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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS1988

Mars rover technology development requirements

The technology development requirements for various Mars rover range capabilities are discussed, focusing on local navigation of the rover. The capabilities of two methods are compared. In one method, operators on the earth view stereo pictures sent by the rover and determine short traverse paths which the rover follows. The other method achieves more autonomous capability by using computer vision from orbital imagery with approximate long routes commanded from earth. The locomotion, navigation, ground operations, computation, power, thermal control, communications, sample acquisition, and analysis and preservation requirements are examined.

Bedard, Roger↗

NASA NTRS1989

Missions to Mars - Assessing tomorrow's technology

The research and development of technologies necessary for the Mars Rover Sample Return (MRSR) mission are examined. Consideration is given to the use of aerobraking, autonomous rendezvous and docking, and an autonomous Mars lander. The development of a Mars Rover and the required sample acquisition, analysis and preservations capabilities of the Rover are discussed.

Thompson, Tina↗

NASA NTRS1989

Planetary rover technology development requirements

Planetary surface (including lunar) mobility and sampling capability is required to support proposed future National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) solar system exploration missions. The NASA Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST) is addressing some of these technology needs in its base research and development program, the Civil Space Technology Initiative (CSTI) and a new technology initiative entitled Pathfinder. The Pathfinder Planetary Rover (PPR) and Sample Acquisition, Analysis and Preservation (SAAP) programs will develop and validate the technologies needed to enable both robotic and piloted rovers on various planetary surfaces. The technology requirements for a planetary roving vehicle and the development plans of the PPR and SAAP programs are discussed.

Bedard, Roger J., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2018

The CAESAR New Frontiers Comet Sample Return Mission

The Comet Astrobiology Exploration Sample Return (CAESAR) mission is one of two finalists selected by NASA for Phase A study in the New Frontiers program. CAESAR will acquire a minimum of 80 grams of material from the surface of comet 67P/Churuyumov-Gerasimenko and return it to Earth for laboratory analysis. CAESAR preserves much of the science of a cryogenic sample return by retaining volatiles in a dedicated reservoir securely separated from the solid sample. Comet 67P was selected based on its favorable orbital geometry and the risk reduction and scientific context provided by the ESA (European Space Agency)'s Rosetta mission. CAESAR's objectives are to understand the origins of the Solar System starting materials and how these components came together to form planets and give rise to life. We also seek to resolve the conflicting views of comet origins arising from the Stardust and Rosetta missions. While the greater than 1 micron solids returned by Stardust originated in the hot, inner solar nebula, measurements by Rosetta suggest 67P volatiles formed at cryogenic temperatures and remained unchanged for billions of years. This dichotomy provides the rationale for returning both solid and gaseous samples.

CAESAR New Frontiers↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Drilling Mission to Search for Biosignatures of Life on Mars Simulated in Atacama Chile

Missions to search for evidence of life on Mars, including Mars Science Laboratory(MSL)are using drilling systems to get beneath the high oxidized and radiated surface where biomolecules may be preserved. MSL drill holes show that even at shallow depth the subsurface is more reduced and therefor more likely to preserve biosignatures. Analysis of these reduced materials yielded the first detection of organic carbon compounds on Mars[1].While MSL was capable of drilling only 10 cm, the ExoMars mission now planned for a 2022 launch will feature a rover carrying a 2 m drill, motivated by desire to penetrate beneath the irradiated surface. The Atacama Rover Astrobiology Drilling Studies(ARADS)was a PSTAR project that used flight prototype technologies in a highly relevant Mars analog site, together with related scientific studies, to better understand how to best search for life on Mars. ARADS field work was performed in Atacama Chile and featured a rover-mounted 1.2m auguring drill to acquire subsurface samples that were analyzed with flight prototype instruments designed to search for chemical signatures of life.

C R Stoker↗

NASA NTRS2011

Anaerobic Cultures from Preserved Tissues of Baby Mammoth

Microbiological analysis of several cold-preserved tissue samples from the Siberian baby mammoth known as Lyuba revealed a number of culturable bacterial strains that were grown on anaerobic media at 4 C. Lactic acid produced by LAB (lactic acid bacteria) group, usually by members of the genera Carnobacterium and Lactosphera, appears to be a wonderful preservative that prevents other bacteria from over-dominating a system. Permafrost and lactic acid preserved the body of this one-month old baby mammoth and kept it in exceptionally good condition, resulting in this mammoth being the most complete such specimen ever recovered. The diversity of novel anaerobic isolates was expressed on morphological, physiological and phylogenetic levels. Here we discuss the specifics of the isolation of new strains, differentiation from trivial contamination, and preliminary results for the characterization of cultures.

Pikuta, Elena V.↗

NASA NTRS2002

On the Choice of Variable for Atmospheric Moisture Analysis

The implications of using different control variables for the analysis of moisture observations in a global atmospheric data assimilation system are investigated. A moisture analysis based on either mixing ratio or specific humidity is prone to large extrapolation errors, due to the high variability in space and time of these parameters and to the difficulties in modeling their error covariances. Using the logarithm of specific humidity does not alleviate these problems, and has the further disadvantage that very dry background estimates cannot be effectively corrected by observations. Relative humidity is a better choice from a statistical point of view, because this field is spatially and temporally more coherent and error statistics are therefore easier to obtain. If, however, the analysis is designed to preserve relative humidity in the absence of moisture observations, then the analyzed specific humidity field depends entirely on analyzed temperature changes. If the model has a cool bias in the stratosphere this will lead to an unstable accumulation of excess moisture there. A pseudo-relative humidity can be defined by scaling the mixing ratio by the background saturation mixing ratio. A univariate pseudo-relative humidity analysis will preserve the specific humidity field in the absence of moisture observations. A pseudorelative humidity analysis is shown to be equivalent to a mixing ratio analysis with flow-dependent covariances. In the presence of multivariate (temperature-moisture) observations it produces analyzed relative humidity values that are nearly identical to those produced by a relative humidity analysis. Based on a time series analysis of radiosonde observed-minus-background differences it appears to be more justifiable to neglect specific humidity-temperature correlations (in a univariate pseudo-relative humidity analysis) than to neglect relative humidity-temperature correlations (in a univariate relative humidity analysis). A pseudo-relative humidity analysis is easily implemented in an existing moisture analysis system, by simply scaling observed-minus background moisture residuals prior to solving the analysis equation, and rescaling the analyzed increments afterward.

Dee, Dick P.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP) hardware. The EPG/FCP hardware is required for performing functions of electrical power generation and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the EPG/FCP hardware consists of the following divisions: (1) Power Section Assembly (PSA); (2) Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS); (3) Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS); and (4) Water Removal Subsystem (WRS). The IOA analysis process utilized available EPG/FCP hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Brown, K. L.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the rudder/speed brake subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism is documented. The function of the Rudder/Speedbrake (RSB) is to provide directional control and to provide a means of energy control during entry. The system consists of two panels on a vertical hinge mounted on the aft part of the vertical stabilizer. These two panels move together to form a rudder but split apart to make a speedbrake. The Rudder/Speedbrake Actuation Mechanism consists of the following elements: (1) Power Drive Unit (PDU) which is composed of hydraulic valve module and a hydraulic motor-powered gearbox which contains differentials and mixer gears to provide PDU torque output; (2) four geared rotary actuators which apply the PDU generated torque to the rudder/speedbrake panels; and (3) ten torque shafts which join the PDU to the rotary actuators and interconnect the four rotary actuators. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failures and causes. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical RSB failures which result in potential loss of vehicle control were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contaminators, and mechanical failures in gears and shafts.

Wilson, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/power reactant storage and distribution subsystem

Gotch, S. M.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the orbital maneuvering system

Prust, C. D.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the guidance, navigation, and control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Subsystem hardware are documented. The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance, navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC software. Some of the GNC hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed includes: hand controllers; Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA); Speed Brake Thrust Controller (SBTC); Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU); Star Tracker (ST); Crew Optical Alignment Site (COAS); Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADTA); Rate Gyro Assemblies; Accelerometer Assembly (AA); Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA); and Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC). The IOA analysis process utilized available GNC hardware drawings, workbooks, specifications, schematics, and systems briefs for defining hardware assemblies, components, and circuits. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the nose wheel steering subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware are documented. The NWS hardware provides primary directional control for the Orbiter vehicle during landing rollout. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The original NWS design was envisioned as a backup system to differential braking for directional control of the Orbiter during landing rollout. No real effort was made to design the NWS system as fail operational. The brakes have much redundancy built into their design but the poor brake/tire performance has forced the NSTS to upgrade NWS to the primary mode of directional control during rollout. As a result, a large percentage of the NWS system components have become Potential Critical Items (PCI).

Mediavilla, Anthony Scott↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the atmospheric revitalization pressure control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Atmospheric Revitalization and Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) are documented. The ARPCS hardware was categorized into the following subdivisions: (1) Atmospheric Make-up and Control (including the Auxiliary Oxygen Assembly, Oxygen Assembly, and Nitrogen Assembly); and (2) Atmospheric Vent and Control (including the Positive Relief Vent Assembly, Negative Relief Vent Assembly, and Cabin Vent Assembly). The IOA analysis process utilized available ARPCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Saiidi, M. J.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the instrumentation subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Instrumentation Subsystem are documented. The Instrumentation Subsystem (SS) consists of transducers, signal conditioning equipment, pulse code modulation (PCM) encoding equipment, tape recorders, frequency division multiplexers, and timing equipment. For this analysis, the SS is broken into two major groupings: Operational Instrumentation (OI) equipment and Modular Auxiliary Data System (MADS) equipment. The OI equipment is required to acquire, condition, scale, digitize, interleave/multiplex, format, and distribute operational Orbiter and payload data and voice for display, recording, telemetry, and checkout. It also must provide accurate timing for time critical functions for crew and payload specialist use. The MADS provides additional instrumentation to measure and record selected pressure, temperature, strain, vibration, and event data for post-flight playback and analysis. MADS data is used to assess vehicle responses to the flight environment and to permit correlation of such data from flight to flight. The IOA analysis utilized available SS hardware drawings and schematics for identifying hardware assemblies and components and their interfaces. Criticality for each item was assigned on the basis of the worst-case effect of the failure modes identified.

Howard, B. S.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) Actuator hardware are documented. The function of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuators (ATVC) is to gimbal the main engines to provide for attitude and flight path control during ascent. During first stage flight, the SRB nozzles provide nearly all the steering. After SRB separation, the Orbiter is steered by gimbaling of its main engines. There are six electrohydraulic servoactuators, one pitch and one yaw for each of the three main engines. Each servoactuator is composed of four electrohydraulic servovalve assemblies, one second stage power spool valve assembly, one primary piston assembly and a switching valve. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical failures resulting in loss of ATVC were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contamination and mechanical failures.

Wilson, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the auxiliary power unit

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). The APUs are required to provide power to the Orbiter hydraulics systems during ascent and entry flight phases for aerosurface actuation, main engine gimballing, landing gear extension, and other vital functions. For analysis purposes, the APU system was broken down into ten functional subsystems. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. A preponderance of 1/1 criticality items were related to failures that allowed the hydrazine fuel to escape into the Orbiter aft compartment, creating a severe fire hazard, and failures that caused loss of the gas generator injector cooling system.

Barnes, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the backup flight system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware. The BFS hardware consists of one General Purpose Computer (GPC) loaded with backup flight software and the components used to engage/disengage that unique GPC. Specifically, the BFS hardware includes the following: DDU (Display Driver Unit), BFC (Backup Flight Controller), GPC (General Purpose Computer), switches (engage, disengage, GPC, CRT), and circuit protectors (fuses, circuit breakers). The IOA analysis process utilized available BFS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the failure modes analyzed, 19 could potentially result in a loss of life and/or loss of vehicle.

Prust, E. E.↗