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The application of Artificial Intelligence to electronic and process control can help attain the autonomy and safety requirements of manned space systems. An overview of documented applications within various industries is presented. The development process is discussed along with associated issues for implementing an intelligence process control system.
Storing hydrogen on board the Space Station presents both safety and logistics problems. Conventional storage using pressurized bottles requires large masses, pressures, and volumes to handle the hydrogen to be used in experiments in the U.S. Laboratory Module and residual hydrogen generated by the ECLSS. Rechargeable metal hydrides may be competitive with conventional storage techniques. The basic theory of hydride behavior is presented and the engineering properties of LaNi5 are discussed to gain a clear understanding of the potential of metal hydrides for handling spacecraft hydrogen resources. Applications to Space Station and the safety of metal hydrides are presented and compared to conventional hydride storage. This comparison indicates that metal hydrides may be safer and require lower pressures, less volume, and less mass to store an equivalent mass of hydrogen.
The Personnel Launch System (PLS) is a small transportation system designed to transport people, but no cargo, to and from low-earth orbit. The PLS is being considered as an addition to the manned launch capability of the United States for three main reasons: (1) to assure manned access to space, (2) to achieve a first-stage abort ability, and (3) to reduce operations costs. To those ends, two designs are being considered for the PLS that differ in their lift-to-drag (L/D) ratio. The Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center was assigned the task of examining low L/D capsules with no wings and a parachute landing capability. The Langley Research Center is studying a higher L/D PLS with wings and runway landings. Whichever design is selected, the PLS will act as a complement to the Space Shuttle fleet and will enhance the ability of our Nation to achieve reliable, safe, and cost-effective access to space flight, thus furthering the goals of the U.S. space program and increasing the safety of the human crews manning a future space station.
Automation subsystem of computers, computer workstations, communication equipment, and radar helps air-traffic controllers in terminal radar approach-control (TRACON) facility manage sequence and spacing of arriving aircraft for both efficiency and safety. Called FAST (Final Approach Spacing Tool), subsystem enables controllers to choose among various levels of automation.
In June 1999 the NASA Administrator chartered an internal NASA task force, termed the Decadal Planning Team, to create new integrated vision and strategy for space exploration. The efforts of the Decadal Planning Team evolved into the Agency-wide team known as the NASA Exploration Team (NEXT). This team was also instructed to identify technology roadmaps to enable the science-driven exploration vision, established a cross-Enterprise, cross-Center systems engineering team with emphasis focused on revolutionary not evolutionary approaches. The strategy of the DPT and NEXT teams was to "Go Anywhere, Anytime" by conquering key exploration hurdles of space transportation, crew health and safety, human/robotic partnerships, affordable abundant power, and advanced space systems performance. Early emphasis was placed on revolutionary exploration concepts such as rail gun and electromagnetic launchers, propellant depots, retrograde trajectories, nano structures, and gas core nuclear rockets to name a few. Many of these revolutionary concepts turned out to be either not feasible for human exploration missions or well beyond expected technology readiness for near-term implementation. During the DPT and NEXT study cycles, several architectures were analyzed including missions to the Earth-Sun Libration Point (L2), the Earth-Moon Gateway and L1, the lunar surface, Mars (both short and long stays), one-year round trip Mars, and near-Earth asteroids. Common emphasis of these studies included utilization of the Earth-Moon Libration Point (L1) as a staging point for exploration activities, current (Shuttle) and near-term launch capabilities (EELV), advanced propulsion, and robust space power. Although there was much emphasis placed on utilization of existing launch capabilities, the team concluded that missions in near-Earth space are only marginally feasible and human missions to Mars were not feasible without a heavy lift launch capability. In addition, the team concluded that missions in Earth s neighborhood, such as to the Moon, can serve as stepping-stones toward further deep-space missions in terms of proving systems, technologies, and operational concepts. The material contained in this presentation was compiled to capture the work performed by the Mars Sub-Team of the DPT NEXT efforts in the late 1999-2001 timeframe.
Current and future aviation safety trends related to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies Project's three technical challenges (engine icing characterization and simulation capability; airframe icing simulation and engineering tool capability; and atmospheric hazard sensing and mitigation technology capability) were assessed by examining the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident database (1989 to 2008), incidents from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident/incident database (1989 to 2006), and literature from various industry and government sources. The accident and incident data were examined for events involving fixed-wing airplanes operating under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Parts 121, 135, and 91 for atmospheric conditions related to airframe icing, ice-crystal engine icing, turbulence, clear air turbulence, wake vortex, lightning, and low visibility (fog, low ceiling, clouds, precipitation, and low lighting). Five future aviation safety risk areas associated with the three AEST technical challenges were identified after an exhaustive survey of a variety of sources and include: approach and landing accident reduction, icing/ice detection, loss of control in flight, super density operations, and runway safety.
Computer graphics is being employed at the NASA Johnson Space Center as a tool to perform rapid, efficient and economical analyses for man-machine integration, flight operations development and systems engineering. The Operator Station Design System (OSDS), a computer-based facility featuring a highly flexible and versatile interactive software package, PLAID, is described. This unique evaluation tool, with its expanding data base of Space Shuttle elements, various payloads, experiments, crew equipment and man models, supports a multitude of technical evaluations, including spacecraft and workstation layout, definition of astronaut visual access, flight techniques development, cargo integration and crew training. As OSDS is being applied to the Space Shuttle, Orbiter payloads (including the European Space Agency's Spacelab) and future space vehicles and stations, astronaut and systems safety are being enhanced. Typical OSDS examples are presented. By performing physical and operational evaluations during early conceptual phases. supporting systems verification for flight readiness, and applying its capabilities to real-time mission support, the OSDS provides the wherewithal to satisfy a growing need of the current and future space programs for efficient, economical analyses.
The Space Exploration Division of the Safety and Mission Assurances Directorate is responsible for reducing the risk to Human Space Flight Programs by providing system safety, reliability, and risk analysis. The Risk & Reliability Analysis branch plays a part in this by utilizing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) tools to identify possible types of failure and effective solutions. A continuous effort of this branch is MaRS, or Mass and Reliability System, a tool that was the focus of this internship. Future long duration space missions will have to find a balance between the mass and reliability of their spare parts. They will be unable take spares of everything and will have to determine what is most likely to require maintenance and spares. Currently there is no database that combines mass and reliability data of low level space-grade components. MaRS aims to be the first database to do this. The data in MaRS will be based on the hardware flown on the International Space Stations (ISS). The components on the ISS have a long history and are well documented, making them the perfect source. Currently, MaRS is a functioning excel workbook database; the backend is complete and only requires optimization. MaRS has been populated with all the assemblies and their components that are used on the ISS; the failures of these components are updated regularly. This project was a continuation on the efforts of previous intern groups. Once complete, R&M engineers working on future space flight missions will be able to quickly access failure and mass data on assemblies and components, allowing them to make important decisions and tradeoffs.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 31 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 40 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 28 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Mission safety factors relative to Space Transportation System (STS) Mission 34 are discussed. In addition to a mission summary, safety risk factors and inflight anomalies are discussed.
Exposure to microgravity during space flight results in profound physiologic changes. Numerous studies have shown changes in circulating populations of peripheral blood immune cells immediately after space flight. It is currently unknown if these changes result from exposure to microgravity or are caused by the stress of reentry and readaptation to gravity. We have developed the whole blood staining device as a system for the staining of whole blood collected during space flight for subsequent flow cytometric analysis, This device contains all liquids to address safety issues concerned with space flight and also moves the cells through the staining, lyse/fixation and dilution steps.
As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.
The Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) will not only bring increased safety, reliability and performance for the Space Shuttle Booster, it will enhance overall Shuttle safety by effectively eliminating 174 failure points in the Space Shuttle Main Engine throttling system and by reducing the exposure time to aborts due to main engine loss or shutdown. In some missions, the vulnerability time to Return-to-Launch Site aborts is halved. The ASRM uses case joints which will close or remain static under the effects of motor ignition and pressurization. The case itself is constructed of the weldable steel alloy HP 9-4-0.30, having very high strength and with superior fracture toughness and stress corrosion resistance. The internal insulation is strip-wound and is free of asbestos. The nozzle employs light weight ablative parts and is some 5,000 pounds lighter than the Shuttle motor used to date. The payload performance of the ASRM-powered Shuttle is 12,000 pounds higher than that provided by the present motor. This is of particular benefit for payloads delivered to higher inclinations and/or altitudes. The ASRM facility uses state-of-the-art manufacturing techniques, including continuous propellant mixing and direct casting.
Medications have been a part of space travel dating back as far as the Apollo missions. Currently, medical kits aboard the ISS contain medications and supplies to help crew members cope with a variety of possible medical events. NASA reported that 1,867 medical events occurred from 1981 to 1998 on space shuttle flights, STS-1 to STS-89; 498 out of the 508 crewmembers on those flights reported experiencing a medical event other than space motion sickness. In 2000, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) convened a committee of experts, Committee on Creating a Vision for Space Medicine during Travel beyond Earth Orbit, to examine the issues surrounding astronaut health and safety for long duration space missions. The primary theme of the committee’s final report is that there is not enough known about the risks to human health during long-duration missions beyond Earth’s orbit and ways to effectively mitigate those risks in an environment of deep space. In 2014, the IOM convened the Committee on Ethics Principles and Guidelines for Health Standards for Long Duration and Exploration Spaceflights and released a report emphasizing the importance of prevention, mitigation, and treatment of major risks to human health during exploration spaceflight. NASA’s Human Research Program has organized five distinct categories of spaceflight hazards summarized by the acronym “RIDGE” (Space Radiation, Isolation and Confinement, Distance from Earth, Gravity fields, and Hostile/Closed Environments) that astronauts may encounter during exploration spaceflight. From those hazards, NASA further derived 30 of the most critical human health and performance risks, including limits to medical care resulting from pharmaceutical degradation. As we prepare for more distant exploration missions to Mars and beyond, risk management planning for astronaut healthcare should include the assembly of a medication formulary that is comprehensive enough to prevent or treat anticipated medical events, remains safe and chemically stable, and retains sufficient potency to last for the duration of the mission. The present editorial will summarize the current state of knowledge regarding innovative formulary optimization strategies, pharmaceutical stability assessment techniques, and storage and packaging solutions that could enhance drug safety and efficacy for future exploration spaceflight missions.
Imaging techniques based on Soft Computing (SC) and developed at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have been implemented on a variety of prototype applications related to the safety operation of the Space Shuttle during the liftoff process. These SC-based prototype applications include detection and tracking of moving Foreign Objects Debris (FOD) during the Space Shuttle liftoff, visual anomaly detection on slidewires used in the emergency egress system for the Space Shuttle at the laJlIlch pad, and visual detection of distant birds approaching the Space Shuttle launch pad. This SC-based image analysis capability developed at KSC was also used to analyze images acquired during the accident of the Space Shuttle Columbia and estimate the trajectory and velocity of the foam that caused the accident.
The Exploration Medical Capabilities (ExMC) Element of NASA's Human Research Program is charged with identifying medical capabilities that can address the challenges of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of disease and injuries that could occur during exploration missions beyond Earth's orbit. Faced with the obstacle of access to in-flight medical care, and limitations of vehicle space, time, and communications; it is necessary to prioritize what medical consumables are manifested for the flight, and which medical conditions are addressed. Studies of astronaut health establish the incidence of common and high risk medical conditions that require medical intervention during long-duration exploration missions. In 2000, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) convened a committee of experts, Committee on Creating a Vision for Space Medicine during Travel beyond Earth Orbit, to examine the issues surrounding astronaut health and safety for long duration space missions. Two themes run throughout the committee's final report: (1) that not enough is known about the risks to human health during long-duration missions beyond Earth's orbit or about what can effectively mitigate those risks to enable humans to travel and work safely in the environment of deep space and (2) that everything reasonable should be done to gain the necessary information before humans are sent on missions of space exploration (IOM, 2001). Although several spaceflight focused pharmaceutical research studies have been conducted, few have provided sufficient data regarding medication usage or potency changes during spaceflight. The Du pharmaceutical stability study assessed medications flown on space shuttles to and from the International Space Station (ISS) from 2006 until 2008; of which some medications were still viable beyond their expiration dates (Du et al, 2011). However, as with many spaceflight studies, the small 'n' associated with this study limits the ability to draw strong conclusions from it. Dr. Wotring and others have recently published articles containing information regarding medication usage, indications, and efficacy gleaned from spaceflight records (Wotring et al, 2015, 2016; Barger et al, 2014; Basner and Dinges, 2014). Although some conclusions can be drawn from these studies, the inability to fully quantify medication usage, indications, side effects, and effectiveness, limits insight as to which medications should be prioritized for further research.