requirements and an open and receptive environment for testing and deployment. To facilitate this development and deployment effort, the NNL and DOE have initiated discussions to explore a collaborative R and D program that would accelerate development and support the optimum utilization of resources. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiological Characterization of Selected Thermal Centres Based on Indoor Radon Dosimetry - 17507

In countries with long historical tradition in thermal water therapy and with several mineral-medicinal thermal sources, workplaces within thermal centers may be a source of radon exposure which may be intensified if these are located in regions of high level of natural radiation. According to the EU Directive 96/29/Euratom (repealed by the Directive 2013/59/EURATOM) each Member State shall identify, by means of survey or any other adequate mean, the work activities where a significant increase in the exposure from natural radiation sources may occur, including thermal centers where the exposure to thoron/radon daughters or gamma radiation may occur. The purpose of this work was to perform a radiological characterization of selected thermal centers based on indoor dosimetry. The effective doses received by workers due to radon inhalation were estimated and gamma dose rates were measured through continuous periods. The radon risk for indoor exposure was assessed on a probabilistic basis both on thermal centers and workers' dwellings. Radon levels within the thermal centers ranged from 73 to 4335 Bq/m{sup 3} and the values within the workers dwellings are of the same order of magnitude, 68-4051 Bq/m{sup 3}. Approximately 66 % of indoor radon concentration values are above the maximum EU reference (300 Bq/m{sup 3}) and 94 % of the effective dose is higher than 1 mSv/year. In some situations, radon levels at residential environments are much higher than at workplaces and effective doses are higher than 6 mSv/year, both at residential and work environments. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Development of Advanced T-OZON{sup TM} for PWR Decommissioning (2) - 18170

The number of aging nuclear power plants (NPPs) slated for closure around the world has increased. The majority of them are PWRs. Minimization of radiation exposure for PWR decommissioning workers is one of the key factors in decommissioning in order to apply the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) principle. To this end, it is desirable to establish a chemical decontamination method to reduce the exposure of PWR decommissioning workers. Toshiba developed T-OZON{sup TM}, a chemical decontamination method for BWRs [1, 2, 3]. To date, the method has been applied more than 90 times in Japanese BWR plants. The reduction in radiation exposure of workers achieved by applying T-OZON{sup TM} is estimated at about 300-2700 man mSv [4]. A major feature of T-OZON{sup TM} is the reduced amount of radioactive waste produced when compared to other decontamination processes. Oxide films on PWR wetted surfaces are harder to decontaminate than those in a BWR due to their chemical composition. To apply T-OZON{sup TM} to PWR oxide films, it is necessary to modify the process conditions. (authors)

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Modeling of Lead-210 Data Documents Benefits in Proactively Understanding TENORM Deposition - 18515

Radioactive decay of naturally occurring Radon-222 present in just-produced natural gas can lead to deposition of its radiogenic daughter, Lead-210, and subsequent radiogenic progeny within natural gas handling, treatment, and distribution facilities. Worker safety issues and disposal challenges arise when these accumulate to radiologically problematic activity levels. This is due to the 22.3-year half-life of Lead-210, allowing for multi-decade period of accumulation to occur and to persist, even after facility operations have ceased. Due to the far shorter half-lives of Lead-210 radiogenic progeny, especially that of Polonium-210, secular equilibrium within the Lead-210-Bismuth-210-Polonium-210 decay chain is quickly approached during facility operations and achieved after facility operations end. Lead-210 that accumulates in pipe scale can complicate any subsequent intrusive facility modifications, such as disassembly and dismantlement, potentially exposing workers to adverse radioactivity and impeding recycling and/or disposal of radiologically impacted equipment or other material. Experience has shown it is not strictly the presence of Lead-210 that is problematic but rather its 'unexpected' presence when this Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (TENORM) is discovered during intrusive work not incorporating radiological health and safety and material handling plans. Conversely, when implementing a program that proactively considers the potential for Lead-210, this form of TENORM simply becomes another 'special waste' that can be safely, efficiently, and effectively addressed during a decommissioning effort, without associated adverse worker exposures, project cost over-runs, and schedule delays. This paper will discuss how proactive radioactive scanning quickly and safely identified Lead-210 and its radiogenic progeny within a natural gas sweetening and compressor station located in northern Montana, a portion of which was undergoing decommissioning, aiding in safe and compliant material handling and recycling. The location of this operation necessitated that the decommissioning program be completed on schedule to prevent weather-related impacts due to the onset of adverse winter conditions. Further, the radioactive data acquired during this project will be shown to provide important insight into historic behavior of Lead-210 in terms of its disposition and its more recent decay. From these data, it became possible to back-model the average activity of Radon-222 within the natural gas being processed during the life of the operation, how the estimated Radon-222 activity within the processed natural gas conformed to measured Radon-222 at various other natural gas fields, and how this information can be leveraged in developing safe and successful plans for future intrusive work at this and companion site operations. This presentation will also note the apparent preferential accumulation of Lead-210 within both rubber-based materials, such as gaskets and seals, and grease-based products found within natural gas flow lines. Thoughts regarding processes that may lead to this finding will be explored. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Environmental Management Waste Management Facility Operations Team Commitment to Safety - 18546

The Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF) is an above-grade waste disposal facility that is owned by DOE and operated by URS | CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR), a contractor to DOE's Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management. The EMWMF landfill is located on the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) and has a 2.18 M cubic yard capacity. EMWMF is a key component of the cost-effective ORR cleanup program and accepts remediation waste from across the ORR. Multiple low-level and low-level mixed CERCLA waste streams are disposed at EMWMF, mostly as direct-dumped demolition and remediation debris. EMWMF receives and disposes of a myriad of contaminated waste streams and waste types, including massive structural steel from some of the largest buildings ever constructed, contaminated soils from legacy disposal areas, containers that must be grouted under negative pressure, and special waste that must be tightly controlled. Support activities include managing several million gallons of landfill wastewater per year and driving around 20,000 miles per year to transport leachate to a treatment facility. Even with the wide range of waste accepted and the diversity of support activities, EMWMF Operations has maintained an impressive safety record of no lost workday cases in nearly 16 years of continuous operation and was recently awarded the National Safety Council's Superior Safety Performance Award. This safety record is a testament to the commitment to safety by both workers and management. Several factors are key to the EMWMF Operations safety record. UCOR senior management established safety as a priority and allocates proper funding and resources. EMWMF Operations management embraces safety as an integral part of the work and also 'walks the talk'-emphasizing safety over productivity and showing personal commitment to safety. A stable workforce promotes a culture where safety is valued and helps train new personnel in this culture. The UCOR integrated safety management approach to work control is fully embraced, where worker feedback is highly valued and used to better identify and control job hazards. Finally, job supervisors actively encourage input. Worker concerns, suggestions, and observations are encouraged and positively addressed. As a result, the entire Operations Team is committed to identifying and mitigating hazards. This team commitment to safety results in a culture where safety is not only valued, but is expected. Safety concerns are identified and addressed proactively, and communication is encouraged. This strong safety culture and outstanding safety record have also proven to be good business, with the facility available to receive waste 99.6% of available work hours and outstanding turnaround times on waste shipments. The EMWMF Operations team commitment to safety can be used in other environments to develop an engaged, safety-conscious workforce. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Glovebox Handling of High-Consequence Materials with Super Baxter and Gesture-Based Programming - 18598

The handling of high-consequence materials is a difficult task requiring safe object manipulation while avoiding the risk of contamination or spillage. Specific operations including opening containers, segregating the wastes, and repackaging are required to be safely executed inside contained spaces such as gloveboxes. However, the workers' ability and dexterity to manipulate objects through thick protective gloves are compromised in many aspects. The fixed position of the glovebox arm ports restricts the movements of the workers' arms, which also makes it hard to lift heavy objects. Further, the operational workspace inside the glovebox is restricted by the gloves' reachability. Safety of workers is the paramount concern in glovebox operations and the very reason for their existence. Sharp edges and tools increases the risk of glove punctures, which may expose the operator to chemicals and radiation and risks contamination in the vicinity outside the glovebox. The operators are also affected by ergonomic stressors due to prolonged and repetitive operations. To achieve a high degree of human safety, robotic solutions to handle high-consequence materials inside the glovebox are desirable, as they remove the operators from the hazards listed above. However, robots, in general, lack the degree of adaptability necessary for most high-consequence material handling tasks as these tasks are often unstructured or highly variable. Likewise, most human operators, while highly skilled in the tasks at hand (task expertise), lack the robot programming skills necessary to adapt the robot's motions to the variations (programming expertise). A way to bridge this divide is to make robot programming more intuitive to human operators. Since humans naturally teach one another through demonstration and learning, robotic 'programming by demonstration' paradigms have begun to appear to reduce the burden of robot reprogramming. Gesture-Based Programming attempts to achieve that by enabling a robot to observe the normal actions and affordances of a human performing a task to learn to map those onto the skills of the robot. In the end, this approach permits benefits from both the human and the robot: the human's adaptive decision making and the robot's resilience to high-consequence material. Robotic solutions assuringly provide protection for the operators, however their autonomy brings about other potential risks. Artificial Intelligence is not perfect; it is a black box, which can produce results, but the full extent of those results may not be known precisely. In self-driving cars, a hypothetical AI problem is the 'green man detector'. Since self-driving cars have presumably never seen a green man, how can we know it won't veer toward him the first time it sees a green man? Likewise, even though GbP provides an open method for safe task execution replicating a human, incorrect task inferences can lead to potential collisions or unintended operations. Thus, a hardware safety measure is proposed to provide reliable operation inside the glovebox, and true safe operations are achieved by mechanically limiting the operational range of each arm link. The operational range is computed and validated through exhaustive offline simulations, which can be streamlined by affordable computing power. Super Baxter is one such robot which incorporates these capabilities. It is a human-like, bimanual robot, being developed at the Collaborative Robotics Lab (CRL) in conjunction with the Dept. of Energy/Environmental Management, Rethink Robotics, Barrett Technology, and the NSF Center for Robots and Sensors for the Human Well-Being (RoSe-HUB). Super Baxter is envisioned to represent the next generation of collaborative robots that will be intrinsically human-safe, as well as exceptionally human-intuitive. In summary, Super Baxter will enable safe glovebox operations through low-shot Gesture based Programming incorporated with hardware safety measures. Two aspects of safety will be discussed in the paper. First, the safety of the operator achieved by allowing him to program Super Baxter remotely through Gesture based Programming. Second, the safety of the glovebox, achieved by incorporating hardware safety measures using joint limits. Further, the capability of Super Baxter on Gesture based Programming is demonstrated through typical object manipulation tasks in glovebox operations. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

I Asked 30,000 People in the Nuclear Industry About Safety Culture; This is What I Learned - 19204

Organizations in the nuclear industry place a high value on maintaining the safety of the workforce and community. Some of these organizations do a better job than others when it comes to developing and sustaining a healthy safety culture. We spent six years studying nuclear organizations to better understand the factors that influence safety culture. We used mixed methods to evaluate perceptions of safety culture in these organizations including administering a valid and reliable safety culture survey, conducting one-on-one interviews with managers, and facilitating focus groups with members of the workforce. We analyzed the quantitative and qualitative data collected from more than 30,000 workers in U.S. based organizations. All of the organizations had a nuclear component to their operations. They operated nuclear reactors, processed nuclear materials, decontaminated and decommissioned buildings with radiological contamination, cleaned-up hazardous/mixed waste, and conducted basic science research and development. We talked to craft workers, technicians, engineers, scientific professionals, support personnel, production workers, supervisors and managers. We conducted extensive statistical analysis and learned that, with rare exception, there is a gap between the perceptions of managers and the workforce that they manage. Managers almost always have a more positive perception of safety culture than the people that are actually performing the work. It is not a question of whether there will be a gap; it is simply a matter of the magnitude of the gap. We also learned through exploratory factor analysis that there is one dominant factor that accounted for almost all (75%) of the variance in the perceptions of safety culture. It was the behavior of the leaders, the decisions they made, and the systems they implemented that most influenced the workforce's perception of safety culture. Personal accountability for safety accounted for 14% of the variance, communication and reporting accounted for another 6%. Everything else accounted for the remaining 5%. Management systems, decision making and behavior is the dominant factor and managers almost always have a more positive perception than the people that work for them. People that work in organizations where management exhibits positive decision-making and safety-related behaviors tend to have more positive perceptions of safety culture. Based upon these results, we developed a theory that there were a few important factors on which management could focus on if they sought to influence the safety culture in their organization. Our experience and research suggests that management often fails to recognize five root causes of employee discontent. Employees seek: - To be recognized as an individual; - To be respected; - A sense of stability; - Fairness; - To make a difference. Understanding the perceptions of the workforce is critical because perceptions influence attitudes, which contribute to behaviors that determine individual performance. An organisation's performance is simply the sum of the performance of all of the members of that organization. To change an organisation's safety culture, interventions should target management behavior and decision making for the greatest return on investment. (authors)

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Idaho-Developed Technologies, Processes Offer Unique Solutions to Waste Management Challenges - 19281

INL Site cleanup contractor Fluor Idaho, LLC (Fluor Idaho) and its predecessors have developed a host of state-of-the-art technologies and specialized processes for nuclear waste handling, treatment, storage, and shipping. The cleanup program has also repurposed and upgraded previously idled Cold War-era buildings to treat and repackage both on- and off-site generated radioactive and hazardous wastes. And lastly, Fluor Idaho is using one-of-a-kind equipment to protect waste management personnel as they undertake their work to meet cleanup commitments that the Department of Energy (DOE) made to the state of Idaho. Such applications, although developed for Idaho's wastes, have the potential to benefit other facilities within the DOE Complex. Engineers and fabricators have teamed up to develop truly unique devices made of specialized metals, like stainless steel alloys, and more readily available materials such as Lexan. All waste types that Fluor Idaho manages daily - spent nuclear fuel, both high- and low-level wastes, and both remote-handled (RH) and CH-TRU - benefit from these innovations. Without question, the greatest number of specialized equipment, processes, and worker-protection technologies developed are for the retrieving, characterizing, repackaging, and shipping of TRU wastes, which makes sense considering the INL Site stores the most TRU waste in the DOE Complex. On the CH-TRU retrieval front, crews are using specially modified Gradall excavators to protect workers while they exhume Rocky Flats Plant wastes that were sent to Idaho in the 1950's and 1960's and buried in a shallow landfill. The excavators are supplied with extra Lexan windows to protect operators from the potential for flying debris during exhumation. On-board supplied air, pumped into the cab, and individual air supplies protect workers from inhalation hazards. Also on-board infrared cameras allow operators to detect heat generating from reactive metals at the dig face. At the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility (AMWTP), Brokk robotic arm operators use a 'super clam' claw, designed and built at the INL Site, on the remotely operated heavy equipment to size-reduce waste boxes, drums, concrete, and metal containing TRU constituents. The super clam is so powerful and dexterous that operators can crush a 55-gallon drum into the size of a basketball, but also delicately turn the pages of a magazine. Boxes too large to be sized at the AMWTP's box-lines are sent to the Accelerated Retrieval Project VII facility to be sized by Waste Management personnel. Such waste boxes, which sometimes contain 'flighty' plutonium-238 material, have forced the project to employ a heavily ventilated and filtered interior tent. Not all technologies developed for the Waste Management program are high-technology; in fact, one piece of equipment is so simple it's literally ingenious. Operators who inspect and repackage RH-TRU inside a hot cell at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) needed a backup plan in case the hot cell port couldn't be closed in the event of a power outage. Engineers and fabricators collaborated to develop a port cover actuator mechanism, which allows operators to open and close the cell's hatch cover with nothing more than a cordless drill. Also at INTEC, Maintenance Shop fabricators developed a Lexan container or 'pig' suitable for shielding neutron-emitting TRU waste sources. Lexan was chosen as the preferred shielded container material for this special type of waste because neutrons are best shielded with materials containing lots of hydrogen, such as plastics, which are composed of carbon and hydrogen molecules. Once approved for shipment, the high-activity waste will be loaded into specialty casks and shipped to WIPP for permanent disposal. Although all these technologies and processes were initially developed for resolving challenges at the INL Site, their applications could be far-reaching. Like the INL Site, many other facilities in the DOE Complex manage, treat, store, and ship TRU, low-and high-level wastes, and spent nuclear fuel. The technologies and processes developed in Idaho protect Waste Management personnel as they undertake their work, but these benefits could be utilized by other facilities and personnel doing similar work. (authors)

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Integrating Mindfulness with Human Performance in High Complexity Environments - 19498

This paper includes a survey of both scientific and technical literature studies of mindfulness interventions in a variety of industries and populations and proposes potential applications in complex nuclear waste operations. Mindfulness training techniques have been utilized in various forms for decades in high consequence work in both public and private enterprise. The traditional safety nomenclature has simply used different words to describe many of the same concepts that mindfulness practice addresses. Historically, human performance improvement (HPI) has focused on task, mission and error-likely conditions. These safety programs recognize that human behavior is the source of most errors and focus on identification of specific error precursors (mind not on task, incorrect mental picture, etc.). Workers in nuclear and related industries have been trained to recognize these error precursors but have received little training on what to do about them. The techniques of mindfulness align well with HPI programs currently utilized in commercial and government nuclear operations. Indeed, Chapter 5 of the Department of Energy Human Performance Improvement Handbook (DOE-HDBK-1028-2009) includes a discussion of mindfulness with respect to human performance. Mindfulness training supplements current performance improvement efforts by giving workers the tools to not just recognize error-likely conditions within themselves, but also gives them methods to mitigate them. The mindfulness practices presented here focus on self-awareness rather than task-awareness. Workers can apply these techniques in all aspects of their lives which in turn addresses many of the distractions previously identified as error precursors (stress at home or at work, physical discomforts, mind not on task, etc.). The application of mindfulness techniques through integration with established Integrated Safety Management Systems (ISMS) has the potential to improve the safe performance of nuclear waste operations and increase the breadth of organizational safety culture. (authors)

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Radiological Performance Modeling: Platform Comparison

Zapadnoe Uranium Mill Tailings Site, Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant Ukraine: Two exposure scenarios were utilized to develop performance assessment models in GoldSim and NORMALYSA. The first scenario is an onsite worker exposed to radioactivity through external ground irradiation as well as radon and radioactive dust inhalation. The second being an offsite Resident 300 years after institutional control exposed through the ingestion of garden vegetables irrigated by contaminated ground water, ingestion of fish from Konoplyanka River, and agricultural activities in contaminated garden. NORMALYSA utilizes a modular interface to connect extensive pre-created modules to develop contaminant transport and risk assessment models for safety assessments and performance assessments at NORM and legacy sites. Developed by Facilia AB, the program was tested with the creation of the Zapadnoe model under the International Atomic Energy Agency MODARIA Il Working Group 1 (WG1). Default values are provided for input parameters where site specific data and distributions lack. Probabilistic simulations and inputs are limited to parameters with assigned Gaussian probability functions. Similar results for transient worker inhalation dose were found in comparison with the Zapadnoe GoldSim model. However, the NORMALYSA model has results larger by an order of magnitude for external radiation in the transient worker and for aquatic food ingestion, inhalation, and garden food ingestion to the resident. Performance Assessment Modeling: Radiological performance models promote good management and support in remediation and environmental decision making by optimizing radioactive waste disposal site performance. a performance assessment model of the Zapadnoe uranium mill tailings site and a model for calculating authorized limits at Los Alamos National Laboratory are created to demonstrate and highlight the respective capabilities of three modeling platforms: GoldSim, NORMALYSA, and RESRAD-Onsite. GoldSim is a general-purpose modeling platform with the ability to simulate site-specific FT radionuclide transport and risk assessment using a graphical interface to create and link elements that act as indivisible building blocks of the model. The Zapadnoe performance assessment model created in GoldSim is composed of input parameters collected from site specific parameters from WG1 as well as standard assumptions seen in the Generic PA Model from Neptune and Company. The multivariate Zapadnoe simulation contains both deterministic and probabilistic simulation capabilities with the ability to quantitatively represent the uncertainty and associated risks of the site via the Monte Carlo simulation method. Model parameters, documentation, and assumptions are built directly into the model creating a transparent, reproducible, and more purposeful site specific model. To demonstrate this, an ingestion of water pathway was included in addition to the exposure pathways included in the NORMALYSA model. GoldSim offers a wide variety of probability distributions to choose from as well as many tools to visualize the uncertainty of the models and explore which pathways and radionuclides dominate dose. In contrast to the NORMALYSA model, the GoldSim model uses dynamic simulation to calculate tritium concentrations. Authorized limits support the evaluation of radiological health effects from radionuclides present in bulk contaminated soil in order to assist in the process of clearing land for release under different uses. Calculations of authorized limits in RESRAD-Onsite and GoldSim models support the evaluation for 15 radionuclides using a residential exposure scenario, indoor and outdoor inhalation of dust and vapor phase radionuclides (tritium), incidental soil ingestion, and ingestion grown fruits and Vegetables. RESRAD-Onsite, developed by Argonne National Laboratory is a dedicated computer code for calculating radiation doses and cancer risks to an individual located on top of radioactively contaminated soils. It can also be used to provide guidelines for deriving radionuclide soil levels corresponding to a specific dose criterion. The menu driven user interface facilitates selection of radionuclides and soil concentrations, as well as defines parameter values related to materials, environmental factors, and exposure pathways. The program contains radionuclide-specific data such as dose conversion factors and risk coefficients, as well as soil-water partition coefficients and transfer factors for biotic media. The GoldSim model successfully emulates the RESRAD-Onsite code using identical radiological decay and ingrowth factors, radiation dose conversion factors, and other input parameters. DE EEDE ETS Each model supports dynamic modeling of radionuclide ingrowth and decay over time, and integrate this capability with the transport of radionuclides in the environment via processes such as advection and/or diffusion in fluids, or within porous solid media, The applicability of each program is heavily dependent on project context. In the context of developing Authorized Limits, RESRAD-Onsite may be a more desirable option as it was developed for this particular application. For simple disposal or legacy sites or sites that do not need site-specific model structure, NORMALYSA may be a desirable modeling platform, GoldSim can be used to model any problem for which RESRAD or NORMALYSA is applicable, but its strength lies in its flexibility, analytical, and probabilistic capabilities.

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