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At least 55 records · Page 3

Health Physics Research Reactor Criticality Accident Alarm System Benchmark Overview

From the countless critical experiments performed in the world during the past century, high-quality integral benchmarks experiments have been collected and gathered into the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (ICSBEP Handbook), managed by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Working Group. This information preservation and dissemination effort is crucial for reactor licensing as well as criticality and radiation transport modeling validation. This summary reports on the status of a tentative benchmark addition to the ICSBEP Handbook. The proposed benchmark arises from legacy operation data of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR). The HPRR was a small, unmoderated, unshielded fast burst reactor that was used for research in health physics and radiobiology as well as teaching and training. As part of a comprehensive investigation of the available HPRR operation data and characteristics, different possibilities for use of the valuable results were studied. A critical experiment benchmark evaluation was performed, analyzing data coming from sub-critical and critical operation of the HPRR during operator training, steady-state irradiation of samples and before critical bursts. The results of the evaluation do not satisfy for the ICSBEP standards as the benchmark relative standard uncertainty is of about 4% for k eff , and the relative difference between sample calculations and expected k eff results is of about 1.5%. Due to those unsatisfactory results, it was decided not to pursue critical experiments evaluation of the HPRR presently and to focus instead on shielding type data for the creation of a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) and shielding category benchmark, which is currently very scarce in the ICSBEP handbook—especially concerning critical, pulsed assembly, or reactor operation data. Several dosimetry and shielding experiments from HPRR burst operation were evaluated, with different benchmark metrics as sulfur fluence, Element 57 dose, or neutron fluence at different distances and under different shield materials conditions. An evaluation focusing on the Element 57 neutron dose as a benchmark metric was submitted to the ICSBEP Technical Review Group (TRG) meeting in October 2021, and the inclusion of the evaluation in the ICSBEP Handbook was deferred. The main change proposed by the international experiment evaluation experts is to use the neutron fluence measured by Bonner spheres as a benchmark metric. This represents a quantity closer to that actually measured by the experimentalists of the HPRR compared to the Element 57 dose, which adds another step of data transformation, thus potentially adding uncertainty to the benchmark. The evaluation has been updated and will be submitted to the 2022 ICSBEP TRG meeting for inclusion in the 2023 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. The evaluation is performed using the KENO and MAVRIC combination from the SCALE 6.2.4 code suite which was previously used in similar CAAS benchmarks to allow for the use of variance reduction techniques.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

UPF and Y-12 Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Radiation Testing Report

This report documents the experimental conditions and results for the testing of the Mirion Technologies CAAS-3S Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). The testing was conducted at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) during the week of January 11, 2021. The testing was conducted in accordance with 25774-QL-POA-JR00-00002-VDE-27.0, CAAS-3S Radiation Testing of Cabinet Components Test Plan. The tests subjected the CAAS-3S system to intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields and to high integrated radiation doses. The purpose of the test was to environmentally qualify various CAAS-3S components in a radiation environment. Successful completion of the tests was predicated on the collaborative efforts of several organizations. Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided dosimetry to estimate photon and neutron dose. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) manages the NCERC facility, operated the Godiva IV reactor, and provided field support for CAAS-3S placement and communications interface for data acquisition systems supplied by Mirion Technologies. Throughout the test campaign, Y-12 and UPF personnel provided technical support in determining changes to the test schedule, as needed, interpretation of the results, and comparison between the measured dosimetry data and predicted results. Throughout the test campaign, Mirion personnel provided technical support in the operation of the CAAS-3S system itself.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

MCNP6 for Criticality Accident Alarm Systems – A Primer

MCNP6 is a Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) developed, general-purpose Monte Carlo radiation transport simulation package. The code is capable of transporting a broad range of particles for numerous applications. MCNP6 has continuous-energy neutron and photon physics that make it suitable for both criticality and shielding problems. The analysis of a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) combines methodologies and techniques for both classes of problems, and the requisite knowledge for both is quite different in some areas. For this reason, a primer has been created with the focus on teaching criticality safety practitioners the Monte Carlo techniques needed to analyze a CAAS. This primer specifically focuses on the Monte Carlo transport techniques for CAAS design. The use of radiation transport codes is a small portion of the overall design process, which is preceded and followed by many other design calculations and decisions. Those readers unfamiliar with the design of CAAS systems are directed to a PNNL report by Greenfield, which gives a thorough overview of the CAAS design process. This document gives reference to applicable standards and regulatory requirements and how to meet them, which is not the subject of this primer. The PNNL report explains where radiation transport codes such as MCNP play a role in this process, and this primer is meant to provide a more in-depth set of lessons for this portion of the design process.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Evaluation of the concrete shield compositions from the 2010 criticality accident alarm system benchmark experiments at the CEA Valduc SILENE facility

In October 2010, a series of benchmark experiments were conducted at the French Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives (CEA) Valduc SILENE facility. These experiments were a joint effort between the United States Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program and the CEA. The purpose of these experiments was to create three benchmarks for the verification and validation of radiation transport codes and evaluated nuclear data used in the analysis of criticality accident alarm systems. This series of experiments consisted of three single-pulsed experiments with the SILENE reactor. For the first experiment, the reactor was bare (unshielded), whereas in the second and third experiments, it was shielded by lead and polyethylene, respectively. The polyethylene shield of the third experiment had a cadmium liner on its internal and external surfaces, which vertically was located near the fuel region of SILENE. During each experiment, several neutron activation foils and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) were placed around the reactor. Nearly half of the foils and TLDs had additional high-density magnetite concrete, high-density barite concrete, standard concrete, and/or BoroBond shields. CEA Saclay provided all the concrete, and the US Y-12 National Security Complex provided the BoroBond. Measurement data from the experiments were published at the 2011 International Conference on Nuclear Criticality (ICNC 2011) and the 2013 Nuclear Criticality Safety Division (NCSD 2013) topical meeting. Preliminary computational results for the first experiment were presented in the ICNC 2011 paper, which showed poor agreement between the computational results and the measured values of the foils shielded by concrete. Recently the hydrogen content, boron content, and density of these concrete shields were further investigated within the constraints of the previously available data. New computational results for the first experiment are now available that show much better agreement with the measured values.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Criticality Accident Alarm System Shielding Benchmark: Integral Experiment Request 498, Critical Engineering Decision 1 Report

This report supports Critical/Subcritical Experiment Decision 1 (CED-1) for Integral Experiment Request (IER) 498, a shielding benchmark produced using the Godiva IV critical assembly at the National Critical Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Shielding benchmarks are datasets collected to provide a comparison for computer models that simulate the effect of shielding on radiation transmission from a source to a detector. The purpose of a CED-1 report is to produce a conceptual design for an integral experiment and to identify the long lead-time items. The design presented in this report favors certain detailed design options such as material selections. However, alternative options can be selected as the project evolves. Dimensions are specified only as needed to evaluate feasibility and performance. Development of Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) shielding benchmarks supports two main programmatic needs. The first need is to improve confidence in models of facilities that house nuclear material handling operations. Better models can support effective CAAS detector placement when criticality may result in dose, and it enables more accurate analysis of criticality accident impacts at various locations in a facility. A key quantity that can be verified is the secondary gamma production caused by neutron interactions with various materials. The second programmatic need supported by shielding benchmarks is the ongoing development of methods being integrated into nuclear simulation codes such as the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code and the SCALE code system used in efforts funded by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). Previous work performed under the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experimental Program (ICSBEP) to produce shielding benchmark data is primarily limited to a set of measurements at the SILENE critical assembly at the Valduc facility in France. The experiment used an open configuration and a burst mode operation, which limited detector options to thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) and activation foils. Because TLDs do not record gamma spectra, it was difficult to verify the gamma energy spectrum from the experiment. In this work, the Godiva IV assembly will be used because it is a fast system capable of producing a wide range of source strengths, including super-prompt critical bursts. The room return for the facility is expected to be substantial and challenging to characterize, so a more closed, shielded experimental configuration is considered. Furthermore, because the physics of radiation transport outside the assembly does not change between the burst mode and the delayed critical mode, it is anticipated that most measurements will be made with the Godiva IV assembly in delayed critical mode, operating within a range that will allow electronic counters to collect accurate data. Scoping calculations concluded that a workable room return shield is comprised of 40 cm of 5% borated polyethylene backed by 7 cm of lead. This configuration was shown to produce a ratio of signal–to–room return of over 100 for up to 2 mean free paths of shield sample material, and over 10 for up to 4 mean free paths of shield sample material, ensuring that useful results can be obtained. With no shielding sample in the room return shield, it was shown that the neutron and gamma spectra do not appreciably change with a change in room size. This scoping calculation does not preclude the use of tungsten powder in a binder, some other effective gamma shielding material, or a hybrid design. Dose rates for various source intensities at an unshielded detector are listed herein to inform detector selection during CED-2, and calibration chains are identified. Preliminary estimates of costs and schedules are outlined but remain to be verified. Values could double or triple as estimates become more accurate and are principally included here to demonstrate feasibility. Preliminary estimates indicate that the apparatus can be installed within a feasible schedule and budget. Two measurements per day are assumed. Producing a shielding benchmark at NCERC using the Godiva IV assembly has been shown to be feasible, with manageable uncertainties and risks. A clear, continuing need for shielding benchmark data remains present, and this report identifies and evaluates a method for creating integrated shielding benchmark datasets.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Intrusion Detection System Alarm Station Operator Interface Improvements

To address Alarm Station operator performance, Portable Intrusion Detection System team gathered information concerning AS operator data needs when assessing alarms. The purpose was to improve the Portable Intrusion Detection System operator interface to ensure that critical information was quickly presented and easily accessible. To gather the data, the team used a Goal Directed Task Analysis approach. The method of analysis was to prepare a set of interview questions, interview selected AS operator experts, conduct the interviews, create a goal/decision/information hierarchy based on information gathered, and then apply the results to the operator interface. In applying the results, the team had to consider not only the Goal Directed Task Analysis -determined information needs of the Alarm Station operator end-user population, but also account for customer requirements and differences in domain. The constraints in implementing all situation awareness recommendations are summarized and initial potential solutions presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The unforeseen component of risk when considering the need for a criticality accident alarm system - 14281

This paper sets out a concept for estimating the size of the contribution of the unforeseen component of criticality accident risk to that of the totality of criticality risks for a process involving fissile materials. By performing this, and considering this estimate alongside those risks known and evaluated as part of the safety justification for the process, a more informed and justifiable basis to the arguments for installing, or not installing a CAAS may be made. This works in in development, further work to identify the detailed means of estimation will be made and presented in a future paper provided the concept as set out is considered reasonable. (author)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Criticality Accident Alarm System Shielding Benchmark: Integral Experiment Request 498, Critical Engineering Decision 2 Report

A workable design to perform a CAAS benchmark experiment is detailed herein. Key dimensions, materials, source intensity levels, and detectors are listed in this report. Sensitivity to 21 perturbations was determined to be acceptable. The next step will be for NCSP management to determine whether procurement should occur and if the experiment should proceed. The perturbation study suggests that the room return shield cavity radius and runout should be maintained to within a millimeter, the room return shield should be positioned carefully (perhaps with a laser range finder), and that the detectors should be mounted in a lightweight fixture such as aluminum, so their positioning is assured. Using a 3D scanner or photogrammetry to record part shapes may be beneficial. Further work is also needed to verify source reproducibility.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Using the Criticality Accident Alarm System modeling capabilities in SCALE [Slides]

The following is a summary of advice for CAAS modeling in SCALE. Refer to the SCALE Criticality Safety and Radiation Shielding training slides or to the SCALE manual for exact syntax. Use a mesh for the fission source that is the most adequate for the problem to solve (coarse/fine). Don’t spend unnecessary resources; simplify the model if it does not impact the final results of interest. Be careful to deactivate secondary fissions in MAVRIC or the calculation may never end. Check that k eff and $\overline{\upsilon}$ calculated results are logical. Between KENO and MAVRIC, cross section libraries, materials, geometry, and mesh grid can be the same or different. Iterative calculations are usually complex problems that need variance reduction. It will be hard to find the best solving parameters in the first attempt; expert judgement is needed. Check each step separately. Use Fulcrum to visualize fission source, mesh source, and spatial/energy distributions to find potential errors or impactful imprecisions.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

2010 Criticality Accident Alarm System Benchmark Experiment at the CEA Valduc SILENE Facility

Several experiments were performed at the CEA Valduc SILENE reactor facility, which are intended to be published as evaluated benchmark experiments in the ICSBEP Handbook. These evaluated benchmarks will be useful for the verification and validation of radiation transport codes and evaluated nuclear data, particularly those that are used in the analysis of CAASs. During these experiments SILENE was operated in pulsed mode in order to be representative of a criticality accident, which is rare among shielding benchmarks. Measurements of the neutron flux were made with neutron activation foils and measurements of photon doses were made with TLDs. Also unique to these experiments was the presence of several detectors used in actual CAASs, which allowed for the observation of their behavior during an actual critical pulse. This paper presents the preliminary measurement data currently available from these experiments. Also presented are comparisons of preliminary computational results with Scale and TRIPOLI-4 to the preliminary measurement data.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Personal Alarm System

Software that runs on smartphones and desktop web browsers and notifies border officials of radiation alarms. It displays images and data associated with an alarm and provides a variety of reports. DOE had a need for discrete notification. PAS replaces the lights and sounds of a Radiation Portal Monitor.

Source record↗

Report for 2.2.1 Task 5: Develop and Document a State-Based Alarm System for a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Using Machine Learning

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has contracted IFE to support human factors research and the development of leading-edge technology to support control room operators as the U.S. fleet undergoes modernization and digitalization in legacy plants and control rooms. As the nuclear industry starts to shift to more digital controls and systems, these upgrades provide more information to the main control room in the form of digital signals and values. Also, an increase in the number of alarms points is provided by the vendors. New digital control rooms shift from main control boards to soft controls, and alarm panels to a single display. This change to a single display has created a problem of alarm waterfall, a situation in which the addition of new alarm points causes an overload of information to the operator during either a plant disturbance or other than normal full power operations. IFE’s goal is to find a workable solution to assist operators in both handling and understanding incoming alarms during emergency situations under these waterfall conditions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Shooter Alarm System Final Report FY23

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing a multiphysics sensor package for automatic live arms fire detection for use in schools, houses of worship, hospi tals, etc. The goal is to have a package the size of a common smoke or CO2 detector with a price point of $50 or less which may be deployed throughout the aforementioned facilities. The commercial device will detect live gun fire with low probability of false alarm and auto matically alert first responders. A prototype board with four accelerometers, two infrared (IR) and two microphones has been developed and deployed at two experiments at LLNL’s Small Firearms Training Facility (SFTF). The device successfully and consistently measured signals on the accelerometer and acoustic channels. IR responses were measured depending upon the environment and sound source.

42 ENGINEERING↗

ANS-8.3 Criteria and the Use of Electronic Personal Detectors as a Criticality Accident Alarm System [Slides]

Motivations for EPDs as a CAAS: Key features of the 2022 revision of ANS 8.3; Review of the relevant criteria in ANS-8.3 2022–How does (or could) an EPD based CAAS comply; Advantages & Disadvantages of Permanently Installed CAAS; Advantages & Disadvantages of EPD Based CAAS; Suggested Decision Criteria; Conclusions & Recommendations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Intensive care alarm system

Inductive loop has been added to commercially available call system fitted with earphone receiver. System transmits high frequency signals to nurse's receiver to announce patient's need for help without disturbing others.

Christensen, J. L.↗

Silent emergency alarm system for schools and the like

An emergency alert system is described. In a school each classroom (or other area) is instrumented with a hidden microphone and receiver tuned to a non-audible frequency. The receivers' outputs are connected to a central display unit in the school's administrative office. Each instructor is provided with a small concealable transmitter which, when hand activated by the instructor upon the occurrance of any emergency, generates a non-audible signal at the receiver's tuned frequency.

Read, W. S.↗