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NASA NTRS2005

Uncertainty Considerations for Ballistic Limit Equations

The overall risk for any spacecraft system is typically determined using a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). A PRA attempts to determine the overall risk associated with a particular mission by factoring in all known risks (and their corresponding uncertainties, if known) to the spacecraft during its mission. The threat to mission and human life posed by the mircro-meteoroid & orbital debris (MMOD) environment is one of the risks. NASA uses the BUMPER II program to provide point estimate predictions of MMOD risk for the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. However, BUMPER II does not provide uncertainty bounds or confidence intervals for its predictions. With so many uncertainties believed to be present in the models used within BUMPER II, providing uncertainty bounds with BUMPER II results would appear to be essential to properly evaluating its predictions of MMOD risk. The uncertainties in BUMPER II come primarily from three areas: damage prediction/ballistic limit equations, environment models, and failure criteria definitions. In order to quantify the overall uncertainty bounds on MMOD risk predictions, the uncertainties in these three areas must be identified. In this paper, possible approaches through which uncertainty bounds can be developed for the various damage prediction and ballistic limit equations encoded within the shuttle and station versions of BUMPER II are presented and discussed. We begin the paper with a review of the current approaches used by NASA to perform a PRA for the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station, followed by a review of the results of a recent sensitivity analysis performed by NASA using the shuttle version of the BUMPER II code. Following a discussion of the various equations that are encoded in BUMPER II, we propose several possible approaches for establishing uncertainty bounds for the equations within BUMPER II. We conclude with an evaluation of these approaches and present a recommendation regarding which of them would be the most appropriate to follow.

Schonberg, W. P.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Spacecraft ceramic protective shield

A low areal density protective shield apparatus, and method for making same, for protecting spacecraft structures from impact with hypervelocity objects, including a bumper member comprising a bumper ceramic layer, a bumper shock attenuator layer, and a bumper confining layer. The bumper ceramic layer can be SiC or B.sub.4 C; the bumper shock attenuator layer can be zirconia felt; and the bumper confining layer can be aluminum. A base armor member can be spaced from the bumper member and a ceramic fiber-based curtain can be positioned between the bumper and base armor members.

Larriva, Rene F.↗

NASA NTRS1990

Spacecraft wall design for increased protection against penetration by space debris impacts

All orbiting spacecraft are susceptible to impacts by meteoroids and pieces of orbital space debris. These impacts occur at extremely high speeds and can damage flight-critical systems, which can in turn lead to catastrophic failure of the spacecraft. The design of a spacecraft for a long-duration mission into the meteoroid and space debris environment must include adequate protection against perforation of pressurized components by such impacts. This paper presents the results of an investigation into the perforation resistance of dual-wall structural systems fabricated with monolithic bumper plates and with corrugated bumper plates of equal weight. A comparative analysis of the impact damage in dual-wall systems with corrugated bumper specimens and that in dual-wall specimens with monolithic bumpers of similar weight is performed to determine the advantages and disadvantages of employing corrugated bumpers in structural wall systems for long-duration spacecraft. The analysis indicates that a significant increase in perforation protection can be achieved if a monolithic bumper is replaced by a corrugated bumper of equal weight. The parameters of the corrugations in the corrugated bumper plates are optimized in a manner that minimizes the potential for the creation of ricochet debris in the event of an oblique hypervelocity impact. Several design examples using the optimization scheme are presented and discussed.

Schonberg, William P.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Hypervelocity impact response of aluminum multi-wall structures

The results of an investigation in which the perforation resistance of aluminum multiwall structures is analyzed under a variety of hypervelocity impact loading conditions are presented. A comparative analysis of the impact damage in structural systems with two or more bumpers and the damage in single-bumper systems of similar weight is performed to determine the advantages and disadvantages of employing more than one bumper in structural wall systems for long-duration spacecraft. A significant increase in protection against perforation by hypervelocity projectiles can be achieved if a single bumper is replaced by two bumpers of similar weight while the total wall spacing is kept constant. It is found that increasing the number of bumpers beyond two while keeping the total stand-off distance constant does not result in a substantial increase in protection over that offered by two bumpers of similar weight.

Schonberg, William P.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Shield Design For Protection Against Hypervelocity Particles

Installing multilayer insulation against primary Whipple bumper reduces pressure-wall damage. Protection to Space Station based on Whipple bumper concept, "Multishock Shields Containing Aluminum Mesh" (MSC-21792). In addition to Whipple bumper, thermal insulation required and provided by multilayered insulation (MLI) consisting of 20 layers (alternating) of double-aluminized Mylar(R) and Dacron(R) netting. When MLI located against bumper, material still disintegrates, but extra space between MLI and pressure wall allows debris pressure cloud to expand so pressure cloud loading reduced. In addition, total amount of MLI material damaged considerably less when placed against Whipple bumper, which contributes to decrease in excess pressure and contents of expanding debris cloud.

Schwinghamer, R. J.↗

NASA NTRS1995

Structural Damage Prediction and Analysis for Hypervelocity Impact. UDRI Light Gas Gun Test Data Summaries

The HEX bumper was originally developed for use with the Defensive Shields Demonstration (DSD) Program. The University of Dayton Research Institute was a subcontractor to the Martin Marietta Astronautics Group in Denver Colorado at the time the HEX bumper was designed for use on the DSD Program. The design originated at the University and was essentially made available to interested parties. All HEX bumpers used in the DSD Program were fabricated at the University by rolling sheet stock through a special set of rollers. Two pieces of 3003-H14 aluminum sheet were rolled to produce the bumpers evaluated in Shots 4-1302 and 4-1304. A brief summary of the results of these tests is given in below. Contact prints of the multiple-exposure, orthogonal view radiographs of the debris clouds produced by the tests are attached. A sketch of the HEX bumper design is also attached.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2011

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Threat Assessment: Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle

This report provides results of a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) risk assessment of the Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle (MSR EEV). The assessment was performed using standard risk assessment methodology illustrated in Figure 1-1. Central to the process is the Bumper risk assessment code (Figure 1-2), which calculates the critical penetration risk based on geometry, shielding configurations and flight parameters. The assessment process begins by building a finite element model (FEM) of the spacecraft, which defines the size and shape of the spacecraft as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations. This model is built using the NX I-deas software package from Siemens PLM Software. The FEM is constructed using triangular and quadrilateral elements that define the outer shell of the spacecraft. Bumper-II uses the model file to determine the geometry of the spacecraft for the analysis. The next step of the process is to identify the ballistic limit characteristics for the various shield types. These ballistic limits define the critical size particle that will penetrate a shield at a given impact angle and impact velocity. When the finite element model is built, each individual element is assigned a property identifier (PID) to act as an index for its shielding properties. Using the ballistic limit equations (BLEs) built into the Bumper-II code, the shield characteristics are defined for each and every PID in the model. The final stage of the analysis is to determine the probability of no penetration (PNP) on the spacecraft. This is done using the micrometeoroid and orbital debris environment definitions that are built into the Bumper-II code. These engineering models take into account orbit inclination, altitude, attitude and analysis date in order to predict an impacting particle flux on the spacecraft. Using the geometry and shielding characteristics previously defined for the spacecraft and combining that information with the environment model calculations, the Bumper-II code calculates a probability of no penetration for the spacecraft.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Conversion of Environment Files from ORDEM 3 & MEM 3 to STENVI

To perform Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) analyses, NASA describes the orbital debris particle environment using the ORDEM 3 tool and the micrometeoroid environment using the MEM 3 tool. Both output files that detail the flux of particles as a function of several parameters. European MMOD analyses use different tools to perform similar functions, including the Meteoroid And Space debris Terrestrial Environment Reference (MASTER) environment model, which outputs flux data in the Standard Environment Interface (STENVI) format. The NASA Johnson Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology Group was asked to create a converter to translate flux data from the output file formats used by ORDEM 3.x and MEM 3 into the STENVI file format. Validation was performed to ensure that the converter was reproducing the input data correctly. The Bumper 3 MMOD risk assessment tool has a capability for reading ORDEM 3.x, MEM 3, and STENVI environment file formats and was used to compare MMOD risk results generated using the converter’s output STENVI files to the risk results generated using the input ORDEM 3.x and MEM 3 igloo files. Specific point comparisons validated that the converter translated the environment data correctly, producing the intended output. However, realistic risk assessments showed that the bin methodology employed by Bumper for determining particle flux as a function of particle size when reading files in STENVI format produces much higher MMOD risk than the point-interpolation methodology used in Bumper risk assessments using ORDEM and MEM. Modifications to how Bumper 3 reads STENVI files during analyses are considered to improve Bumper’s ability to perform useful analyses with environment files in this format.

STENVI↗

NASA NTRS2023

Conversion of ORDEM 3.X & MEM 3 Into STENVI File Format

STENVI↗

NASA NTRS1994

Permanent superconducting magnets for space applications

Work has been done to develop superconducting trapped field magnets (TFM's) and to apply them to a bumper-tether device for magnetic docking of spacecraft. The quality parameters for TFM's are J(c), the critical current of the superconductor, and d, the diameter of the superconducting tile. During this year we have doubled d, for production models, from 1 cm to 2 cm. This was done by means of seeding, an improved temperature profile in processing, and the addition of 1 percent Pt to the superconductor chemistry. Using these tiles we have set increasing records for the fields' permanent magnets. Magnets fabricated from old 1 cm tiles trapped 1.52 Tesla at 77K, 4.0T at 65K and 7.0T at 55K. The second of these fields broke a 17 year old record set at Stanford. The third field broke our own record. More recently using 2 cm tiles, we have trapped 2.3T at 77K, and 5.3T at 65K. We expect to trap lOT at 55K in this magnet in the near future. We have also achieved increases in J(c) using a method we developed for seeding U-235, and subsequently bombarding with neutrons. This method doubles J(c). We have not yet fabricated magnets from these tiles. During this year we have increased production yields from 15 percent to 95 percent. We have explored the properties of a magnetic bumper-tether for spacecraft. We have measured the bumper forces, and their dependence on time, distance, and the field of the ordinary ferromagnet (used together with a TFM). We have accounted for 85 percent of the collision energy, and its transformation to magnetic energy and heat energy. We have learned to control the relative bumper and tether forces by controlling TFM and ferromagnetic field strengths.

Weinstein, Roy↗

NASA NTRS2007

Code Assesses Risks Posed by Meteoroids and Orbital Debris

BUMPER II version 1.92e is a computer code for assessing the risk of damage from impacts of micrometeoroids and orbital debris on the International Space Station (ISS), including those parts of the ISS covered by shielding that affords partial protection against such impacts. (Other versions of BUMPER II have been written for other spacecraft.) Bumper II quantifies the probability of penetration of shielding and the damage to spacecraft equipment as functions of the size, shape, and orientation of the spacecraft; the parameters of its orbit; failure criteria that quantify impact damage at the threshold of failure for each spacecraft surface; and the impact-damage resistance of each spacecraft surface as defined by "ballistic limit equations" that return the size of a failure-causing particle as a function of target parameters (including materials, configurations, thicknesses, and gap distances) and impact conditions (impact velocity and the density and shape of the impactor). BUMPER II version 1.92e contains several dozen ballistic limit equations that are based on results from thousands of hypervelocity impact tests conducted by NASA on ISS shielding and other hardware, and on results from numerical simulations of impacts.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Risk Assessment Update: Russian Segment

BUMPER-II version 1.95j source code was provided to RSC-E- and Khrunichev at January 2012 MMOD TIM in Moscow. MEMCxP and ORDEM 3.0 environments implemented as external data files. NASA provided a sample ORDEM 3.0 g."key" & "daf" environment file set for demonstration and benchmarking BUMPER -II v1.95j installation at the Jan-12 TIM. ORDEM 3.0 has been completed and is currently in beta testing. NASA will provide a preliminary set of ORDEM 3.0 ".key" & ".daf" environment files for the years 2012 through 2028. Bumper output files produced using the new ORDEM 3.0 data files are intended for internal use only, not for requirements verification. Output files will contain these words ORDEM FILE DESCRIPTION = PRELIMINARY VERSION: not for production. The projectile density term in many BUMPER-II ballistic limit equations will need to be updated. Cube demo scripts and output files delivered at the Jan-12 TIM have been updated for the new ORDEM 3.0 data files. Risk assessment results based on ORDEM 3.0 and MEM will be presented for the Russian Segment (RS) of ISS.

Christiansen, Eric↗

NASA NTRS2015

Multi-Shock Shield Performance at 15 MJ for Catalogued Debris

While orbital debris of ten centimeters or more are tracked and catalogued, the difficulty of finding and accurately accounting for forces acting on the objects near the ten centimeter threshold results in both uncertainty of their presence and location. These challenges result in difficult decisions for operators balancing potential costly operational approaches with system loss risk. In this paper, the assessment of the feasibility of protecting a spacecraft from this catalogued debris is described using numerical simulations and a test of a multi-shock shield system against a cylindrical projectile impacting normal to the surface with approximately 15 MJ of kinetic energy. The hypervelocity impact test has been conducted at the Arnold Engineering Development Complex (AEDC) with a 598 g projectile at 6.905 km/s on a NASA supplied multi-shock shield. The projectile used is a hollow aluminum and nylon cylinder with an outside diameter of 8.6 cm and length of 10.3 cm. Figure 1 illustrates the multi-shock shield test article, which consisted of five separate bumpers, four of which are fiberglass fabric and one of steel mesh, and two rear walls, each consisting of Kevlar fabric. The overall length of the test article was 2.65 m. The test article was a 5X scaled-up version of a smaller multi-shock shield previously tested using a 1.4 cm diameter aluminum projectile for an inflatable module project. The distances represented by S1 and S1/2 in the figure are 61 cm and 30.5 cm, respectively. Prior to the impact test, hydrodynamic simulations indicated that some enhancement to the standard multi-shock system is needed to address the effects of the cylindrical shape of the projectile. Based on the simulations, a steel mesh bumper has been added to the shield configuration to enhance the fragmentation of the projectile. The AEDC test occurred as planned, and the modified NASA multi-shock shield successfully stopped 598 g projectile using 85.6 kg/m(exp 2). The fifth bumper layer remained in tact, although it was torn free from its support structure and thrown into the first rear wall. The outer Kevlar layer of the first rear wall tore likely from the impact of the fifth bumper's support structure, but the back of the rear wall was intact. No damage occurred to the second rear wall, or to the witness plate behind the target.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Analytic Ballistic Performance Model of Whipple Shields

The dual-wall Whipple shield is the shield of choice for lightweight, long-duration flight. The shield uses an initial sacrificial wall to initiate fragmentation and melt an impacting threat that expands over a void before hitting a subsequent shield wall of a critical component. The key parameters to this type of shield are the rear wall and its mass which stops the debris, as well as the minimum pressure generated under threat particle impact of the sacrificial wall and the amount of void that is available for expansion. Ensuring the minimum pressure is sufficiently high to achieve large scale fragmentation/melt of the threat particle enables the expansion of the threat and reduces the momentum flux of the debris on the rear wall. Three key factors in the minimum pressure achieved are the thickness of the sacrificial wall relative to the characteristic dimension of the impacting particle, the density and material cohesion contrast of the sacrificial wall relative to the threat particle and the impact speed. The mass of the rear wall and the sacrificial wall are desirable to minimize for launch costs and dynamic concerns making it important to have an understanding of the effects of density contrast and impact speed. In this paper a fourth key parameter is identified related to fragmentation, which corresponds to the ratio of the size of the projectile relative to the transition from brittle to ductile hole growth in the projectile. Ballistic limit equations have been developed to define the failure limits of a MMOD shield, generally in terms of projectile diameter (or mass), impact velocity, and angle. Within the range of impact velocities relevant for Earth-orbiting spacecraft, three distinct regions of penetration phenomenology have been identified for Whipple shields: center dot Low velocity: the projectile is eroded (and possibly deformed) during its passage through the bumper plate, but is not fragmented. Thus, perforation of the rear wall is by a fragment with a mass and speed equal to or less than the original impactor. center dot Intermediate (shatter) velocity: impact velocities are sufficient to induce projectile fragmentation upon impact with the bumper plate, resulting in a coarse debris cloud with large solid fragments. Increasing velocity within the shatter regime results in increased fragmentation, and eventually melting, of the projectile and bumper fragments, generating a finer and more evenly dispersed debris cloud. Failure of the rear wall is a complicated combination of modes observed at low- and hypervelocity. center dot Hypervelocity: the projectile and holed-out bumper material is completely, or nearly completely, melted and/or vaporized by the initial impact. The resultant debris cloud impacts over a dispersed area of the rear wall, loading it impulsively and inducing failure through rupture or petalling. While each of these regimes are well observed with extensive empirical methods to describe these regions, differences in impactor materials, configurations of shields and questions about the limitations of the attainable impact speeds have left questions that are difficult to answer from completely empirical methods.

Miller, J. E.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Safeguarding a Lunar Rover with Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Test

The virtual bumper is a safeguarding mechanism for autonomous and remotely operated robots. In this paper we take a new approach to the virtual bumper system by using an old statistical test. By using a modified version of Wald's sequential probability ratio test we demonstrate that we can reduce the number of false positive reported by the virtual bumper, thereby saving valuable mission time. We use the concept of sequential probability ratio to control vehicle speed in the presence of possible obstacles in order to increase certainty about whether or not obstacles are present. Our new algorithm reduces the chances of collision by approximately 98 relative to traditional virtual bumper safeguarding without speed control.

safeguarding↗

NASA NTRS1987

Space station integrated wall design and penetration damage control

The analysis code BUMPER executes a numerical solution to the problem of calculating the probability of no penetration (PNP) of a spacecraft subject to man-made orbital debris or meteoroid impact. The codes were developed on a DEC VAX 11/780 computer that uses the Virtual Memory System (VMS) operating system, which is written in FORTRAN 77 with no VAX extensions. To help illustrate the steps involved, a single sample analysis is performed. The example used is the space station reference configuration. The finite element model (FEM) of this configuration is relatively complex but demonstrates many BUMPER features. The computer tools and guidelines are described for constructing a FEM for the space station under consideration. The methods used to analyze the sensitivity of PNP to variations in design, are described. Ways are suggested for developing contour plots of the sensitivity study data. Additional BUMPER analysis examples are provided, including FEMs, command inputs, and data outputs. The mathematical theory used as the basis for the code is described, and illustrates the data flow within the analysis.

Coronado, A. R.↗

NASA NTRS1988

Shielding against debris

The damage to spacecraft caused by debris and design of the Space Station to minimize damage from debris are discussed. Although current estimates of the debris environment show that fragments bigger than 2 cm are not likely to hit the Space Station, orbital debris from about 0.5 mm to 2 cm will pose a hazard, especially on brittle surfaces, such as glass. Spacesuits are being designed to reduce debris caused dangers to astronauts during EVA. About 5 cm of high-strength aluminum are needed to prevent penetration by a 1 cm piece of aluminum with a mass near 1.5 g colliding at 10 km/sec. Because aluminum bumpers have the drawback of metallic debris ejected outward after a hypervelocity collision, the use of nonmetallic materials for bumpers is being studied. Methods of reducing the weight and volume of the shield for the Space Station are also being researched. A space station habitation module using bumpers has a 99.6 percent chance of avoiding penetration during its lifetime.

Cour-Palais, Burton G.↗

NASA NTRS1991

MLITemp: A computer program to predict the thermal effects associated with hypervelocity impact damage to space station MLI

A family of user-friendly, DOS PC based, Microsoft BASIC programs written to provide spacecraft designers with empirical predictions of space debris damage to orbiting spacecraft are described. Spacecraft wall temperatures and condensate formation is also predicted. The spacecraft wall configuration is assumed to consist of multilayered insulation (MLI) placed between a Whipple style bumper and the pressure wall. Impact damage predictions are based on data sets of experimental results obtained from simulating debris impacts on spacecraft using light gas guns on earth. A module of the program facilitates the creation of the database of experimental results that is used by the damage prediction modules to predict damage to the bumper, the MLI, and the pressure wall. A finite difference technique is used to predict temperature distributions in the pressure wall, the MLI, and the bumper. Condensate layer thickness is predicted for the case where the pressure wall temperature drops below the dew point temperature of the spacecraft atmosphere.

Rule, W. K.↗