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Program combines all calculation and determination requirements into one comprehensible technique. Program automatically performs selection of separation springs, composition of spring sets, and correct spring location with improved accuracy and reliability.
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The system is described which is used to separate the solid rocket boosters from the space shuttle after they have expended most of their propellant and their thrust is near burnout. The dynamics of the separation are simulated in a computer program so that the separation system can be analyzed. The assumptions and ground rules used in analyzing this system are explained and the method of analysis is delineated. The capability of the separation system is presented together with data which may be used to aid in the design of the external tank and solid rocket booster interface. The results of a parameter study to determine the sensitivity of the separation to the initial state of the space shuttle are also presented.
An investigation has been conducted in the Langley Unitary Plan wind tunnel to determine the aerodynamic loads and the static longitudinal and lateral stability of a 0.05-scale model of the XSM-64A Navaho missile and booster and its various components. Tests were conducted through a Mach number range of 1.77 to 3.51 with a corresponding Reynolds number range of 2.4 x 10(exp 6) to 2.9 x 10(exp 6). Results are presented for an angle-of-attack range of -8 deg to 4 deg for the missile-booster combination and -10 deg to 10 deg for the missile-alone configuration. Tests for both configurations were conducted through an angle-of-sideslip range of -8 deg to 8 deg. Also presented are some effects on the model characteristics of the deflection of various components including canard, tip aileron, vertical stabilizer, speed brakes, and booster pitch and yaw thrust chambers. The various components on which loads were measured include the wing, tip aileron, rudder, booster, booster separating surface, booster fin, and booster yaw and pitch thrust chambers. These data are presented without analysis.
Experimental aerodynamic investigations were conducted from July 5 through July 17, 1973, on a 0.01 scale model. The AEDC captive trajectory system was utilized in conjunction with the tunnel primary sector to obtain grid-type data for external tank abort from the orbiter, and for nominal separation of one solid rocket booster from the orbiter-tank combination. Booster separation was investigated with and without separation motors plume simulation. The plumes were generated by eight M sub j = 2.15 nozzles using a 1500 psia cold air supply. Free stream data were obtained for all models (orbiter, tank, orbiter-tank, and right-hand booster) to provide baselines for evaluation of proximity effects.
The transonic phase of the 0.0088105-scale MSC orbiter booster separation test was conducted in the LTV 4-foot high speed wind tunnel, at Mach numbers of 0.6,0.9, 1.1, and 1.38. The purpose of this test was to define the effects of the orbiter/ booster proximity interference on the aerodynamic characteristics of the launch configuration during separation or abort maneuvers. Each model had both straight and delta wings available for variation of launch vehicle configuration concepts.
A definition of the expendable second stage and space shuttle booster separation system is presented. Modifications required on the reusable booster for expendable second stage/payload flight and the ground systems needed to operate the expendable second stage in conjuction with the space shuttle booster are described. The safety, reliability, and quality assurance program is explained. Launch complex operations and services are analyzed.
A review is presented of the technology involved in integrating the Space Shuttle system. A powered flight analysis of the Shuttle is presented, touching upon the following areas: ascent profile and abort mode integration, sizing and design, control of load factor by a stage thrust shaping, structural load constraints, flight performance reserve and trajectory design for the orbital flight test. A discussion is presented of aerothermodynamics including aerodynamic and plume heating. Flight control and separation is considered with attention paid to liftoff, ascent to booster staging, elevon load relief, booster tailoff thrust mismatch and gimbal limitations and booster separation. Structural analysis and dynamics is examined, considering: vehicle loads and modes and the pogo effect. Propulsion aspects (hydraulics, the LH2 recirculation system, the antigeyser system, the pressurization system, etc.), ground vibration tests, separation system verification and flight readiness firing are all described.
This paper describes the processing and recovery operations at Kennedy Space Center as applied to the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster. The introductory portion covers the overall Space Shuttle launch vehicle with a description of the Solid Rocket Boosters and explanations of their functions. Processing operations begin with the arrival of the new or refurbished Solid Rocket Motor segments by rail cars from the manufacturer. Segment buildup is performed on the Mobile Launch Platform, and the completed major booster elements are functionally tested prior to their integration with other prime elements that comprise a complete Shuttle launch vehicle. The recovery operations following launch include Solid Rocket Booster separation, parachute deployment, splashdown, and the activities associated with retrieval of the reusable components of the Solid Rocket Boosters. Subsequently, the paper describes the processing required to thoroughly clean the retrieved items, the disassembly activities, and refurbishment steps planned for restoration of the hardware components to usable condition.
Flow separation effect on large space booster - saturn i /sa-1/ launch vehicle
Functional shock, safety, overall system costs, and emergence of new technologies, have raised concerns regarding continued use of pyrotechnics on spacecraft. NASA Headquarters-Office of Chief Engineer requested Langley Research Center (LaRC) study pyrotechnic alternatives using non-explosive actuators (NEA's), and LARC participated with Lockheed Martin Missile and Space Co. (LMMSC)-Sunnyvale, CA in objectively evaluating applicability of some NEA mechanisms to reduce small spacecraft and booster separation event shock. Comparative tests were conducted on a structural simulator using five different separation nut mechanisms, consisting of three pyrotechnics from OEA-Aerospace and Hi-Shear Technology and two NEA's from G&H Technology and Lockheed Martin Astronautics (LMA)-Denver, CO. Multiple actuations were performed with preloads up to 7000 pounds, 7000 being the comparison standard. All devices except LMA's NEA rotary flywheel-nut concept were available units with no added provisions to attenuate shock. Accelerometer measurements were recorded, reviewed, processed into Shock Response Spectra (SRS), and comparisons performed. For the standard preload, pyrotechnics produced the most severe and the G&H NEA the least severe functional shock levels. Comparing all results, the LMA concept produced the lowest levels, with preload limited to approximately 4200 pounds. Testing this concept over a range of 3000 to 4200 pounds indicated no effect of preload on shock response levels. This report presents data from these tests and the comparative results.
A 55 foot diameter disk-gap-band parachute was deployed behind an expandable 15 foot diameter, 120 deg blunted-cone simulated spacecraft. The spacecraft was carried to altitude in the folded condition. An automatic control system kept the folded spacecraft pointing in the desired direction after booster separation. The aeroshell was then erected at the desired conditions by ground command. When the desired parachute test conditions were reached, another ground command deployed the test parachute. The test Mach number and dynamic pressure obtained at the parachute peak load were 2.62 and 19.4 pounds per square foot respectively. A large disturbance after aeroshell erection caused a large angle of attack to exist at parachute deployment. Methods of preventing this disturbance are discussed.
The problems associated with overtorque applied to the Booster Separation Motor (BSM) Igniter Adapter high strength 200 KSI (1379 Mpa) A286 CRES bolts and the threaded holes of the 7075-T73 aluminum alloy BSM cases are addressed. The evaluation included torque, tensile, and stress corrosion tests incorporating the A286 CRES bolts and the 7075-T73 aluminum alloy BSM cases. The tensile test data includes ultimate tensile load (UTL), Johnson's 2/3 yield load (J2/3YL), proportional limit load (PLL), and total bolt stretch. Torque tension data includes torque, torque induced load, and positive and negative break-away torque. Stress corrosion test data reflect the overtorque and the resulting torque induced loads sustained by the A286 CRES bolts torqued into a 7075-T73 aluminum alloy forged dome with threaded holes. After 60 days of salt fog exposure, the positive and the negative break-away torques, the subsequent mechanical property tensile test results, and the BSM dome threaded hole axial tensile pullout loads are reported.
The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware. The EPD and C hardware performs the functions of distributing, sensing, and controlling 28 volt DC power and of inverting, distributing, sensing, and controlling 117 volt 400 Hz AC power to all Orbiter subsystems from the three fuel cells in the Electrical Power Generation (EPG) subsystem. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 1671 failure modes analyzed, 9 single failures were determined to result in loss of crew or vehicle. Three single failures unique to intact abort were determined to result in possible loss of the crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of 136 single failures occurred. Six of the criticality 1/1 failures are in two rotary and two pushbutton switches that control External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster separation. The other 6 criticality 1/1 failures are fuses, one each per Aft Power Control Assembly (APCA) 4, 5, and 6 and one each per Forward Power Control Assembly (FPCA) 1, 2, and 3, that supply power to certain Main Propulsion System (MPS) valves and Forward Reaction Control System (RCS) circuits.
The performance of the thermal protection system, field joint protection system, and systems tunnel components of Flight Set 360L006, are documented, as evaluated by postflight hardware inspection. The condition of both motors was similar to previous flights. Sixteen aft edge hits were noted on the ground environment instrumentation thermal protection system. Each hit left a clean substrate, indicating that the damage was caused by nozzle severance debris and/or water impact. No National Space and Transporation System debris criteria for missing thermal protection system were violated. One 5.0 by 1.0 in. unbond was observed on the left hand center field joint K5NA closeout and was elevated to an in-flight anomaly (STS-34-M-4) by the NASA Ice/Debris team. Aft edge damage to the K5NA and an associated black streak indicate that burning debris from the nozzle severance system was the likely cause of the damage. Minor divots caused by debris were seen on previous flights, but this is the first occurrence of a K5NA unbond. Since the unbond occurred after booster separation there is no impact on flight safety and no corrective actions was taken. The right hand center field joint primary heater failed the dielectric withstanding voltage test after joint closeout. The heater was then disabled by opening the circuit breaker, and the redundant heater was used. The redundant heater performed nominally during the launch countdown. A similar condition occurred on Flight 4 when a secondary joint heater failed the dielectric withstanding voltage test.